

Being Byzantine

Greek Identity before the Ottomans

Gill Page



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BEING BYZANTINE

In 1204, the Byzantine empire was conquered by troops from western Europe ostensibly taking part in the Fourth Crusade. This was a hugely significant event for the subjects of the empire, radically altering the Byzantines' self-image and weakening their state for the later conflict with the Ottoman Turks. Using the theory of ethnicity – a comparatively recent tool with regard to the pre-modern era – Gill Page provides fresh insight into the late Byzantine period, providing a corrective to nationalistic interpretations of the period of Frankish rule and more broadly to generally held assumptions of ethnic hostility in the period. A systematic analysis of texts in Greek from the period 1200–1420, from both ends of the social spectrum, is backed up by an in-depth study of Frankish rule in the Peloponnese to reveal the trends in the development of Byzantine identity under the impact of the Franks.

GILL PAGE studied Classics at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, before beginning a career in museum education. After completing an MA in Medieval History at the University of Manchester, Dr Page went on to complete a doctorate at the University of Leeds.

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*This book is dedicated to my parents, Mike and Pam,
and also to Paul*

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A note on the use and transliteration of Greek

As far as is possible without confusing the contemporary reader in English, I have utilised direct transliterations from the Greek. Thus I have written *Kantakouzenos* rather than *Cantacuzenus*, *Palaiologos* rather than *Palaeologus*, and *Nikaia* rather than *Nicaea*. However, I have made use of some non-direct transliteration in the case of those names which have passed into everyday English usage; thus, for example, I have written *Constantinople* rather than *Konstantinoupolis*, *Theodore* rather than *Theodoros*, *George* rather than *Georgios*.

The analysis of Greek texts requires that a lot of vocabulary must be cited in Greek. Where Greek words are used more than once I have, at the first occurrence, given the word in Greek, accompanied by a transliteration and a translation. For subsequent occurrences, I have given only the transliteration. A Glossary at the end of the text lists all these words in Greek, transliterated and translated.

Abbreviations

<i>ABSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>BMGS</i>	<i>Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies</i>
<i>BZ</i>	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>DAI</i>	<i>De administrando imperio</i>
<i>DCAH</i>	<i>Deltion tes Christianikes Archaiologikes Hetaireias</i>
<i>DOP</i>	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</i>
<i>EB</i>	<i>Études Balkaniques</i>
<i>ERS</i>	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>JMH</i>	<i>Journal of Medieval History</i>
<i>MGH</i>	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i>
<i>PG</i>	Migne, J.-P. (ed.) (1857–66) <i>Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus</i> (166 vols.). Paris
<i>PL</i>	Migne, J.-P. (ed.) (1844–55) <i>Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus</i> (two series, 217 vols.). Paris
<i>REB</i>	<i>Revue d'études byzantines</i>

Reference works

- Liddell & Scott: Liddell, H. G. and R. Scott (1968) *A Greek–English Lexicon*. Oxford.
- ODB: Kazhdan, A. and others (eds.) (1991) *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (3 vols.). Oxford.
- Sophocles: Sophocles, A. (1887) *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (from BC 146 to AD 1100)*, 2nd edn (2 vols.). New York.

INTRODUCTION

The Frankish conquest of Greece

In 1204, the imperial city of Constantinople was captured by the troops of the Fourth Crusade, a collection of forces gathered from the states of western Europe with the ostensible aim of the liberation of Jerusalem. It was a momentous event for the citizens and subjects of the 'Byzantine' empire ruled from Constantinople, as their city had never before fallen to any enemy in its nine centuries of history. Having taken the capital city, the crusaders from the west went on to conquer most of the empire, although Constantinople was eventually won back fifty-seven years later, and what we now generally call the 'Byzantine' empire did manage to survive into the fifteenth century before its final irrevocable conquest by the Ottoman Turks. Nevertheless, this first conquest by the western Franks of the Fourth Crusade is often seen as the beginning of the end, and its impact on the state of mind of the subjects of the empire was immense. For the next 200 years – and beyond – various parts of what had historically been the Byzantine empire were to be ruled, for varying lengths of time, by these crusaders and their descendants. For centuries, the emperors of Constantinople had held these territories, but now, remarkable quickly, they changed hands and the peasants and local lords of the conquered areas had to become accustomed to new masters who, at least at the beginning, spoke little or no Greek, had some startlingly different ways of arranging society and everyday life and, not least, had a church and religion which was Christian but very different from the 'Orthodox' Christianity of the empire.

There had been a history of, if not animosity, then at least ill-ease between the Byzantine empire and the kingdoms of western Europe long before the shock of the taking of Constantinople. In the east, the Byzantines saw themselves, with justification, as the heirs and continuators of the ancient Roman empire. Their emperor was the 'emperor of the Romans', and the people of the empire by and large thought of themselves as 'Romans' in a

usage that survived beyond the term of the empire and into modern times in parts of Greece and Turkey. Further, the eastern Roman, Byzantine, empire was the empire of Constantine the Great, who had founded Constantinople in the fourth century and had made Christianity the religion of his empire. The Byzantine Romans of the eastern empire were thus not just the heirs of *the* pre-eminent state of the ancient world but also, in their view, the heirs of the true and original Christianity. In contrast, the west had sustained and survived the break with the ancient Roman world. It had its own brand of Christianity which had survived in Rome itself, and it had started to rediscover the ancient world as a political model. By the second millennium after Christ, the east and west of Europe did not really know each other and were in many senses rivals in their different versions of historical and religious validation. Their mutual incomprehension was manifested and reinforced in 1054 when the patriarch of Constantinople, head of the eastern Orthodox church, and Cardinal Humbert of the church of Rome mutually excommunicated each other.

Nevertheless, how did an army bent on religious liberation end up subjugating a city and state of their fellow Christians?

The Fourth Crusade has been an object of controversy ever since it went so curiously awry. On his accession to the papal throne in 1198, Innocent III had immediately started urging the need for a fresh crusade to regain Jerusalem from the Saracens, and forces gathered at Venice in the spring of 1202. The Venetians were ready to provide sea transport to the Holy Land, but they drove a hard bargain with the military pilgrims in return for this help. Innocent may with justification already have felt that the crusade was slipping from his control when the expedition began with a diversion to Zara, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. This Christian city had revolted from Venetian rule, but now the crusading army paid off a part of their debt to Venice by attacking and regaining it for them. However, things only got worse with the intervention of the Byzantines.

Alexios Angelos was the son and heir of the deposed Byzantine Roman emperor Isaak II Angelos, who had been forcibly ousted by his brother Alexios in 1195. In 1201, the younger Alexios had fled to the west to try and gather help to restore his father to the throne. Despite a specific papal prohibition on any intervention in Constantinopolitan affairs, a substantial section of the crusading force now agreed to go to Alexios' assistance, largely at the urging of the Venetians. Debate has raged on Venetian motivation: certainly, the Venetians present themselves in the accounts of the conquest and its aftermath as a discrete and well-organised faction within the larger crusade, both highly motivated and efficient in accruing

all the potential mercantile gain from the expedition. Although not all the crusaders assented to this radical redirection of their holy pilgrimage and many continued to Syria, nevertheless a substantial crusading army arrived outside Constantinople in July 1203 and was swiftly able to effect the restoration of Isaak and Alexios Angelos. The young Alexios had promised financial reward and military assistance in the continuing campaign to the Holy Land, but, with the agreed payment not forthcoming and unrest growing within the city, the patience of the crusaders finally ran out and they took the city by force on 13 April 1204. Many of the inhabitants were put to the sword and the city was comprehensively pillaged.

The crusaders and Venetians had already come to an agreement on the division of the empire: a new emperor would be elected, who would personally hold one fourth of Constantinople and one fourth of the rest of the empire, including eastern Thrace, the essential buffer for Constantinople. Venice would hold one fourth of Constantinople and three eighths of the rest of the empire; the rest would be divided between the leading knights of the crusade.¹

All in all, this was a vision of prosperity and power that few on the crusade can have dreamt of. Surely, only Doge Enrico Dandolo and his Venetians had a clear programme; certainly, after the conquest Venice swiftly organised its apportionment, handing over mainland and inland territory in exchange for islands and ports to the effect that the Republic would exclusively control the sea routes between Constantinople and the west and operate an effective monopoly on trade. Venice also held sway more indirectly in the Aegean: the duchy of the Archipelago was created by the Venetian Marco Sanudo, who was a nephew of Doge Enrico Dandolo and had been present on the crusade. Sanudo regularised his conquests by acknowledging the suzerainty of the Latin emperor (Baldwin of Flanders had been elected emperor in Constantinople in May 1204), and several other Venetian families ruled other islands in the Aegean, thus maintaining Venetian influence in the region while remaining at arm's length from the Republic.²

In contrast to Venice's well-planned and effective assumption of power, the Latin empire was weak from the start because the lands granted to the knights of the empire first had to be secured by them; this took much of the fighting arm away from Constantinople and out of the army which

¹ For the Fourth Crusade see especially Queller and Madden 1997, Brand 1968: 222–69. For the division of the empire cf. Carile 1965, also Nicol 1980: 141, 148–50 and Lock 1995: 40–3, 45–50.

² Lock 1995: 142–55, Nicol 1980: 148–65.

should have been consolidating and defending the capital. The result was that, in the end, the Latin empire of Constantinople ended up just one of several Latin states carved out of the erstwhile Byzantine Roman empire, being joined by the kingdom of Thessaloniki, the lordship of Athens, the principality of the Morea, the above-mentioned duchy of the Archipelago and finally the lordships of Evia.

In 1204, however, Latin Constantinople stood alone, with the rest of the empire awaiting conquest. There was considerable pressure from the Bulgarian tsar Kalojan, the local population around Constantinople was far from reliably loyal, and in Anatolia the Byzantine Roman aristocrat Theodore Laskaris was on his way to establishing a significant power base at Nikaia. Laskaris' creation would eventually become the reborn eastern empire that regained Constantinople in 1261, while other Roman nobles established viable alternative successor states in Epiros in western Greece and in Trebizond in northern Anatolia. Back in Constantinople, the Latin empire needed a vigorous and dedicated defence at its heart, but many knights had other priorities; Baldwin was left to defend Constantinople and Thrace against the Bulgarians and, a mere year after the taking of Constantinople, the unfortunate emperor was captured by them. He died in captivity. Fortunately for the Franks, Baldwin's brother Henry proved a more effective ruler who was able to assert imperial suzerainty over the Latin states in the Balkan peninsula, repel the advances of Epiros, push back the Bulgarians in Thrace, and enlist Turkish aid against Laskaris of Nikaia. Henry's death in 1216 brought in a less successful period. His brother-in-law and heir, Peter of Courtenay, was captured and killed by the Epirots before he even reached Constantinople. Peter's widow, Henry's sister Yolande, ruled as regent for the baby Baldwin II for two years until her death in 1219, and her elder son Robert of Courtenay ruled as emperor from 1221 to 1228. Baldwin II then took the throne, assisted by John de Brienne as co-emperor in the 1230s. The Latin empire was now under almost continual threat, yet conflict amongst its enemies allowed it to stagger on: Baldwin II reigned until the eventual retaking of Constantinople by the emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos of Nikaia in 1261.³

Of the other Latin states, some lasted only a handful of years while others proved far more durable. Having wrested Thessaloniki from the reluctant emperor Baldwin, Boniface of Montferrat set out to conquer the western lands of the empire. His armies met very little resistance in

³ Longnon 1949; Wolff 1969; Nicol 1966.

Thessaly, Boiotia and Attica, and the local population suffered little at his hands. Boniface assigned the important island of Evia (with the exception of its major town, Negroponte, which was under the Venetians) to three Lombard knights; these lordships are generally known as the triarchies of Evia. The lordship of Athens and Thebes went to the Burgundian knight Othon de la Roche, and this rule over Attica and Boiotia came to be known as the duchy of Athens. By early 1205, Boniface had won through to the Peloponnese, where he met up with Geoffrey de Villehardouin the younger, who together with Guillaume de Champlitte went on to establish the principality of the Morea in the Peloponnese, again under the auspices of Boniface of Montferrat. While the states which Boniface oversaw in Evia, Athens and the Peloponnese all achieved lasting security, Boniface's more personal conquests were not to last long. He was captured and killed by the Bulgarians in September 1207, and his kingdom of Thessaloniki was then largely absorbed by the Byzantine Roman state based in Epiros.

The momentous victory of 1204, then, marked a new phase in the history of the eastern Aegean and heralded a period when westerners of French, Flemish, Hispanic or Italian origin ruled in that part of the old eastern Roman Empire which we now call Greece. This book examines and illustrates various developments in the identity of the Greeks – or, as the subjects of the empire tended to call themselves, the 'Romans' – during this period of western rule. Chronologically speaking, the period under study is, roughly, the two centuries following the conquest of Constantinople by the Frankish troops of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, but preceding the Ottoman domination and eventual conquest of the fifteenth century.

This investigation rests on the fundamental hypothesis that the conquest by the westerners was an event with extreme implications for group identities among the Byzantine Romans. Such a major alteration in the quality of their relationship with westerners, and such a blow to their imperial self-esteem as the taking of Constantinople, inevitably brought about changes in the ways they viewed themselves as a group – in their sense of ethnic identity. This central hypothesis can be further elaborated, thus:

- There was no single uniform sense of ethnic identity among the Romans (that is, the inhabitants of the territory under the rule of the emperor in Constantinople in the period preceding the conquest of 1204 and the descendants of those inhabitants).
- Ethnic identities among the Romans were not static during this period but developed in response to major political changes.

- The phenomenon of Frankish conquest and rule was the single most critical impetus for developments in the senses of ethnic identity among the Romans during this period.

Until recently, the vast majority of histories of the period of western rule have made the assumption that the ethnic division between the westerners (often referred to as the 'Franks') and the Greeks (or as they will be called here the 'Romans') conditioned political and social developments and that there was no true assimilation between these ethnic groups. This well-established position has emphasised the history of the religious schism between the eastern and western churches and pointed to the repeated and ill-fated attempts at church union in this period as indicative of ethnic hostility. However, this book challenges this position by means of a systematic analysis of sources from both ends of the social spectrum in the Byzantine Roman world. Employing a model of ethnicity as an aspect of interaction between social groups, it will further be shown that the conquests by the Franks in fact effected a significant shift in the relationship between the Byzantine Romans and their western neighbours that was more about rapprochement than any ethnically conditioned hostility.

Finally, a preparatory note on naming. As discussed above, this study looks at the sense of ethnic identity among a particular set of people – those people resident in the Byzantine empire at the time of the Frankish conquest of the empire in 1204, and their descendants. These people will generally be called 'Romans' or 'Byzantine Romans', and this may need some justification or at least explanation. Most modern historians make reference to either 'Byzantines' or 'Greeks', but the first of these is anachronistic for the period, while the second is a term of limited use within the empire, and typically a term used by outsiders about the empire and its people. In a discussion of identity in which names are so important, it seems appropriate to use the self-identifying term favoured by the people themselves, and this was, overwhelmingly, *Ῥωμαῖος* – *Rhomaïos*, 'Roman'. However, to use simply 'Roman' would inevitably be confusing for the English-speaking reader, so I have for the sake of clarity often qualified the basic name with 'Byzantine'.

Naming is such a fundamental part of the expression of ethnic identity that any choice of ethnonym is laden. However, 'Byzantine Roman' hopefully goes some way to give the people of the empire their own name while being clear for a modern readership. Nevertheless, it has proved impossible to be entirely consistent in this usage. At some points, for example, it has been necessary to use 'Byzantine Roman' with a limited application so that it relates only to the state ruled by the emperor and to the subjects of that

state – this is mostly when a group or groups who are clearly ethnically Roman need to be contrasted with the Byzantine Roman state because they are in some way opposed to it, or not limited to it. In such cases, a distinction is drawn between Byzantine Romans (being those politically loyal to the imperial Roman state) and ethnic Romans (those identifiable as Romans in ways other than the political). Again, when referring directly to the writings of any particular Byzantine Roman author, it has been on most occasions simplest and most accurate just to echo their own usage of *Rhomaioi*, unqualified in any way.

IDENTITY AND THE FRANKISH CONQUEST: THE STORY SO FAR

In his *The Latins in the Levant*, published in 1908 and still the most comprehensive overall account of the rule of the Franks in Greece, William Miller tended towards a romanticised portrayal of the Frankish lords of Greece, thereby portraying them as generous to the conquered Greeks while maintaining fixed ethnic divisions. His focus was on the Franks and he presented no thesis on Greek ethnic identity beyond holding it to be strong and in opposition to an equally well-defined Frankishness. Rennell Rodd's *The Princes of Achaia and the Chronicles of Morea* is broadly similar in approach. Of post-war writers, Jean Longnon and Antoine Bon in, respectively, *L'Empire latin du Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* and *La Morée franque* were not concerned with presenting the Greek (Roman) point of view. Peter Lock's *The Franks in the Aegean 1204–1500* is the most thorough modern account of Latin rule, also covering as it does Venetian and Genoese involvement in the region. Lock argues that ethnic divisions were always strong between incomers and the local populations and that there was no true symbiosis between the different cultures.⁴

The Frankish period is also covered in general crusade histories; see, for example, in Kenneth Setton's six-volume *History of the Crusades*, Jean Longnon's 'The Frankish States in Greece 1204–1311' in volume two, and Peter Topping's two chapters on 'The Morea' in volume three, alongside Setton's own accounts in the latter volume of the Catalans and Florentines in Greece, which supplement his *The Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311–1388*.⁵ The crusade focus precludes any detailed consideration of Roman cultural identity, and the model of ethnic distinction is generally preserved.

⁴ Miller 1908; Rodd 1907; Longnon 1949; Bon 1969; Lock 1995.

⁵ Setton 1969–89; Setton 1948; Mayer 1988; Houseley 1992.

Turning from a crusade focus to Byzantium, most general histories of the later Byzantine period give some attention to the impact of 1204, for example Donald Nicol's *The Last Centuries of Byzantium* and Nicholas Cheetham's *Medieval Greece*, while Jonathan Harris' *Byzantium and the Crusades* straddles the Byzantinist and crusade divide to provide the ideological background to Byzantium's relationship with the crusaders. Dimitre Angelov's *Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium* skilfully analyses the reactions and accommodations made by the political elite of the empire as a result of the loss – and eventual recapture – of Constantinople. Michael Angold's *A Byzantine Government in Exile* concentrates on the social and cultural effects of 1204 in the Byzantine Roman 'successor state' of Nikaia, while Donald Nicol considers Nikaia's rival in his two works on *The Despotate of Epiros*. Dionysius Zakythinos has provided the most detailed account of later Byzantine Roman rule in the Peloponnese in his *Le despotat grec de Morée*. The emperors have attracted plenty of attention with Deno J. Geanakoplos' study of *The Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West*, Angeliki Laiou's *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II*, John W. Barker's *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* and Donald Nicol's *The Reluctant Emperor* and *The Immortal Emperor*, on John VI Kantakouzenos and Constantine XI Palaiologos respectively.⁶ The collection of essays edited by Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby, *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, examines inter-ethnic interaction during the period of western rule in more depth, and other relevant collections include those of David Jacoby, Robert Wolff, Peter Topping and, again, Donald Nicol.⁷ There is a general consensus among Byzantinists as well as crusade scholars that the ethnic lines were firmly drawn in this period and that ethnic hostility was a given factor in foreign policy.

The Frankish period has also been given considerable attention in the work of Greek nationalist historians. This vigorous trend in the historiography of the period concentrates not so much on its importance to the history of the crusading movement or as a backdrop to the end of the Byzantine Roman empire, but as constituting a vital stage in the national history of the Greek people. In this school, the Frankish conquest and occupation which shook the Constantinopolitan empire to its roots were of major

⁶ Nicol 1957, 1972a, 1984, 1992 and 1996; Zakythinos 1975; Cheetham 1981; Harris 2003; Angold 1975a; Geanakoplos 1959; Laiou 1972; Barker 1968.

⁷ Arbel, Hamilton and Jacoby 1989; Jacoby 1975 and 1979; Topping 1977b; Wolff 1969; Nicol 1972b and 1986.

importance in redefining the Byzantine sense of identity away from the universalism of the ancient imperial Roman ideal, and towards a narrower Greek orthodox nationalism. Moreover, it might even be said that in this movement the Greeks rediscovered themselves, returning to and giving new value to the geographical heartland of ancient Hellas. In this context and argument, the apparent return by late Byzantine writers to the use of the ancient 'Hellene' as ethnic signifier in preference to 'Roman' – which had been the overwhelmingly dominant signifier in the eastern empire – is seen as being of crucial significance in confirming a basic continuity of self-identification as Hellenic on the part of the Greeks.⁸

Here, then, there is a more direct concern with issues of ethnicity than can generally be seen in the histories of the crusades or of Byzantium cited above. This approach has been pervasive among Greek historians, of whom one might particularly cite Deno J. Geanakoplos and Apostolis Vacalopoulos. Cyril Mango, however, has eloquently argued against the general thesis, which indeed rests on fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of ethnic identity.⁹ The ethno-nationalism that propelled into being so many states in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries proclaimed a belief in peoples as fundamentally unchanging and tied by hereditary right to a certain patch of land; this was certainly very much the case with modern Greece, where great ideological weight was placed on the mission to recreate ancient Hellas.¹⁰ The modern nationalist position on any medieval Greek ethnicity says more about modern Greece's quest for legitimisation in the past than about the past which is ostensibly under examination.

More recently, an alternative and more convincing model of ethnicity has emphasised its mutability and negotiability under the constraints of circumstance, and this is the model that will be utilised in this study. Both the Greek nationalist historians and, with a few exceptions, the crusade and Byzantinist historians have taken it as a given that the ethnic divide between the Byzantine Romans and the Franks of this period was fundamentally unbridgeable and that relations between the two groups were predominantly driven by ethnic hostility. Such a position is now seen as increasingly outdated, and more recent work has emphasised instead the fluidity of ethnic boundaries. Thus, Sally McKee's *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity* exploded the thesis of ethnic

⁸ Vacalopoulos 1970; Vryonis 1991 and 1999; Xydis 1968; Geanakoplos 1976.

⁹ Mango 1968. ¹⁰ Cf. Herzfeld 1986.

irreconcilability in one corner of the Frankish Aegean, while Aneta Ilieva's *Frankish Morea (1205–1262): Socio-Cultural Interactions between the Franks and the Local Population* emphasised considerable acculturation at the higher social levels in the Peloponnese of the thirteenth century, and Teresa Shawcross's recent work on the *Chronicle of the Morea* has similarly pointed towards cross-ethnic identities in the Peloponnese.¹¹ Again, articles such as Sharon Gerstel's 'Art and identity in the Medieval Morea' have drawn attention to artistic symbiosis in Frankish Greece as representative of more complex ethnic interactions.¹² Most recently, there have appeared several collections of articles on the interpretation of the Greek past, many of which include valuable material on ethnicity in the Byzantine era.¹³

More broadly, as we shall see, the substantial body of recent work on the nature of ethnicity in the pre-modern era offers considerable insights for the study of medieval Greece. In the light of current thinking on pre-modern ethnic identity, there is the opportunity for a fresh look at medieval Greece, its ethnic formulations and its ethnic interactions in the new world after the Fourth Crusade.

¹¹ McKee 2000, Ilieva 1991, Shawcross 2006.

¹² Gerstel 2001, see also the currently unpublished work by Grossman 2004 and Hirschbichler 2005.

¹³ Brown and Hamilakis 2003; Hokwerda 2003; slightly earlier Ricks and Magdalino 1998.

CHAPTER I

Ethnic identity?

This study of the Byzantine Roman response to the Franks relies on a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of ethnicity within social groups, and requires that this be seen as applicable to societies of the pre-modern era. A preliminary working definition of ethnicity will help to set the scene for this discussion:

Ethnicity, or ethnic identity, is a property of a group. It is a faith on the part of the members of the group that they are in some sense the same, and that this sameness is rooted in a racial kinship stretching into the past. Further, this act of faith is inherently defensive – it arises and gains its strength from a contrast with another group (or groups), who are seen as not the same, and as presenting a threat to the survival or at least prosperity of one's own group.

The key features which emerge from my first definition are that

- ethnicity is a group identity with strong associations with race and with the past;
- ethnicity requires the existence of a contrasting other and is a feature of conflict situations rather than of stability; and
- ethnicity is a subjective act of faith by members of a group, rather than an objective and quantifiable aspect of a group.

These aspects are broadly discernible in the everyday understanding of 'ethnic' in the English-speaking western world, for instance in familiar uses like 'ethnic clothing', or 'ethnic music', which have clear connotations of being minority-related.¹ Implicit in this mundane sense of ethnic is a sense of difference that has both cultural and racial bases. The associated noun 'ethnicity' is first recorded in the early 1950s but common only from the 1960s.² It is surely probable that the invention of the terminology of ethnicity arose from the contemporary movements of ethnic pride and of

¹ *OED* v: 424, col. 1 A2a (from the 1960s), A2b 'ethnic minority'. *Webster's Third International Dictionary* 1: 278, col. 1, usage 3.

² Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 1; Tonkin, McDonald and Chapman 1989: 12.

decolonialism; such contexts placed new value on cultures seen as offering an alternative to the white status quo, and were also situations of actual or potential conflict. It is clear that such terminology also gained an impetus from a desire to avoid the terminology of racism that had been tainted by associations with Nazism. In the introduction to their *History and Ethnicity*, Elisabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcolm Chapman have usefully illustrated how the terminology of ethnicity has ‘rediscovered the “us and them” duality that related terms have had through most of recorded history’.³ Terminology seen as racist was to be eschewed after the unforgivable excesses of the Second World War, while at the same time the phenomenon of the awareness of cultural and physical difference that in the nineteenth century had been discussed in terms of race was if anything of even greater significance in the post-imperialist new world order.

The popular, counter-cultural, usage of ethnic has connotations of the free, the natural and the unfettered, and we find very similar overtones going back to the recorded uses of *ethnos* in ancient Greece. To Aristotle, the *ethne* were the barbarians, the other nations beyond the pale of Greekness – they were the non-Hellenic.⁴ If the Greeks had had a word for ethnicity – and they did not – it would have denoted an undesirable quality, necessarily not Greek, uncivilised, to be shunned. It is worth noting that this pejorative sense has been lost in the twentieth-century use of the word: challenging norms can now be seen as praiseworthy. However, the modern un-academic application of ‘ethnic’ nevertheless retains the essential sense, which goes right back to its classical roots, of being different from the prevailing norm.

The terminology of ethnicity in its more popular application thus seems to encompass two essential aspects. Firstly, there is an association with the cultural markers that are special to one group: these are the things that may be described as ethnic (and would include the visible aspects of perceived racial difference). Secondly, there is the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of one group being set in contrast to another. For a sense of ethnicity, a sense of belonging to any particular ethnic group, knowing what you are not (the ‘us’ and ‘them’) is as important as knowing what you are (the cultural markers). But just as important is the act of knowing; in other words, ethnic identity is a subjective phenomenon – it is an individual decision to associate oneself with the group.⁵ Thus, to break down our definition

³ Tonkin, McDonald and Chapman 1989: 15.

⁴ *OED* v: 424, col. 1 A2a, 1965 citation; Aristotle, *Politics* 1324b10.

⁵ Hylland Eriksen 1993: 38; Amory 1997: 14; Hall 1997: 28–31.

a little further, it will be argued here that ethnicity is a nexus of three fundamental areas:

- an individual subjective belief that one is a member of a certain named group and that one has that membership by virtue of one's ancestry. This belief is bolstered by the certainty that the other members of that group individually share the same belief about themselves as well, and thus that all the members of the named group believe that they are linked by shared ancestry; and
- the possession, expression or favouring of certain social and cultural traits (the 'ethnic criteria') by the members of the group; for example, language, style of dress, religious faith. To these, we may add an association with a particular geographical area; and
- the awareness of a boundary and therefore the contrasting of one's group with another group – one might say a feeling of 'us' versus 'them'.

This threefold division echoes definitions used by other writers on history and ethnicity, although different thinkers prioritise different aspects. Thus, for example, in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Anthony Smith lists the possession of a group name, a common myth of descent, a shared history and culture, an association with a particular territory and a feeling of group solidarity as the essential characteristics of an ethnic group, placing the integrative function of shared 'we' characteristics above the relational contrast of 'us' and 'them'. Jonathan Hall, in *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, basically agrees with Smith but prioritises the territorial association and the myth of descent. Walter Pohl ('Telling the difference: signs of ethnic identity', in *Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300–800*) stresses the instrumentality of the subjective choice of identity, while in *Ethnicity and Nationalism* Thomas Hylland Eriksen similarly emphasises the relational quality of ethnicity, along with the *sine qua non* of (presumed) kinship.⁶

SUBJECTIVITY, TRADITION AND NAMING

The subjective belief about group membership based on shared ancestry is the fundamental element that must be present in any ethnic identity, and it is this belief which clearly distinguishes the ethnic group from most other social groups. It is vital to appreciate, however, that this is a *subjective* belief about the past which need bear no relation to reality. The members of an ethnic group need not be all biologically related – all 'of the same race' – but

⁶ Smith 1986: 24–9; Hall 1997: 3, 25; Pohl and Reimitz 1998: 20–2; Hylland Eriksen 1993: 12.

for the group to be classed as ethnic it is necessary that its members believe that they are. Patrick Amory has described ethnicity as ‘an irrational belief in biological “race”’, and this belief is a subjective phenomenon that is justified by the members of the group by pointing to those traits and practices that are objectively visible (but not necessarily all of universal application) – the externally discernible markers like language, dress, or occupation of territory.⁷ The belief in shared descent can be a justification for the actions proposed in the future, and also serves to explain the shared attributes of the present. A sense of ethnicity is thus necessarily transgenerational. There is always the sense that the ethnic group has existed in the past and will (in times of danger, *should*) exist in the future. Moreover, the relationship between past, present and future is such that present and future depend on and are demanded by the past – the group wouldn’t exist if it hadn’t existed, and it must continue to exist because it has existed. Thus, tradition – a set of beliefs about the past shared within the group – is hugely important in any sense of ethnicity.⁸

Importantly, ethnicity is a *group* identity. Although the ethnic self-ascription is individual and subjective, ethnic identity necessarily requires the existence of a group; it is a way of binding people together and promoting group interests, often above the immediate advantage of the individual – moreover, membership of the group has the potential to influence individual behaviour. Connected with this subjective belief in group membership is the association with a name (the ‘ethnonym’), which all members of that group will intuitively give to the members of the group. Smith has emphasised the importance of ethnic crisis in the genesis and maintenance of ethnonyms – the names given to ethnic groups – with specific reference to the Muslims of the former Yugoslavia, ‘as if in a name lay the magic of their existence and guarantee of their survival’.⁹ The name a group gives to itself may be different from that given to it by others and, in such cases especially, the difference between the subjective self-ascription and the alien naming can give useful insights into the detail of the ethnic identity in question. One should also note that ethnonyms are remarkably durable, and the continuing existence of an ethnonym should not necessarily be taken as indicating the parallel continuing existence of a corresponding ethnic group, although it may well say a lot about the traditions and origin myths of the later group that it claims the name of an earlier group.¹⁰

⁷ Amory 1997: 14. ⁸ Nash 1989: 14–15; Sugar 1980: 84–5. ⁹ Smith 1986: 23.

¹⁰ Geary 2002: 118–19.

The undeniable association between ethnicity and history means that each must be considered in examining the other. In any study of an ethnicity it is important to analyse how the past is understood, for this subjective appreciation of the past (often encapsulated within tradition) will contribute to conditioning present actions and attitudes. In looking at the period c.1200–c.1420, then, it may well be important to attempt to analyse how our subject group, or groups, perceived their past. We may return to modern Greece to illustrate this point. It is arguable that the modern Greek state embraces two ethnicities. Modern Greeks generally possess a very strong ethnic awareness, which has been heightened by being bound to their political existence as a modern state, but their expression of their ethnicity can appear contradictory. *Hellenismos*, the identification with the classical past above all else, is difficult to reconcile with *Rhomiossyne*, the identification with the Orthodox and Byzantine past.¹¹ These two options for ethnic identification represent a choice between the classical or Byzantine past for the fund of myth and imagery that justifies the strength of ethnic loyalty.¹² The competing ethnic histories and ethnicities of modern Greece in turn affect how Greeks perceive their past and pursue their contemporary goals. One significant solution to this dilemma has been the nationalist historical tradition, beginning with Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos in the nineteenth century, which has posited an essential continuity from the classical through the medieval to the modern, and thus seeks to resolve the apparent conflict between these two identities, each resting on two contrasting histories.¹³

Whether it be the case of modern Greece, of post-*Braveheart* Scotland, or of Serbia's attitude to Kosovo, it is easy to find modern examples of ethnic identities which draw their strength from the presumed historical roots or experiences of the particular group in question. However, ethnic identity is a feature of the modern nation state, and indeed contemporary ethnicity study has its roots in the investigation of minorities within the modern nation state. This presents a first challenge to its legitimacy as a model for the study of the more distant past: if ethnic identity is a feature of the modern nation state, then might it not be illegitimate to apply it as a model to the pre-modern period?¹⁴ Yet it is so easy to find examples

¹¹ Herzfeld 1986: 18–21.

¹² Smith 1992 and, especially for the Greek context, Smith 1986: 24–6, 115, 192, 202–3.

¹³ Summarised in Huxley 1998; also Brown and Hamilakis 2003: 5–8.

¹⁴ Anderson 1983: 9–25.

from the more distant past of the presence of ethnic awareness in inter-group relations. To take an example from the Byzantine Roman context, the historian Niketas Choniates commented on the pro-western policies of the twelfth-century emperor Manuel I Komnenos, criticising the emperor's inclination to employ 'attendants from races who speak other languages and barbarise their Greek . . . dignitaries of grand nations who are devoid of any learning at all or of the Hellenic tongue'.¹⁵ In the face of this, it seems foolish to restrict ethnic sensibilities to the modern nation state.

One approach to dealing with this has been explicitly to associate ethnicity with nationalism as, in some sense, the latter's pre-modern aspect, in the manner of Greek nationalist historiography.¹⁶ This places great weight on the undoubted expression of ethnic feeling in group solidarity, and its manifestation in pride in language, culture and homeland; ethnicity here shares much with nationalism's imagery and popular appeal, and indeed the two are often conflated. Seeing ethnicity in this way as a precursor of nationalism is a striking shift away from ethnicity as minority/subordinate awareness to a model of ethnicity as popular/dominant self-determining machine. Nineteenth-century nationalism and late twentieth-century ethnic movements may in this model be viewed as making an appeal to a certain perennial nexus of popular attitudes and feelings; historically people have repeatedly organised themselves along lines which show the same basic conceptual framework.¹⁷

Yet this nationalist interpretation of ethnicity is a mistake. Nationalism indeed gave weight to ethnic identity, making it into the fundamental basis for political sovereignty, but this was not the necessary end of ethnicity but rather a slant on the phenomenon of ethnic identity that answered the needs of its time. Danger lies in associating ethnicity too closely with nationalism as a necessary precursor in the way that the late Byzantine period has been interpreted by modern Greek nationalist historians. Such nationalist interpretations of the past fall into the trap of overinterpreting ethnic phenomena with the benefit of hindsight: thus, an aspect of contemporary ethnicity – a desire to assert a unique and valuable national character – is allowed to shape the understanding of the past.¹⁸ It should rather be agreed that, whereas ethnic groups have existed throughout history and all over the globe, the ethnic nationalism which predicates claims to political autonomy

¹⁵ Cf. Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 169–70; Vryonis similarly cites the ethnic prejudice of Katrares: Vryonis 1999: 28–9.

¹⁶ Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986; Connor 1994.

¹⁷ Hylland Eriksen 1993: 54–6; Smith 1986: 210–15.

¹⁸ Mango 1968: 258, with Vacalopoulos criticised for *ethnikismos* and 'partisan spirit'.

on the right of self-determination of a certain people inhabiting a certain geographical space is an invention of the modern era, dating from the second half of the eighteenth century.¹⁹ Tibi has shown that 'ethnic bonds did not simply disappear when nations emerged'. Moreover, he strongly suggests that the ethnic nation state is a somewhat unwieldy and ill-fitting model for some societies.²⁰ The ethnic sense thus cannot simply be the child which grows to become the nation state adult. Following Anthony Smith, it may be posited that under certain circumstances the ethnic group *may* develop into a nation state, and that nationalism as a model thus inherits much of the language of ethnicity.²¹ However, the nation state is not a necessary result of ethnicity, although that was (and largely remains) the prevailing rhetoric of the European nationalism of self-determination. In the case of modern Greece, then, though it may be important that Greece emerged as a nation state in the nineteenth century, this later development need not be viewed as part of the same phenomenon as any manifestations of ethnic identity in the medieval period, and is fundamentally irrelevant in considering that period. Two instances of ethnicity within the same geographical space and the same linguistic group but widely separated in time are not proof of the continuity, in any sense, of ethnic identity.

ETHNIC CRITERIA

Ethnicity can be hard to pin down in an objective sense, in that any examination of externally perceivable criteria soon shows that these are not reliable guides: not all Scotsmen live in Scotland, wear kilts or speak Gaelic, or even have a perceptible accent.²² Nevertheless, it is these kinds of criteria that are typically pointed to as evidence of ethnic identity, and it is easy enough to find examples of such selection of criteria in any period, from Herodotos' description of the barbarians, through Tacitus' *Germania*, and on to the historians of the later barbarians of the west and of the kingdoms of western Europe, and also in Byzantine Roman writers.²³ Language, traditional weaponry and specific items of dress and appearance, and legal and religious customs are repeatedly picked out as characteristics of different peoples, and there is also a strong association with the territory of residence or origin of a particular people.²⁴

Such descriptions picking on particular details are more common when describing a group to which one does not belong, but it is possible for those

¹⁹ Geary 2002: 13. ²⁰ Tibi 1991: 141. ²¹ Smith 1986: 214–15; also Smith 1995: 21–46.

²² Pohl and Reimitz 1998: 17–69. ²³ Ibid.; Goffart 1988. ²⁴ Bartlett 1993: 196–242.

with a particular interest to extend their observation of others to comment on their own group. Thus, Herodotos characterised the ancient Hellenes as one group, despite their political differences, because of shared language, shared religion, shared blood and a shared way of life, making appeal to a nexus of primary ethnic markers.²⁵ Again, however, these ethnic criteria are by no means definitive guides to ethnic identity. For one thing, such criteria can serve as significant markers in other kinds of social differentiation, which may supersede their importance as ethnic criteria. Moreover, although it is clear that, throughout history, the same visible criteria have been repeatedly used as grounds for marking ethnic distinction, it is also clear that such objective criteria are never individually necessary markers of ethnic identity, nor are they on their own the sufficient constituents of ethnicity.²⁶ Ostensibly objective ethnic criteria almost always turn out to be more fluid and negotiable symbols of identity. In the frontier regions where rival ethnicities meet, such criteria can become the battleground of defensive ethnic identification as groups under threat cling, and make appeal, to the supposed heart of their group self-identification. The western conquests of the Byzantine Roman empire constituted an ethnic crisis of this kind, and it was therefore likely that ethnic criteria would emerge into the foreground. Thus, in the sources at the heart of this study, it will often be at moments of ethnic boundary transgression that appeal is made to the nexus of the ethnic criteria of 'Roman-ness'.

BOUNDARIES: US AND THEM

Boundaries are essential to the ethnic sense. Although ethnicity has often been conceived as inherent in the mass of specific cultural content – the ethnic criteria – it is the relationship with others that is central. Thomas Hylland Eriksen has used the Zen paradox of one hand clapping to express the absurdity of ethnicity existing in a single group which knows no other groups; in other words, we may choose to perceive ethnicity as residing in contact and interaction with other groups.²⁷ Ethnicity is a subjective belief about one's own group founded on and shaped by a subjective attitude to the group(s) of which one is not a member. An ethnic group's attitude to the others who are outside this group and against whom the group may be contrasted can vary. A group may adopt a black-and-white sense of 'us

²⁵ Herodotos, *Histories* 8.144.2.

²⁶ Pohl and Reimitz 1998: 22–69, especially on dress as social rather than ethnic marker: 40; Hall 1997: 20–4.

²⁷ Hylland Eriksen 1993: 9.

v them', where all outsiders are considered as basically the same and all equally unlike 'us', and this may be classified as a digital (or binary) sense of identity. Alternatively, an ethnic group may categorise outsiders on a sliding scale of difference, where some outsiders are more like 'us', and thereby more acceptable, while other outsiders are very different from 'us'. This latter model of difference may be classified as analogic.²⁸

Fredrik Barth argued that investigations into ethnicity ought to focus on the boundaries, on the relationship of difference from others, rather than on the cultural matters that are most easily seen as expressing ethnic identity.²⁹ Group identities must needs be explained by reference to what they are not; in a sense of ethnic identity, all the cultural material – as indeed the act of subjective self-ascription – is contingent on this sense of difference, no matter how important such material might appear within a group's social systems. The cultural aspects assume significance from the nature and development of the boundary awareness, rather than vice versa. Thus it is typically when a group sees itself as under threat that the cultural features commonly perceived to be ethnic assume greater importance, as a result of the choice of assuming group membership in the face of that threat. Returning to our introduction to ethnicity in its popular sense, it is therefore no coincidence that the popular jargon of ethnicity should have emerged during the period of minority civil rights movements. Thus, when a group which could consider itself ethnic is under threat, it is likely that an ethnic awareness will emerge. However, while the relationship with others is the key component and catalyst of ethnicity, that relationship is expressed and made manifest by such cultural ethnic markers as religion, language, dress and so on. We have also already mentioned the importance of the boundary in forming and preserving group names.

Broadly speaking, it is this Barthian model that will be followed in the present investigation. It is one hypothesis of this study that the new presence of the Franks as rulers within the area historically ruled by the Byzantine emperors introduced pressures upon the ethnic identity of the Byzantine Romans, in that the nature of their relationship with other ethnic groups (the boundary) was fundamentally altered. The study will show how that relationship was altered, how the ethnic boundaries shifted, disappeared, weakened or were reinforced. One principal means of accessing this will be through the self-ascriptions adopted by the writers of the various texts employed and, more specifically, through their use of ethnic names.

²⁸ Hylland Eriksen 1993: 66–7. ²⁹ Barth 1969: 10–17.

Ethnicity, then, is one category by which a group may be held together and defined; as such it is comparable to social class or gender and it is further a relational category that requires the existence of a contrasting social group. For ethnicity to bind a group, the members of that group need to believe that they are all linked together by shared ancestry and have a right to continue to exist on that basis. The members of the group will have a common name for the group, and are likely to share some observable traits such as language and religious practice and perhaps also styles of dress and appearance. The observable traits, however, are likely not to be universal and may well vary in importance within the group depending on, for example, social status or geographical origin. It is worth bearing in mind that ethnicity is not necessarily going to be the only or most important category of group organisation in such situations – regionalism, class or religion may be as, or more, important, and individuals in an ethnic group can choose whether or not to put value on the ethnic identification. Both the subjective roots of ethnicity and the objective criteria are likely to become important or gain in importance in situations of encounter and conflict with other groups and, finally, ethnic identities are therefore not static but are, rather, subject to change. Circumstances will alter the quality of the relationship with the contrasting group, and this will impinge on the sense of ethnic identity created and maintained by the contrast with the other.

Thus, there is a viable model for analysis of pre-modern societies in the theory of ethnicity which emphasises (1) subjective self-ascription within the context of a group, (2) perceptible criteria by which membership of a group may be expressed or defined and (3) the impetus to ethnic group formation provided by the awareness of difference from other groups and particularly the need to maintain a border against other groups perceived as a threat to one's own group's survival or prosperity.

This model has hitherto been applied most comprehensively to the so-called barbarian kingdoms which came to power in western Europe at the end of the Roman period. In the analysis of the presentation of difference in the texts of these kingdoms and the historians who recorded them, a picture has been gained of negotiable boundaries and mixed self-ascription in the western Roman provinces that has revolutionised the previously prevailing images of barbarian invasions.³⁰ The later medieval history of Europe has also begun to receive attention, with the renewal

³⁰ Goffart 1980 and 1989; Pohl 1997; Pohl and Reimitz 1998; Wood 1994; Amory 1997.

in the 1990s of ethnic conflicts in eastern Europe proving a catalyst for the re-examination of the proclaimed medieval roots of modern ethnic nations.³¹ Greece has also attracted specific attention. Michael Herzfeld's *Ours Once More* explores the construction of the modern Greek identity, while Jonathan Hall has analysed the classical nexus of identities in his *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity and Hellenicity*; Simon Goldhill and others have meanwhile looked at the experience of being Greek under the Romans.³²

There is, moreover, a growing interest in this area within Byzantine studies. The collection by Hélène Ahrweiler and Angeliki Laiou, *Studies on the Internal Diaspora of the Byzantine Empire*, provides valuable insights into 'the other' within the Byzantine world, while the volume *Études Balkaniques* 6, *Byzance et l'hellénisme: l'identité grecque au Moyen-Âge* contains useful material alongside highly traditional nationalistic interpretations of the Frankish period by Spyros Vryonis and Chryssa Maltezou; however, neither of these collections takes real account of the implications of ethnicity theory.³³ The nineteenth International Symposium of Byzantine Studies took identity in Byzantium as one of its central themes, and the proceedings included an as yet rare application of sociological theory to Byzantine studies in Dion Smythe's paper on labelling theory. Again, Anthony Eastmond's *Art and Identity in Thirteenth Century Byzantium: Hagia Sophia and the Empire of Trebizond* considered alternative Byzantine Roman identities on the fringes of their world and divorced from the elite written records to provide a fresher approach.³⁴ Overall, however, Byzantinist approaches to identity remain fixed in the older model of rigid ethnic division. This study, in contrast, will consider ethnicity in the Frankish period from the starting point of the model of negotiable ethnic boundaries.

METHOD: THE HISTORIANS

Ethnicity then, following Barth, is encapsulated in the relationship between the subject ethnic group and the other group or groups it sees as different; ethnicity is not something that can be engendered, perceived or expressed without the existence of contrasting groups, though it will be perceived and

³¹ Geary 2002; also Forde, Johnson and Murray 1995; Smyth 1998.

³² Herzfeld 1986; Hall 1997 and 2002; Goldhill 2001 and 2002: especially 60–107.

³³ Ahrweiler and Laiou 1998; *Études Balkaniques* 6 1999.

³⁴ Smythe 1996; Eastmond 2004; also McKee 2000 and Harris 1995.

expressed by a focus on a variety of cultural factors that promote an introspective, ethnocentric, perspective. It is thus true that ethnicity becomes more apparent, in the form of cultural expression, when the subject group is perceived to be under threat. When the relationship between ethnic groups undergoes or threatens to undergo material qualitative change, this impinges on a group's sense of ethnicity.

By any standard, the events of 1204 constituted qualitative change in the relationship between the Byzantine Romans and their western neighbours. The coming of the Franks as rulers into the territory of the Byzantine Roman empire must, then, have stimulated some change in the consciousness of identity among the Byzantine Romans. So how can we gain access to the minds of the Romans, in order to analyse and assess this change?

The evidence available to us is primarily documentary, with a surprisingly large and varied number of extant texts in Greek from this period. The content of a selected group of these texts, and more particularly the occurrence and frequency in them of significant items of vocabulary ('key content items'), will be analysed with the aim of assessing the hypotheses with which we began.³⁵ It must be assumed that there is an analysable relationship between what someone says and what they are thinking, consciously or unconsciously, and thus the method can provide a window into the thought patterns and attitudes of the writers of the past. Here we may see expression given to the group identities experienced by the writer, and those which the group wished to project.

Taking into account the importance of self-ascription in ethnic awareness, ethnonyms like Ῥωμαῖος (*Rhomaïos*: Roman), Γραικός (*Graikos*: Greek), and Ἑλλην (*Hellen*: Hellene) will be a particularly important group among the key content items.³⁶ Attention will also be paid to the usage of the terminology of groups – γένος (*genos*), ἔθνος (*ethnos*) and their cognates – and similarly to the usage over the period of βάρβαρος (*barbaros*: barbarian) and other terms indicating the foreign as well as the application of other ethnic signifiers – Λατῖνος (*Latinos*: Latin), Φράγκος (*Fragkos*: Frank) etc.

All these key content items are considered in depth in [Chapter 2](#), in preparation for the analysis of their use in the texts of the Frankish period. More generally at this stage, we can say that the application of the key content items is important in showing in what the identity inheres – language, land, customs and so on – and particular attention will be given to those markers which are typically seen as indicative of group ethnic

³⁵ Berelson 1952; also Krippendorf 1980; Smith 1992. ³⁶ Barth 1969: 38.

identity, whether in its formation, maintenance or dissolution. Are there, for example, specific mentions of ethnically typical styles of appearance? Yes: in the fourteenth century, the historian Gregoras makes a single passing reference to a 'shaven beard' as being typically Latin as opposed to Roman; we will similarly come across references to contrasting ethnic law codes and churches, and to ethnically determined linguistic competence. However, bearing in mind the more recent consensus on the fluidity of ethnic identity, it will be important to see whether many of these supposed boundary markers were actually honoured more in the breach than the observance. Were languages shared, did personal names cross the supposed ethnic divides; is there evidence of intermarriage? Furthermore, it is plain that there were other identities at work, not least social status, and these could outweigh ethnicity in influence: it will not be assumed that ethnicity was the key motivating factor in interactions between the Byzantine Romans and westerners.

In relation to the use of key content items, a quantitative approach will be employed whereby it may prove possible to access the less considered opinions of our writers. To assess any given statement as unconsidered is a problematic business; the temptation is to see any 'rogue' statement – that is, anything remarkably at odds with a writer's perceived norm – as the unconscious speaking and so, somehow, as more valid and interesting. This is an easy and appealing option, and not necessarily always the wrong one. The problem remains that we can never be sure if we are assessing these statements correctly; we must look for patterns that seem internally coherent and consistent with the general, external, trends and sequences. An example of a rogue statement may clarify the issue. The thirteenth-century historian George Akropolites at one point uses the word 'Romans' to describe Peloponnesian forces fighting on the side of the Frankish princes of Achaia, against his own people of Nikaia. This is a rogue statement in that Akropolites is generally very careful in his restriction of the term 'Romans' to those loyal to Nikaia, withholding the terminology from those actively opposed to Nikaia. Furthermore, such restriction of the term to the Byzantine Roman political context is typical of historical writing within the empire. It will be argued that this usage is revelatory of an ethnic sense of being Roman, beyond the more restricted political sense, and that it was prompted either consciously or unconsciously by Akropolites' need to distinguish these people from the Franks they served politically. Thus, following Kazhdan and Constable, 'sources can also be asked questions that their creators never intended to be asked'.³⁷

³⁷ Kazhdan and Constable 1982: 164, and more generally 163–75.

This study, then, considers a selection of texts in Greek from the period 1200–1410 with the aim of analysing the effect of the Frankish conquest and occupation on the Byzantine Romans' sense of their own identity. The range of texts available for the period is huge, including lengthy formal histories, collections of letters, speeches, stories in verse and prose, religious tracts and shorter poems but, as the emphasis here is on the impact of Frankish rule, the decision has been taken to focus on works of history (with the addition of one explicitly oratorical work with a strong historical focus), since the histories deal most closely with the detail of the arrival and settlement of the Franks. Moreover, as can be seen in the case of Paparrigopoulos and the modern Greek historians in the nationalist tradition, it is clear that historians can play an important role in shaping group identities since they deal with the past, the source of tradition and validation for the group's special nature. For their audiences, historians can provide an expression of a sense of group identity, by locating it securely in the past; at the same time, historians can be especially useful in revealing group identity by the ways in which they tackle the stories they have to tell.

There is an apparent problem in using formal works by elite Byzantine Roman writers, and that is the artificial style of writing that incorporated not only a simulation of classical Greek that would have been incomprehensible to the majority of contemporary Greek speakers, but also a mimicking of classical styles such that, for example, contemporary peoples were named with appropriate classical ethnonyms.³⁸ Thus western crusaders might be called 'Celts', Turkish opponents could be called 'Persians' . . . This particular kind of homage to the classics could be taken to denote that the Byzantine Romans were not only obsessed with the classical Greek past but identified with the ancient Greeks in some ethnic sense. This appeal to a linguistic tradition will need particular attention, but it will be important to get a grasp of its contemporary significance, and to see to what extent the ancient Greek past appears as an ethnic criterion outside the linguistic sphere.

A focus on works of history also permits a direct contrast between writings from different ends of the social spectrum in the period. Studies hitherto have placed overmuch emphasis on the writings of elite Byzantine Romans as basically typical of the outlook of the Greeks of this period. This is of course not surprising, but it is an imbalance this study aims to redress.

³⁸ Mango 1975; Mullett and Scott 1981.

Through placing equal weight on a vernacular work by a writer of far lesser social standing, a comparison will be made between the focus of the elite and, at least, the existence of other viewpoints. It may well prove necessary to deny any meaningful ethnic solidarity across geographical and social divisions; pre-modern societies lacked the means of mass mobilisation and indoctrination that have facilitated modern ethnic nationalism, and we may need to employ different models of ethnicity for the different social levels of our period.³⁹ Thus the investigation is looking for variation in ethnicity over both a temporal period and a geographical area, as well as within the social hierarchies.

The first group of texts comprises formal historical works written by highly educated members of the Byzantine Roman elite: Niketas Choniates, George Akropolites, George Pachymeres, Nikephoros Gregoras and John VI Kantakouzenos; to this collection of histories can be added a lengthy oratorical work with a strong historical focus, written by the emperor Manuel II Palaiologos. Here we have a group composed of two emperors and four senior civil servants, and such writers shared three key characteristics. Firstly, they were highly educated, and this is reflected in their style and modes of expression. Secondly, they were all concerned in affairs of state and are likely to have had an agenda to defend or promote. Thirdly, they are writing for an audience like themselves: educated, privileged and politically active. These writers will be treated as generally self-aware; moreover, while not thinking of ethnicity in the same terms as twenty-first century academics, they were aware of some formal taxonomy of ethnic difference inherited from their predecessors; they were also aware of inter-group negotiation and interaction on the practical political stage. From these works, we shall get an impression of the changing ideologies of the Byzantine Romans under the impact of the Frankish conquest as viewed and formulated at the heart of Roman power.

Set against this group of works by the privileged elite is the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*, a very different kind of work. Written in something approaching the vernacular and originating in the Frankish-ruled Peloponnese very far from the ideological influence of Constantinople, this work will provide the starting point for a closer examination of the actual experience of living under the Franks. The examination will additionally move beyond the textual focus of the analysis of the literature outlined above to place the results of that analysis within the context of developments in the Peloponnese between 1200 and c.1420. By an examination,

³⁹ Smith 1986: 69–91; Armstrong 1982: 201–6.

as far as possible, of the day-to-day dealings between ruling Franks and local Romans, a picture will be drawn of the actuality of ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relations as well as developments in ethnic identity among the people of the Peloponnese over the course of two centuries. This is a long enough period to allow us to make some assessment of the long-term impact of Frankish rule – what effects it had on local ethnicity and how critical it was in comparison with other factors – making this localised study in depth an ‘acid test’ of actual, practical responses, set against the traditional ideologies of the Byzantine Roman elite.⁴⁰ The other evidence utilised to build up the many-sided picture of the Peloponnese under the Franks includes archaeology, architecture and art history, alongside history and archival material in other languages.

Furthermore, the vernacular romances of the period will be given some attention, since there is so little in the vernacular compared to the vast amounts of surviving work by high-status writers in their educated classicising Greek. Finally, there is also the *Journey into Hades* by Mazaris; this satirical work from the early fifteenth century uses something of a middle register in Greek and, dealing as it does once more with the Peloponnese, stands usefully alongside both the *Chronicle of the Morea* and Manuel II Palaiologos’ *Funeral Oration* on his brother Theodore, despot of Mistra in the Peloponnese.

⁴⁰ Heather 1998: 110–11.

CHAPTER 2

Byzantine identities

This chapter has two objectives. Firstly, by providing a portrait of Byzantine Roman identities in the years leading up to the Fourth Crusade, it aims to set the scene for the investigation of Roman identities during the Frankish period. How did the Byzantine Romans view their state at the end of the twelfth century, and what was their sense of themselves as Romans? Secondly, it seeks to explore the importance and justify the choice of the key content items to be analysed in the sources. What was the history of words like Ῥωμαῖος/Ῥωμαϊκός (*Rhomaïos/Rhomaïkos*, Roman, noun and adjective), Ἑλλην (*Hellen*, Hellenic), βάρβαρος (*barbaros*, barbarian) or ἔθνος (*ethnos*, group), what might they have been expected to convey to the Byzantine Romans? This must be the underpinning for a detailed consideration of the writers of the Frankish period.

BYZANTIUM BEFORE THE FOURTH CRUSADE¹

When Constantinople fell to the crusaders in 1204, it was a huge shock to the self-image of the Byzantine Romans. Nevertheless, it might also have seemed to be the logical outcome of a period of crisis and decline. The preceding century and a half had been a time of significant changes. Firstly, the empire had lost a great deal of territory in the east, fundamentally altering the make-up and operation of the state. The relationship of Byzantium with its neighbours had, in effect if not in imperial theory, changed from that of superior superpower to peer. The western crusades of the 1090s, 1140s and 1180s had brought the empire into an entirely new relationship with the west, such that by the end of the twelfth century the threat of western conquest was an accepted reality, even if the elite of the empire would have scarcely countenanced it becoming an actuality.

¹ Invaluable for this period: Magdalino 1993b; Brand 1968; Angold 1984a; also Ahrweiler 1975; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985; Bryer 1973 and 1981.

Alongside external threats, there had been periods of civil war, and the institutions of the empire and the role of the emperor had been brought into doubt.

This is not to say that the story of Byzantium from the eleventh and through the twelfth century was wholly gloomy. For much of this period, the empire was ruled by the Komnenoi dynasty, and Alexios I Komnenos, John II Komnenos and Manuel I Komnenos, who successively ruled from 1081 to 1180, were each of them talented, energetic and charismatic rulers who made great effort to address the problems facing the empire. Yet for all that the twelfth century ended in the kind of chaos that made the crusaders' aggression and conquest all too easy. Moreover, many of the problems that racked the empire by this time had their roots either in the problems faced by the Komnenoi or in the solutions they attempted to apply.

In fact, the Komnenoi dynasty had come to power out of a similar, if not so extreme, period of disorder after the fizzling out of the Macedonian dynasty that ruled from 867 to 1056. The Macedonians had achieved enormous success in the defence and extension of the empire; since the death of the great Basil II in 1025, however, there had been something of a power vacuum. After the death of Basil's brother Constantine VIII in 1028 there were no male heirs and so the throne, for the most part, went to successive husbands of Constantine's daughter Zoe, who were none of them particularly able, but were representatives of the powerful civilian aristocracy dominant in Constantinople. Meanwhile, the military aristocracy of Asia Minor began to grow impatient with what they saw as Constantinopolitan excess, corruption and ineffectiveness. Significant reform of the military also meant that there was now little in the way of reserves to meet threats on the frontier.

The empress Theodora, the second daughter of Constantine VIII, eventually succeeded in 1055 but ruled for just a year. She had nominated her successor, Michael VI Stratiotikos, but a military revolt brought Isaak I Komnenos to the throne in 1057; however, he was forced to abdicate in 1059, and Constantine X Doukas was proclaimed emperor in his place. Constantine died in 1067, leaving no adult heir but a regency under his widow Eudokia. The throne was shortly after assumed by Romanos IV Diogenes, who married Eudokia; like Isaak Komnenos, Romanos was a military magnate from Asia Minor, and it was military strength that was thought necessary now, as the Seljuk Turks were beginning to sweep into Anatolia.

So, in the thirteen years from the accession of Theodora in 1055 to the accession of Romanos in 1068, the empire had seen six rulers: Theodora,

Michael VI, Isaak I Komnenos, Constantine X, Eudokia and Romanos IV. Clearly, this was a period of considerable instability. The principle of dynastic rule had become established under the Macedonians, but this period saw no dynasty rise in its turn. Instead, the throne was contended between nominees of the civilian aristocracy on the one hand and representatives of the military aristocracy of Asia Minor on the other. Meanwhile, defence was neglected.

In 1064, the Hungarians took Belgrade and in the same year the Uzes invaded the Balkans. The following year, the Seljuk Turks invaded Byzantine Armenia, taking Ani; in 1067 they swept into Cappadocia and seized Caesarea. This was the homeland of Romanos Diogenes and the context for his selection as emperor, and he marched against the Seljuks in 1068. Initially he had some success, but the campaign came to a catastrophic end in 1071 at the battle of Manzikert, when Romanos was captured, the first such capture of a reigning emperor since Nikephoros I over 250 years before.

This defeat exacerbated the existing tensions within the empire, bringing it to civil war. Romanos was released, but meanwhile the Constantinopolitans had proclaimed Michael VII Doukas emperor; Michael then seized and blinded Romanos to eliminate his claim. Military revolts continued through Michael's reign, with Nikephoros III Botaneiates eventually successful in 1078. However, other military magnates continued to plot. Among them was Alexios Komnenos, who built up a strong alliance among several powerful families in Asia Minor; in 1081 he was able to take Constantinople and force the abdication of Nikephoros and take the throne. Although no one could have expected it, this typical military coup resulted in a stable and effective rule that Alexios was able to pass on to his successor. This is even more surprising given the problems that faced Alexios on his accession.

The failure at Manzikert and the ensuing period of civil war had aggravated the problems on the frontiers. In the west, the Bulgarians and Croats were in revolt. In the very year of Manzikert, the Norman Robert Guiscard took Bari, the last Byzantine outpost in Italy; it was clear that Guiscard had ambitions on the Balkans if not for the empire itself, and the chaos of the 1070s can only have encouraged his hopes. In 1081 Guiscard crossed the Adriatic and besieged and took Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), the fortress at the western end of the Via Egnatia leading over the Balkans to Constantinople. Meanwhile in the east the Seljuks had taken most of Asia Minor and were establishing a more permanent presence with the sultanate of Rhum based on their capital at Ikonion (Konya).

To confront these threats, Alexios needed to raise troops. The old system of militias raised in the various districts (known as *themes*) had died out under the Macedonians and the growth of the independently minded military aristocracy. Alexios thus needed to raise money to pay for mercenaries and he did this by confiscating the treasures of the churches in Constantinople. Alexios also bought himself the best navy available by concluding a highly generous trade treaty with the republic of Venice. With Venetian help by sea, the new mercenary army was able to repel the Normans from the Balkans. However, the empire was only really up to dealing with one external threat at a time, and the Slavic kingdoms in the Balkans were meanwhile able to continue their moves towards independence. The Seljuk threat also had to wait, and from 1087 to 1094 Alexios had in addition to deal with Pecheneg and Cuman invasions from the north.

Internally, Alexios also had clear problems – the state had been racked for decades by the rivalry between the civilian aristocracy, seen as corrupt and ineffective, and the military aristocracy, who had shown themselves willing to endanger the state for their own gain. Alexios' answer was to establish a whole new hierarchy at the heart of the empire. Old established offices were devalued or suppressed and a new set of titles was instituted. Just as importantly, civilian offices and military commands were distributed on a whole new basis of kinship with the emperor. In this way, Alexios was able to reward those close to him, who had helped him to power, and to limit the inclination to rebel. Alexios worked hard to replace the old devalued aristocracy of Constantinople with his own new aristocracy from the provincial elites that had brought him to the throne, and the result was a whole new nobility at the head of the imperial hierarchy. Alexios' comprehensive restructuring was a remarkable success, with his family and its closest connections ruling in different parts of the empire for the next three and a half centuries through to the conquest by the Ottomans.²

Alexios' reign is marked by the First Crusade, the great collision between the Byzantine Christian east and the papal Christian west, and in part this was a result of Alexios' strategy for dealing with the Seljuk threat. As well as invading and settling Asia Minor, the Seljuk Turks had overrun Palestine and their presence had disrupted the well-established route for pilgrims coming from the west; western clerics had therefore begun to call for an expedition to liberate the holy places. At the same time, Alexios had

² Angold 1984b: 123–5; Neville 2004: 31–8; Magdalino 1993b: 180–201; Mango 2002: 205.

appealed to the west for help against the Seljuks in Asia Minor.³ In making this appeal, Alexios was seeking a fresh influx of mercenaries for a major campaign: he did not do this in the expectation of receiving an army of holy pilgrims from the west, which would have been a concept well-nigh unimaginable for a Byzantine Roman.⁴ Arguably, the crusader army was as much of a shock to the papacy.

In a sermon delivered at Clermont in southern France in late 1095, Pope Urban II appealed for men to go to help the Christians of the east who had been overrun by the infidel and, according to most accounts, laid before his audience the possibility that they might regain Jerusalem for Christianity. This turned the proposed journey into a pilgrimage with the promise of remission of sin; it also made Jerusalem the focus, and not Constantinople and its empire. Nevertheless, Urban cannot have dreamt of the mass response to his proposal, which was repeated across France in early 1096 and backed up with written appeals. Volunteers flocked to the call. Warriors of high and low rank were attracted to a campaign that would allow them to use their special skills – for once, not against their fellow Christians – and also earn forgiveness for their often grisly pasts. A collection of armies gathered and made their way east in 1096.⁵

When these armies from the west arrived in Constantinople, the result was a major clash of expectations and cultures. Alexios saw crusaders as mercenaries who would help him to reassert his legitimate power in Anatolia, whereas the crusaders themselves saw the campaign as a religious duty that would also win them independent principalities. The Byzantine Roman empire was very centralised in contrast to the feudal polyarchy of the crusaders, and the Byzantine Romans saw the crusaders as disorganised; they were also shocked to see the western clerics bearing arms, in contravention of Orthodox canon law. Such perceptions only confirmed the built-in superiority complex of the Romans of Constantinople; this arrogance very easily offended the crusaders, who were themselves proud and ambitious – and astounded by the wealth of the empire.⁶

Alexios rightly tried to regularise the position of the crusaders as agents of the empire, by making the leaders take an oath of allegiance to himself, although he found it necessary to bribe most of them. This was familiar diplomatic practice for the Byzantine Romans.⁷ It did not help that Bohemond of Sicily was one of the leaders – the son of Robert Guiscard,

³ Harris 2003: 47–9. ⁴ Haldon 1999: 23–7. ⁵ Harris 2003: 50–4.

⁶ Browning 1980: 121; Lilie 1993: 1–7. ⁷ Harris 2003: 57–8; Magdalino 1993b: 31–4.

Bohemond had inherited all his father's antipathy towards the empire. Nevertheless, things began well with the Byzantine Romans able to reoccupy areas in western Asia Minor in the wake of the crusading army. However, with the seizure of Antioch in 1098 and then Jerusalem the following year, the crusaders departed from the imperial script, with the establishment of independent crusader states on historically Byzantine imperial territory. Antioch in particular had been part of the empire as recently as 1084, and had historically been the third city in importance after Constantinople and Rome.⁸

The results of the First Crusade for Alexios were on balance negative: the empire now faced vigorous and aggressive westerners in the east as well as the west; moreover, the close encounter between the subjects of the empire and the crusaders had confirmed and exacerbated much negative stereotyping on both sides. Most importantly from the perspective of Alexios and his government, very little had been achieved in Asia Minor, and this remained the case for the rest of Alexios' reign. The result was that Asia Minor was effectively lost to Byzantine Christian rule, with Seljuk dominance asserted over two generations.

When Alexios died in 1118 he left the empire far stronger than he had found it. However, various factors did not bode well for the future. The loss of most of Asia Minor meant a significant reduction in peasant numbers and resources, and the assets of the empire, including its peasantry, had been significantly privatised through the growth of large estates in a process that had begun under the Macedonian emperors.⁹ The trading agreements with Venice, and also Pisa, had handed enormous commercial advantage to the Italians, who could now undercut Byzantine Roman merchants; the treaties had been made so that the empire could make use of Italian naval strength, but this was something that could equally well be turned against the empire. Above all, it was – or should have been – impossible not to recognise that the empire was no longer a unique, superior power, but rather one large state among many. The old model of the Roman enemy had been the disorganised barbarian horde; the Romans needed to recognise that they were typically now dealing with states who were organisationally their equals.¹⁰ However, although Alexios himself may have perceived this to some extent, this recognition was largely beyond the Byzantine Romans.

Alexios' son John II Komnenos ruled from 1118 to 1143, and in turn John's son Manuel I Komnenos reigned to 1180. Both emperors made considerable

⁸ Harris 2003: 75–87; Lilie 1993: 33–51. ⁹ Angold 1984a: 65–7, 253–4. ¹⁰ Haldon 1999: 65.

efforts to regain lost territory in Asia Minor. Although the Seljuks controlled most of the region, enough had been retaken under Alexios and had remained Roman for his successors to plan further reconquest. In the 1130s, John defeated the Seljuk emirate of Danishmend and went on to take Cilician Armenia and compel crusader Antioch to swear allegiance to the empire. The gains did not prove secure – there was in fact significant local opposition to Constantinopolitan rule on these fringes of the empire – and John was campaigning again in Cilicia when he died in 1143.¹¹ Manuel I returned to the area in 1158 and once again brought it under Byzantine Roman control. In 1176 Sultan Kilij Arslan invaded the empire and Manuel gathered a huge army to throw him out; this army was destroyed at the battle of Myriokephalon and Manuel had to come to terms with the Turks. So the record of the Komnenoi in Asia Minor was patchy, with intermittent, impressive, military successes marked by a huge amount of pomp, but ending in a major defeat. Moreover, they were battling all the time with the fact that the Turkish, Islamic, presence was now dominant in much of the region; many Christians had converted and some ethnic Romans actively resisted reintegration into the empire.¹²

The battle on the western front also continued much unchanged. John II had early successes against the Serbs, but this worsened relations with Hungary; war broke out in 1128 and John was able to force the Hungarians back over the Danube. Manuel I was again successful against Hungary in the 1160s in a campaign which permitted him to restore Croatia, Bosnia and Dalmatia to imperial rule. However, Serbia was now a prime threat under the vigorous leadership of Stefan Nemanja, who had taken advantage of the Byzantine Roman focus on Hungary to unite his kingdom and now fought to keep this independence. Although the Serbian ruler was forced to recognise Byzantine Roman suzerainty in 1172, Serbia remained effectively independent and Nemanja was ready and waiting to profit from the death of Manuel in 1180.

The Normans likewise remained a threat throughout this period. To counter this threat, John relied above all on diplomacy: in 1130, when the Norman king Roger II united both Sicily and southern Italy, the emperor was able to conclude an alliance with the Germans, who were equally perturbed by this Norman success. It was this alliance in the west that permitted John to turn his attention to Asia Minor, and it was a major diplomatic success. On his accession, Manuel maintained the close

¹¹ Magdalino 1993b: 37–41. ¹² See below, pp. 83–4.

relationship with Germany by marrying Bertha of Sulzbach, sister-in-law of the German emperor Conrad II. The importance of this German alliance was revealed in 1147. With Conrad II away on the Second Crusade, the Norman King Roger swiftly took advantage of his absence to invade the empire, seizing Corfu and sacking the wealthy Roman towns of Thebes and Corinth. However, Manuel was subsequently able to draw on the long-standing alliances with Germany and Venice, and the empire retook Corfu in 1149.

The German alliance came crashing down on the accession of Frederick Barbarossa in 1152, who was at all times hostile to the Byzantine Roman empire, and whose hostility was confirmed by Manuel's hopelessly ambitious Italian campaign. On the death of Roger II in 1154 the empire invaded Italy and was initially very successful, bringing eastern Italy from Ancona to Taranto under Byzantine Roman rule. The people of southern Italy had a positive image of the empire, and Manuel's aim of securing the coastlands was a valid one; however, the imperial armies were defeated at Brindisi in 1156 and thrown out of Italy. Despite the pragmatic attitude shown by both John and Manuel in their use of the German alliance to secure their western frontier, this Italian campaign is the best illustration of the fundamental failure of the Byzantine Romans to accept the new political realities. The Byzantine Roman empire could never retake Italy, and it had been a waste of men and effort to try. Meanwhile, the Normans of Sicily were confirmed in their opposition to the empire, and the Germans under Barbarossa were further alienated.¹³

Alexios I Komnenos had profited from the trading alliance with Venice, and this had again proved its worth against the Normans in 1149. However, it had also become plain that the arrangements were heavily weighted in favour of the Venetians and to the detriment of some domestic commercial interests, especially in Constantinople. On his accession in 1118, John II resisted ratifying the treaty for as long as possible, but in the end Venice forced him to sign by using their all-important fleet to raid the Byzantine Roman islands of the Aegean.¹⁴ It was a graphic illustration of Venetian power and Roman weakness. In 1169 and 1170 Manuel tried to counter Venetian influence by concluding similar alliances with Pisa and Genoa, but this only served further to weaken the domestic position. In 1171, the empire demonstrated its organisational capacity by instituting a mass arrest of all Venetians and the confiscation of their moveable

¹³ Magdalino 1993b: 56–61. ¹⁴ Lilie 1993: 97.

goods: it was an amazing administrative achievement and designed to demonstrate the power of the empire but, once again, it was an overambitious move that the empire could not back up and it inevitably alienated Venice.

The crusade movement also continued to be a thorn in the flesh of the empire. The crusader states were an active irritant to the Byzantine Romans, occupying what was thought of as imperial territory, and both John and Manuel spent energy attempting to restore Roman suzerainty here. In both cases, when John and Manuel retook Antioch, they made a magnificent ceremonial entry into the former imperial city with all the pomp and grandeur which the Romans did so well, in a graphic – and outdated – display of the Byzantine Romans' 'manifest destiny' to rule the Christian world.¹⁵ Alongside this, Manuel in particular was remarkably friendly to the crusader states, providing Antioch and Jerusalem with financial subsidies and ransoms for prisoners that were extremely useful in the fight against Nureddin and Saladin. He also married a westerner, Maria of Antioch. Despite this, the imperial policy towards the region, which included active diplomacy with the Turks as well as the crusader states, irritated the west. Alongside a high level of admiration for Manuel personally, the image of Roman duplicitousness and arrogance was now a fixture among the west, leading in 1147 to the first western proposal to seize Constantinople and widespread fear of such an outcome among the Byzantine Romans.¹⁶

This was in the context of the Second Crusade, with which Manuel had to deal from 1146.¹⁷ Like his grandfather Alexios, he took care to exact oaths of allegiance from the crusade leaders along with the undertaking to restore to the empire any formerly imperial land which they managed to take – although he must have been cynical about this. The crusaders brought considerable disruption to the Byzantine Roman lands through which they passed, and Manuel worked above all to hasten their progress and so minimise the chances for disaster.

Manuel had a complex attitude to the west. As shown in his Italian campaign and his dealing with the crusader states, he believed utterly in the unique superiority of the Byzantine Roman empire. At the same time, he plainly admired much about the west, and this admiration was reflected in his friendly attitude to the crusader states, in his promotion of westerners

¹⁵ Browning 1980: 125; Lilie 1993: 120–30, 176–81; Magdalino 1993b: 66–76.

¹⁶ Harris 2003: 90–3, 98–100; Lilie 1993: 154–5; Magdalino 1993b: 46–9. ¹⁷ Lilie 1993: 145–63.

within the empire and in his adoption of some western ways – for example, jousting became popular in Constantinople. Manuel also investigated the chances for union between the western and eastern churches.¹⁸ Such admiration was not in contradiction with the faith in Byzantine Roman superiority; it could be said that Manuel was giving a place to the west within the empire, allotting them a role within the Byzantine Roman world. However, Manuel's 'phillatinism' was hugely unpopular with some sections of Roman society and intensified anti-western feeling in Constantinople. At the same time, his concentration on the west led him to neglect the problems of Asia Minor. Manuel's perceived pro-western bias led to enormous problems after his death.

So, on the death of Manuel in 1180, the empire still faced much the same appalling set of problems which had confronted Alexios Komnenos a century before. The Turks held most of Asia Minor and with the passage of time it was only getting harder to reassert Byzantine Roman rule. The Normans in southern Italy continued to harbour designs on the empire. The Balkan peoples continued to press on the western frontier and were in fact now at least semi-independent; new groupings continued to move south and pressurise the Danube frontier. The west, in the shape of the crusade movement, remained a present threat within the theoretical bounds of the empire. The Byzantine Romans continued to hold themselves irrevocably superior to their neighbours, in the face of a changing reality, and this led to increasing hostility between east and west which the closer contact resulting from the crusade movement also exacerbated. On the other hand, the three Komnenoi emperors had brought continuity and stability to the empire, in contrast to the chaotic years which had followed the end of the Macedonian dynasty. Even though there had been a failure to appreciate the empire's changing status in the world, the empire had at the same time regained a much needed confidence and a pride that was to a degree justified. Yet, twenty-four years after the death of Manuel, the city of Constantinople and the empire of the Byzantine Romans fell to the leaders of the Fourth Crusade. Manuel could not have expected things would go so horribly wrong.

In many ways, it was a repeat of the post-Macedonian situation. Manuel left a juvenile heir, Alexios II Komnenos, under the regency of his widow Maria of Antioch, a Latin. Her ethnic status did not help her credibility, and even members of the Komnenos family opposed her rule. It was Andronikos

¹⁸ Harris 2003: 103, 112–13; Kazhdan 2001: 95–9; Magdalino 1993b: 86–92.

Komnenos, a fascinating character and very much the black sheep of his distinguished family, who was able to take advantage of this situation. He had much in common with his late uncle Manuel I, being clearly intelligent, energetic and extremely charming. He had shown himself to be a talented military leader, but had also repeatedly dallied with treason and had repeatedly been pardoned by his uncle.¹⁹ By the time his uncle died, when he was serving as governor in Pontos on the Black Sea coast, Andronikos had achieved a glamorous reputation which he was able to exploit, and he gathered a large army as he moved westward through Asia Minor. In May 1182, as Andronikos approached the city, the Constantinopolitans turned on the westerners in the city and there was a horrendous massacre. Andronikos was then welcomed into the city by acclamation. At first he just appointed himself regent in place of Maria, but in the following year he was made co-emperor with the young heir Alexios II, and shortly afterwards the young emperor was executed, leaving Andronikos in sole charge. Maria too was put to death.

This was a return to the bad old days, and the enemies of the empire were not slow to take advantage. In 1181, the Hungarians and Serbs overran the western Balkans. Two years later, they combined to invade the empire along the Balkan high road via Belgrade, Niš and Sofia, and the cities fell before them. In 1185, the Normans took their turn, taking Durazzo, Corfu, Cephalonia, Zakynthos and finally Thessaloniki. This last, now the second city of the empire, was taken with particular savagery, and the Normans then marched on Constantinople. Although they were successfully defeated and turned back, the approach of the Normans seems to have set the populace against Andronikos, who was butchered by the mob. This was despite a certain vigour in Andronikos' approach as emperor: he had instituted several significant and timely reforms in the administration of the empire and was a determined populist.²⁰ However, he was also violently repressive of opposition and in the two years of his reign lost all the popular support which had initially helped him to power.

Isaak II Angelos was proclaimed emperor on Andronikos' death in 1185, and managed to rule for ten years. He was a member of one of the aristocratic families that had risen to prominence under the Komnenoi, but he proved an ineffective ruler at home and militarily. In 1185, Bulgaria had declared independence and, after unsuccessful campaigns in 1186 and 1187, Isaak recognised the new state by treaty in 1187, signalling the end of

¹⁹ Browning 1980: 133; Magdalino 1993b: 197–201. ²⁰ Choniates, *History* 324–6.

Byzantine Roman dominance in the Balkans. Hostilities against Bulgaria continued into the 1190s with a major Bulgarian victory at Arcadiopolis in 1194, while Isaak had more success with Serbia, defeating Stefan Nemanja in 1190.

Isaak could not even consider military action in the east, but was able instead to resort to diplomacy. After Saladin seized Jerusalem in 1187, the empire made friendly approaches to the Saracens. After all, this Muslim success had effectively removed the irritant of the crusader kingdoms and returned the Middle East to a more familiar model for the Byzantine Romans. Above all, the empire needed at this time, with so much trouble threatening from the west, to be on good terms with its powerful eastern neighbour. To the west, though, such diplomatic efforts appeared typically duplicitous of the Byzantine Romans – it reminded westerners of how Manuel Komnenos had treated with the Seljuks after his entry into Antioch in 1159, and how the Seljuk sultan Kilij Arslan had been feted in Constantinople in 1164. This perception in the west helped to make the Third Crusade, from 1188, even more traumatic for the empire. In the circumstances, with the west the greater threat at this time, the approaches to Saladin were a strategic error on Isaak's part.²¹

The Third Crusade was a real crisis for Isaak and for the empire. Although the French and English contingents went by sea, the Germans under the hostile Frederick Barbarossa came overland through the Balkans. From the start, the Germans treated Byzantine Roman territory as hostile: Philippopolis was occupied, Adrianople taken by force, and the countryside harried. In an understandable response, Isaak arrested the German envoys in Constantinople, but this was again a piece of Byzantine Roman bravado, or lack of realism, that could in no way be backed up. Barbarossa promptly took Didymoteichum in Thrace and announced preparations for a crusade against the duplicitous and obstructive empire. Isaak had to apologise and provide hostages for the future good behaviour of the Byzantine Romans – an unprecedented humiliation.²²

Barbarossa died on campaign, but his successor Henry VI continued the German hostility to the empire. Henry's brother Philip of Swabia was married to Isaak's daughter and, when Isaak was ousted in 1195, this presented the Germans with a possible pretext for invasion of the empire on Isaak's behalf. Isaak was succeeded by his brother Alexios III Angelos, who attempted to buy off the Germans with a substantial payment of

²¹ Lilie 1993: 230–45. ²² Harris 2003: 132–41.

tribute; this was paid for by the *Alamanikon* – the German tax – which was a burden felt throughout the empire. Fortunately, the *Alamanikon* lapsed on Henry's death in 1197; nevertheless, German hostility to the empire remained strong. Alexios attempted to bolster his position with the west, and so minimise this German threat, by entering into negotiation with the papacy on bringing about a union of the eastern and western churches. Historically, the two churches had been in a state of schism since 1054, and this had added fuel to prejudices in both east and west.²³ However, the level of opposition in the church to making any concessions on doctrine, and the level of popular anti-westernism in Constantinople, made this infeasible. Meanwhile in the Balkans, the Bulgarians overran much of Macedonia.

The situation in the opening years of the thirteenth century was thus reminiscent of the situation in the 1070s, but it was notwithstanding in many ways worse. The successors to Manuel I were in their different ways poor rulers who brought the empire into disrepute at home and abroad. The fates of the young Alexios II, of Andronikos I and of Isaak II – who was blinded on his deposition to make him unfit for rule, as had happened to Romanos Diogenes over a century before – marked a return to violence at the heart of the government. As with the Macedonians, the lack of an obvious dynastic heir had laid the imperial throne open to competition, this time from rival claimants within the established imperial family. Militarily, Andronikos Komnenos and the two Angeloi achieved nothing of significance. The sack of Thessaloniki by the Normans, the demeaning apology to Frederick Barbarossa, the payment of the *Alamanikon*, and even the hint of some concessions to the west on church doctrine, had intensified resentment of westerners and must also have diminished respect for the emperors who allowed such humiliation for the mighty empire of the Romans. The ineffectiveness of central rule also allowed the provinces on the periphery of the empire to develop some autonomy; rule had similarly become increasingly centralised. There are strong suggestions that many people were disenchanted with imperial rule, and these will be explored further below.

As the thirteenth century opened, a whole array of threats crowded around the empire. In the east, Asia Minor had been largely lost, weakening the economy of the empire and leaving it open to any threat from the Muslim world. In the west, the Balkans had been effectively

²³ See below, pp. 55–8.

lost to the empire, with Bulgaria and Serbia achieving practical or actual independence. The western provinces of the empire were geographically remote from Constantinople and, as we shall see, disenchanted with imperial rule. Further west, the Normans had recently sacked the second city of the empire and the Germans were actively hostile; moreover, the dynamic Pope Innocent III was planning a fourth crusade, and these holy pilgrimages had become ever more difficult for the empire to handle. Venice was another potential enemy: although the Republic had long held a favourable trading position within the empire, there was a history of hostility with the mass arrests of 1171 and the massacre of Latins in 1182, which had fallen heavily on the large Venetian colony in Constantinople. Enrico Dandolo, the current doge of Venice, was moreover personally antipathetic to the empire. Economically, the empire was impoverished by the payment of the *Alamanikon* and the loss of tax revenues as the territory of the empire shrank. The atmosphere in Constantinople was febrile with distrust of the west and disappointment with the record of rule under the Angeloi. Culturally, the Byzantine Romans were mostly stuck within an outdated world view that made it extremely difficult to address the problems confronting them.

And thus, in so many ways, the fall of the empire in 1204 was a disaster waiting to happen. However, it should be remembered that the Byzantine Romans would prove themselves able to pick themselves up and recreate their empire even after the westerners had seemed to deal them such a mortal blow. Therefore, despite the many problems and weaknesses clear at the close of the twelfth century, the empire was not moribund and it retained a certain strength.

THE TERMINOLOGY

It will be useful now to consider some of the more important ways in which the writers of the Byzantine Roman empire chose to discuss both themselves and other groups. The terminology used will constitute the set of 'key content items' for the consideration of ethnic identity after the Fourth Crusade, and this initial discussion will highlight more of the background to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. What framework for representation of ethnicity was available to writers after 1204 and what were the established ways of looking at different ethnicities which they inherited? We need to look back into the history of the empire to uncover the likely, the inherited, perspective on ethnicity of the writers in our period.

Ethnic groups: genos and ethnos

Digenes Akrites is the eponymous hero of a Byzantine Roman epic poem whose origins in written form almost certainly go back to the twelfth century but rely on earlier Anatolian traditions. His name literally means 'the twice-born borderer', and this expresses his identity as a man born in the border zone in Anatolia between Romans and Muslims. As was no doubt the case with many in this situation, he was 'twice-born', that is, he could trace his descent to both groups: ἔθνικὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πατρός, ἐκ δὲ μητρὸς Ῥωμῆος, 'foreign on his father's side, but Roman on his mother's'.²⁴

This description introduces the two primary terms used by the Byzantine Romans for groups that could be thought of as being ethnic: *genos* and *ethnos*. Etymologically, and as shown in Digenes' name, it was *genos* that most closely conformed to the model of ethnicity outlined above; classically, *genos* had denoted 'race', 'stock' or 'kin', and was firmly associated with biological relationship.²⁵ In Byzantine Roman writing *genos* was thus frequently used with the meaning of family, but it could also denote a state, taking the broadest sense of kinship. This is notable in the twelfth century, when *genos* had strong associations with nobility, in a reflection of the new aristocracy based on and around the imperial family of the Komnenoi. These associations also allowed for a contrast between the noble *genos* of the Byzantine Romans and the less distinguished non-Roman races. In some sense, all Romans were part of the same family.²⁶

In contrast, this sense of biological relationship was of much lesser importance in *ethnos* and its cognates. In the classical period *ethnos* meant, at its simplest, 'a group living together', and any closely associated group could be an *ethnos*, including a flock of animals or a social class.²⁷ From the time of Homer, however, *ethnos* had been used to denote a people or a state; in Attic Greek it was used in the plural to denote the foreign, non-Greek, races and states, while in Biblical Greek it denoted in an exactly parallel manner the non-Jewish peoples (the 'gentiles'). The members of an *ethnos*, then, did not need to be biologically related, and *ethnos* was more a matter of shared association, of culture, than of kinship; in this sense a *genos* can be a subdivision of an *ethnos*, but not vice versa.²⁸ The description of Digenes'

²⁴ *Digenes Akrites*, Grottaferrata version iv.51. For the tangled issue of the dating of *Digenes Akrites* see especially Jeffreys 1998: xxx–xli, xlvii–xlviii; Magdalino 1993a.

²⁵ Liddell & Scott. s. v. γένος Α1. ²⁶ Angold 1999c: 47; Magdalino 1991: 7–9.

²⁷ Liddell & Scott. s. v. ἔθνος Α1, 3.

²⁸ Cf. especially Jones 1996; also Smith 1986: 21; Geary 2002: 42–6.

origins also illustrates that, in Byzantine Roman usage, *ethnos* in addition had very strong connotations of being foreign, non-Roman. The term thus also had derogatory overtones, while *genos* was in contrast more neutral.

Thus, although ‘ethnicity’ now refers to a sense of group solidarity which is founded on a putative biological link, this sense of shared descent was predominantly lacking in the Greek understanding of *ethnos*. In contrast, the connotations of shared descent were so strong in *genos* that any use of this term in application to Byzantine Romans should be seen as potentially indicative of a sense of ethnic identity. Such uses are known throughout the history of the empire, but it should be borne in mind that formulas such as γένος τῶν Ῥωμαίων (‘the *genos* of the Romans’) may more limitedly attest to a desire on the part of the literate ruling class to encourage a sense of shared ethnicity over and above the more obvious polyethnicity – particularly in the early days of the empire.²⁹

Nevertheless, despite the ‘foreign’ overtones in *ethnos*, and even though the connotations of shared descent were far stronger in *genos*, both terms were still used in the modern ethnic sense. The emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos, writing in the mid tenth century, displayed a strong and typically Byzantine Roman sense of ethnicity, stating that, since each nation (*ethnos*) had different customs, laws and institutions, so each *ethnos* ought to stick to its own ways; further, just as animals mate with their own kind, so the members of any *ethnos* should marry only their compatriots who speak the same language as them.³⁰ This is in the context of disapproving a marriage between a Roman and a Bulgar: here, then, *ethnos* is strongly associated with race and with being Roman: the Romans are viewed as a group apart which should stick to its own. Constantine’s comments show that the Byzantine Romans were thus certainly comfortable with the idea of ethnic identity, seeing ethnicity as based in shared descent and expressed in ways of behaving – and speaking – that differed from the ways of other groups. The Romans made up such an ethnic group.

Romans on non-Romans: barbaros

The division between themselves and others was fundamental to the Byzantine Roman world view: in opposition to the Roman there stood the *barbaros*, the barbarian. Another term with ancient origins, *barbaros* had originally served to represent non-Greeks onomatopoeically by reference

²⁹ Chrysos 1996: 8. ³⁰ *DAI* 13.175–81; cf. Magdalino 1991: 4–5.

to the incomprehensible ‘ba-ba-ba’ sounds they made – a *locus classicus* of language as ethnic marker – and Homer had thus used ‘barbarophone’ to denote those whose first language was not Greek.³¹ In the classical period then, used as the fundamental ‘they’ term in direct contrast to the Hellenic ‘we’, the term was essentially derogatory, with overtones of moral and cultural disparagement.³² Uncultured nomadic barbarians were contrasted with urbanised and sophisticated Greeks. In time, *barbaros* came in turn to be similarly contrasted with civilised imperial Roman citizens, although this shift was not without problems since the ancient Hellenes had naturally at first classed the Romans themselves as barbarians.³³ However, the Roman empire successfully adopted the term to denote non-Roman status, naturally preserving its negative connotations, and *barbaros* furthermore often had territorial associations, encouraged by the introduction of universal citizenship within the empire by Caracalla in AD 212. Thus Romans were those who lived within the bounds of the empire and the *barbaroi* were those outside those bounds. Over time, though, with the increasing settlement of barbarian peoples within the territory of the empire and their employment within the imperial army, purely geographical connotations decreased in importance, and instead political and religious allegiances marked out the Roman and the barbarian.³⁴ The Byzantine Romans continued to use this model to draw a contrast between Roman insiders and barbarian outsiders, with a renewed emphasis on the geographical dimension.

Obolensky thought that there could have been little explicit ethnic content to the barbarian categorisation, since ‘the East Roman Empire was made up of too many races for any meaningful distinction to be possible on ethnic grounds between the *Rhomaïos* and the barbarian’.³⁵ However, this confuses the ethnic sense with the (presumed) objective criterion of race, and the situation is rather more complex. The *barbaros* must always be understood as existing in opposition to *Rhomaïos* but, as we shall see below, there was more than one version of Roman identity, and the *barbaros* was in fact opposed to the *Rhomaïos* in both these versions. Thus, one understanding of *Rhomaïos* had as fundamental the connotation of loyalty to the emperor: to be Roman was above all to be a subject of the emperor, resident in the empire. In parallel to this there was a clear and primary political content to the barbarian categorisation: barbarians

³¹ Homer, *Iliad* 2.867.

³² Hall 1989: especially 2–11, 56–100. Further examples of the classical Greek perspectives: e.g. Aristotle, *Politics* 1.1324b10 and 2.1252a34–b9; Herodotos, *Histories* 1.1; Thucydides 1.1.

³³ Goldhill 2002: 265–71. ³⁴ Greatrex 2000: 268–78. ³⁵ Obolensky 1971: 355.

were those who lived outside the jurisdiction of the emperor and did not acknowledge his suzerainty. In this dichotomy there was indeed no explicit ethnic content: this was just a matter of political ascription. On the other hand, there was an understanding of *Rhomaïos* which relied as much, if not more, on a certain set of cultural criteria (in which political, imperial, loyalty might or might not need to play a role) – Orthodox Christianity, speaking Greek as a first language, and the more amorphous concepts of civilised living. A second barbarian/Roman dichotomy paralleled this Roman identity, so that those who failed on one or more of these cultural criteria were also open to be called *barbaroi*. Here, there was a very high level of ethnic content in the categorisation.

Curiously, then, the body of imperial subjects could include barbarians. In the classic Byzantine Roman formulation, a Roman was a subject of the empire, but such an imperial subject did not need to be a Roman. Notably, barbarians played an important role in imperial ceremony, for the closest bodyguard of the emperor was composed of the ‘axe-bearing barbarians’. Several groups of palace guards are known, but the characteristic axe-bearers were the Varangian guard, of Scandinavian, and later English, origin.³⁶ The Varangians were regularly present for imperial receptions, when they would formally salute the emperor in their native tongues, and in this way their ethnic non-Roman identity was explicitly evoked in contrast to their political allegiance. Dion Smythe has argued that writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries employed mention of this barbarian presence to assert or stress the legitimacy of emperors or imperial pretenders, and this emphasises the significance of these ‘barbarians within’; they were an essential part of the life of the empire and an essential complement to any true emperor.³⁷ As all peoples were viewed as theoretically subject to the empire, so the barbarian presence in imperial ceremonial served also to emphasise the universalism of the Roman imperial role. Paradoxically, the βάρβαρος (*barbaros*) was the quintessential outsider, but he too came beneath the presumed universal umbrella of the emperor.³⁸

Westerners held a particular place in the ranks of the barbarian outsiders, whereby they were far from the lowest of the low. Firstly, they inhabited lands which had been part of the Roman empire of old. As such, they again came in theory under the authority of the emperor of the Romans, and their inferior though honoured status was expressed through the model of the family of kings. In the tenth-century *De administrando imperio*

³⁶ Dawkins 1947; Shepard 1973; Nicol 1974; Bartusis 1992: 272–86.

³⁷ Smythe 1992. ³⁸ Obolensky 1971: 354–5.

Constantine Porphyrogenitos accorded special status to the Franks: 'never,' he says, 'shall an emperor of Romans become allied through marriage with a nation which uses customs differing from and alien to those used in the Roman way, except with the Franks alone. That great man, the holy Constantine [i.e. Constantine the Great in the fourth century, founder of the eastern empire] made an exception of these only, because he himself came from those parts, and there is much relationship and congress between Franks and Romans.'³⁹ This distinction is a pragmatic reflection of the exalted brotherly status accorded to Charlemagne over a century earlier. The coronation of Charlemagne as 'emperor of the Romans' in 800 had been insulting to the Byzantine Romans, but they had come to a compromise with Charlemagne by which he could remain an emperor, a βασιλεύς (*basileus*), but not 'of the Romans'. The special status accorded to Franks in the *De administrando imperio* also reflected the fact that in court circles intermarriage between Romans and Frankish women was actually taking place.⁴⁰

In reality, apart from this, there was very little contact between westerners and Romans at this date; subsequent developments would suggest that this lack of actual contact facilitated such earlier, blithe, claims of close affinity.⁴¹ In the twelfth century, which saw far closer contact between east and west, the princess Anna Komnene had no qualms about classifying the crusading westerners as barbarians, while the bishop Eustathios of Thessaloniki was equally ready to use the term for the Normans who attacked his city in 1185. It should be noted too that, for all his stipulations, Constantine Porphyrogenitos classed the Franks among the alien and inferior nations. Constantine's approach ostensibly presents as more analogic than binary; that is, he seems ready to accept a scale of otherness, with the Franks closer to the Romans than were other barbarian groups. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that this passage comes in the context of forbidding Roman intermarriage with barbarians, and thus it is clear that the broader sense of 'we the Romans' versus 'them the barbarians' was the primary conceptualisation of ethnic difference for the Byzantine Romans, on a binary model of 'us' versus 'them'.⁴²

As the fundamental term for the non-Roman other, then, *barbaros* will merit attention. In particular, it will be useful to see if the fairly indiscriminating and binary sense of otherness which was dominant under the

³⁹ *DAI* 13.114–19. ⁴⁰ Macrides 1992. ⁴¹ Shepard 1988: 92–3.

⁴² Cf. Pohl and Reimitz 1998: 65–6.

Komnenoi is maintained in the Frankish period, or whether the Byzantine Romans developed a more differentiated understanding of the variety of non-Romans. Further, could the *victorious* incoming Franks of 1204 be classed as subject barbarians or would new models need to be developed?

*Romans on themselves: Rhomaïos, Rhomaïkos, Rhomaïs and
Rhomania – the political and ethnic Roman identities*

Thus, the Byzantine Romans set themselves against the barbarians, and in various ways had been able to perceive themselves as superior. Above all, it was the fact of empire that made the Byzantine Romans see themselves as unique among the peoples and gave them a sense of a past which belonged to them.

In the twelfth century, the subjects of the empire were still ruled by an emperor in Constantinople and they still called themselves Romans, in a direct debt to the ancient empire that had conquered the Balkans, the Aegean and Asia Minor more than a thousand years before.⁴³ These Byzantine Romans expected to be ruled by an emperor, and with this went the expected corollaries of paying tax and performing military and other service. As far as we can tell, there was pride in the empire: it was the highest form of political living, and the emperor was the highest of earthly rulers. Roman imperial rule was strongly associated with the territory it covered, with an expectation that all those within the limits of the empire were Roman while those living outside were not. The capital of the empire could only be Constantinople, which was the seat of the emperor and the greatest city on earth. The empire was a Christian entity, and all Romans were necessarily Christian: the emperor had a sacral role as the earthly equivalent of the divine ruler of the kingdom of heaven, the earthly *pantokrator*; all other rulers were lesser rulers and anyway in some sense subject to the emperor. The millennial history of imperial rule placed great weight on tradition and precedent, written rules and conservatism. Lastly, as we have noted, being Roman was contrasted with the barbarian in a fundamentally binary model. Where Romans were ancient and civilised, barbarians were newcomers, unsettled and without worthy institutions; where Romans were Christian, barbarians were pagan; where Romans lived within the empire, barbarians lived outside the empire.

⁴³ Barker 1957: 7–8; Magdalino 1993b: 415–18.

This brief summary necessary generalises over the inevitable variety and evolution of the many centuries of Byzantine Roman history. Yet, as will be seen, this imperial model was strongly entrenched and remained dominant in the ideology of the Byzantine Roman state until its end in the fifteenth century. This imperial Roman identity can be viewed as an ethnic identity, being formulated in opposition to the barbarian other, but having a great deal of objective content in the political, social and religious institutions of the empire and also having a strong sense of its past; moreover, the political identity founded on the inheritance from ancient Rome provided the dominant ethnonym of the Byzantine Romans.

It is of central significance that *Rhomaïos* – more usually in the plural *Rhomaïoi* – was always the most important self-identifying name in Byzantine Roman writers. Usage of *Rhomaïoi* falls into two broad categories – the two versions of Roman identity already referred to in the discussion about barbarians. Firstly, *Rhomaïoi* was a clear shorthand for ‘the state ruled by the emperor’, it is indeed the most usual way of referring to this state. For example, in *De administrando imperio*, *Rhomaïoi* receive tribute, make administrative decisions, rule territory, are at war with others and engage in foreign policy (*DAI* 22.11, 23.14, 28.9, 27.5, 33.1–2, 46.133 and 166). Again, *basileus* is in the same text usually qualified ‘of the Romans’: the people in a collective sense were the very stuff of this state, and this qualification, in use since Heraklios, was officially added to the imperial title in 812 in response to Charlemagne’s imperial pretensions.⁴⁴ A similar collective usage can be observed at the end of the twelfth century in Eustathios of Thessaloniki: the Latins are accused of planning harm ‘against Romans’, i.e. against the Byzantine Roman state, Alexios Komnenos hopes that ‘the eyes of Romans’ will turn to him, i.e., he hopes to win the state, and Illyria marks the boundary of ‘the things of Romans’ (τὰ Ῥωμαίων, *ta Rhomaïon*) – the phrase really does not work in English, but plainly means ‘the Roman state’.⁴⁵ This usage of *Rhomaïos*, which attaches to the millennial tradition of imperial rule from Constantinople, will be referred to in this study as *the political Roman identity*. Here, the basic stuff of being Roman was loyalty to the emperor in Constantinople. Again, this is not to deny that the Roman imperial identity was also an ethnic identity: merely, this distinction should be observed in order to separate the imperial identity from the alternative religious–linguistic identity to be discussed next.

⁴⁴ *ODB* III: 1793. ⁴⁵ Melville Jones 1988: 344.4, 64.11–12 and 14–15.

There was an alternative understanding of *Rhomaïos*. The named existence of other ethnic groups within the empire in the period of the Komnenoi, in specific contrast to the *Rhomaioi*, indicates that on some level a *Rhomaïos* was not identical to ‘a subject of the empire’. It had taken on distinct ethnic characteristics, in particular the profession of Orthodox Christianity and the speaking of Greek as a native tongue.⁴⁶ As seen in the case of barbarian subjects of the emperor, this understanding, which will be termed *the ethnic Roman identity*, allowed for the selection of some subjects of the empire as truly Roman whereas, in the political Roman identity, all were theoretically equally Roman. In the sixth century, certain groups could be called barbarian or Roman purely on the criterion of loyalty to the empire.⁴⁷ By the twelfth century, however, the growing influence of the ethnic Roman identity had made such liberal naming less acceptable, judging by the naming of Bulgarian subjects of the empire as *μιξοβάρβαροι* (*mixobarbaroi* – ‘semi-barbarian’), and also by the ethnically specific names of ‘foreign’ squadrons within the army.⁴⁸ Political status as an imperial subject was, while not necessarily irrelevant, thus of comparatively minor importance in the ethnic Roman identity: at the end of the twelfth century it presents as a necessary but not sufficient condition of being Roman.

The cultural criteria for this ethnic Roman identity will be examined in more detail below, but Anna Komnene’s critique of John Italos can serve as an illustration which will further lead on to an insight into the growing strains on the political Roman identity. Writing in the mid twelfth century, Anna deprecated the unfortunate John Italos, an intellectual Sicilian who had made his career in the imperial capital, saying that his accent was the kind that might be expected of a Latin arriviste who had studied Greek thoroughly but was far from a native speaker: he therefore seemed vulgar to those who had had a decent education.⁴⁹ For Anna and her educated peers, Italos’ style of Greek irrevocably marked him as an outsider, and there are clearly also issues of education and class here. In such responses to mistrusted foreigners within the Byzantine Roman state, there was direct conflict between the political and ethnic understandings of *Rhomaïos*, such that an individual or group could be considered Roman in one sense, as citizen(s) of the empire and subject(s) of the emperor, but not in the other sense which came with all the cultural baggage of language use, faith, physical appearance and so on. Italos’ case also shows that by Anna’s

⁴⁶ Magdalino 1991: 9.

⁴⁷ Greatrex 2000: 270–4.

⁴⁸ Haldon 1999: 125–6, 226.

⁴⁹ Cf. Sewter 1969: 177.

time there was a very clear hierarchy within the state, whereby those who fulfilled all the political *and* ethnic criteria of Roman-ness saw themselves as naturally superior, and indeed were in reality socially and economically of the first rank: the elite of the empire were Greek-speaking, Orthodox and imbued with the centuries of tradition of imperial Constantinopolitan rule. For this Constantinopolitan elite, in fact, there was little difference between ethnic others and provincial Romans.⁵⁰ The result was that, by the end of the twelfth century, the empire was seriously out of balance in many respects and not least in the division of sentiment between capital and provinces.

It is easy to find examples of twelfth-century Constantinopolitan contempt for provincials – Michael Choniates' ironic implication that the Athenians are really barbarians, Constantine Manasses' disdain for smelly Cypriots and so on.⁵¹ It is true that this outlook was not universal, and also that individual writers were not always consistent in their approach to provincials. Margaret Mullett has shown that Theophylact, Bishop of Ochrid in the late eleventh century, was far from uniform in his approach to his Bulgarian flock. The contempt shown in some of his letters is notorious, but his works (including some letters) also show a scholarly interest in the Bulgarians and a concern for their welfare and interests.⁵² However, there were solid reasons for an archbishop to show interest in his see – it was part of the established role – and the dominant tone of contempt in the letters written by one educated Constantinopolitan to others of his ilk is typical and revealing, notwithstanding Theophylact's occasional more positive approach to Bulgarians.

It is further abundantly clear that this dislike was not one-sided. In the epic *Digenes Akrites*, clearly written from an eastern Anatolian perspective and probably reflecting twelfth-century attitudes, there is no affection for Constantinople or imperial rule, to which the hero professed his allegiance 'even though I get nothing good from it'.⁵³ Leonora Neville has described how the relationship between capital and periphery was typically one of little understanding or appreciation on both sides. The empire ruled most of the time with a fairly light hand and encouraged the development and implementation of local solutions; however, the empire had to be able – and be perceived to be able – to enforce its will if required and to provide adequate defence. If the empire could not show

⁵⁰ Magdalino 1991: 7. ⁵¹ Kolovou 2001; Horna 1904: 344.

⁵² Mullett 1997: 266–77; cf. Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 169, 183.

⁵³ *Digenes Akrites*, Grottaferrata version, iv.989; Ševčenko 1982: 732–5; Galatariotou 1987: 40–4.

that it had this 'capacity for effective violence', then there was the danger that it might not be able to maintain its sovereignty against local alternatives.⁵⁴

This was precisely the situation as the twelfth century drew towards its close, with a growing dissatisfaction with Constantinopolitan rule all around the periphery of the empire.⁵⁵ Lack of interest from the centre, combined with oppressive and corruptly gathered taxation with little visible return in the way of social justice or protection from external attack, had carried an inevitable price. At one level, the loyalty of a provincial community to the empire depended on the quality of the protection available from the imperial administration, counted against the burden imposed by that administration; the reputation and charisma of the administration might also play a role in enabling communities to bear fiscal and other burdens. Towards the end of the twelfth century, the imperial government lost both authority and respect and seemed incapable of providing adequate defence to the periphery of the empire. Faced with the incursions of the Seljuk Turks from the east and with the endemic piracy of the Aegean, provincial communities began to look to powerful local men, rather than relying on imperial assistance. For some time, the central government had depended on regional men of influence to deliver the imperial administration in the more distant provinces, and for long enough this had worked with successful maintenance of loyalty to the regime in Constantinople. However, Constantinople could now no longer incentivise or enforce its authority upon such local leaders as Theodore Mangaphas in Philadelphia and the Gabras family in Trebizond, as well as Isaak Komnenos in Cyprus and Leon Sgouros in the Peloponnese. Such men, who had often at some stage held important positions in local government and defence, were now effectively independent of the capital and cared little for imperial prestige. Their rejection of the conventional Constantinopolitan career – or of the role of a local imperial middleman – again bears witness to the failure of the imperial ideal.⁵⁶

This tension between capital and periphery reveals further strains within the Roman identity. In particular, it would appear that, though all subjects of the empire were Romans in the collective, political, sense, the Romans of Constantinople viewed themselves as perhaps more Roman in the individual ethnic sense, for provincials are often pictured as closer

⁵⁴ Neville 2004: 136–67. ⁵⁵ Cheynet 1990: 446–59; Herrin 1975: 253–84; Ahrweiler 1975: 89–94.

⁵⁶ Cheynet 1990: 446–7; Ahrweiler 1975: 92–3; Angold 1984a: 275–6; Herrin 1975: 275–6; Magdalino 1993b: 150–5, 491–2; Neville 2004: 39–46.

to alien barbarians than to civilised Romans. Again, in the established Byzantine Roman ideology, the meat of Roman identity appears to be political, tied to the proud fact of immemorial imperial rule: if, however, this had ceased to resonate among the provincials, in what might *their* sense of identity reside? Here again it is necessary to separate out political and ethnic Roman-ness and, indeed, distinguish between elite ideologies and provincial actualities.

In this context, it is clear that the coming of Franks as rulers had considerable disruptive potential for the complex of Roman identities. If, in the dominant political Roman identity, the basic stuff of being Roman was loyalty to the emperor in Constantinople, what would happen if that emperor and his court were no longer ethnically Roman? The result might easily be a disjunction between political and other allegiances. The radically altered relationship with the Frankish other could thus impel the Byzantine Romans to rethink their sense of themselves.

In conclusion, then, *Rhomaïos* was the fundamental term of self-identification in any Byzantine Roman writer before the Fourth Crusade. In the use of *Rhomaïos*, the imperial, political, sense was always dominant while, notwithstanding, it is also possible to discern a parallel ethnic understanding.⁵⁷ It will be the task here to see how *Rhomaïos* is used, with which other concepts and concrete items it is associated, and whom precisely it is used to denote and, in pursuit of this aim, the distinction between the political and ethnic Roman identities will continue to be utilised. That is, for clarity, reference will be made to *the political Roman identity* to designate cases where the fundamental content of a usage of *Rhomaïos* is to denote the status of being a subject within the empire, and this may be a collective plural use or one with reference to an individual. Reference to *the ethnic Roman identity*, in contrast, will denote cases where the *fundamental* content of a usage is *not* this matter of political status. It is, however, important to appreciate that the political Roman identity could remain as a component of an ethnic Roman identity, that is, that the matter of political allegiance to the emperor could be one criterion of this ethnic identity.

In terms of syntax, *Rhomaïos* occurs in two distinct patterns, which it will be useful to bear in mind. Firstly, it often occurs in the genitive plural form, thus: χ (τῶν) 'Ρωμαίων ('x of (the) Romans'), and here it can be

⁵⁷ Vryonis argues for the imperial heritage as the primary reference of *Rhomaïos*, Vryonis 1999: 31–2 and cf. *ODB* III: 1793.

illuminating to see *what* (the 'x') is being associated with the Romans. This pattern will be called *the genitive formula*. Secondly, it frequently occurs in other cases, generally without anything else directly associated in the manner of the genitive formula; it is still nonetheless possible to see in what sense the item is being used, by means of a close examination of the context. This pattern will be called *the plain formula*. The adjectival form 'Ρωμαϊκός (*Rhomaïkos*) will also be considered, giving attention to the nouns to which it is applied.

Also associated with *Rhomaïos* are 'Ρωμαῖς (*Rhomaïs*) and 'Ρωμανία (*Rhomania*). Fundamentally terms of geographical application for the lands encompassed within the Byzantine Roman empire, these nonetheless have a more complex and interesting pattern of use. *Rhomania* had the longer history, being regularly employed to denote the Roman state ruled from Constantinople from its earliest days.⁵⁸ It was not, however, used in official imperial documentation until the time of the Komnenoi; imperial officials spoke rather of the ἀρχή (*arche*: rule) or ἡγεμονία (*hegemonia*: hegemony) 'of the Romans', using the collective political sense of *Rhomaïos*. Analysis of Italian archives suggests that from the twelfth century, however, *Rhomania* was a term favoured by the Byzantine Romans for their state, with a possibility that it had special application to the western half of the empire.⁵⁹ This is supported by *Digenes Akrites*, dating back at least to the twelfth century, where *Rhomania* is the territory occupied by those called Romans, and at least nominally ruled by the emperor in Constantinople. *Rhomaïs* is rarer but used in much the same way to denote both a geographical and political entity.⁶⁰

More on the ethnic Roman identity: ethnic criteria

Christianity

The contrast between the Byzantine Orthodox faith and the western Catholic faith has been generally perceived as a fundamental factor in ethnic hostility between westerners and Byzantine Romans before and during the Frankish period. Indeed, the Orthodox religion was a central fact of Byzantine Roman society; the emperor was the thirteenth apostle of Christ and the protector of Orthodoxy, chosen by God to rule on his behalf,

⁵⁸ Chrysos 1996: 16.

⁵⁹ Wolff 1948: 2–13; see also Sophocles: 974. For typical usage: e.g. *DAI* 22.22, 44.125–8; the latter has strong geographical content.

⁶⁰ Melville Jones 1988: 58.31 and 64.19; Sophocles: 973.

and was given the epithet 'from God' on the coinage of the empire.⁶¹ The empire of the Romans was in some ways viewed as the earthly equivalent of the kingdom of heaven and, ideally, the empire was the Christian world. The threat from the Muslim Arabs and later from the Turks was a threat to both state and religion, and each had gained strength from the other. 'The fight is a struggle for God and for his love and for all the nation (ὅλου τοῦ ἔθνους). Above all it is for our brothers of the same faith . . . for our wives, for our children, for our fatherland (πατρίδος)'; thus Leo VI (886–912) encouraged his generals to urge on their troops against the Arabs.⁶² The Byzantine Romans were not simply soldiers of Christ, however, but guardians of Orthodoxy, of correct interpretation of the faith. The early emperors had intervened in the church councils to establish the true interpretation of the faith against heterodox heresies, and in the iconoclast struggle of the eighth and ninth centuries, the conflict over the admissibility of images of the holy and divine, the state again was necessarily involved in the maintenance of Orthodoxy. Thus, war undertaken by the Chosen People of God could encompass war against misguided fellow Christians.

However, the correlation of Orthodox Christianity with the Roman political identity came to be problematic in a number of ways, such that the Franks with their distinct Christian church were only one in a series of anomalies within the ideal coterminality of state and religion.⁶³ Firstly, there was the problem of Christians outside the empire. Leo's advice to his generals illustrates that he identified the state with the faith, yet moreover saw those Christians under Muslim rule, the erstwhile subjects of the empire, in a personal or familial sense as compatriots. Alternatively, take the case of the Bulgarians settled in northern Macedonia, Thrace and to the north, whose conversion to Christianity was followed by the reincorporation of these areas into the empire. The Roman approach to the Bulgarians illustrates, firstly, that the Byzantine Romans thought that Christians *ought* to be Romans in the political sense and, secondly, that many Christians could never be considered as Romans in the ethnic sense.

Converted in the 860s, the Bulgarians existed for a century and a half as a Christian state outside the political boundaries of the Roman empire, something not really accounted for in Byzantine Roman theory. The Romans clearly considered the independent Bulgarians to be nevertheless somehow under their hegemony: Byzantine Roman writers repeatedly characterised Bulgarian attacks on the empire as revolt, and the correspondence

⁶¹ Cf. *DAI*, Proem 31–48. ⁶² *Leonis Tactica*, PG CVII: col. 828. ⁶³ Hylland Eriksen 1993: 62–4.

between Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos and the Bulgarian tsar Symeon in the early tenth century shows that the Romans were aware of the combined political and religious aspects to their rule. Mystikos stated that the Bulgarian church came under the control of the patriarchate of Constantinople, and this implied that they should also be subservient to the emperor; moreover, the emperor naturally owned dominion over the west.⁶⁴ The independent Christian Bulgarians thus constituted a novelty and an anomaly, and the Byzantine Roman response was to incorporate them politically as well as religiously: Basil II 'the Bulgar-Slayer' achieved final victory for the Byzantine Romans over the Bulgarians a century later in 1019. Christian and Roman had been brought into the appropriate harmony once more.

But this harmony was strictly limited to the political Roman identity and, both before and after their incorporation into the empire, the Bulgarians failed the Roman ethnic identity test. To the Byzantine Romans, the advance of peoples from the north to settle the Balkans and the Greek peninsula was an all too familiar model; typically these were disorganised peasant populations seeking land to settle and the Bulgars, although more organised than other groups on the move, fitted this quintessential barbarian model. Such non-urbanised journeyers from the outside were more or less expected by definition to be pagan.⁶⁵ The converted 'pagan who accepted Orthodox Christianity ceased, in theory, to be a barbarian'.⁶⁶ More precisely, though, once the Bulgarians were Christianised they entered a shadowy zone that was ideologically neither fully Roman nor fully barbarian: Leo VI described them as τοῖς 'Ρωμοῖκοις ἐπ' ὀλίγον μεταβάλλοντο ἤθεσι, 'almost assimilated into the Roman way of life' (my emphasis).⁶⁷ Even after becoming part of the empire, the Bulgarians only fell into the Byzantine classification of inferior, peripheral Romans which has already been noted. In the view of the Constantinopolitan elite they constituted a familiar type: politically Roman but perhaps not ethnically or culturally, and Theophylact, archbishop of Ochrid in the late twelfth century, remains the classic witness to this attitude.⁶⁸ Notable in this regard was the new usage by writers from the eleventh century of *mixobarbaros* with reference to the mixed populations in the northern Roman-Bulgarian zone: intermarriage and the mixing of cultural traditions had made some people hard to classify.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Ahrweiler and Laiou 1998: 148–53. ⁶⁵ Ahrweiler and Laiou 1998: 5–6, 11–15.

⁶⁶ Obolensky 1971: 355; also Ahrweiler and Laiou 1998: 5–9. ⁶⁷ *Leonis Tactica*, PG CVII: col. 960.

⁶⁸ Mullett 1997: 266–77.

⁶⁹ Stephenson 1999: 82–3; Stephenson 2003: ch. 6. Note that these people of mixed ethnicity are classed by the Romans as basically within the outgroup, 'them'; cf. Hylland Eriksen 1993: 64.

People like the Bulgarians, who were subjects of the empire and converts to Orthodoxy but nevertheless failed the ethnic test as Romans, were one anomaly. Subjects who were Christian but not Orthodox also failed the test, people like the Armenians and Syrians, who re-entered the empire in great numbers as a result of the Macedonian reconquests of the ninth and tenth centuries.⁷⁰ Many of these Armenians and Syrians were Monophysite Christians, believing in the single nature of Christ as opposed to the dual nature upheld by imperial Orthodoxy, and as well as this doctrinal distinction there were key differences in ritual. Attitudes to these heterodox churches varied, with some (often including the secular authorities in Constantinople) favouring a pragmatic tolerance that might lead to assimilation, and others – the hierarchy of the Orthodox church – favouring the forcible imposition of Orthodoxy. In these disputes we should note again a contrast between the capital and the provinces; it was inevitable that most Armenian and Syrian worshippers lived in Asia Minor and Syria, and there is evidence that in the regions there was a local tolerance of heterodoxy that was in stark contrast to the fundamentalist Orthodoxy of the church leaders in Constantinople.⁷¹ The Monophysite churches presented a challenge to the role of Byzantine Orthodoxy within the imperial state, and the varied response to this challenge shows that the Orthodox identity remained subject to debate. Moreover, in the response to these heresies, we see a refining of the elite ethnic Roman identity as necessarily Orthodox and Greek-speaking in contrast to the heterodox religions and languages of the immigrants.⁷²

The response to the non-Orthodox eastern sects provided the model for the response to heterodox westerners, who eventually presented the most serious threat to the model of Orthodox ecumenicity incorporated within the Byzantine Roman imperial model.

When the Franks took Constantinople and the empire in 1204 the fact of religious difference between east and west was already a familiar point of dispute. The formal schism between the eastern and western churches, initiated in 1054 when Cardinal Humbert of Rome and Patriarch Michael Kerularios of Constantinople mutually excommunicated each other, had at first created few problems in practical relations between east and west.⁷³ Western aggression then inflamed the situation: in Norman southern Italy the Orthodox rite was ousted in favour of the Latin rite, and the crusader states in Outremer followed this Norman lead in instituting the Latin

⁷⁰ Cheynet 1990: 384; Dagron 1976.

⁷¹ Kolbaba 2001: 122–6.

⁷² Dagron 1976: 213–15.

⁷³ Runciman 1955: 39–50.

rite and a Latin religious hierarchy and ousting the incumbent Orthodox churchmen or at best tolerating them as a parallel hierarchy. The resulting dual patriarchate was a perpetual reminder of the schism, as witnessed by the vitriolic attitude of Theodore Balsamon, Orthodox patriarch of Antioch under the Angeloi.⁷⁴ Then again, the increasing proximity of and congress between westerners and Romans in Constantinople and other ports and cities turned the formal differences in religious ritual into issues of grievance. Increased tension is reflected in the new genre of tracts directed 'against the errors of the Latins', and it is noteworthy that in these comparatively early days these tracts focused most on everyday differences – how to sign the cross, the Latin use of unleavened bread and so on – and little was made of the larger issue of papal supremacy. Christianity was a vital aspect of the Roman ethnic identity, and as the Romans came up against the existence of an alternative view of Christianity, their sense of tension is expressed in an emphasis on the criteria of Orthodoxy.

However, the increasing independence and activity of the papacy added another area of tension, as the movement for papal reform impinged on the eastern Romans and their church. The papacy was now promoting itself as having a unique authority over the Christian world that had divine origins; this implied a monarchical model of the papacy which was not only perilously close to that of the emperor of the Romans, but also downplayed the conciliar model of clerical authority favoured by the eastern church.⁷⁵ Long-standing differences on the relationship between the eastern and western churches came into sharper focus and assumed real political significance in the eleventh century. The issue of supreme papal authority emerged as the major sticking point between the churches, as can most clearly be seen in the controversy over the *filioque*.⁷⁶

In its rendering of the creed into Latin, the western church had come to speak of the Holy Spirit as proceeding from the father *filioque*, 'and the son', and this constituted an addition to the older Greek creed, naturally still current in the east. The two versions of the creed implied very different views of the nature of the Son within the Holy Trinity, and both sides found it difficult to find middle ground. Just as important, however, was the conflict between papal and conciliar authority. The Latin church was highly disinclined to countenance any revision of papally approved doctrine while, from the other side, the Byzantine Romans, firstly, could not ignore the fact that additions to the creed had been formally disallowed by the

⁷⁴ Angold 1995: 502.

⁷⁵ Papadakis 1994: 17–67; Nicol 1979a: 141–4.

⁷⁶ Runciman 1955: 30–2.

Council of Ephesos in 431 and, secondly, firmly upheld that any doctrinal debate could and should only be settled with a general council of the church of which the pope was only one of the five patriarchs. Thus, differences in religion played an important part in the ever widening gulf between Latins and Byzantine Romans. Both the political and the ethnic Roman identities became clarified in the sense of threat produced by the contrast with the newly energetic western church, which firstly constituted a challenge to the supreme imperial identity of the empire of the Romans and, secondly, gave extra emotional weight to a variety of differences between eastern and western Christians that became more provocative as contact between the two groups increased within the empire.

Once again, however, we should beware of viewing the Byzantine Roman world as a uniform whole. It was initially divergences of opinion *within* the Orthodox world which caused issues of ritual to become controversial within Byzantium, as a result of the influx of Monophysite Christians into the empire with the reconquests in the east. In the eleventh century, Patriarch Michael Kerularios' focus on incorrect usages first arose because of the desire to impose uniformity on the large Armenian community newly integrated into the empire; Armenians and Latins shared some of the practices of which the Orthodox Romans disapproved, and the Latins picked up some of the opprobrium attached to Armenians because of these shared practices. The imperial appeal for western help, with the concomitant need to conciliate the westerners, fostered such internal disputes, and in turn exacerbated tensions with the west.⁷⁷

The alternative versions of Christianity, met first within the empire and then to a more extreme extent in the west, fostered a defensive Orthodox identity that impacted on the Roman identities in a variety of ways. Within the empire, Orthodox Christians might be seen as more fully Roman than the minority churches that attached to minority ethnicities, despite the full political integration of these ethnic groups. Then again, as the boundaries of Christianity and of the empire became increasingly dissimilar, Orthodoxy became more important as a constituent of the ethnic Roman identity. Hence, in the eastern border zone, Christians could be viewed as Romans in contrast to the Muslim Turks, and this is a clear issue in the epic of *Digenes Akrites* where the hero's father, a Muslim emir, converts to Christianity on his marriage to a Roman (and therefore Christian) girl. Orthodoxy here presents as a necessary constituent of Roman-ness but, importantly,

⁷⁷ Kolbaba 2001: 122–6.

conversion does not suffice to make the emir a Roman.⁷⁸ As with Saracens in Anatolia, so with the Slavs and others in the Balkans. Newly converted Slavs or Bulgars became Orthodox Christians, but other ethnic prejudices precluded naming them Romans; here the spread of Orthodoxy inculcated a religious identity focused on Constantinople that did not need to take account of political loyalty and was in a sense a rival to the political Roman identity.

Finally, just as there was conversion in the east, so the negative reaction to westerners was not universal – on the periphery of the empire, some Romans adopted Latin religious practices, as the writings of aghast churchmen testify.⁷⁹ On the actual borders of the empire and of the faith, the Orthodox Christian identity was negotiable. By 1204, it was clear that being Christian was not the same as being Roman, and that religious allegiance to Constantinople need not be accompanied by political loyalty. Politically loyal non-Orthodox Christians were a known phenomenon, as were Orthodox Christians not politically subject to Constantinople. The Franks of 1204 represented a wholly new anomaly in the nexus of political and religious identities only in that they constituted non-Orthodox rulers. How would this impinge on the Byzantine Romans' sense of themselves?

Language and literacy

The other fundamental criterion of the ethnic Roman identity was the use of the Greek language, and here again the Franks of 1204 presented something new, in that Greek ceased at least in part to be the language of rule. However, if the Greek language was an expression of the unity of the Byzantine Roman empire, it was also an important factor in its underlying disunity in the years before and after 1204.

While Latin had at all times been dominant in the west of the ancient Roman empire, in the east Greek had always existed as at least a parallel language which, although it had had its political role within the ancient cities of the east, was above all the language of everyday exchange and of cultural discourse. In the third century AD, Greek speakers were content to see Greek as the language of that brand of educated sophistication which was the incomparable gift of Hellenism to the empire, and Latin as the language of that imperial power which promised security for the cultured life.⁸⁰ Once the east had taken on a discrete political existence, over the three centuries from the death of Constantine to the death of Heraklios

⁷⁸ *Digenes Akrites*, Grottaferrata version iv. 46–7. Cf. de Boel 2003: 161–2. ⁷⁹ Angold 1995: 511.

⁸⁰ Dagron 1969; also Goldhill 2002: 74–80.

(AD 337–641) the Greek language effectively ousted Latin in the eastern empire to become the language of political power as well as of culture.⁸¹ In illustration of this, it is notable that Emperor Heraklios ceased using all the multiple and celebrated Latin titles of the emperor, in favour of the Greek *basileus* ('emperor'), which had been unofficially customary in the east since the time of Constantine.⁸² Greek was also the language of religion. Although the early church councils of Nikaia and Chalkedon were both opened with a speech in Latin from the emperor, the debates were conducted in Greek; at the Council of Ephesos in 431 a Latin letter from Pope Celestine had had to be translated into Greek. With its reputation in philosophy, Greek was the natural choice for theological argument; it was also the most useful common language for the widely spread church hierarchy.⁸³

Thus, alongside the imperial and religious facets of the Byzantine Roman identity, there was also the linguistic. Greek was the language of the empire, if anything becoming more dominant with the contraction of the state to its oldest Greek-speaking centre. Although in the late twelfth century the empire was far from monoethnic and monoglot, the balance had nevertheless shifted in favour of the Greek Aegean and away from the more diverse eastern Mediterranean; moreover, while the state must have remained fundamentally multilingual, this was not seen as a positive aspect of empire.⁸⁴ In the ethnic Roman identity, then, the speaking of Greek played a fundamental part.⁸⁵

However, the use of Greek also played a part in internal division within the Byzantine Roman world. This is shown even in the survival of Latin influences within the eastern empire. In the second half of the tenth century, Symeon the Logothete (known as Metaphrastes) undertook to rewrite the lives of the saints. Most saints' lives had provincial origins and were written in popular Greek, and Symeon rewrote them in a higher register. Where the provincial originals have survived, it is possible to gain an insight into provincial Greek at the end of the first millennium, and to compare hagiographical texts written before and after this 'Metaphrastic' process. This has revealed that Latinisms were always more current in the further-flung areas of the empire; a purist and exclusive pride in speaking Greek was thus always strongest in the Constantinopolitan elite, while Latin retained a stronger hold in the socially disadvantaged provinces.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Dagron 1969: 39–42. ⁸² Chrysos 1978. ⁸³ Dagron 1969: 48.

⁸⁴ Charanis 1959; Dagron 1994: 219–23. ⁸⁵ Bryer 1981: 97. ⁸⁶ Kahane and Kahane 1982: 132–4.

This was just one aspect of a linguistic divide in the empire that mirrored social divisions and was inculcated by education. There was a wide spectrum of literacy within the Byzantine Roman world and we need to distinguish between, firstly, the vast majority in the empire who received no education at all, secondly, those few who were taught in the elementary schools of provincial towns to read and write in the Greek they spoke, and finally the tiny minority who advanced further to study in Constantinople and become acquainted with the ancient models.⁸⁷ As a result of the vast gulf of learning between the ruling elite and the mass of the populace, the Greek of the Byzantine Roman empire existed in a state of diglossia – which may be defined as a situation where at least two variants of the same language are used under different conditions by at least some of the speakers of that language.⁸⁸

Modern Greek, which we may briefly examine for illustrative purposes, represents a classic example of diglossia.⁸⁹ Ancient and modern Greek are clearly closely related, yet fluency in either will not guarantee fluency in the other. After the revolution of 1821, the founders of the modern Greek state inherited a popular spoken language (*dimotiki*) that was – of course – very different from ancient Greek. Fired with a belief in the continuity of the Hellenic people from ancient times, they attempted to ‘cleanse’ the *dimotiki* of foreign influences and to regularise grammar and vocabulary along ancient lines, with the aim of creating a so-called ‘purified’ (*katharevousa*) form of the language. Despite all efforts, though, *katharevousa* was not able to displace *dimotiki*, and the end result was diglossia, with *katharevousa* used for more formal situations (politics, literature, religion, education etc.) and demotic for everyday communication.⁹⁰ *Katharevousa* is typical of a linguistic ‘high’ form, in the situations in which it is employed, its greater grammatical complexity and its prescriptive, formally taught, acquisition; it is furthermore by its nature a written language. Conversely, *dimotiki* is learnt spontaneously, is less standardised, sets the phonological norms for both varieties and is the spoken language (though in the last century this dichotomy of spoken and written has naturally broken down). A high form is thus typically the language of prestige while the low is dismissed as crude and unsophisticated.

A remarkably similar situation can be observed in the Byzantine Roman context, where education had the potential to open up to a writer a whole

⁸⁷ Browning 1978b: 46–52; cf. also Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 120–33; Ševčenko 1981.

⁸⁸ Ferguson 1959. ⁸⁹ Horrocks 1997: ch. 17; Beaton 1994; Mackridge 1990.

⁹⁰ Mirambel 1937; also Browning 1983: 111–13; Mackridge 1990.

new range of styles beyond the spoken Greek learned in childhood.⁹¹ To progress beyond basic literacy in the spoken Greek a student needed to be in Constantinople, where the educational programme imparted a value system that placed worth on the antique and disparaged the model of the spoken tongue as debased and uncultured; the educational process militated against writing as one spoke, and all written language tended towards archaic models of grammar, syntax and even vocabulary.⁹² This type of diglossia had been a factor in the eastern empire since its birth; however, from the late ninth century, under the Macedonian dynasty's rediscovery of Hellenic learning, the linguistic gulf was widened under the influence of the impulse to archaism. Huge numbers of ancient texts were copied in the new cursive bookhand, and these served as the exemplars for contemporary style from the tenth century until the end of the empire. Commentaries on the texts served as schoolbooks, so that every reasonably educated person was imbued to some extent with the style of the ancient writers. The Metaphrastic approach was part of this wider Hellenising movement: Symeon Metaphrastes reworked the hagiographical texts, introducing obsolete forms like the dual or optative, scattering Attic particles and reworking simple prose into rhetorical flourishes. Under the Komnenoi dynasty (from 1081), the process only intensified: Anna Komnene and Niketas Choniates exemplified the learned style that could verge on the incomprehensible in its striving towards archaic complexities, and which was surely only truly appreciable by a tiny minority – Choniates, after all, was paraphrased into easier Greek in the fourteenth century.⁹³ Thus we see a complex and exceedingly prestigious high form, formally acquired and associated with literary production, accompanied by a low form which was the naturally acquired spoken language, devoid of prestige and only limitedly recognised as a written style. Education and language were thus an integral part of the elite Constantinopolitan Roman identity – and another factor that divided capital and provinces.⁹⁴

It is true that there was always a wide spectrum of literary styles in the Byzantine Roman world; at the close of the twelfth century the archaic classicising style was, as ever, by far the most prestigious by virtue of its alien complexities, but there were other accepted ways of writing. From the latter part of the ninth century, there had developed a second register for

⁹¹ Browning 1983. Beaton 1987 comments on choice of register as indicative of status; see also Beaton 1996: 2–5 for the low status given to early vernacular works in Greek.

⁹² Wilson 1983: 18–27 summarises the educational programme. Major cities like Thessaloniki also at times had superior institutions, cf. Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 121.

⁹³ Wilson 1983: 4–8; Browning 1978a: 119–21. ⁹⁴ Magdalino 1993b: 320, 389.

written Greek that was something of a midpoint between the classicising style and the everyday, spoken, language.⁹⁵ Thus, in the tenth century, Constantine Porphyrogenitos had written his *De administrando imperio* and *De ceremoniis* in a consciously unpretentious mode which he explicitly described as ‘everyday and conversational narrative’ in contrast to ‘an Atticising style’, and this kind of contrast went back at least to the Roman imperial period.⁹⁶ Kekaumenos, writing in the later eleventh century and like Constantine ostensibly for his sons, made a similar point, as did Leo VI in his *Taktika*. Such men scarcely wrote in conversational language; rather, they pursued a middle way of an educated Greek which did not wholly avoid contemporary usages and was based rather on the Greek of the early church as opposed to that of the golden age of Athens. This style would still require to be formally taught.⁹⁷ A similar style of educated, non-Atticising, Greek was employed in the ‘political verse’ which became popular from the eleventh century. This decapentasyllabic (fifteen-syllable) metre may well have been in use as early as the eighth century and, although employed within the imperial court, almost certainly arose from the vernacular (i.e. uneducated) milieu.⁹⁸ Under Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80), John Tzetzes employed political verse for his works on Homer and ancient Greek mythology, works composed for high-ranking ladies of the imperial court who perhaps lacked the learning for the originals; Constantine Manasses wrote his historical *Chronicle* in political verse for the same audience.

The literary *koine* of Tzetzes and Manasses is a polished style, but verse was also employed under the later Komnenoi, for the first time, for works in something approaching the vernacular, ‘low’, form of Greek. The origins of the Anatolian border epic *Digenes Akrites* are moot, but there is clearly a strong vernacular element in the telling of the story, which probably reflects an oral tradition.⁹⁹ More conclusive are the *Poems of Poor Prodromos*, generally attributed to Theodore Prodromos, and the poems of Michael Glykas. Both men were writing around the middle of the twelfth century and both were capable writers in the high style; indeed, both writers employ a mixture of registers in these poems. However, more than any writer hitherto, these poems employed language which must have been close to the actual spoken Greek of the time.¹⁰⁰ Vernacular writing of this

⁹⁵ Browning 1982: 51; Ševčenko 1981. ⁹⁶ *DAI* 48.11–2. Swain 1996.

⁹⁷ Browning 1978b: 118; Browning 1980: 102–5; also Horrocks 1997: 165–6.

⁹⁸ Jeffreys 1974; and with E. Jeffreys 1984: 334–6; also Beaton 1996: 98–100.

⁹⁹ Horrocks 1997: 261–5; Beaton 1996: 30–51, 95.

¹⁰⁰ Browning 1983: 75–9; Horrocks 1997: 265–71; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 83–6.

type was to become ever more popular, and it also moved away from the capital and into the provinces.

Thus twelfth-century Constantinopolitan literature encompassed the extremes of the heights of Atticising style and the new phenomenon of vernacular literature. Could this too be symptomatic of strain within the Byzantine Roman identity? It has been held that Byzantine Roman diglossia was not a socially divisive issue, in contrast to the modern Greek situation, and it is true that for centuries diglossia presented no challenge within the Roman state.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, in the context of the twelfth-century crisis, the rise of vernacular literature can be taken as one indicator of diglossic strain within Byzantine Roman society.

More than ever before, this was a monoethnic and monolingual society of speakers of Greek; at the same time, this was a period of increased and problematic contact with outsider groups who did not speak Greek, and language is always one of the first identifiers of difference. Thus the Greek language became more significant as a way of identifying one beleaguered group against the threatening others, and the spoken form of the language had the potential to be viewed as something like a national language. More than that, as cracks grew in the imperial identity, the spoken language could be seen as a vehicle for alternatives to the old conservative order; it has been speculated that Manuel I Komnenos, an emperor more innovative than most, may have encouraged work in the vernacular.¹⁰²

Other identities? Hellen and Graikos

Hellen was the name the ancient Greeks had given to themselves when they thought of themselves collectively rather than as citizens of distinct city-states. In the Christian Roman empire, *Hellen* was in contrast negatively associated with the pagan faith and learning of the Greek east: *Hellen*, with its cognates, was synonymous with paganism from at least the fifth century. This pagan association was strong enough to permit the application of the term to Saracens by John Moschos in the sixth century and even, by virtue of their infidel status, to the Chinese by Michael Psellos in the eleventh.¹⁰³ While *Hellen* was for centuries limited to this derogatory usage, related vocabulary was closely associated with the Greek language and here had more mixed connotations. There were negative associations, with Greek as

¹⁰¹ Browning 1978a: 121. ¹⁰² Browning 1978a: 123.

¹⁰³ *PG* LXXXVII.3, cap. 133, col. 2996D and CXXII, col. 788B. Cf. also 'Hellene' in *ODB*, II: 911–12.

the language of paganism within the eastern empire, but this vocabulary could also be used positively in relation to language and the literary arts: Gregory of Nazianzenos was, for example, able to use ἑλληνίζω (*hellenizo*) to denote the speaking of good Greek alongside ἑλληνικόν (*hellenikon*) for idolatry.¹⁰⁴ These conflicting associations were to persist throughout the life of the empire; Michael Psellos exemplifies the educated Byzantine's ambiguous attitude well, being careful not to exalt the Hellenic explicitly while also using Hellenic wisdom as a mirror for the critique of his own times.¹⁰⁵

Despite its negative connotations, Hellenism – the association with the ancient past of Greece of which the Atticising literary style discussed above was one aspect – remained of huge importance into the twelfth century, again to the elite of Constantinople. The Hellenic past formed the lens through which all intellectual endeavour was focused; the one exception was necessarily Christian theology, although even this played a part in the Hellenic revival under the Macedonians and Komnenoi. The Byzantine Romans' reliance on the classical past for their model of the world, their genres and their terminology has been seen as a 'distorting mirror' that impels us to see them as wilfully conservative and their state as unchanging. However, the classical mirror also allowed for a safe mode of critique of contemporary life at the same time as providing a comforting feeling of continuity and stability.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the vocabulary of Hellenism retained its derogatory overtones of paganism alongside its positive associations with literary culture, and all Byzantine Roman intellectuals had to tread carefully to avoid accusations of Hellenism – that is, of heresy – in their reliance on or reference to the classical corpus. A particular danger lay in the use of Plato or Aristotle for theological argument. John Italos, despised by Anna Komnene, was caught like this and as a result the anathema against 'those who devote themselves to Hellenic studies and, instead of merely making them a part of their education, adopt the foolish doctrines of the ancients' was added to the Orthodox *Synodikon*. However, as the anathema shows, study of the ancients was always permitted – as we have seen, it was the very stuff of all education beyond the basic.¹⁰⁷

The Hellenism of the twelfth century had distinctly humanist overtones, with a new willingness to engage with contemporary life and a growing

¹⁰⁴ Gounaridis 1999: 55. ¹⁰⁵ Wilson 1983: 157ff.; Kaldellis 1999: 117–31.

¹⁰⁶ Mango 1975; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 139–41; Macrides and Magdalino 1992: 151–3.

¹⁰⁷ Papadakis 1994: 176–80; Wilson 1970: 71.

importance for the individual.¹⁰⁸ It is clear that the Byzantine Romans now felt closer to the ancients: Eustathios of Thessaloniki put the Homeric heroes in a contemporary context, Anna Komnene compared her father Alexios I Komnenos to Herakles. Whereas 'the classical past had been regarded as alluring but alien . . . in these centuries Byzantine identification with the hellenic past became firmly rooted'; it has been suggested that this assertion of a close relationship with a past and culture whose worth seemed irrefutable was a response to the growing sense of insecurity in a world newly threatening.¹⁰⁹ It has also been suggested that a new fondness for Greece, the home of Hellenic culture, can be detected in writers of the mid and late twelfth century, alongside the customary derogatory comments about provincial lifestyles.¹¹⁰ Moreover, an increased familiarity with the peoples of Italy and the rival 'Holy Roman Empire' of the Germans could make the ethnonym 'Roman' more problematic and so promote the search for an alternative self-identification.

In the twelfth century, then, some Byzantine Roman writers started to use *Hellen* as a name for themselves, and this surely denotes a more strongly felt emotional link with their ancient forebears among the literate elite. In the 1150s George Tornikes explicitly contrasted the Hellenes, as his people, with the barbarians (mostly Latins) who were being employed by the emperor Manuel. Most writers of the twelfth century were less direct. Anna Komnene uses *Hellenes* predominantly for the ancients; however, her use of τὰ Ἑλλήνων ('the language of the Hellenes') for the language spoken by the group with which she identifies herself and from which she wishes to exclude the foreign heretic Italos is self-identifying, even though the primary reference is to the learning and style imparted by study of the classics.¹¹¹

In the fifty or so years before the Fourth Crusade, then, there was a growing identification with the ancient Hellenes on the part of some Byzantine Roman writers, whereby *Hellen* was employed to promote the status of the Byzantine Romans by association with a glorious past, and as a contrast to the *barbaros*. This was by no means universally or consistently done: Eustathios of Thessaloniki speaks in a sermon of Hellenising as constituting a moral and indeed Christian desirable contrast to barbarian bestiality, and this startlingly novel association of the Hellenic and Christian

¹⁰⁸ Magdalino 1991: 13; Kazhdan and Constable 1982: 113–15.

¹⁰⁹ Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 133, 137 and in general 133–41; Macrides and Magdalino 1992: 154–6.

¹¹⁰ Magdalino 1991: 13–15; Macrides and Magdalino 1992: 141–3.

¹¹¹ Darrouzès 1970: 129.2–7; Leib 1937–45 II: 37.2–3; see Magdalino 1991: 10.

is indeed a sign of the rehabilitation of the Hellenic. However, in his account of the fall of Thessaloniki Eustathios never characterises the Byzantine Roman defenders as Hellenes, even though the Normans are freely named as barbarians.¹¹² *Hellen* is employed in Eustathios' *Capture* only to denote the ancient Greeks and, while on both occasions a contrast is drawn with *barbaros*, no contemporary parallels are drawn with either the attackers or the defenders of Thessaloniki.

We may conclude that the elite Byzantine Romans of the twelfth century felt a closer bond with the ancient Hellenes, such that the Hellenic could be held up as an example and, on occasion, they could assert an identification with their predecessors for rhetorical effect. In the context of an increasing feeling of alien encirclement, the classical contrast between Hellene and barbarian was beguiling, and could well remain so for the term of the beleaguered empire. It is, especially, the perceived increasing acceptability of *Hellen* as an alternative ethnonym under the Palaiologoi that has been cited by Greek nationalist historians as evidence of proto-nationalism. Outside the Constantinopolitan elite, however, perception of the ancients was very different, and there is evidence from the medieval to modern period that the popular conception of the Hellenes was as a mythic race of the past, giants in stature: this can rest as a tribute to the remnants of their grandeur which littered the countryside of the empire.¹¹³

In the early centuries of the empire, *Graikos*, the term derived from the Latin name for the ancient Hellenes, was quite widely used as a less derogatory replacement for *Hellen*. As late as 800, Theodore Stoudites used *Graikos* for the inhabitants of the empire, rejecting *Rhomaïos* as attaching only to the emperors, in an early confirmation of *Rhomaïos* as having a primary political reference to the imperial institutions.¹¹⁴ However, from the ninth century onwards the term fell into disuse, suffering by association with the western practice of calling the inhabitants of the empire *Graeci* and their ruler the *imperator Graecorum* ('emperor of the Greeks'). The Byzantine Romans felt this to be an insult, in denying their Roman imperial heritage, and there is evidence that some at least in the west intended it as such – Liutprand of Cremona, a German ambassador to Constantinople in 968, knew the 'Greeks' looked on this form of address as *peccatrix et temeraria* ('wrong and thoughtless').¹¹⁵ The term did not disappear; interestingly, it is used once in the *De administrando imperio* for the non-Slavic inhabitants

¹¹² Magdalino 1991: 11. ¹¹³ Vacalopoulos 1970: 18, n.6. ¹¹⁴ Gounaridis 1999: 58.

¹¹⁵ Becker 1915: 200, section 47. For *Graikos*, see Magdalino 1991: 9–10; Angelov 2007: 95–6.

of the Peloponnese in the ninth century, although this may be a reflection of the Slavic source used by the compilers of the work and therefore not really a self-identifying term.¹¹⁶ In the twelfth century *Graikos* is barely used by Byzantine Roman writers: this had become the vocabulary of the enemy.

BEFORE 1204: A CRISIS OF IDENTITY

Hélène Ahrweiler has described the fall of Constantinople in 1204 as semi-inevitable, arising out of the problematic condition of the empire at the close of the twelfth century.¹¹⁷ Not the least among the many problems facing the empire of the Romans in the years leading up to the Fourth Crusade was a crisis of its received ideologies and identities. Although the political ideology of the supreme and unique emperor ruling over his body of civilised, Christian, subjects superior in kind to all other earthly associations remained (despite many vicissitudes) basically unchallenged as the twelfth century drew to a close, yet beneath the surface there were numerous and challenging tensions.

Some of these problems were far from new, being perhaps inevitable in the diverse Roman state. Thus there was friction between the ideal of uniformity across the empire and the actuality of diversity, in culture, language and status. The Byzantine Romans were used to the presence within the state of those who were in the formal sense outsiders. Of course, the eastern Roman empire had come into being as multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-faith; and indeed, the internal variety of the empire had made it a theologically pleasing model of the universal kingdom of God. In the early middle ages, ethnic homogeneity was not prized; there was a tolerance, if not expectation, of multi-ethnicity.¹¹⁸ As time went on, and under the pressure of invasions from the southern Muslims and northern nomads, the empire had contracted by the time of the Komnenoi to become ever more characteristically 'Greek', in language, faith (i.e. Orthodoxy) and other cultural phenomena. Nevertheless, other ethnic identities were always present and it does not seem that the Byzantine Roman state thought it appropriate to extirpate this 'other' within, even if there were occasional exceptions, with attacks on Latins intermittent and Jews and Armenians subject to more sustained harassment.¹¹⁹ Particularly in Constantinople and all the major cities and ports of the empire

¹¹⁶ *DAI* 228.6; Vryonis 1999: 30. ¹¹⁷ Ahrweiler 1975: 94.

¹¹⁸ Pohl and Reimitz 1998: 68–9; Bartlett 1993: 236–42.

¹¹⁹ Ahrweiler and Laiou 1988: vii–ix; Angold 1995: 503–10.

people would have been used to different languages, to different styles of dress and to intermarriage between Romans and others. There were the barbarians in the imperial guard and other ethnic units in the imperial army – under the Komnenoi the employment of foreign mercenaries had increased markedly and their presence was felt throughout the empire.¹²⁰ There were the merchants from both east and west, and there were significant Jewish communities. There were diplomats and embassies in the capital, and there were monasteries reserved for non-Roman Christians. Under the Komnenoi, again, westerners had risen to important posts in the imperial service. Moreover, along with these various reasons for residency went the necessary arrangements for differing faiths and legal mechanisms: minority Christian churches, synagogues and mosques, separate courts and judges.¹²¹

So much for ethnic heterogeneity within the empire. Turning to views of the outside world, by the twelfth century the characteristic Byzantine Roman attitude to the aliens outside the empire was one of wary contempt – especially to those from the west – and this was a defensive response to the growing threat from outsiders, added to the ingrained sense of cultural superiority. The immediate roots of this went back to the late eleventh century, when a conglomeration of circumstances had combined to produce a new distrust of the west; this had prompted a particular response from the then new emperor Alexios I Komnenos.¹²²

The Normans of Sicily invaded Byzantine Roman Epiros in 1081, fixing the archetype of the bellicose westerner in the Roman imagination – an archetype to which Anna Komnene's compelling portraits of Robert Guiscard and Bohemond bear witness. Alexios looked for support to Venice, historically quasi-subject to the empire, giving the Republic substantial trading concessions in return for naval aid and effectively initiating the commercial hegemony of the Italians within the empire. The First Crusade bolstered the warlike image of the westerners and, in the establishment of the crusader states of Outremer, gave new outlets for western mercantilism. The crusades, as well as the establishment of Venetian trading posts throughout the empire, also simply brought huge numbers of westerners into the Byzantine Roman sphere, highlighting all the little differences in religion and behaviour. The Romans could not help

¹²⁰ Magdalino 1993b: 175–6, 231–3.

¹²¹ Haldon 1999: 225–7; Adler: 1907; Papadakis 1994: 144–7; Magdalino 1993b: 221–3; Ahrweiler and Laiou 1998: 171–8 on the Venetians before 1204; also Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 172–7.

¹²² Ahrweiler 1975: 82–3; Shepard 1988: 94–116.

but acknowledge the trading ascendancy of the Italian mercantile cities and the ambitious military dynamism of the western crusading nations. The response was not always hostile: Manuel I Komnenos clearly hugely admired aspects of the western way of life. However, his importation of westerners into the court and administration and his perceived favouring of westerners over native Romans built up a wave of resentment that exploded on his death: Andronikos I Komnenos surged to power on a wave of anti-Latin fervour that resulted in massacres in Constantinople. This anti-Latin feeling was, however, not necessarily so strongly felt outside Constantinople – provincial Romans did not necessarily share the Constantinopolitans' prejudices against Latins and, in contrast to the elite of the capital, the businessmen of the provinces often welcomed the new market eager to buy their wine, oil and other products.¹²³

Yet many Byzantine Romans were beginning to fear the west. In contrast to the benign others of the *De administrando imperio*, under the Komnenoi westerners were reclassified as violent and inimical barbarians.¹²⁴ For Anna Komnene, the Sicilian Normans were 'a foreign, barbaric race', and they were also barbarians for Eustathios of Thessaloniki. In the twelfth century, the Norman sacks of Corinth and Thebes in 1147 and Thessaloniki in 1185, the Venetian raids of the 1180s undertaken in reprisal for the massacres under Andronikos I Komnenos, and the progress of the Second and Third Crusades in 1147 and 1189 which seemed to threaten Constantinople itself, can only have reinforced this negative perception.¹²⁵ There was violence in the westerner, but there was also organisation and power; it was more and more difficult to reconcile the vigorous actuality of the west with the image of inferiority demanded by the imperial ideology. The Romans felt vulnerable, before a combination of military might, economic pre-eminence and a certain raw and hostile vigour.

Combined with this nascent sense of vulnerability, it is moreover clear that there were dangerous frictions of identity within the empire which were based on economic and social status and had a strong geographical aspect. The apparently monolithic sense of Byzantine Roman imperial identity was in fact the identity of a privileged elite who would have been identifiable to their contemporaries by their obvious marks of privilege and wealth, by their educated language and by their attachment to the capital, Constantinople. The contempt of the Constantinopolitans for the

¹²³ Cheynet 1996: 80–1.

¹²⁴ Shepard 1988: 96–8.

¹²⁵ Jeffreys and Jeffreys 2001: 108–10, 116.

provincials was an attitude often marked by linguistic reference, particularly perhaps with reference to southern Greece, which was known to be the geographical home of so much of the Hellenic wisdom exalted by the elite, and an epigram of the tenth century expresses it well: 'Not the land of barbarians, but Hellas itself has been barbarised in speech and in manner'.¹²⁶ As far as Constantinopolitans were concerned, provincials were scarcely to be distinguished from foreigners. In the new shrunken empire the phenomenon of diglossia was expressive of this divergence of interests between provinces and capital. There was also divergence in the perspective on foreigners. To many people on the borders of the empire, Constantinople's rivals might offer security and protection in contrast to the centralised power of the empire which seemed to them to be all about taking with precious little granted in return: thus, when the Seljuk Turks captured land in the Maeander valley, some subjects of the empire voluntarily migrated to live under Turkish rule.¹²⁷

On the eve of the Fourth Crusade, then, the Byzantine Roman empire could reasonably be said to be in crisis. The Angeloi dynasty that had succeeded the Komnenoi in 1185 had proved ineffectual, violent and corrupt. The sheer poor quality of the emperors had weakened the Romans' faith, if not in the time-honoured imperial system, then at least in those aspects of its application that were responsible for calling down God's displeasure upon them. This crisis of imperial rule added to the other strains which were undermining the supposed certainties of the Roman identity. Militarily, the empire was under pressure with the successes of the Turks in the east, the Normans in the west and the Bulgarians in the north. Politically, the pre-eminent status of the empire seemed to be at risk with whatever sense of deference the west had retained steadily declining and the papacy taking on a quasi-imperial universalist role. Moreover, internally, the capital Constantinople was dangerously out of step with the provinces, which, overtaxed and underbenefited by imperial rule, were seeking separatist solutions. The political Roman identity which was central to the ideology and elite superiority of the ruling class seemed less appropriate or appealing to provincials, making them likely to search for other identities. Economically, the Italian mercantile communities were becoming increasingly necessary to the empire as business intermediaries and as a source of naval power. Spiritually, the autonomy and tradition of the eastern church

¹²⁶ Cited in R. M. Dawkins, 'The Greek language in the Byzantine period', in Baynes and Moss 1948: 265. See also Magdalino 1984; Magdalino 1993b: 111.

¹²⁷ Cheynet 1996: 70–83.

were under attack from the claimed supremacy of the papacy, and the lack of equivalency between the empire and the Orthodox commonwealth was becoming acute. Culturally, the move towards a positive Hellenism suggests at least a dissatisfaction with existing modes of thought. Ideologically, the comfortable contrast between superior Romans and benighted barbarians no longer seemed to fit, either in international relations or yet in the day-to-day contact with others in the streets of the empire. In sum, the Byzantine Romans felt beleaguered, by the perceived failings of their own system, and by the west. How would the events of 1204 – which may reasonably have felt like a justification of all the Romans' worst suspicions of the west – affect their sense of themselves?

CHAPTER 3

Niketas Choniates

Niketas Choniates stands at the cusp of the period of the late twelfth century, which was considered in the last chapter, and the period of the Frankish conquests. He is an impressive writer, and an exemplar of the educated Byzantine Roman, writing complex Greek in the ancient style, and referencing the classics as well as Biblical sources in a display of extreme erudition. He served the Komnenoi and Angeloi emperors at the highest level, and lived through the sack of Constantinople in 1204 and subsequent exile. Choniates can therefore serve as a marker of much that was typical in Byzantine Roman attitudes at the dawn of the thirteenth century, while also giving valuable insights into the shock of the events of 1204. This chapter is the only one which looks at a single source, and it is intended to serve as a model for the approach to be followed in future chapters, showing how the usage of particular items of vocabulary can be used to elucidate patterns of thought. Additionally, Choniates may in this way be used to illustrate the patterns of thought outlined in the last chapter, and at the same time be set as a template against which we can measure developments in later writers.

Niketas Choniates was born around 1155 in Chonai, a small city in the Maeander valley near the modern Denizli in western Turkey, which was very much in the frontier zone with the Seljuk Turks (it would be lost to the empire within his lifetime). His was not an aristocratic family, but it had useful connections, and he was godson to Niketas, the Bishop of Chonai (*History* 285). He had a much older brother, Michael, born around 1138, of whom he can have seen little in his early years, as Michael went to Constantinople to pursue a career in the church when Niketas was just in his third year (Michael, *Monodia* 347).¹ The contacts made by Michael

¹ Michael Choniates' *Monodia* was written in memory of his brother and provides substantial biographical detail: Lambros 1879–80: 345–66; also useful are Michael's letters (Kolovou 2001), Niketas' own letters and speeches (van Dieten 1973), and the *History* (van Dieten 1975).

in the capital were obviously useful, as Niketas followed his brother to Constantinople in around 1164 at the age of just nine. From now on and into his adulthood Michael must have been a strong influence, overseeing his young brother's education. Unlike Michael, however, Niketas made his career in the imperial civil service. His first post was as a revenue officer in Pontos at some time before 1182 (Michael, *Epistles* 3), and he may have served in a similar capacity in Paphlagonia (Michael, *Epistles* 5). His next known post is as an undersecretary at the court in Constantinople – this was probably during the reign of the young Alexios II Komnenos (1180–3), under the regency of Maria of Antioch (Michael, *Monodia* 349). In 1182, Michael Choniates left Constantinople to take up his post as bishop of Athens; the brothers probably never met again.

The accession of Andronikos I Komnenos in 1183 was a disaster for Niketas. Still in his late twenties, he had begun to establish himself in a steady career at the imperial court; however, he now withdrew from the court, apparently in protest at Andronikos' repressive style and his demotion of many bureaucrats in favour of his own men, who were typically of humbler origin (*History* 276–7; Michael, *Monodia* 349–50).² Niketas is characteristically scathing about these new men, and it is possible that his retirement was more of a push than a jump. However, he returned to court when Isaak II Angelos took the throne in 1185, and was clearly in favour as he gave an oration to celebrate Isaak's marriage to Margaret-Maria of Hungary in 1185 or 1186 (*Oratio* 5). Probably around this time, he married a girl from the Belissariotes family (Michael, *Monodia* 350).

In 1187, Niketas was on campaign with Isaak against the Bulgarians and Cumans; a couple of years later he was promoted and, around this time, he was made governor of the cities of Thrace (*History* 397; Michael, *Monodia* 350). In this capacity, he was a close witness to the disastrous and damaging progress through Thrace of Frederick Barbarossa and his army on the Third Crusade (*History* 408–9). According to his own account, Niketas was at odds with Isaak over his policy towards the Germans, and was instrumental in persuading him to release the German ambassadors held by the empire in protest to the Germans' aggressive actions in Thrace (*History* 409–10). However, the *History's* glowing portrait of Barbarossa and scathing account of Isaak are much at odds with the tone of Niketas' rhetorical works from the period, and the *History's* account may well have been polished up with the benefit of hindsight.³

² Angold 1984b: 270. ³ Harris 2003: 137–41; Magdalino 1993b.

His career continued to prosper. He is known to have been the ‘judge of the velum’ and an ephor, probably in the early 1190s (*Oratio* 1); the content of these posts is not known, but they probably involved financial administration of the imperial estates. By 1195, Niketas had been appointed ‘logothete of the sekreta’ (Michael, *Epistles* 44), which was pretty much the head of the civil service answering directly to the emperor; speaking of other holders of the office, Niketas shows that this was a very influential post with the opportunity for enormous personal gain.⁴ He lost this post in 1204 when Alexios V Mourtzouphlos briefly seized power (*History* 565), and by the time the crusaders took the city he described himself as a senator.

Niketas’ eyewitness account of the fall of the city is deservedly well known (*History* 587–94). Abandoned by their servants and leaving their beautiful home burning behind them, he and his heavily pregnant wife escaped only with the help of a Venetian friend; they had to disguise themselves as captives of this friend. On the way through the city, Niketas successfully defended a girl from rape at the hands of a western soldier (*History* 590–1). It is a beautiful and tragic account of personal loss and, more widely, a lament for the fate of Constantinople itself, which to Niketas seems to stand for everything great and wonderful about the Byzantine Romans.

Having escaped from the city, Niketas was horrified by the contemptuous treatment he and other refugees from the city received from the ordinary people of the countryside (*History* 593). He and his family went first to Selymbria in Thrace, but after the Bulgarians took Philippopolis in the summer of 1205 this region became too dangerous, and they returned to Constantinople. Here, Niketas was able to see something for himself of Latin rule in the city, and his account of individuals like the Latin patriarch Thomas Morosini is clearly that of an eyewitness (*History* 647). Staying in Constantinople for around six months, Niketas finally moved to Nikaia at the close of 1205, where Theodore I Laskaris was beginning to establish a government to replace the imperial court. Niketas did not receive a particularly warm reception (*History* 645), but eventually picked up some work as an orator (*Orationes* 13, 16, 17) and worked on theological works and on his history. The latter remained unfinished on his death in around 1215.⁵

Niketas Choniates is now best known for his monumental history, ‘one of the greatest literary masterpieces of Byzantine historiography’, though a

⁴ Angold 1984b: 130; Magdalino 1993b: 252. ⁵ Magoulias 1984: ix–xvi; *ODB* 1: 428; van Dieten 1971.

substantial theological anthology and several speeches also survive.⁶ This *History*, which was mostly written before 1204 but completed in Nikaia, begins with the death of Alexios I Komnenos in 1118 and continues through to the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. It is remarkable for its elegant, highbrow style, rich in both classical and Biblical references, and also for Choniates' incisive critique of the failures of Byzantine rule under the Komnenoi: in many ways this is his attempt to explain why the city fell to the Latins in 1204.⁷ Alongside the work of John Kinnamos it constitutes our major source for the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, and Choniates also provides a useful corrective to the better-known western accounts of the Fourth Crusade by Geoffrey de Villehardouin and Robert de Clari. Several copies of the history are known to have been made, and the work was known and respected by later Byzantine Roman historians.

Intelligent and perceptive as he was, Choniates had no doubts about the essential strength and rightness of Roman imperial rule, while the fall of the City, which he witnessed, was cataclysmic for him. His history exalts the Byzantine Roman state while at the same time providing a penetrating critical analysis of its failings under the Komnenoi and Angeloi. It should be borne in mind, however, that Choniates was at the heart of this failing state at its nadir. As a historian, he says enough about the authoritarianism and corruption of other leading civil servants, and it is clear from his account of 1204 that he himself, the lad from Chonai, had done very well out of his career. When Andronikos I Komnenos sacked many of the existing civil servants in 1183, this was in an effort to counter the waste and corruption perceived at the heart of government; Choniates returned to office under Isaak II Angelos, when 'the old abuses became more flagrant... open corruption became the order of the day'.⁸ It would of course be impossible and unfair to blame Choniates for all the failings of the state he helped to lead, but it is surely accurate to say that Choniates wrote an awful lot better than he administered, and this was perhaps recognised in Nikaia. Choniates' reputation is nevertheless now high, thanks to his *History*.

In his approach to identity, Choniates is very much a writer of the twelfth century. He shares much of his outlook with earlier historians such as Anna Komnene or Eustathios of Thessaloniki, seeing the world as divided into Romans and barbarians, and the Byzantine Roman state

⁶ Fryde 2000: 64 and in general 63–6; *History*: van Dieten 1975, English trans. Magoulias 1984.

⁷ Harris 2000; Magdalino 1983; Kazhdan and Franklin 1984: 256–86; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 225–30; Angold 1995: 132–3.

⁸ Browning 1980: 135.

as uniquely imperial and superior. Choniates has generally been seen as fundamentally anti-Latin but, in fact, westerners were more peripheral to Choniates than this and they served more as tools to highlight strengths and weaknesses in the Byzantine Roman state, which was of so much greater importance to him.⁹ Nevertheless, his was a limited analysis: although he was brought face-to-face with the social and cultural divide between capital and provinces in and after 1204, this is not a strong theme in his critique of imperial rule. His focus and interests in the *History* are thoroughly Constantinopolitan, despite a close personal connection both with his homeland in Anatolia and with southern Greece, where his older brother Michael was archbishop of Athens in the decades leading up to the Latin conquest.¹⁰

CHONIATES: THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL IDENTITY

As noted in the preceding chapter, the vocabulary of *Rhomaïos* was the most important self-identifying tool for Byzantine Roman writers, and so the following analysis of Choniates' approach to Roman identity will focus above all on his use of this vocabulary. In fact, Choniates makes a more liberal use of the vocabulary of Roman-ness than any other writer under consideration in this study: the *Rhomaïoi* play an important part in his *History*, as this is his history and analysis of the fall of the *Rhomaïoi*, of the Byzantine Roman empire. The *Rhomaïoi* can be individual subjects of this state, but the term overwhelmingly signifies the state, both as a concrete fact and as an ideal.

Choniates' conception of Roman identity is overwhelmingly political: Romans are those who live in the Roman empire and who expect to be ruled by a Roman emperor. This sense of loyalty does not preclude revolt against the ruling emperor at any particular time, revolt which inevitably leads to the establishment of a replacement emperor; it is loyalty to an institution and an ideal. The Romans are the object of rule, they are the essence and embodiment of the empire. Thus, like his predecessors in the twelfth century and before, Choniates uses *Rhomaïoi* and its associated vocabulary to denote the empire, the state, as a collective identity of its subjects.

The primacy of the political Roman identity can be illustrated by a quantitative analysis of Choniates' use of the terminology of Roman-ness, where the collective sense comes through strongly in his use of both the

⁹ Harris 2000: 29–31. ¹⁰ ODB 1: 427–8; Fryde 2000: 63–7.

genitive ('*x ton Rhomaion*') and plain formulas (see [Appendix 1](#): pp. 286–289).

Of over 150 uses of the genitive formula, 135 have clear political associations. The commonest partners in the formula are βασιλεύς (*basileus*: emperor) and πράγματα (*pragmata*: affairs). As noted above, back in the tenth century, Constantine Porphyrogenitos made frequent use of the formula '*basileus of the Romans*'. Also appearing more than twice are ἀρχή (*arche*: rule), βασιλεία (*basileia*: imperial rule or majesty), σκήπτρα (*skeptrā*: sceptres, i.e. imperial rule), αὐτοκράτωρ (*autokrator*: emperor), βασιλεύων (*basileuon*: imperial ruler), ἄναξ (*anax*: lord) and ἐπικράτεια (*epikrateia*: province). All of these uses presuppose a collective understanding of the Romans as the necessary object of imperial rule and, with the exception of *pragmata*, have a specific association with political authority. Also important to Choniates is geography: ὅρια (*horia*: borders) and γῆ (*ge*: land) also both appear more than twice. The emphasis on *horia* reflects the vulnerability of the borders of the empire in Choniates' time – more than with any of our later writers the territorial extent of the empire is crucial to him – yet these uses of the formula in a geopolitical context rely on a collective understanding of *Rhomaioi*. The phrase ὅρια τῶν Ῥωμαίων means 'borders of the Romans', whereby the 'Romans' in a collective sense represent the state, even in its concrete, geographical, expression. This use is mirrored in the usage *ta Rhomaion* of Choniates' contemporary Eustathios of Thessaloniki, noted in the preceding chapter.

Choniates' use of the adjective *Rhomaïkos* has a slightly different emphasis, with over half of the occurrences having military connotations; however, χώρα (*chora*: land) is the noun most commonly used with the adjective, and ἐπαρχία (*eparchia*: province), κωμοπόλις (*komopolis*: town), σχοίνισμα (*schoinisma*: portion of land) and *horia* also occur more than once, confirming the importance of the territorial aspect of the collective Roman political identity. *Arche* also occurs twice with the adjective.

Some of the military usages of *Rhomaioi* can also be understood to have collective application: the military is after all a concrete expression of state power. Thus, 'heavy-armed Roman troops' (540.2) means here simply military assistance from the Byzantine Roman state, and this is a collective political identity. However, it would be a mistake to understand all military uses in the collective sense, as some clearly refer to specific armies or limited actions. Contrast, for example, 'the Romans were terrified and recklessly took to their heels' (567.4–5), which refers to specific troops involved in an engagement – this is not the whole state defeated and fleeing in terror.

Moving on to other uses of the plain formula, Choniates' usage here broadly supports the thesis of a primary collective political identity. Out of over 400 occurrences, at least half have political associations, with around 40 per cent of the overall total clearly denoting a collective identity as the state under the rule of the emperor of the Romans. Thus, the Romans make treaties, engage in war, send embassies, prosper or go into decline and so on just as they had been seen doing in the tenth century in Constantine Porphyrogenitos' *De administrando imperio*.

The primacy of the collective sense is above all illustrated by the fact that Choniates continues to use the plain formula in much the same way when narrating events after 1204 – in other words, after the fall of the empire. For example, in his account of these years he speaks of the Bulgarians overrunning 'all the western dominion under Romans' (612.53–4) when it is abundantly clear that this territory can in no sense now be within a Roman-ruled state, as by this stage – around February 1205 – the Latins were well established in Constantinople and Thessaloniki. Again, Choniates speaks of Latin authority being established over 'both the eastern and the western areas under Romans' (609.87, see also 612.36–7). The sense is clear, even though taken literally this is practically a self-contradiction, and here we clearly see the importance of the territorial aspect of the collective Roman identity. This land, historically ruled from Constantinople, is naturally thought of as Roman despite the facts, and for Choniates *Rhomaioi* necessarily has – even needs? – a territorial dimension.

This outlook revealed in Choniates' use of the terminology of Roman-ness can be detected in the foreign policy of the Komnenoi, showing Choniates to be very much a man of his time. As we have seen, Alexios I and Manuel I expected, whether realistically or not, that the crusaders should return to the empire any captured territory that had historically been part of the empire; similarly, John II and Manuel I both took the opportunity in their ceremonial entries into Antioch to underline the Byzantine Roman suzerainty of the city; again, Manuel I tried to restore southern Italy to the empire. At some level, therefore, Asia Minor, the cities of the crusader states and even Italy might be thought of as, essentially, land 'under Romans', whatever the facts of the situation. This is the mindset in which Choniates spent his working life, and it emerges strongly in his account.

It is clear that when dealing with events after 1204 Choniates continues to use *Rhomaioi* in much the same collective way as before, even though it is moot whether there was an empire of which these people could be the collective expression. At the very least, Choniates' continued use of the

terminology in this way and in this context indicates the fundamentality of the political understanding of Roman identity as, even without a substantive empire in a ruling position, the Romans were clearly considered still to have a collective identity.

Nevertheless, this kind of usage for the period after 1204 raises the question of an ethnic Roman identity. The post-1204 identity must logically be assessed as in some sense ethnic rather than political, given that the complementary ruling institution necessary for the identity as a collectivity of subjects is now lacking. There must be something else that makes these Romans Roman, and it is therefore worth looking more closely to see if any ethnic content can be found in Choniates' usage.

CHONIATES: THE ETHNIC IDENTITY

Firstly, Choniates' tortuous treatment of the Latin empire of Constantinople and its Latin emperors reveals that he certainly is working with an ethnic understanding of Roman-ness alongside the political and collective.

Choniates clearly had enormous problems with accepting the Latin empire as in any sense a valid *basileia Rhomaion* (empire of Romans), and this is a phrase he never uses in the post-1204 context. As for *basileus Rhomaion* (emperor of Romans), after the fall of the City this is applied to no one without qualification. The most that Choniates does is to grant that the Latin emperor Baldwin (598.82–3), Manuel son of Isaak II Angelos (599.25) and Theodore Laskaris of Nikaia (625.53–6) were each 'proclaimed' emperor of the Romans. Thus, in his account of the aftermath of the crusade, Choniates makes no clear statement of imperial rule over the Romans – even by his own ruler Laskaris. It is worth pointing out that Choniates thoroughly accepted Laskaris' position as emperor of the Romans in his other works written in Nikaia, but then history-writing was a franker genre than imperial panegyric.¹¹

Choniates seems able to accept Baldwin as an emperor, but not as emperor of the Romans since, even though the Franks are now accepted as emperors in Constantinople, they are notwithstanding never unequivocally called 'emperors of (the) Romans'. It is surely their simple Latinity that precludes this. The ethnic Roman identity is at work here, and it is in conflict with the Roman political identity. Significantly, Baldwin of Flanders is repeatedly given the title *basileus*, though without the qualifier 'of (the) Romans' (e.g. 614.84, 615.11, 620.60). One may assume that the

¹¹ Cf. Choniates on Isaak II, Harris 2003: 137; Magdalino 1993b: 482; Angelov 2007: 64–5.

fact of ruling as an emperor from Constantinople was enough to ensure some acceptance of Baldwin and his successors, no matter how strong the prejudice against Latins; it is moreover clear that the western conquerors played up themes of continuity to encourage loyalty among Romans, with the Latin emperors adopting the imperial regalia and symbols and in return being feted by many of their Roman subjects.¹² At times, moreover, Choniates displays some acceptance of the Latin empire, and even suggests that certain Romans could be understood to be legitimate subjects of this empire. Thus, those Romans who fought against the Latins after the fall of the City are frequently characterised as rebels (e.g. 614.83, 618.7–8, 632.21): this ascription clearly signifies their subject status although, at the same time, Choniates clearly does not expect or want his compatriots to submit to the Latins. Ironically, this attitude on Choniates' part, implying that these Romans were subjects of the Latin emperor in Constantinople, is probably a reflection of the strength of the Roman political identity, in which the rule of an emperor from Constantinople was so much a part.

It is possible to detect ethnic associations in individual instances, like the 'Roman guides' and the 'Roman soldiers' respectively used and rejected by Boniface of Montferrat in 1204–5 (604.50, 612.49–50). These individuals who were willing to assist their new western ruler would clearly not consider themselves subjects of any nascent Byzantine Roman successor state. They were or wished to be subject to the Latins, but a description as 'Roman' could not usefully be employed to denote this submissive attitude. Thus this use of 'Roman' has nothing to do with political status, and these *Rhomaioi* were so called to denote their ethnic origin, to distinguish them from the Latin subjects of the Latin lords. For Choniates, this is a striking example of Roman identity divorced from any political loyalty.

Along similar lines, in the aftermath of the fall of the City Niketas bemoans 'the indifference of the Romans in the east for their suffering compatriots' (625.24–5); thus there were Romans in Nikaian Anatolia and Romans in the European provinces united by *genos* but not by any formal political or administrative institutions. The disaster of the crusade, then, highlighted the fact that ethnic identity did not need to coincide with political affiliation or with residency.

This ethnic identity becomes evident in these post-1204 usages: that is, once the effective removal of the political identity allowed the pre-existing ethnic aspects of being Roman to come out into the open. However, this

¹² Lock 1994: 302–4.

kind of ethnic signification, untouched by political associations, is only rarely to be detected in Choniates' account of the years before the fall of Constantinople. Usages that can at first sight seem ethnic can also be understood, without any emphasis on descent, as denoting the fact that the individual(s) concerned are subjects of the Roman state though, obviously, this is not necessarily unmixed with ethnic connotations. Contrasts between Romans and Germans or between Romans and Venetians, or between Latins and Romans in accounts of the friendly jousts between Latin non-subjects and Roman subjects of Manuel, in this way seem predominantly to serve to signify contrasting political allegiances (e.g. 63.24, 85.43–4, 109.87–8). *Rhomaioi* is also employed unequivocally to signify 'those ruled by the emperor', for example at 203.58, 364.47 or 410.71.

However, when Choniates' account of the years before 1204 touches on ethnic borders, the ethnic sense of being Roman is occasionally apparent or at least possible. Mixed-ethnic situations in the twelfth century included Corfu (85) or areas in north-west Anatolia (198, 251). The uses of *Rhomaioi* in each of these cases could be understood to denote subject status, but there may be more to it as these areas were on the margins of the empire and far from secure. Such usage may thus emphasise people's ethnic Roman status in contrast to people of other ethnicities living in close proximity to them.

More conclusively, note the account of the merchants from Seljuk Ikonion, 'Ρωμαῖοι τε καὶ Τοῦρκοι ('Romans and Turks'), who, being present in Constantinople, were both equally arrested by Alexios III Angelos in reprisals against the Seljuk Turks of Ikonion (493.85). The Roman merchants seem to have been treated more as Turks than as Romans because they were from Ikonion. They were perhaps considered to have more connection with and sympathy towards the Turks whom they lived under, but were nevertheless still recognised and named as Roman for some reasons – perhaps their religion, or the fact that they were related to Roman families within the state – which were certainly ethnic.

Given the strong signification of the collective Roman identity as the state and territory ruled from Constantinople, it is also illustrative to examine Choniates' treatment of those groups who were resident in the empire but were nevertheless not Roman. Resident westerners were one problematic example. Could families of western origin who had lived in the City, perhaps through several generations, be considered Roman? The answer for Choniates was, in the last analysis, no – and the reasons for that answer can only be ethnic. Choniates says the Venetians at Constantinople were viewed 'as compatriots and as altogether Roman' (171.51), nevertheless

it is abundantly clear that they were on the contrary both identifiable and identified as different from Romans, as this comment comes in the prologue to his account of the 1171 mass arrest of all Venetians within the empire. There could, then, be subjects of the empire who were ‘altogether Roman’ in the political sense, but nevertheless not Roman in another, crucial, sense. Another example were the members of the Varangian Guard, clearly imperial subjects and loyal to the empire, who were barbarian, non-Roman and explicitly contrasted with Romans (cf. 572.70–1). Choniates does not go so far as to call these ‘altogether Roman’, which raises the question of degrees of non-Roman-ness, to be further discussed below.

Choniates’ description of the Anconans resident in the empire as having equality with those τῷ γένει Ῥωμαίων, of Roman descent, is another clear contrast of Roman ethnic identity with political identity (202.41–2). Most explicit of all is his account of the repressive regime of Andronikos I Komnenos, whose death decree he describes as

putting virtually all Romans (τὸ Πανρῶμιον) under the death penalty and doing away with not only those who were descended from Romans (δύπόσοι Ῥωμαίων προήλθοσαν) but also with people of foreign descent (ἐξ ἑθνῶν). (338.78–80)

Here, ‘the whole Roman populace’ should be taken to denote the collective imperial identity inclusive of both those who were Roman and those who were non-Roman in the ethnic sense, while ‘those of Roman descent’, contrasted with ‘many of foreign descent’, literally emphasises the importance of birth for an ethnic Roman identity. Choniates thus does not expect the empire to be made up only of ethnic Romans. He is working within an assumption that the empire should be heterogeneous and multi-ethnic, even though he only accepted that with reservations because of the concomitant potential for disorder – ‘the rabble of Constantinople . . . was composed of diverse nations and one could say it was as fickle in its views as its trades were varied’ (233.71–234.3). In this acceptance of ethnic diversity he had more in common with his predecessors than with those who were to follow him.¹³

As shown above, Choniates had a strong sense of Roman land, that is, land that belonged or had recently belonged to the empire and of which it was expected that the residents would typically be Roman. Put another way, for Choniates Romans lived in the area ruled by the Roman emperor – or, more problematically, in areas which should be ruled by

¹³ Cf. Eustathios of Thessaloniki: Magdalino 1993b: 175–6.

the Roman emperor. Thus, it was true that certain Romans lived in areas which, though now lost, had historically been part of the Roman empire and, it was thought, would one day again be part of it. This kind of 'ideal' extent of the empire perhaps only really encompassed those parts recently lost, although the foreign policy of the Komnenoi is enough to show that the Byzantine Romans could have long memories with regard to historically imperial territory. However, although Choniates is unclear about the precise boundaries of the Roman empire (actual or ideal), within the territorial extent of this empire people were likely to be considered Romans in some sense, and ethnic criteria like religion, language and dress might be key in distinguishing Roman people from others in the border areas of the empire.

The examples of the resident Venetians and Anconans have shown that the ethnic criteria of Roman-ness could supersede the political criteria of residency in, and even loyalty to, the empire. However, Choniates also shows that ethnic criteria might not be enough on their own to give Roman identity. The key passage in this respect is his treatment of the island-dwellers of Lake Pousgousae (Lake Beyşehir) in south-west Asia Minor, with whom he deals in his account of the reign of John II Komnenos (1118–43). This area was now far closer to Seljuk power than to Roman, and these islanders were Christians who had of course historically been Romans within the Roman empire, and were definitely within the ideal extent of the Byzantine Roman empire. However, these people inevitably had come to have more to do with their near neighbours, the Turks of Ikonion, with the result that they had established a firm friendship with these Turks and did a lot of business with them. Choniates says that this resulted in a change of allegiance, such that, when John II Komnenos came to liberate their territory from the Turks, these islanders thought of the Romans as their enemies. John II had to compel them to accept imperial rule, and Choniates comments that this shows that 'custom, strengthened over time, is stronger than race or religion' (37.89–93). This example shows that ethnic criteria might not on their own suffice if the political identity were entirely lacking. For once, Choniates gives some hint of the content of the Roman ethnic identity – religion and race, or birth.

This example strongly reinforces the importance attached by Choniates to the political identity and the necessary components of that identity. Becoming used to dealing with the neighbouring Turks, these people finally allied themselves against the Byzantine Romans and on the side of the Turks; they had fundamentally rejected allegiance to the emperor and no longer held themselves to be a part of the empire. For all their

geographical location, their historical identity as subjects of the empire and their Christianity, Choniates therefore withheld the name of Romans from them, in what on balance looks like a denial of the ethnic as well as the more obvious political identity. He was happy to name them instead as 'Christians' (37.88), and this is a useful reminder that, in the face of the converted Balkan nations and the western Christians who were ever harder for the Romans to ignore, the empire had had to acknowledge the fact that it was no longer the unique nation of Christendom. Choniates was at ease with the idea of Christians outside the empire, but he refused to countenance Romans who had rejected the empire. As far as Choniates was concerned, it was thus possible to cease to be a Roman in every sense via the rejection of imperial rule. This was Choniates' response to the provincial separatism of the twelfth century.

This ideology did not necessarily facilitate acceptance of the Byzantine Roman successor states after 1204, which were in many ways the heirs of separatist movements. However, the events of 1204 inevitably undermined the fundamental importance of imperial allegiance within the Roman identity, and brought into the foreground the ethnic Roman identity dependent on more than just political allegiance. For one thing, after 1204, there were at least three rival Roman successor states as well as the Latin empire laying claim to Roman loyalties. In these circumstances, it became easier, even necessary, for the ethnic Roman identity to become detached from the political and to suffice alone.

In conclusion, Choniates was working with the traditional imperial ideology, wherein the emperor was a uniquely significant figure, qualitatively different from any other ruler, and consequently the state over which he ruled was also unique. This state was physically manifested in two associated ways. Firstly, the empire was imagined to have a territorial extent and, secondly, it was a group of people: the *Rhomaioi*. The primary qualifications for being a Roman in this political sense were twofold:

- firstly, there should be an acceptance and expectation of the rule of the emperors as an ideal (this did not debar support of rival claimants, or living outside the limits of imperial rule providing there was an expectation of the restoration of imperial rule); and
- secondly, this acceptance and expectation should be inherited within the family. The political identity must be transgenerational: Romans belonged to families who were Romans in the territorial and political senses before them, and they should expect that their posterity would also be Romans in a like sense after them.

This political Roman identity clearly has strong ethnic content in being transgenerational and self-ascriptive, but Choniates also has an ethnic understanding of the Roman identity operating alongside the political. This ethnic identity emerges on occasion in Choniates' account of the years before 1204, but the ethnic Roman identity is allowed to emerge much more strongly than before in his account of the immediate aftermath of the fall of Constantinople. This was inevitable given the pressure on the Roman political identity resulting from the loss of the City and the end, however temporary it might prove, of Roman imperial rule. Yet, in an understandably confused presentation, there is nevertheless in Choniates' account of the years after 1204 still evidence of the political understanding of identity revolving around loyalty to the emperor in Constantinople, even though the emperor was a Latin, and above all else this shows the fundamental importance of the political identity in Choniates. Finally, Choniates relies on certain markers to indicate the transgenerational ethnic identity existing independently of the political, but these come out most clearly via his presentation of contrasting non-Roman identities, which will be discussed shortly.

OTHER FORMS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION

While *Rhomaïos* is by far the dominant term used by Choniates for the group with which he identifies himself, he also makes use of 'we', *Hellenes* and *Graikoi*.

We

For Choniates, 'we' generally denoted the Romans, with all the same political connotations, and it is used in a parallel way. Thus, 'we' is used in a military context, e.g. 'our fortresses' (123.82), or 'our ships' (362.97). Alternatively, 'we' may denote the state in the familiar collective sense, and thus as 'we' the *Rhomaioi* again have 'borders' (361.86–7), or territory that is invaded (476.40–1), or are the objects of rule (529.29).

Uses of 'we' multiply in the context of Latin attacks. It is the Sicilian sack of Thessaloniki that prompts the first flurry of 'we' terminology (301–2), and these again proliferate in the account of the fall of Constantinople (from 585) and his summing up from 645. It is tempting to associate such favouring of the more personal 'we' with a heightened emotional response to events, but it could also reflect some unease with the political Roman identity given the fall of the state.

When Choniates relates his own flight from Constantinople in 1204, he naturally identifies the group he is with as 'we'. More interestingly, he goes on to make a contrast between the 'we' who were escaping from Constantinople and the other Romans living in the country, who took vicarious pleasure in the downfall of their erstwhile lords and masters: 'the rustic commoners mocked us who came from Byzantium exceedingly' (593.70–1). It is clear from what follows that 'the rustic commoners' were nevertheless to be viewed as *Rhomaioi*, as Choniates goes on to lay the blame for their bad behaviour down to their ignorance of the Latins, who treated Romans with contempt. Again, in his summing up Choniates reproaches his compatriots (ὁμοφύλοι) for their pusillanimity in the face of the Latins, as traitors who 'betrayed both the City and us' (644.56–60). He defines 'we' here as the members of the Senate, men of great wealth and influence (cf. also 562.56). It is clear from this, firstly, that he held himself and those whom he criticised to be alike *Rhomaioi* and, secondly, that he nevertheless personally identified most with the privileged circles of Constantinople and very little with the poorer provincial Romans. This is in line with the elite contempt for provincials familiar in the twelfth century and confirms that variations in status thus contributed to different kinds of self-identification within the wider Roman identity. However, if 'we' could denote a subgroup within the *Rhomaioi*, it could also signify a larger group, and Choniates additionally uses 'we' to mean humanity in general (e.g. 426.10).

Christian

Christianity is another arena for self-identification, not least as an essential element in Roman-ness. For Choniates, this Christian aspect extends into the fundamental political aspect of being Roman – thus the emperor is lord 'of all Christians' (43.55). At times, being Christian seems directly equivalent with being a *Rhomaios*, and this is most apparent in Choniates' account of the attack by Leon Sgouros on Athens in 1201, where the historian's brother Michael was archbishop and led the defence of the city against Sgouros. Sgouros was an example of the independently minded local dynasts who formed their own local dominions, rejecting rule from Constantinople and so, in this account, Choniates is dealing with another Roman (in some sense) who had explicitly rejected the political identity. Choniates has his brother say that Leo was

called a Christian and reckoned among the Romans . . . but a Christian with his lips only; though in dress and in speech he was a Roman, in his heart he was far removed from those who called themselves Christians. (606.87–90)

There is a contrast drawn here between the external appearance and internal reality of what it was to be a Roman. Both uses of *Rhomaïos* are ethnic here. In remarking on Sgouros' appearance and his Greek speech, Choniates is denoting the ethnic aspects which inevitably identified him as a Roman; however, his rejection of the political identity means that for Choniates – absolutely fundamentally – Sgouros cannot be a Roman. Once again, the political identity is given greatest weight. It had been the same with the Christian island-dwellers of Lake Pousgousae, whom Choniates refused to call Romans despite the ethnically Roman markers of their race and their religion. Again, this refusal to contemplate Roman-ness without the political identity is Choniates' response to provincial separatism in the years before 1204.

The examples of Sgouros and the islanders show that Choniates accepts that Christians need not be Romans, and the westerners of the crusader realms of Outremer in the middle east (39.53), the Russians (522.28), the Normans of Sicily (363.29) and the Germans (409.44–5) all similarly come under this heading. Interestingly, of these four only the Russians are explicitly friendly to the Romans; with all the others the concept of common Christianity is evoked to plead or to rail against inter-Christian conflict.

Greek

As outlined above, *Graikos* was familiar to the Byzantine Romans as a western term for themselves, and in earlier centuries had been used as an alternative to *Hellen*, given the latter's unfortunate overtones of paganism. By the twelfth century, however, the term had come to be hated as a derogatory term which was employed by uninformed westerners for the subjects of the empire, compared to their own proud name of Romans. This received point of view is exemplified by Choniates, who uses *Graikos*, often with satirical sarcasm, to provide a Latin viewpoint. Thus, the Germans of the Third Crusade and Frederick Barbarossa in particular are described as covetous of Roman wealth and longing to conquer 'the Greeks', whom they see as cowardly and effeminate (477.77–8). Again, in a passage immediately following the account of the desecration of the Church of the Holy Wisdom, the leaders of the Fourth Crusade are lauded as paragons of virtue compared to 'we Greeks' (575.68–9). Similarly, Boniface of Montferrat and Thessaloniki castigated his rival Baldwin, the Latin emperor, as 'more deceitful than the Greeks' (599.14–5). In each of these cases, Choniates evokes not only the westerners' name for the Romans, but also the stereotypical prejudices against them: *Graikos* is clearly as wrong a name as the westerners' prejudices are mistaken views.

Hellene

For Choniates, the *Hellenes* were writers, of misleading fables and of the noble art of history, and this mixture of the deprecatory and the eulogistic is, as discussed above, typical of the Byzantine Romans' complex attitude to the ancient Greeks. Historically, *Hellen* had signified pagan, as in Choniates' reference to the time of Constantine, while on the other hand there was much to admire in the literary heritage of the ancient Greeks (see 441–2). However, a strong element of self-identification in the use of *Hellen* emerges in Choniates' account of the fall of Constantinople and of the empire. Choniates directly and repeatedly identifies Romans and Hellenes:

Nor should I be singing out the accomplishments of the barbarians, nor passing on to posterity military actions in which Hellenes were not victorious. (580.87–9)

How can I devote the very best thing and the most beautiful invention of the Hellenes – history – to the recounting of barbarian deeds against the Hellenes? (580.94–5)

O Alpheios, Hellenic river . . . herald not the misfortunes of the Hellenes to the barbarians in Sicily. (610.16–611.18)

Choniates displays his learning with such classical references that have caught the modern eye for their identification of his contemporary Romans with ancient Hellenes: in the second example, he explicitly brackets together the ancient Greeks (as the inventors of historical writing) and the contemporary Romans assaulted by the barbarian westerners, naming them both *Hellenes*.

To the Byzantine Roman mind, the ancient Greek struggle against the invading Persians, the barbarians of the ancient writers, was an obvious model for a literary response to the contemporary invasion and conquest: thus Franks were naturally cast as barbarians and the defending Romans were Hellenes. This erudite conceit need not represent a whole-hearted ethnic identification, a claiming of identity between ancient and modern peoples. Choniates may well have personally identified with the ancient Hellenes, but this does not mean that he necessarily felt he was ethnically the same as them. The identification with the Jews, as the chosen people of God exiled from Jerusalem, is at least as strong in Choniates, and had a longer history in Byzantine Roman writing – however, the Byzantine Romans typically despised the Jews and certainly felt no individual or ethnic link with them.¹⁴

¹⁴ Angold 1995: 508–9.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Choniates expressed this metaphor with real feeling; the appeal to the Hellenic was more than mere symbolism to him in articulating his anguish at the fall of the City and the empire which had inherited the wisdom of the ancient Hellenes and had furthermore, to his mind, kept it alive through the education he and other educated Byzantine Romans had received. Choniates' Hellenic identification arguably illustrates the emotional weight attached to educated Hellenism by at least some of the educated Byzantine Roman elite, such that this was an important and meaningful part of their Roman identity.

Choniates also makes frequent use of the terminology of Hellenism in the linguistic context, describing language as 'Hellenic' or 'according to the Hellenes' and making a contrast with other languages. Once again, the non-Hellenic language is often characterised as barbarian (for example, 130.71, 508.65). However, this is not merely classical allusion: the more simply informative contrasts with western language, for example when dealing with the names of office-holders (200.88–9, 600.47–8), suggest that Choniates thought of his own language as Ἑλληνική (*Hellenike*). Yet he also makes reference to demotic forms, or 'the common language', suggesting a more complex language situation (for example, 134.85–6). This question of language in Choniates will become clearer once set alongside a consideration of Akropolites and Pachymeres (see below, pp. 127–9). We can say here that Choniates seems explicitly conscious of the cultural link with the Hellenic past, as a historian both writing in the language, and seeking to emulate the literary achievements, of the ancient Greeks. He is also aware of the diglossic situation within the empire, and steps outside the demands of educated style when clarity demands it.¹⁵

THE VOCABULARY OF OTHERNESS

For Choniates *barbaros* is the term of choice for any non-Roman, and he uses this item often with over 150 occurrences (see [Appendix 1](#): pp. 289–90). Practically all the other ethnic groups in his *History* are at some time called barbarian by Choniates – Turks (called either *Tourkoi* or *Perses*, Persians, in the classicising manner), Pechenegs, Armenians, Germans, Russians, Serbs, Venetians, Cumans, Hungarians, Saracens, Sicilians, Varangians, Vlachs and Bulgarians, the participants in the Fourth Crusade ... It is clear that for Choniates the world is divided into

¹⁵ Harris 2000: 26–7.

Romans on the one hand and barbarians on the other and, as discussed above, this is an essentially traditional outlook for a writer at the end of the Komnenian period – towards the end of his reign, Alexios I Komnenos made reference to the barbarians who threatened the Romans on all sides.¹⁶

This formulation can appear rather circular and empty – you are a barbarian if you are not a Roman, and a Roman is one who is not a barbarian; furthermore, it is hard to establish any purely Roman or purely barbarian features in Choniates' presentation. Romans were Christian, but so were many barbarians, some of whom were even Orthodox Christians – the Bulgarians, for example. Barbarians behaved badly, but so did many eminent Romans, not least several emperors ... Romans were loyal to the emperor and the empire, but then so were the quintessentially barbarian Varangian guard, at least as often as the most blue-blooded Romans. Romans dressed in a particular way and had traditionally Roman ways of living, but some barbarians shared even these; for example, the Venetian community in Constantinople and elsewhere in the empire, who were 'looked upon as natives and altogether Roman' (171.51).

Interestingly, though, Choniates does allow for degrees of barbarism or, in other words, of non-Roman-ness. Analysis of the space devoted to the different ethnic groups compared to the frequency with which they are called barbarians – what may be called the relative density of reference – reveals that Choniates is most likely to call the Varangians barbarian, followed by other northern peoples like the Cumans and Vlachs (or Bulgarians: Choniates makes no clear distinction between these two). Other northern groups, like Serbs or Russians, follow in roughly similar proportion to the Muslim easterners. The crusaders of 1204 follow some way behind Turks in terms of relative density, and specific western groups like Germans, Venetians, Sicilians and the established crusaders in Outremer are relatively highly unlikely to be called barbarian. Similarly, when Choniates has westerners fighting northerners or easterners, it is the latter – i.e. the Bulgarians or Turks – that are called barbarians, and it is noteworthy that not even their Orthodox Christianity under the patriarch of Constantinople can rescue such northern peoples from the category of barbarians in contrast to Latin westerners.

Choniates is surely relying here on the time-honoured prejudices against the northern incomers, perceived as non-urbanised and uncivilised. This matter of degrees of barbarism offers a window on the criteria of

¹⁶ Maas 1913: 352; cf. Magdalino 1993b: 27–8, also 487–8.

Byzantine Roman identity for Choniates, since the less barbarian a group was, perhaps it was more like the Romans. Being Christian was more Roman than barbarian, so Muslims were necessarily barbarian in contrast to other Christians. However, being Christian was not enough: the Bulgarians and Serbs, although Orthodox Christians, were still very much barbarians; the Latins were Christian, but could still be called barbarians. Operating here is a basic and binary sense of the Roman and non-Roman: given that the Latin crusaders were very clearly enemies of the Romans, such outright hostility demanded they be identified as the 'other' in the conventional Roman–barbarian opposition.

Behaviour, though, was also important, and certain characteristics are highlighted as typical of barbarians – arrogance (31.11), changeability (123.71–2), greed (e.g. 120.94–5, 413.53) and insincerity (124.3).¹⁷ Barbarism is also strongly associated with inhuman behaviour such that, even though Choniates gives plenty of insights into Roman brutality as well, he clearly considered inhumanity more typical of barbarians. Andronikos I Komnenos learnt brutality from foreigners (353.26–7), and in the account of the taking of the City uses of *barbaros* in application to the westerners are often associated with evil actions like pillaging (560.5–6, 649.80–1), violence (574.37–43) and attempted rape (590.1–2).

It is fair to say also that the demands of rhetoric have conditioned Choniates' presentation of the barbarian vis-à-vis the Roman, most noticeably with regard to the account of the disasters of 1204. It is in his exquisite and heart-felt laments on the fate of the City and the empire that the usage of the terminology of barbarism in relation to westerners multiplies where, as discussed above, the Romans are identified with ancient Hellenes and the westerners take up the role of the barbarians who had attacked the city-states of Greece. This ancient model feeds Choniates' presentation of the barbarian as the opposite of the Roman, as an encircling mass of largely undifferentiated foes. Thus, the typical sins of barbarians are presented as shared by the various groups, Christian and non-Christian, western, northern and eastern but, nevertheless, some peoples were more barbarian than others. Choniates' conception of 'the barbarian' devolved on geographical–political origin and elements of custom and behaviour, but was conventionally all-encompassing in a way that owed much to his intelligent readings of ancient authors and was well established in the Komnenian period.

¹⁷ Cf. Kazhdan 2001: 87–8.

The vocabulary of ethnicity

Choniates' use of *genos* and *ethnos*, while not so clear-cut, is suggestive of a broad distinction between *ethnos* – foreign, inferior and barbaric, and *genos* – non-alien, familial and often noble. It is not a straightforward division, as Choniates is happy to use *genos* or *ethnos* for the Romans, albeit with a slight leaning towards the former. He employs *ethnos* in the plural for all non-Romans; it is a general term for non-Roman states and peoples that often had Biblical overtones which contrasted the gentile nations with the Christian Romans (e.g. 199.53, 309.41–2). When Choniates uses *ethnos* for the Romans, it often has religious overtones – the Romans were 'the holy nation' (117.87) and the Russians gave them help as to 'a people of the same faith' (543.42). As these examples show, Choniates does not conclusively align *ethnos* with *barbaros*; however, *ethnos* is comparatively rare in the Byzantine Roman context. Rather, *ethnos* is typically employed in the plural and non-specifically, and often in explicit contrast to the Roman, whether in speaking of the enemies of the Roman or in deprecating the phillatinist policies of Manuel I Komnenos (204.86–7, 89). Saracens, Serbs, Hungarians and Armenians were all specific *ethne*, while westerners could definitely belong to *ethne*, but only in a generalised and plural sense (e.g. 170.24, 204.86); the term is never used for specific western subgroups. In contrast, *genos* is applied to such groups, as well as for, again, Romans, Turks, Serbs and others. Thus, Choniates uses *genos* both more widely, that is for more groups, and less generally: *genos* tends to be used expressly with a named group and is usually singular and specific, while *ethnos* is typically plural and general. Again, when *ethnos* is used specifically, this is with groups relatively most likely to be called barbarian; for application to Romans *genos* is preferred, and *genos* is less derogatory than *ethnos*. There is, then, an approximate correlation between Choniates' terminology of race and his terminology of barbarism.

In conclusion . . .

Choniates was very much a man of his time. In his presentation of the nature of Roman-ness, he illustrates the mindset of the educated Byzantine Roman elite that ruled Constantinople and the empire in the second half of the twelfth century. Like the emperors John II Komnenos and his son Manuel I, Choniates had an implicit belief in the Roman empire as a political entity with an ideal territorial extent that did not always match the reality. As Byzantine Roman writers had done for centuries, Choniates

saw 'the Romans', *Rhomaioi*, as the expression and reality of this political entity. As an individual, the most fundamental aspect of being a Roman was to be loyal to the empire; nevertheless, there were other aspects of Roman identity that existed alongside this political element. These ethnic elements of Roman-ness are most easily seen by contrast with the non-Roman barbarians, and they included being Christian, speaking Greek, living in an urbanised and civilised way and behaving in a humane manner. Choniates is moreover a voice of the educated elite; he does not and cannot speak for the less privileged internal 'others' of the empire.

Living and writing before and during the Latin conquest and occupation of 1204, Choniates is an invaluable bridge between the complacency of the twelfth century and the shocked necessity to address defeat and vulnerability after the fall of Constantinople. In his attempt to deal with the conquest, we can see him struggling with his established modes of expression as the tremendous blow dealt to the political Roman identity allowed new weight to the ethnic criteria of Roman-ness.

CHAPTER 4

The thirteenth century: ambition, euphoria and the loss of illusion

GEORGE AKROPOLITES AND THE RISE OF NIKAIA

George Akropolites and George Pachymeres both had strong associations with the Byzantine Roman state based in Nikaia, in Asia Minor, one of the two states of any consequence that arose among the Romans in response to the disaster of 1204.¹ The Empire of Nikaia was founded by Theodore Laskaris, a son-in-law of the emperor Alexios III Angelos. Escaping from the City in 1204, Laskaris had swiftly organised armed resistance to the Latins in Asia Minor where, thanks in large part to the tribulations of the Latin empire and despite having to deal with various rivals, he eventually organised something like a new imperial state in Nikaia. In 1208, on the appointment of a new ecumenical patriarch, he had himself crowned emperor. Fourteen years later he handed over a strong state to his successor John III Vatatzes, who brought the empire of Nikaia to its zenith.

The historian George Akropolites was born around 1217 to wealthy Roman parents in Latin-ruled Constantinople and received his early education in the City, before moving to Vatatzes' Nikaia in 1233 to complete his education (Akropolites, *History* 46.12–15). He comments that his father wanted to 'release him from the hands of the Latins' (*History* 46.15); he was then sixteen, so of an age to proceed to the advanced education required for a distinguished career. He became a student of Nikephoros Blemmydes, the leading scholar of Nikaia and, from 1240, the tutor of the future emperor Theodore II Laskaris (*History* 49.23–50.4).² Before the age of thirty, Akropolites had become a secretary to the emperor John III Vatatzes: his career was well underway, and Vatatzes also subsequently appointed him in turn as tutor to the heir Theodore and as an imperial ambassador

¹ Angold 1975a; also Gardner 1912; Nicol 1957 and 1984.

² Harris 2003: 16–17; Macrides 2007: 6–9, 189, 192–4.

(*History* 79.1–3, 131.3–8, 92.3–6). At some point, Akropolites married a woman named Eudokia from the distinguished Palaiologos family (*History* 164.19–21).³

While Laskaris had been busy in Anatolia, another Roman aristocrat was also setting up his own version of the empire in the European half of the old empire. Michael Doukas, a cousin of Isaak II Angelos who had not fared well under the usurping Alexios III, succeeded in establishing a rival successor state in Epiros. Initially collaborating with the Latins under Boniface of Montferrat, Doukas soon removed himself from the Latins and managed to establish himself as ruler in Arta, in Epiros. Over the course of the next year he extended his control over much of western Greece from Albania to the Gulf of Corinth. By the time of his death in around 1214 he had extended his rule over Thessaly and into Macedonia, and his heir Theodore went on to take Thessaloniki from the Latins in 1224. Theodore's goal was Constantinople and his main rival was the empire based at Nikaia; rivalry between Epiros and Nikaia was open on the battlefield but also fought out in quarrels over church administration; above all, both of these rival Roman powers wanted to set the seal on their imperial legitimacy by regaining Constantinople. However, Theodore Doukas was defeated by the Bulgarians at the Battle of Klokotnica in 1230, and Epiros never subsequently regained its strength. John III Vatatzes of Nikaia then forced the rulers of Epiros to renounce their imperial pretensions and acknowledge his sovereignty and, most importantly, Epirot power was pushed back to its heartland when Nikaia seized Thessaloniki in 1246.

Vatatzes, who went on to eat steadily away at the Latin territory around Constantinople, was succeeded by Theodore II Laskaris in 1254. Akropolites knew Theodore well as fellow pupil and student, and the new emperor promoted him to the post of Grand Logothete – in essence, Akropolites was now after the emperor himself the head of the imperial administration, much as Choniates had been before him. Akropolites did not always enjoy an easy relationship with Theodore Laskaris, and the emperor comes in for some harsh criticism in the *History* (e.g. 130–2). Akropolites was then made governor of the western provinces and commander of the troops sent against Epiros in 1257. On this occasion, Akropolites was captured by the Epirots and imprisoned for two years (*History* 150.12–24); he was thus in prison when Theodore II died in 1258.

³ Macrides 2007: 355.

Theodore was succeeded by his young son John IV Laskaris but, within months, Michael Palaiologos, the premier aristocrat and soldier of his time, had usurped the throne. John IV was first sidelined and then blinded, the habitual Byzantine method of ensuring the unsuitability for office of awkward rivals. Again, Akropolites was in prison when Michael VIII took over; this does not, however, excuse his complete failure to mention Michael's savage treatment of John IV, which is all part of the *History's* extreme bias in favour of Palaiologos. As already mentioned, Akropolites was linked by marriage to the Palaiologos family, and the new emperor stood by this relationship: Akropolites was freed from captivity by the end of 1259, and took up the post of logothete under the new regime.⁴

The apparent instability in Nikaia resulting from Palaiologos' coup seemed to offer Michael II Doukas of Epiros one more chance on Constantinople, and to this end he enlisted the aid of the Franks active in the region. In 1259 Doukas married one daughter to Manfred of Sicily and the other to William II of Achaia in the Peloponnese, and both men joined him in his campaign against Nikaia later the same year, culminating in Nikaian victory and the disastrous Frankish defeat at the Battle of Pelagonia.⁵

Michael Palaiologos was driven by ambition to regain the lost territory and glory of the empire and Nikaia's recapture of Constantinople now seemed inevitable. Yet the eventual seizure of the City came about almost by accident. In the summer of 1261 the Nikaian general Alexios Strategopoulos was on routine patrol near the city when, learning that the Latin forces were absent en masse on an expedition into the Black Sea, he was able to seize the opportunity, enter the City, and hold it for his emperor. The Latin emperor Baldwin II fled, as did the Latin patriarch Pantaleone Giustiniani, and in August 1261 Michael VIII Palaiologos entered the city in triumph as the new Constantine.⁶

George Akropolites returned to Constantinople with Michael in 1261 and wrote his historical account of the years from 1204 to 1261 most probably during the 1260s: as might be expected the *History* (which as we have it is incomplete) is a triumphant panegyric of the accomplishment of Nikaia and of Michael Palaiologos in particular.⁷ Akropolites also headed up the refounded university in the City, and one of his students, the future patriarch Gregory of Cyprus, relates that he was an excellent teacher of

⁴ Fryde 2000: 308–9. ⁵ Geanakoplos 1953. ⁶ Macrides 1980: 22–4.

⁷ Macrides 2007: 55–65; *ODB* I: 49; Fryde 2000: 308–9; Angold 1975a: 164–5. *History*: Heisenberg 1903 I.

mathematics, rhetoric and philosophy; as he himself says in his *History*, he made a particular study of the Neoplatonists.⁸ On the other hand, Akropolites shared in Michael Palaiologos' unpopularity when the emperor, by way of removing the pretext for Latin attacks on Constantinople, attempted to bring about a union of the eastern and western churches. Akropolites was an active supporter of this policy, and he led the lay delegation to the Council of Lyons in 1274 which accepted a union of the churches, acknowledging both papal supremacy and the *filioque* reading of the creed. Probably as a result of his involvement in this ill-fated and hugely unpopular policy, many of his writings were destroyed in the anti-unionist backlash of the 1280s, and these writings may have included a completed version of the *History* which took in the later course of Michael Palaiologos' reign.⁹ Akropolites himself died in 1282, the same year as the master he had served so loyally.¹⁰

Choniates and Akropolites thus lived in many ways very similar lives. Like his predecessor, Akropolites was sent by his family to receive an education at the imperial court and spent the rest of his life in the imperial service, reaching the very highest rank. Both men wrote a history of their times, as well as theological and rhetorical works. However, Choniates witnessed the fall of Constantinople in 1204 while Akropolites saw it regained in 1261, and this difference inevitably tempers their work. More importantly, Akropolites was not trained in the unchanging atmosphere of the Constantinopolitan court, and his outlook was far less traditional, not least with regard to his attitude towards foreigners. Again, whereas Choniates had been outspoken in his criticism of his imperial masters, Akropolites is, with the exception of Theodore II Laskaris, largely uncritical – particularly with regard to Michael Palaiologos, with all mention omitted of Michael's violent usurpation of the rightful heir, John IV Laskaris. Akropolites adopts criticism of other emperors solely to magnify the achievements and character of Michael Palaiologos, making his a work of panegyric rather than of genuine evaluation.¹¹ Akropolites' *History*, again in contrast to that of Choniates, is admirable for its clarity of language and style, and presents itself as commendably direct and uncomplicated; in fact, written in the self-satisfied aftermath of 1261, the work has the disadvantages attendant on any work of propaganda. It is a eulogy of the Nikaian state as the

⁸ Fryde 2000: 203. ⁹ Macrides 2007: 31–4.

¹⁰ Macrides 2003a: 201–3, 210; Macrides 2003b: 73–5.

¹¹ Macrides 2007: 62: 'the case "for" Michael requires the case "against" Theodore II and his father John III'.

successor and avenger of Byzantium, and of Michael Palaiologos in particular as the saviour of the empire.¹²

Nevertheless, Akropolites' approach cannot be reduced to something as simple as Palaiologian propaganda; there must have been a genuine joy in the writing of such a magnificent success story, and it is important that Akropolites is writing from the perspective of a victor. Nikaia and Michael Palaiologos, to whom he was closely tied both personally and politically, had succeeded in regaining Constantinople and in the 1260s showed every sign of being destined for further glorious successes. This makes a huge contrast with Choniates, writing as one who had witnessed the fall of the City and had personally suffered a decline in fortunes as a result. As we shall see, it also contrasts with Pachymeres, who, writing some forty years after Akropolites, had been forced by events to recognise that the empire based in Constantinople was riven with internal problems and menaced by multiple external threats.

As Pachymeres was to make clear, Michael VIII Palaiologos had a clear agenda for the restoration of Byzantine Roman rule over the areas lost in the years after 1204; however, it could not have been clear when Akropolites was writing his history in the 1260s just how much it would be possible to regain. As his *History* was a work of propaganda for the nascent Romans of Nikaia, Akropolites had to focus on the great achievement of the recovery of Constantinople without emphasising just how much still remained to be done. Thus only the successes under the Nikaian empire, which were impressive enough, are emphasised in his *History*, while Akropolites' treatment of areas still lost or only insecurely held is more cautious. Again, the story of the rise of Nikaia is one of struggle against rival powers, in particular the rival Roman state based in Epiros in western Greece, and Akropolites is concerned to assert Nikaian legitimacy in contrast to the Epirot claim – this is, in fact, a primary objective.¹³ Thus, in Nikaia Akropolites had to deal with and extol a state that, although meeting with striking successes, had lost most of the territory it historically would have liked to call its own, and which was far from the only claimant to pre-eminence in the Byzantine Roman world. He employs the terminology of Roman-ness skilfully in the pursuit of these rhetorical aims. As a result, there is a clear division between his expression of the political Roman identity, which includes the ethnic detail but is limited to the empire

¹² Macrides 2007: 55–65.

¹³ In this discussion, 'Epirot' will be employed, albeit anachronistically, to denote the Greek successor state established in western Greece after 1204, its rulers and its subjects.

of Nikaia, and his rarer but significant expression of the ethnic Roman identity, which he was led of necessity to use in relation to Romans not loyal to Nikaia, but nonetheless still Roman.

Akropolites: the political Roman identity

Akropolites' use of *Rhomaioi* as the collectivity of subjects who are complementary to the terminology and machinery of imperial rule is as pervasive as that of Choniates, even though he uses the Roman terminology far less frequently than his predecessor (Appendix 1, pp. 290–2). Of the forty-three uses of the genitive formula in Akropolites, a mere handful are military; all the rest can be seen to have a collective political application. The commonest use of the genitive formula is with *arche*; 'basileus of the Romans' is next most frequent, though it is rare compared to Choniates with just five occurrences, and also appearing more than once are *pragmata* and *chora*. Like Choniates again, use of *Rhomaïkos* shows a different emphasis with well over half of the occurrences having a military context, *στράτευμα* (*strateuma*: army) alone occurring twelve times. As we shall see, this emphasis on the Roman-ness of the army may be understood as one way for Akropolites to underline the identity of the Nikaian empire as the truly Roman power in contrast to the rival Romans based in western Greece: there is thus a strong political connotation to many of these military uses of *Rhomaïkos*. Moving on to the use of the plain formula, around three quarters of the occurrences have political associations, with over 50 per cent of the total denoting the collective identity of the subjects of the state.

In his use of the terminology of Roman-ness, Akropolites contrasts with Choniates in his lack of emphasis on territorial control and the physical, geographical expression of the empire. Proportionately, and as part of his total employment of the Roman terminology, geographical associations are only marginally less frequent in Akropolites; however, compared to Choniates' rich lexicon of geographical terms (fourteen in all) used with the genitive formula or the adjective, Akropolites uses only *chora*, *eparchia*, πόλις (*polis*: city), ὄρος (*horos*: borders), *horia* and ἄστυ (*asty*: town). Michael Doukas of Epiros takes over 'some part of the land of Romans' (24.13), and the Latin emperor Henry wins 'many cities and lands of Romans' (27.5). Akropolites' use of *Rhomaïs* is comparable: Theodore Doukas 'put under himself much of the land of *Rhomaïs*, that which had been held by the Italians' (13.4–5), and the Frankish conquerors are similarly described as 'coming into the inheritance of all the things of *Rhomaïs*'

(33.16). In the first of these pairs, 'of Romans' could be understood in an ethnic sense, as denoting lands occupied by ethnic Romans not subject to a Roman empire any more. Alternatively, this usage could reflect an ideal territorial extent of the empire, looking back to its pre-1204 extent; this is supported by the parallel use of *Rhomaïs*, and would be reminiscent of Choniates.

However, a comparison of the use of the plain formula by Choniates and Akropolites suggests that the later writer attached comparatively little importance to the territorial expression of empire. He is comparatively ready to accept territorial acquisition, by anyone, but rarely concedes the rule of people; in other words, compared to Choniates, he manages to divorce the Romans, in their political dimension at least, from the land they occupy. Choniates had been happy to use the plain formula to indicate territory: other groups or powers are, for example, 'to the west of Romans' or 'neighbours to Romans' (e.g. 18.63 and 118.24–5). As noted above, Choniates also speaks of the territory of the empire as that which is 'under Romans', i.e. under Byzantine Roman rule. In contrast, Akropolites only uses the plain formula in a geographical context to say that land *becomes* 'under Romans' – i.e. that it is newly taken by Romans and incorporated into the state. This is perhaps a subtle difference but is indicative of the fact that Akropolites has no clear conception of an extensive swathe of land that is quintessentially Roman in a political sense by virtue of its age-long occupation by Romans, and thus rule by the state whom they embody, and this is a radical departure from the earlier world view typified even by Choniates. Of course, it is easily explicable by the grim facts of Akropolites' own times: places occupied by ethnic Romans were now far from guaranteed – or even likely – to be politically Roman. It was an awkward fact and one that required careful handling.

Above all, Akropolites manipulates the key terminology of Roman-ness to endorse the imperial claims of Nikaia and to downplay the less than glorious aspects of the contemporary Roman situation. For Akropolites, the Romans are those who profess allegiance to the emperors based at Nikaia.¹⁴ Thus, although he uses the phrase 'emperor of (the) Romans' comparatively rarely (only four occurrences in all), he uses it only with reference to an emperor of Nikaia (76.21, 76.29, 183.19) or to the emperors based at Constantinople before 1204 (79.4). It is clear that he holds the Nikaian Romans to be the same group as those Romans who ruled in Constantinople before 1204. Thus, John Asen II of Bulgaria feared 'the improved prosperity of the Romans' because he was 'leader of a people

¹⁴ Macrides 2007: 41–2, 94–7.

that had of old been subject to the Romans' (52.24–5). Here, the first 'Romans' are the Romans of Nikaia while the second are the Romans of Constantinople; the two groups are clearly to be identified. More explicitly still, in 1261 Constantinople is 'again under the hand of the emperor of the Romans' (183.19); Michael VIII Palaiologos is thus portrayed as the clear successor of the emperors in Constantinople.

The terminology of imperial rule, which he uses with remarkable prodigality, is similarly employed by Akropolites. Although only Nikaian or pre-1204 emperors are given the title of 'emperor of (the) Romans', Akropolites nevertheless unequivocally portrays the Latin emperors in Constantinople as emperors, although always qualified by name, by place (always Constantinople) or by peoples (Latins or Italians). The Bulgarian leaders are also frequently given imperial titles, again qualified by name or by people. In contrast, the emperors of Nikaia are most often referred to without any qualification, and thus the legitimacy of Nikaian imperial rule is enforced by the sheer bulk of references to their emperors as *basileus*, unqualified by name, place or people. In addition, there is a distinct falling-off in the application of *basileus* and its cognates to non-Romans as the *History* progresses. The last such non-Roman occurrence of *basileus* is to John Asen II of Bulgaria, less than halfway through the work. By the retaking of Constantinople, the Latin emperor has been reduced to 'the imperial ruler' (182.1–2) and 'Baldwin, lately ruler in the imperial style (τῷ βασιλικῷ . . . κατάρχοντι Βαλδουίνῳ) in Constantinople' (182.25–6.) Likewise, the Bulgarian ruler is in the latter half of the *History* typically an ἄρχων (*archon*: ruler, for example, 112.6–7, 152.1). In these ways Akropolites subtly enhances the position of Nikaia, brings out its rise to pre-eminence, and evokes a sense of Nikaian legitimacy while yet in the early stages of his account accurately reflecting the chaos of competing claims in the early years after the fall of the City. Akropolites' skilful rhetorical manipulation of the key imperial vocabulary, notwithstanding, reveals a limited acceptance of the imperial status of the Latin conquerors and, as noted above, this grudging recognition is also perceptible in Choniates.

As with his manipulation of the key vocabulary of Roman-ness, Akropolites uses the terminology of empire above all to heighten the contrast between Nikaia and its major Roman rival based in Epiros. The Doukas rulers of Epiros are not permitted any unqualified attribution of imperial status, and Akropolites emphasises their status (as he saw it) of rebels against Nikaia whenever he can. Theodore Doukas, who had himself crowned emperor at Thessaloniki in 1224, is in the *History* merely 'named' or 'proclaimed' emperor (34.5, 40.1, 13), and the Epirot ruler is more typically

an ἐγκρατής (*egkrates*: master, e.g. 40.20, 44.2). In other words, Nikaia's rivals in the west are portrayed as less legitimate emperors than were the Latins or even the Bulgarians. The crucial difference as far as Akropolites' account is concerned is that, unlike the Latins or Bulgarians, the Epirots were claiming Roman status and could logically be seen as Romans; they were therefore more of a threat to Nikaia's own imperial ambitions.

Returning to the vocabulary of Roman-ness, the same agenda is clear: Akropolites is again adroit in his belittling of the Epirots, despite having a difficult tale to tell. He had had to confront the fact that the Nikaians and the Epirots were often at war and, judging by pre-1204 standards, he would have had to admit that both had good title to be called Romans. This became particularly significant from the 1240s, when the two sides were directly at war with each other starting with the Nikaian capture of Thessaloniki from the Epirots. However, Akropolites is quite clear about who was Roman on that occasion:

Thus the city of Thessaloniki came under the Emperor John, or rather under the Romans, for the enemies to Romans who had been holding her (οἱ γὰρ αὐτήν κρατοῦντες ἐναντιόφρονες Ῥωμαίοις) were over and done with. (83.12–14)

The state of Epiros was thus the enemy of Romans.

Akropolites is generally very careful to avoid calling the people of Epiros 'Romans', and there is only one occasion where he acknowledged the presence of Romans in the army of Epiros: on the occasion of the ill-fated Epirot campaign against Bulgaria in 1230 the Epirot army was 'made up of Romans and westerners' (41.20–1). As alternatives to *Rhomaioi*, Akropolites called the Epirots 'Theodore Komnenos' people' (26.6–7), 'the rebel Michael's people' (148.13), 'the local people' (168.4, 172.14–15) and 'the enemies' (149.19, 169.2), and by the use of such phrases he contrasted them with the *Rhomaioi*, or alternatively with 'we', especially in the passages dealing with Nikaian–Epirot conflicts (148–50 and 171–2). It is true that Akropolites limits his use of *Rhomaioi* for either side in such wars (favouring 'we' for the Nikaian side, as we shall see), and this is reminiscent of Choniates' treatment of the various rebellions against reigning emperors in the twelfth century. However, his systematic limiting of 'Roman-ness' to one side only in accounts of what would have been civil wars in the previous century, and were certainly wars between two peoples who both saw themselves as Romans, is a striking departure from the pre-1204 perspective, where anyone in the extent of the empire was a Roman.

Note especially 181.3–4: ‘to the western regions, to those people there who are opposed to Romans’: Akropolites clearly had his doubts about the residents of the western regions, and along with this different residence came differences in character. He says that ‘the race of westerners’ (τὸ δυτικὸν γένος) or ‘the residents of the western regions’ (οἱ τῶν δυτικῶν οἰκήτορες) lacked stamina and tended to be changeable (167.15–22). This is an interesting attitude because, as we shall see, one of the ways in which Akropolites classifies barbarity is by behavioural difference; moreover, the specific fault of the people of the western regions is identical to a specific behavioural aspect of the Latins – lack of stamina (27.20). The people of the western regions were thus presented by Akropolites as something less than Roman.¹⁵

In conclusion, Akropolites downplayed the Epirot claim even to the extent of denying Roman status to Nikaia’s rival. Although it is true that Theodore Doukas ‘wanted all Romans to have him as emperor’ and offered to exalt the people of Didymoteichon in Thrace ‘above all other Romans’ (40.4–5 and 12–13), we are also told that Theodore Doukas ‘did not want to stay in his proper place and usurped the empire’ (33.14–6). Strikingly, Akropolites also used the terminology of barbarism, a terminology with which he is typically extremely sparing, to belittle the Epirot imperial claim:

Being ignorant with regard to the institutions of the empire, he [Doukas] dealt with the undertaking in a more Bulgarian, or rather more barbarous, way (Βουλγαρικώτερον ἢ μᾶλλον βαρβαρικώτερον). He was not aware of proper order, nor of method nor of any of the time-honoured imperial institutions. (34.8–12)

Akropolites was not the only Nikaian writer to identify the rulers of Epiros with the Bulgarians who had preceded them and settled extensively in western Greece, and who were their main rivals in the region.¹⁶ He is generally so sparing in his use of the terminology of barbarism that there is surely more than merely geography behind this slur. Although Akropolites acknowledged that the ruling Doukas family of Epiros was related to the Nikaian emperor John III Vatatzes – they were thus Roman by *genos*, at least in the sense of family – his use of key vocabulary implies that Theodore and his so-called imperial state were not merely not Roman, they were the opposite of Roman, and this will be further discussed below.

¹⁵ Macrides 2007: 52–3. ¹⁶ Nicol 1976: 24.

Akropolites: the ethnic Roman identity

Even though Akropolites makes such adroit use of the terminology of Roman-ness for political ends, and the primary Roman identity is political, centred on loyalty to the Nikaian successor state, the ethnic Roman identity is also clearly discernible in Akropolites. Although the vast majority of the occurrences of *Rhomaioi* refer to the Romans of Nikaia, Akropolites also has Romans outside this Nikaian context.

For example, in the early days of Laskarid power, there were Romans in Asia Minor who were not loyal to Nikaia: Akropolites comments that, in these early days, Theodore Laskaris had enough problems with the Latins but 'was no less troubled by the Romans' (12.5). It would perhaps be marginally possible to understand this as referring to Romans in a political sense, people who had loyalty to the idea of empire if not to Theodore Laskaris as a person. However, in the context of the centrifugal forces acting against imperial rule at the time, this is better understood as having an ethnic sense: these were Roman foes of Laskaris rather than Latin foes; Akropolites wants to underline an ethnic rather than political aspect of these people. Another revealing reference tells how, when John Asen II of Bulgaria defeated Theodore Doukas of Epiros at the battle of Klokotnica in 1230 and overran northern Greece, Asen 'returned the lands to the inhabitants, leaving a certain one of the forts to be ruled by Romans, and placing the majority under himself' (43.4–6). The inhabitants who were thus ceded lands would have included some ethnic Romans, perhaps concentrated around urban centres. It seems unlikely that Akropolites was here describing a single fort governed by Nikaia surrounded by Bulgarian territory; rather, this was a fort occupied and guarded by ethnic Romans native to the area, within and under the Bulgarian state.

Of three references with more unequivocally ethnic connotations, the case of Melnik presents a similar set of circumstances to the fortress example just cited. Upon the death of John Asen II of Bulgaria in 1241, Nikaia took advantage of Bulgarian disarray to move into northern Thrace and Macedonia, areas historically part of the Roman empire but heavily settled by Bulgarians over several decades. Akropolites presents the people of Melnik, on the River Struma north of Thessaloniki, as having a choice – to stay under Bulgarian rule or to swap their allegiance to the Byzantine Romans, to Nikaia. The Melnikot leader Nicholas Manglavites argued:

But since the emperor of the Romans has approached us, we ought to entrust ourselves to him . . . one who has in the past been just to us. For our land belongs to the rule of the Romans. The Bulgarians are more greedy in their management

of affairs. They have become masters of Melnik, but we are originally from Philippopolis, and by race we are Romans (τὸ γένος Ῥωμαῖοι). Moreover, the emperor of the Romans in fact has rights over us, even if we have belonged to the Bulgarians. (76.21–30)

This exposition combines three elements in Akropolites' conception of Roman identity. The Melnikots were drawn towards the Romans firstly because they had a history of being ruled by Romans and the area where they lived had been within the historical extent of the Byzantine Roman empire. All this is very reminiscent of Choniates' political identity based on territory and the expectation of imperial rule. Additionally, though, the Melnikots were of Roman descent – *genos*, and this is associated with their place of origin. Manglavites did not mean by this that he and his audience had personally moved to Melnik from Philippopolis, rather, he was citing the historical foundation of Melnik by people from the older town. Here then, through the use of *genos*, Akropolites makes an appeal to a transgenerational ethnic identity which could override the political control of Melnik. Given the choice, the Melnikots opted for political control which was coincident with this ethnic identity.¹⁷

Again, Akropolites' use of *Rhomaioi* in the Peloponnesian context is particularly striking. He is relating how the armies under and allied to Michael II Doukas of Epiros gathered in 1259 for the campaign against Nikaia that would end in defeat at the battle of Pelagonia, and he describes the army of the Frankish Prince William de Villehardouin of the Morea, saying: 'he led a very great number of men-at-arms. They were of the Frankish race and also included Roman residents of Achaia and Peloponnese, whom he [Prince William] ruled. Most of these were of the race of the Lakonians' (168.12–16). This passage describes Romans who were actually fighting for the Latin Prince of Achaia in his campaign, with the Epirots, against Nikaia, and is one of only two references in the *History* to anything Roman in outright conflict with Nikaia. Here then, firstly, the rule of Latins over a part of the erstwhile Byzantine Roman empire is accepted. At no point does Akropolites protest against Villehardouin rule in the Peloponnese; as noted, he was relatively happy to speak of others gaining territorial control. However, this passage speaks of the rule of Romans, as people, and this is much rarer in Akropolites. As we have seen, Akropolites worked hard at limiting the application of Romans to Nikaian subjects, and the political content in his use of the terminology of *Rhomaioi* is abundantly clear. This

¹⁷ Macrides 2003a: 204–5.

usage, then, contrasts strongly with his approach to the Epirots, discussed above.

The treatment of the Peloponnesians also contrasts with Akropolites' treatment of Constantinople. Even though it must have been perfectly obvious that ethnic Romans were living under Latin rule in the capital – indeed Akropolites himself grew up there under Latin rule – he never definitively calls these people Romans, preferring to speak, for example, of 'the residents of Constantinople' (ἐν τοῖς Κωνσταντίνου οἰκήτορσι, e.g. 30.3). In the case of the Peloponnese, though, Akropolites shows Romans not merely subject to an alien political authority but actively fighting against Nikaia, fighting for Latins against other Romans.

Why does Akropolites call the Peloponnesians Romans? He could have avoided or circumlocuted the issue, as he does for the Epirots and Constantinopolitans. The fact is that these Romans stood out in contrast to the Franks in the Villehardouin army, who were also their co-residents in the Peloponnese: Akropolites has stumbled over the unavoidable fact of ethnic difference – he knew and wanted to specify that these people, although ruled by a Frank, were not themselves Franks. Akropolites does not specify his grounds for calling them Romans; this is a purely ethnic reference based on transgenerational residence in historically Roman territory, or on religion, or dress, or language. These people were certainly not politically loyal to Nikaia.

There is one other similar instance. Akropolites relates how the Latin Emperor Henry (1206–16), whom he presents very positively and accurately as generous to his Roman subjects, enlisted for his army in 'the Roman towns Lentiana and Poimanenon', creating companies with 'commanders of the same race' and setting them to garrison duty in the eastern part of his realm (28.17ff.). Here, the Latin emperor plainly had ethnic Roman subjects, and these two towns are called Roman not for any Roman political loyalty but for the ethnicity of their inhabitants. The account strongly suggests that these companies were sent to guard against Nikaian encroachment on the Latin empire, so here again, as with the Peloponnese, is an example of ethnic but not political Romans fighting against ethnic and political Romans.

Akropolites' use of *genos* in relation to the Roman residents of Constantinople is also worthy of notice. The context is the visit of the papal representative Pelagius to Constantinople in 1217, a visit which stirred up considerable anger among the Orthodox Romans because of his renewed efforts to enforce their religious conformity with western practices. The Orthodox community, described as noted above not as *Rhomaioi* but as 'residents of Constantinople', made an appeal to their emperor Henry to

protect them from this kind of treatment: 'We happen to be of another race (ἄλλου γεγονότες γένους) and we have another leader of the church. We are subject to your rule so that you rule us bodily, but not however spiritually and with respect to the soul' (30.5ff.). This comment, which may be compared with the letter from the Constantinopolitans to Innocent III which similarly stressed political loyalty and religious freedoms, is strongly suggestive of an ethnic Roman identity, founded in religious practice, which was at odds with the Latin political identity.¹⁸ Although it is noticeable that Akropolites does not identify the Constantinopolitans as Romans, he is nevertheless clearly saying that the Constantinopolitans had more than one identity and consequently more than one set of allegiances, and this account thus provides a rare clue to the markers that might distinguish ethnic Romans.

To sum up so far, Akropolites presents many striking contrasts with Choniates. His *History* presents a fair amount of information on the content of Roman ethnic identity, but is above all driven by a political agenda – to validate and celebrate the Nikaian successor state as the legitimate Roman empire. Thus, Akropolites used the vocabulary and formulas of the political Roman identity to promote Nikaia, with the necessary result that this political identity had to be thoroughly denied to the Epirot rivals of Nikaia. Yet, the Epirots had every claim to ethnic Roman identity. . . . Moreover, there were other groups in the story whom Akropolites was almost required to name as Roman, as there was no other easy way to name them, and these people were Roman in the ethnic sense. Akropolites wants to limit Roman identity to the Nikaians, so as to reinforce his presentation of the empire of Nikaia as the one and only legitimate successor of the pre-1204 state based in Constantinople, but the demands of his story meant that he had to recognise certain other groups as Roman as well – in the ethnic sense only. For Akropolites then, and even despite his very insistent political agenda, there was a clear ethnic Roman identity which did not have to be tied to political allegiance. At the same time, the political Roman identity was extremely important to him and constituted a basic component in his structuring of his *History* of the Nikaian state.

PACHYMERES AND THE PALAIOLOGOI

Beginning to write some thirty years later at the turn of the century, George Pachymeres presents a vast contrast with the bumptious confidence

¹⁸ Cotelerius 1686: 519; Setton 1976: 42.

of Akropolites. The understandable euphoria and triumphalism resulting from the recapture of Constantinople was a distant memory; now, the empire was racked by economic crisis and religious schism, once again menaced by enemies from the west, and encountering for the first time what would prove to be its greatest menace – the Ottoman Turks.

Pachymeres is an intelligent and stylish commentator on this troubled empire. He was born in Nikaia in 1242, where he was educated at the imperial court, and moved to the retaken Constantinople with the rest of the court soon after 1261 (*Michael* 23.3–6).¹⁹ He spent the rest of his life there as a teacher, ecclesiastic and civil servant. While never attaining the lofty heights of Choniates and Akropolites, he held senior positions in church administration and the imperial court, and played a leading role in the controversies which racked the church in his time. Early in his career, around 1265, he was a secretary at the imperial court (*Michael* 347.28–9). When he undertook his history of the reign of Michael Palaiologos, he was a *protekdikos* – one of the most senior assistants to the patriarch – at the great cathedral of Agia Sophia in Constantinople, and he also held the rank of *dikaiofylax* at the imperial palace; this was probably in the last decade of the thirteenth century, when Pachymeres would have been in his fifties (*Michael* 23.5–8).²⁰ In contrast to Akropolites, little of Pachymeres' personal life gets into his historical narration, and it is not known if he was married or had any children. However, his status as an eyewitness to much of his story is clear – he often backs up his account by asserting this.²¹

Like many of his countrymen, Pachymeres harboured grave doubts about the character of Michael VIII Palaiologos, who had come to the crown through intrigue and assassination; nevertheless, the recovery of Constantinople was seen by sufficiently many as a mark of divine approval.²² Michael Palaiologos was determined to follow up on his successes against Epiros and the recapture of Constantinople with the recovery of the remaining lost lands of the empire as well. This expansionist impulse was exemplified by his wresting of territorial concessions from the captive prince of Achaia, Prince William II de Villehardouin, who had been captured at the battle of Pelagonia in 1259. Naturally, as all sources agree, William had tried to purchase his release in hard cash. However, the emperor, newly ensconced in Constantinople, would settle only for territorial concessions

¹⁹ References for the details of Pachymeres' life relate to the Failler and Laurent edition, 1984.

²⁰ Failler and Laurent 1984: 240–I, n. 3, 364, n. 1. Magdalino 1993b: 236 (*dikaiofylax*).

²¹ Failler and Laurent 1984: xx. ²² Geanakoplos 1959; Angold 1975a: 81–90.

in the Peloponnese, namely the south-eastern castles of Mistra, Monemvasia and Grand Mainé.

Michael Palaiologos looked always more to the west than to the east and his great struggles were always focused in that direction, whether against his rivals in Epiros, or against the Latins of Constantinople or of the Morea, or against his greatest rival, Charles of Anjou. Having expelled the Latins from Constantinople, Michael saw the greatest threat to his empire in a new western coalition against the capital, and he focused his energies to repel this threat. Charles of Anjou undoubtedly had ambitions on Constantinople, and in 1267 he gained a foothold in the Peloponnese. With the Romans making substantial gains from their bases in the south-east of the region, Prince William turned to Charles of Anjou as one interested in Romania and already a committed foe of Michael VIII Palaiologos. Under the terms of an agreement made at Viterbo, on William's death in 1278 the Morea came into Angevin hands. Michael Palaiologos was well aware of this threat from the Angevin, and his role in instigating the Sicilian Vespers, the 1281 revolt that wiped out the imperial aspirations of Charles of Anjou, has been widely speculated upon. The emperor had every reason to support this revolt by the Aragonese, but only moral support to offer at this time; nevertheless, in his autobiography, Michael certainly wants the credit: 'if I were to say that God had now given the Sicilians freedom and had done this through us, then I would be saying the truth' . . . ²³

Less successful in the long run was Michael Palaiologos' religious policy which, again, is an example of his western focus. Justifiably, Michael saw the religious schism between the eastern Orthodox and the western Catholics as the most potent pretext for any Latin attack on his empire, and he hoped to end that schism. In his approach to the problem, however, he showed himself woefully out of tune with the prevailing prejudices of his subjects.

In the wake of the Fourth Crusade a Latin patriarch of Constantinople had been appointed, ignoring the existence of an Orthodox patriarch. In 1261, the Romans predictably retaliated by ousting the Latin church; thus, western action against the re-established Byzantine Roman empire could be, and was, portrayed and promoted as action on behalf of the true, western, church. Accordingly, Michael VIII Palaiologos saw the taming of this religious dispute as a means of protecting his empire and therefore, at the Council of Lyons in 1274, the Byzantine Roman delegation under George Akropolites accepted a union of the churches, in the process

²³ *De vita sua*, Gregoire 1960: 461. Cf. Dunbabin 1998: 90–101; Geanakoplos 1959: 344–67.

acknowledging both papal supremacy and the *filioque* reading of the creed. Palaiologos must have seen this as a token concession that would appease the Latins and nullify the threat from the west; he probably did not consider the difficulties in getting his subjects to accept and implement the changes, believing that this would not really be necessary so long as the Latins believed union had occurred. However, the Union of Lyons backfired on all sides. Pachymeres, like many, was opposed to the church union. The emperor's subjects in Constantinople vociferously protested and denied the union, the Latins grew increasingly suspicious of Byzantine Roman motives and actions, and Michael alienated his subjects still more by attempting to coerce their compliance in this matter.²⁴ The extent of Michael's unpopularity was extreme: on his accession in 1282, Andronikos II Palaiologos immediately repudiated his father's religious policy, Michael Palaiologos was denied a Christian burial, and all churches in Constantinople were ritually purified.

During most of his long and largely unhappy reign, Andronikos II Palaiologos pursued a contrary policy to that of his father, essentially neglecting the western half of the empire in favour of the eastern, but with little success.²⁵ Treaties were struck with the Frankish principality of the Morea and with the daunting and bellicose Serbian king Stefan Milutin, who notoriously received the emperor's five-year-old daughter Simonis as his bride. Andronikos was, however, dragged into a costly war against Venice, while Asia Minor presented the greatest problems, with massive Turkish incursions and settlement. The Byzantine Roman army for the first time met and were defeated by the Osmanlis or Ottomans at Bapheon in Bithynia in 1302, and the Ottomans were soon effective masters of Bithynia, just across the Hellespont from Constantinople itself. Desperate to recover Anatolia, Andronikos II Palaiologos looked for western mercenary aid against the eastern threat, in the customary manner of Byzantine Roman emperors. In the summer of 1303, he employed the Grand Company of Catalans to this end. Initially, the Company had striking successes in Anatolia, but the problem of pay – or lack of it – soured relations between the mercenaries and the Byzantine Romans and, for Andronikos, the cure turned out worse than the disease. By 1305, the Catalans were based on the European mainland at Gallipoli and here too they lived off the plunder of the land. After the murder of their leader Roger de Flor in 1305 on the orders of Andronikos' son Michael, the Company lived by raiding in

²⁴ Geanakoplos 1959: 237–45, 258–76; Runciman 1958: 163–7. ²⁵ Laiou 1972.

Thrace and Macedonia, bringing terror to the local population. There was famine in Constantinople as a result and numerous minor revolts before the Catalans moved south around 1309.²⁶

Thus the new century opened with fresh western depredations on the soil of the empire, and this is the context for the writing of Pachymeres' history of the reign of Andronikos II. As the history of this reign ends abruptly while narrating events of the summer of 1307, it is presumed that Pachymeres wrote it towards the end of his life and that he himself died around 1310.²⁷

Although Pachymeres did not reach such exalted heights as the two logothetes Akropolites and Choniates, he was just as well educated and moved in much the same circles. He certainly had the widest academic interests of the three and, as well as his history, he wrote extensively on philosophy and the natural sciences. His *Quadrivium*, dealing with arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, was widely used as a textbook and bears witness to his experience as a teacher at the Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople. His summaries of Aristotelian texts (including scientific and mathematical works mistakenly attributed by the Byzantine Romans to Aristotle) as well as his copies of works by the fifth-century Neoplatonist Proklos bear witness both to his erudition and to his interest in the ancients.²⁸ These are also evidenced in his writing style, which is highly complex in an attempt to imitate the ancient Attic writers. It is probably this that has led to the neglect of Pachymeres; however, as a source for the later thirteenth century he is unparalleled.²⁹

Like Akropolites, he has his own point of view and agenda. He clearly valued Asia Minor above the western territories; consequently, he deprecates what he saw as Michael VIII Palaiologos' overambitious plans of reconquest in the west. He is further clearly opposed to church union. However, while he cannot help but disapprove of Michael on most fronts, he respected the emperor's achievements and deplored the failures of Andronikos, even though he found the son a more sympathetic figure than the father. Pachymeres is amazingly outspoken, for example about Michael Palaiologos' bloody rise to power and the less than universal acclaim in response to the retaking of Constantinople, leading to speculation whether

²⁶ Goodenough 1920–1; Setton 1969–89 III: 168–70; also Laiou 1972: 132–8.

²⁷ *ODB* III: 1550; Fryde 2000: 315–19, 321. *Michael*: Failler and Laurent 1984; *Michael and Andronikos*: Bekker 1835.

²⁸ Fryde 2000: 199–200, 206–8, 337–9.

²⁹ Laiou 1972: 346–8; Macrides 2003b: 70–1; Macrides 2007: 71–5; Angelov 2007: 260–3.

the *History* 'could ever have circulated in his lifetime'.³⁰ Nevertheless, in this form of history as *Kaiserkritik*, Pachymeres was following a well-established Byzantine Roman genre which Choniates would have appreciated, although, more than Choniates, he saw τύχη (*tyche*: fate), as the determining force in history. With regard to identity, Pachymeres' approach is typically considered and subtle, revealing a predisposition towards the traditional outlook of Choniates that was nonetheless tempered by a mature and realistic appreciation of the concrete situation of the empire under the Palaiologoi.

Pachymeres' presentation of the Romans

While, once again, it is the political Roman identity that dominates in Pachymeres' historical account, Pachymeres also has a strong conception of an ethnic Roman identity. As we have seen, this kind of identity had begun to play an interesting role in Akropolites' history, but it is far stronger in Pachymeres.

Nevertheless, it should come as no surprise that the use of *Rhomaioi* for the collective political identity of the empire is once again overwhelmingly dominant. Like Choniates and Akropolites, this political identity dominates in Pachymeres' use of the genitive formula. The commonest use in this formula is for the unspecified feminine singular, ἡ (τῶν) 'Ρωμαίων, where the unsupplied subject, as with Akropolites, is most likely to be *arche*. Next most common is *pragmata* and then *arche*, specified, while an unspecified neuter plural, which is certainly *pragmata*, also appears more than once in the genitive formula, as do *basileia* and *basileus*. Thus the collective understanding of *Rhomaioi* is once again clear, with the primary association with political rule and political fortunes. Associated with the political is the military, as the army is one expression of the state, certainly in relation to other political entities, and the genitive formula is also common in the military context, being used more than once for both *strateuma* and δύναμις (*dynamis*: military force). Furthermore, out of over 150 occurrences of the plain formula, around two thirds can be seen unequivocally to have a meaning of 'Roman state'. Contexts include territorial gain, loss and control, treaty – and peacemaking, loyalty or treachery, foreign relations and wars, good or bad fortunes, and administrative systems. Thus the collective identity is still exceptionally strong.

³⁰ Fryde 2000: 315.

The ethnic Roman identity need not, clearly, be mutually exclusive with the political usage; one of the ways in which the state may be constituted and bound together could be through common ethnic bonds, and conversely a typical political allegiance may be a dominant cultural aspect of an ethnic group. *Rhomaioi* is in fact used comparatively rarely by Pachymeres in the purely ethnic sense, but his uses in this sense are striking, and combine to provide a strong model of the ethnic Roman identity.

As one might expect, the ethnic Roman identity is employed by Pachymeres to differentiate the various subjects of the Latin empire of Constantinople. For example, early in his reign, Michael Palaiologos came to agreements with 'Roman ambassadors, being those born of Romans' (*Michael* 106. 11–12), who were sent to Nikaia by the Latin emperor. Here, there can be no political connotation in the strict sense: these men were working for another state; notwithstanding, there was an expectation, apparently fulfilled, that they should be and secretly were loyal to the Byzantine Roman state. Pachymeres' treatment of this instance can be usefully contrasted with that of Akropolites. Where Pachymeres acknowledges the ethnic Roman identity of these envoys and shows Michael Palaiologos as ready to be generous, Akropolites had presented these men as simply ambassadors from Constantinople, given no hint that they were Roman, and said that Palaiologos refused any concessions. This is in line with Akropolites' reluctance to acknowledge any Roman identity outside the Nikaian state; in contrast, Pachymeres gives primacy to the ethnic identity.³¹

Thus, for Pachymeres, ethnic identity was seen as leading, if not integral, to political loyalty and identity, and this is also true in Pachymeres' account of the *thelematarioi*. This is the name given by the historian to those people who lived around Constantinople when it was under Latin rule and, presumably through sheer expediency, customarily had no fixed loyalty but tended rather to switch sides between the Latins and Byzantine Romans – they were thus 'the wilful', *Θεληματάριοι* (*thelematarioi*).³² Pachymeres makes it clear that, as long as the *thelematarioi* had to deal with both Romans and Latins (whom Pachymeres customarily calls 'Italians') without being sure who would come out on top, they were of very dubious loyalty, but that when the Romans seemed to be winning, and particularly after

³¹ Macrides 2003a: 209–10; Macrides 2007: 63–4, 352–3.

³² In the fourteenth-century Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* this is given as an attribute of the Franks, 604, and of the Germans, 6935, suggesting that it was possibly seen as a non-Roman attribute.

they had taken Selymbria and seemed set fair to take Constantinople, these people came over to the Roman side:

They tended to incline sometimes to Romans and sometimes to Italians. The Romans were attached to them, for these people were themselves Romans while the Italians trusted them because they had been neighbours for a long time . . . thus they were between the Romans and the Italians and because of this they were called wilful. (*Michael* 110.10–14)

Here, the political and ethnic senses of ‘Roman’ are in conflict with each other. Although the first two uses of *Rhomaioi* in this excerpt are both political, the next use is clearly ethnic: it is thought that the ethnic identity of the *thelematarioi* should condition their political loyalty and identity, as with the Melnikots in Akropolites’ account discussed above. The Roman state sometimes had the loyalty of the *thelematarioi* and certainly thought it ought to have had it – because the *thelematarioi* were *Rhomaioi*. However, in the final analysis, it did not have their loyalty: Pachymeres’ account brings out the expediency of the choice made by these unfortunate *thelematarioi*. This case recalls that of the pro-Turkish islanders of Lake Pousgousae, whom Choniates chose to call Christians rather than Romans, because of their switch in loyalty. Pachymeres, though, could not follow Choniates’ pre-1204 approach of simply denying the Roman-ness of the problematic group: he needed to acknowledge the Roman identity of the *thelematarioi* as it ended up playing an important part in the story. Nevertheless, as in Choniates and Akropolites (in the case of the Melnikots), there is here again a clear implication that ethnic descent should determine political loyalty; however, the story again shows that things were not that simple.

It would appear, moreover, that Pachymeres was aware of the awkwardness of the situation and the contradictions within the idea of Roman-ness as, apart from in the excerpt above, he uncharacteristically avoids the use of *Rhomaioi* for the Nikaians in the account of the *thelematarioi*, choosing instead to talk of ‘we’. Similarly, the problem group are given a special name. Comparable expectations based on ethnic identity, comparable disappointments, and a comparable approach on the part of the historian are revealed in the account of the Ῥωμαῖζοντες (*Rhomaizontes*). These were the Roman residents of Constantinople, on whom the general Alexios Strategopoulos was able to call for help in the recapture of the city: ‘the *Rhomaizontes* who, as Romans, willingly or unwillingly collaborated with our men’ (*Michael* 145.8–9). The qualification ‘willingly or unwillingly’, like the ‘wilful’ aspect in the story of the *thelematarioi*, serves as a useful

corrective to any simplistic ideas about automatic loyalty based on race in such complicated times; note too how these troublesome Romans have their Roman-ness qualified with a distinctive identifying epithet.

Pachymeres' problem, one familiar to Akropolites, is that there were two groups in the story who could naturally be called *Rhomaioi*, but simply to name both groups as Roman would have threatened the discrete wholeness of Roman identity. Pachymeres thus, while not ignoring the conflict between the ethnic and political identities, circumvented the problem by his alternative wording. On a somewhat similar note, one may note Pachymeres' avoidance of *Rhomaioi* in his account of the rebellion of Philanthropenos in Asia Minor, in late 1295. Sent to Asia Minor to confront Turkish incursions in 1294, the general Alexios Philanthropenos scored significant successes such that his soldiers combined with the local people to press him into challenging for the throne (*Andronikos* 210ff.). Pachymeres clearly had some sympathy for Philanthropenos' cause, and accepted the widespread support for him as unsurprising, but he hesitates to call Philanthropenos' supporters Roman, presumably because they were explicitly disloyal to the Constantinopolitan state. Nevertheless, he compares Philanthropenos to a '*basileus* if not in name then in acknowledged worth', and this indirectness is typical of the historian's subtle style (*Andronikos* 219.16–17).

Pachymeres is here again reminiscent of Akropolites in his creative approach to naming peoples and rulers so as to heighten his portrayal of the society and events under consideration. Like his predecessor he employs *δυτικός* (*dytikos*: 'western') to refer to those inhabitants of the Balkans, especially in Epiros, who were generally opposed to Constantinopolitan rule; thus too he similarly avoids the terminology of *Rhomaioi* for these ethnic, but not political, Romans.³³ Again, when relating the Turkish conquests in Asia Minor, he speaks of the conquest of the lands of the 'Maryandenoï' or the 'Boukellarïoï', once again avoiding the use of *Rhomaioi*, even though this is plainly conquest of Byzantine Roman territory inhabited by ethnic Romans.³⁴

So, Pachymeres had a sophisticated approach to the interface between ethnic and political loyalty and identity. Yet in his account of the expatriarch John Bekkos' personal attack on his successor Gregory of Cyprus he illustrates a less mature approach with overtones of ethnic hatred reminiscent of Anna Komnene's treatment of John Italos over a century

³³ Laiou 1993: 97; Failler 1980a. ³⁴ Angelov 2007: 273–4.

before. Bekkos contrasted himself, 'one born of Romans and raised by Romans', with Gregory, 'a man born of and raised by Italians who has insinuated himself into our ways in his very dress and speech' (*Andronikos* 89.4–8). Now, in fact, Gregory came of native Cypriot stock and was in an ethnic sense arguably Roman, though it is not possible to say with certainty whether Bekkos knew this; his attack certainly suggests the opposite. However, Gregory had grown up under Latin rule on Cyprus and, whatever his transgenerational ethnic identity, this seems to have been enough for Bekkos at least to characterise him as fundamentally Latin and not 'one of us': Bekkos' attack strongly emphasises the ethnic, the transgenerational and racial. This account of Bekkos and Gregory – which must surely reflect some of the prejudices around at that time – is an example of a political identity (Latin) overriding an ethnic identity (Cypriot) to condition the Roman ethnic identity in some way (not truly Roman), but then this being overridden again by adoption into Byzantine Roman norms (Roman) – for, of course, Gregory had made it to the ecumenical patriarchate; only an emperor could have been more essentially one of the Byzantine Roman 'us' than that. The shifting of identity in Gregory's case also mirrors his move from the periphery to the capital, and the elite sense that Constantinopolitan identity was the truest Roman identity was of course, as noted above, another idea with a long history.

Conservative elements in Constantinople may well thus have kept many of the prejudices of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and perhaps, in this account, Pachymeres was simply reflecting the less considered approach of Bekkos, as certainly this perspective contrasts with his personally more mature approach in the examples discussed above. Nevertheless, a similar process of shifting identity can be observed in relation to the Vasilikoi brothers. Originally from Rhodes and by implication clearly of Roman stock, these two had gone over to the Seljuk sultan. They had gained high rank at the Persian court and had met Michael Palaiologos there when, in exile in the 1250s, he too had served under the sultan. On Palaiologos' accession to the imperial throne they came to join him in Nikaia, with the result that 'they changed into Romans' (κατὰ Ῥωμαίους μετασχηματισθέντες, *Michael* 130.14–15) and thereafter served the emperor faithfully. Here again the ethnic identity (Rhodian, possibly Roman) has been overridden by adoption into other norms (Persian), and then this second identity has been overridden once again by fresh acculturation (becoming Roman).

Once again, it is worth noting, the Vasilikoi were originally from the distant provinces, and this may have brought their original identity into

doubt; in other words, as Rhodians they were not necessarily Roman to start with, and Pachymeres only says that they 'changed into' Romans, not that they 'changed back'. It is, then, significant that both Gregory and the Vasilikoi came from the distant provinces – respectively Cyprus and Rhodes. Quite possibly, there is a simple Constantinopolitan prejudice at work here – provincials were basically always seen as *less* Roman and thus more likely to fall off the Roman scale. Still, in both these cases the original ethnic identity was, at least approximately, Roman, and the eventual identity was similarly Roman.

In contrast, Pachymeres has no unambiguous examples of anyone becoming Roman who was of unambiguously non-Roman origin, in the ethnic Roman sense. The closest examples of this are, firstly, the monk Markos who comes 'of another race from the Romans' (*Michael* 130.14–15); his loyalty to the Roman side was firm, but his alien ethnic origin remained worthy of note. Secondly, there is the renegade Catalan who 'became a Hellene and changed his opinion and dress' (*Andronikos* 530.1–2); the context refers specifically in this case to the adoption of Orthodoxy, but the use of 'Hellene' makes this problematic in assessing Romanisation, as we shall see below. Unequivocally, a Persian (that is, a Turk) cannot become a Roman: Pachymeres tells the story of Sultan Isaak Melik, who was educated in Constantinople and took on a Roman way of life in many ways but nevertheless clearly remained a Persian (*Andronikos* 608–9). From the other side, Pachymeres similarly suggests that it is impossible to lose one's birth identity completely with his account of those Romans of Asia Minor who revolted to the side of the Catalans, and made themselves look like their new masters, by shaving their beards and the hair on their heads – but note that these renegades are still called Romans (*Andronikos* 626.3–5). For Pachymeres, ethnic signifiers (which in the case of the Romans include political loyalty to the empire) are important in denoting identity, but cannot overcome the basic importance of ethnic origin and ancestry.

There is also Pachymeres' treatment of the Γασμουῖλοι (*Gasmouloi*), those of mixed birth, who were enlisted in the Byzantine Roman army after the retaking of Constantinople: 'the contingent of the Gasmouloi, who being of mixed race could speak the Latin language – for they were born of both Romans and Latins . . . they had forethought in war and prudence from Romans, audacity and stubbornness from Latins' (*Michael* 188.8–13). Again, it is significant that these people are not unequivocally Roman. Clearly their loyalty was to the Byzantine Roman state, for whom they were going to fight; however, they are not called Romans, but again have a special name, *Gasmouloi* (here used in the adjectival form *Gasmoulikon*

as for a military contingent). Two things may have counted against their full Roman-ness. Firstly, they were only half-Roman in descent; and this is explicitly stated to affect their nature. Secondly, they seem to have been raised in a Latin environment as they could speak the Latin language. Thus, both birth and upbringing, Bekkos' two grounds for complaint against Gregory, are here called into play and, once more, ethnic and political identity need not coincide. The *Gasmouloi* are here and elsewhere linked with the Lakonians, who are similarly not usually called Roman; these people were not of mixed blood at all but simply came from a particular area in the Peloponnese. The two groups, Pachymeres states, had been resettled from the Peloponnese. Again, this exemplifies either simple Constantinopolitan prejudice against provincials or the doubts attached to those who had grown up under Latin rule, in this case the Latin principality of Achaia.

Pachymeres had, then, a tendency to use original or specific vocabulary whenever he perceived a problem with the terminology of Roman-ness: *thelematarioi*, *Rhomaizontes*, *Gasmouloi*. Like Akropolites, he wanted to restrict Roman identity to those who were politically Roman as well as ethnically Roman. However, the terminology of Roman-ness is nevertheless used by Pachymeres in the problematic context of localised Roman identity in contrast to another, alien, identity, for example when talking of Romans who were living under the rule of other political entities. This usage has clear ethnic connotations. Pachymeres uses *Rhomaioi* in this sense in relation to Asia Minor, where Romans fell successively under waves of Turks (e.g. *Andronikos* 310, 327, 332), and for areas in the west, a specific instance being Belgrade, where Romans are contrasted with the Serbs, the ruling nation (e.g. *Andronikos* 557.10–11). At other times the localised use is employed for areas under Byzantine Roman rule (more or less) where different peoples mingled; the best example from Pachymeres is Pera, the Latin suburb across the Golden Horn from Constantinople proper, where the Roman inhabitants were often at loggerheads with Genoese settlers (*Andronikos* 240–2).

What of Pachymeres' conception of a Roman land? Firstly, it is clearly not the case, in Pachymeres' view, that the rule of Romans over an area will make the inhabitants of that area Roman. The clearest expression of this is in his description of the tribes of the Black or Caspian Seas, who are described as formerly subject to Romans, but who were not to be classified as Romans (*Michael* 344.17–345.9, *Andronikos* 263). In fact, in contrast to Choniates, the territorial aspect of Roman identity has almost

disappeared in Pachymeres: one ideological result of the enormous losses in territory since 1204 and the continual shifting of boundaries ever since. However, more than any other historian in this study, Pachymeres uses the terms *Rhomaïs* and *Rhomania* to denote the geographical extent of Byzantine Roman rule, and contexts for such usage include the settlement of colonists and the borders of Byzantine Roman influence.

In particular, Michael Palaiologos is generally portrayed by the historian as having a strong sense of the geographical aspect of Roman-ness. Early in his reign the emperor is shown staking a claim to Mesembrea and its neighbour Anchialos, on the western shore of the Black Sea, against the claims of the encroaching Bulgarians. He says the loss of these towns 'would be to the serious weakening of *Rhomaïs*' (*Michael* 344.15), and that they were 'a part of *Rhomania*' (*Michael* 344.18), and Constantine of Bulgaria accepted the Byzantine Roman claim that the two towns were part of *Rhomaïs*. There is a strong sense here of the geographical integrity of the empire; it is, however, arguably Pachymeres' reflection of policy under Michael Palaiologos, while his own conceptions were rather different. For Pachymeres, Romans in the ethnic Roman sense may live in many areas besides the geographical extent of *Rhomaïs*, and while it is ideal that Romans be ruled by Romans, that is, within *Rhomaïs*, this will not always be the case: Michael Palaiologos' claim that the Mesembreians are Romans and that as such it would not be right for them to be ruled by Bulgarians is an example of the difficulties of maintaining identities on the borders (*Michael* 443.15).

Although Pachymeres recounts Michael Palaiologos' grandiose plans to reconquer all the territory lost in 1204 (cf. *Michael* 153), it is clear the historian himself had little sympathy with such plans. This comes out most clearly in his account of the 1262 negotiations with Prince William of Achaia in the Peloponnese, who had been captured by the emperor at the battle of Pelagonia in 1259. Unable to gain his release by a monetary ransom, William acknowledged Byzantine Roman supremacy and gave up land in the Peloponnese in return for his freedom from captivity. In Pachymeres' account of the negotiations, there is no hint of any automatic Byzantine Roman claim to the Peloponnese as Roman land. Writing of the beginning of the 1259 Pelagonia campaign which was to result in William's captivity and eventual submission, Pachymeres introduced William thus: 'the Prince was autonomous, having inherited all the Achaia and the Morea' (*Michael* 84.1-3) – William's claim to his principality was thus uncontested. Some three years after the battle and bargaining for his release, William recognised Michael Palaiologos as 'first lord of Romania' and submitted to

him as *basileus* (86.22–87.1); in return, William gained the title of Grand Domestic. Pachymeres goes on to say that William would have remained loyal to his undertakings as an official within the Byzantine Roman state were it not for the intervention of the pope (86.21–87.1).

There is in this account little to suggest that Pachymeres believed the prince of Achaia to be naturally under the rule of the Roman emperor, by virtue of owning lands within the historical purview of the Byzantine Roman empire. Rather, an autonomous ruler agreed to submit because of the fortunes of war and then escaped the obligations he had signed up to because of the complicated diplomatic situation between Byzantine Roman rule and the west. Pachymeres was, then, willing to accept a Latin holding office within the Roman state and ruling at least semi-independently under that state. After all, William did not formally submit all his principality to Michael Palaiologos (and to the Romans, to use Pachymeres' wording), but rather conceded only specific areas. The rest of his principality remained in his hands; further, the implication is clear that, if William had remained within the terms of the agreement, there would have been no conflict in the Peloponnese. Pachymeres thus accepted Latin rule over an erstwhile part of the Byzantine Roman empire.

Rhomaïs is also frequently used by Pachymeres in a political sense to mean the Byzantine Roman state – offices held within, *pragmata* of, weakening of and so on. The most striking example of this must be Michael Palaiologos' injunction to his pilot to navigate carefully in a storm, 'since you conduct, if not the whole world, then all *Rhomaïs* in this little boat, since it holds the emperors' (*Michael* 527.20–528.2) Here *Rhomaïs* has no territorial aspect at all; the Roman state is the fact of imperial rule.

POLITICAL, TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES: THE STORY SO FAR

For Akropolites, Pachymeres and Choniates the political aspect of Roman identity was highly significant, and each historian attempted to cope with the vast political changes of his time by manipulating the concept and terminology of the political Roman identity. In the last chapter, we saw that Choniates had worked within the traditional imperial ideology of the unique Byzantine Roman emperor ruling over the unique Byzantine Roman empire. This empire was imagined in two complementary ways: its territory and its people, the *Rhomaioi*. To be a Roman was primarily a political matter of being a subject (or ruler) of this empire, but there were strong ethnic elements to this identity, including the belief that the

identity was and should be inheritable and that this transgenerational identity would be manifested in certain outward signs.

The political understanding of *Rhomaioi* is similarly basic in Akropolites, but the later historian controlled his use of Roman terminology in order to drive home the perceived prior claim of Nikaia to the imperial position against all other claimants. Akropolites' presentation can only seem inconsistent on any close examination. On first glance it might seem that only Nikaian subjects could be Romans, but a few key uses reveal that Romans also lived outside Nikaian rule. However, again, substantial numbers of people who would seem to have had an equal right to be Roman with, say, the acknowledged Romans of the Peloponnese or Lentiana are very explicitly non-Roman. Thus, the territorial aspect of Roman identity is far less strong. Although this is something Akropolites seems to wish to de-emphasise, it is no longer a given that Romans should live within the empire; indeed, significant groups of Romans are explicitly shown as living under alien rule. However, the Romans under alien rule were not Akropolites' main concern; he was more interested in obscuring any possible claim that the rulers of Epiros might have had to Roman status. This agenda conditioned his presentation of the Romans of Epiros, who are unfavourably characterised in such a way as to liken them to alien westerners rather than to Romans.

Under the old imperial ideology, the *Rhomaioi* had been a single group united by their allegiance to the imperial rule based in Constantinople. However, the old markers of this political Roman identity – rule from Constantinople, the speaking of Greek, the profession of Orthodox Christianity, residence in a certain area historically ruled from Constantinople – were all problematic after 1204. By presenting the opposition as non-Roman, Akropolites sought to imply a continuity between the pre-1204 rule from Constantinople and the rule from Constantinople after 1261, but the facts were working against him. It is clear that Akropolites was also working with an ethnic understanding of Roman identity, and this is allowed to emerge in the treatment of certain groups of Romans under alien rule after 1204. Akropolites gives us few hints of the markers that revealed such non-political Romans nevertheless to be *Rhomaioi*, but Orthodox Christianity was surely one such marker as shown by Akropolites' use of *genos* for the Orthodox Christians in Latin Constantinople.

For Pachymeres, the political Roman identity had decreased in importance compared to the increasingly significant ethnic Roman identity, but it still remained a vital element in his overall picture of Roman identity. This basic importance is most clearly seen in his habit of either avoiding

Roman terminology or using alternative terms when dealing with people who in many ways appeared Roman but were at best only dubiously loyal to the Byzantine Roman imperial state. However, he is far clearer than Akropolites about the fact that many Romans were subjects of other states. Crucially, he strongly implies that their Roman identity, which had continued to exist despite their political status, should fundamentally determine that political status: all Romans should feel sentiment for and wish to support the Byzantine Roman state. The transgenerational ethnic aspect of Roman identity had thus come to the fore and, perhaps because of this now accepted phenomenon of ethnic Romans living in large numbers outside the Roman state, Pachymeres gives more detail about the tangible markers of Roman identity. Language was the first obvious example of such a marker, and Pachymeres contrasts how others said things and how Romans said them. Appearance was another factor, including hairstyle in the account of the Romans who went over to the Catalans, and dress (and language) in Bekkos' comments on Gregory of Cyprus. More specific is the reference to the Romans of Asia Minor who revolted to the side of the Catalans, and made themselves look like their new masters, by shaving their beards and the hair on their heads – note, however, that these are still called Romans (*Andronikos* 626.3–5). Pachymeres' position appears to be that one can change such externals, but not one's basic identity, although this is not definitive.

Another, more subtle, aspect to identity was provided by upbringing. Bekkos' accusations against Gregory of Cyprus really came down to this, and we have also noted the Vasilikoi brothers. Upbringing would ensure familiarity with the Roman ways of doing things – to use the old-fashioned word, with customs. As with externals like language and dress, Pachymeres suggests that customs, familiarity with Roman ways, could be acquired. A further, similarly detectable, aspect to identity was character, and this will be dealt with below in the discussion of the terminology of barbarism.

Although Pachymeres' characterisation of Roman identity stresses the political aspect heavily, on an individual level this should be seen as one element of the ethnic. For Pachymeres, in fact, the empire should be seen as the most complete expression of Roman customs: the Byzantine Roman state was an inheritance of the Romans, a transgenerational aspect of their identity transmitted from generation to generation in the same way as the fundamentally uncivilised, though not unadmirable, way of life of the Tatars (cf. *Andronikos* 457–9). Romans inherited the political aspect along with everything else – dress, customs, language, religion. Sometimes, this political aspect of the ethnic seems highly important (as with the Vasilikoi

brothers), but Pachymeres is not entirely consistent; at other times the political is clearly a less important aspect than all the other ethnic criteria, as it was entirely feasible to be a Roman but live outside of the Byzantine Roman state with at best only a theoretical loyalty to the emperor – for example, the Roman residents of Latin Constantinople. This whole approach contrasts strongly with Choniates' treatment of the Romans living in Ikonion. Most extraordinary of all, there could be Romans living outside the empire, explicitly loyal to another political power, and even ceasing to *look* like Romans – but still Roman. As all these examples show in different ways, upbringing or life changes were capable of determining or altering a great deal, but could not change one's basic ethnic identity which, in the final analysis, depended on birth and ancestry – the ethnic group one was born into. It is this notion of birth that is the fundamental aspect of Roman identity for Pachymeres.

All Pachymeres' aspects of identity, then, fundamentally rest on a trans-generational quality that it was all but impossible to overcome. Language, customary dress and appearance, ways of worshipping, modes of behaviour, type of character at the individual and state level, all depended on the fact of your birth and added up to a complex nexus that could never be wholly created in the course of one lifetime, or wholly done away with. On an individual level, the Roman political identity was one aspect of the Roman identity nexus.

AKROPOLITES AND PACHYMERES: OTHER FORMS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Rhomaïos is by far the dominant term in both historians for the group with which they identified themselves and, as has been suggested so far, this carried connotations of political allegiance and/or ethnic descent. For Akropolites, *Rhomaïos* is really the only self-identifying term, apart from a use of 'we', which is used especially in contrast to the Epirots. As noted above, he completely avoids the use of *Rhomaïoi* for the Epirots; he also reduces his use of *Rhomaïoi* for Nikaïans too in situations of direct conflict with Epiros (cf. 148–50, 171–2). Akropolites' use of *Rhomaïos* to denote the Nikaïans is, as noted, highly politicised and conscious; his avoidance of *Rhomaïos* for his own side when relating conflicts between Nikaia and Epiros may thus reflect a more unconscious recognition of a shared ethnic Roman identity between the people of both successor states.

Akropolites also occasionally uses 'we' to denote Nikaïans in contrast to other peoples, for example Bulgarians, westerners or Muslim easterners.

The use appears relatively emotive: the Bulgarians felt 'enmity towards us' (94.13), 'the race of the Latins always nurse hatred towards us ... they looked for an opportunity to attack us' (59.19–20), fleeing into exile in the 1250s Michael Palaiologos was vehemently attacked by the emperor Theodore II Laskaris as 'fugitive from us' (134.24). The uses of 'we' as contrasted to Bulgarians and Latins could be understood as signifying the Romans as a race. However, Akropolites most often uses 'we' in a more strictly Nikaian context, as with the Epirots and Michael Palaiologos, confirming his fundamental loyalties (for example, 73.11, 59.19–20).

Pachymeres' use of 'we' is more pervasive and in many ways similar to that of Choniates. The earlier historian had used 'we' to denote the Romans in a political sense, and with all the same associations, and his use of 'we' had become more frequent in more emotive situations, as when the empire was under attack. Thus, for Pachymeres, too, 'we' is commonly equivalent to *Rhomaioi*. It is used in military contexts, for example with *strateuma* (Michael 19.9–10), and the sense of a collective citizenry also emerges, for example, Michael VIII Palaiologos seems to be acting 'in our interests' (Michael 178.14–15). As noted above, Pachymeres also uses 'we' to signify Nikaian Romans when discussing the fluctuating loyalties of the *thelmatarioi*; he uses a similar approach for the people of western Greece before 1261: 'the westerners at one time inclined to us and at another to them' (Michael 20.13–14). It is possible that, like Akropolites before him, Pachymeres may at some level have wanted to avoid using *Rhomaioi* for only one side in the Nikaian–Epirot conflict.

Pachymeres also shares with Choniates the importance of Christianity as an essential element of what it was to be Roman. For Pachymeres, the importance of the Christian identity may be illustrated by his frequent adoption of 'we' in reference to the Orthodox church and its leaders, with whom he was personally most active in the great events of his day (see especially Michael 366.16). However, this Christian identity, like the political and ethnic already examined, was fraught with difficulties. How could it be otherwise in Pachymeres' time? The Orthodox church was racked by internal schism as a direct result of Michael Palaiologos' violent usurpation of power from the legitimate emperor John IV Laskaris. Patriarch Arsenios had excommunicated the emperor, and had therefore been deposed and replaced in his turn, but feelings ran strong and Arsenios retained a great deal of support. On top of this, the church was also often in direct conflict with the emperor under the challenge of union with the church of Rome.

Pachymeres sometimes uses 'we' to denote Orthodox Christians in contrast to western Christians (Michael 371.11–12 and 16, 375.6–7); again,

however, the terminology of Christianity is often invoked by Pachymeres as it had been by Choniates as an appeal to end conflict with fellow Christians, for example with Epiros (*Michael* 241.2–3) or the Angevins (*Michael* 359.14–17). He uses ‘we’ in this more inclusive sense also: ‘Christians should not attack Christians, lest *we* rouse the wrath of God’ (*Michael* 410.14–16, my emphasis). This Christian identity in its fullest sense was thus broader than the Roman, although the Roman identity of course continued to include Christianity as a necessary component; see the patriarch’s address to ‘Romans and Christians’ (*Andronikos* 648.5). This appeal is, though, a rare example of the Roman and Christian identities being explicitly linked; more typically they were not associated.

It is against this background that one should consider the problem of Pachymeres’ terminology of identity in his account of Michael Palaiologos’ doomed attempts at church union. At times, Pachymeres abandons altogether the terminology of Roman-ness for the Byzantine Roman side in the controversy, when on some ten occasions he refers to the Byzantine side as ‘Greek’ – *Graikos*.³⁵ In fact, he consciously and explicitly adopts the terminology of the western Latins to use in relation to his own people, as he shows on the first occasion of such use, saying that ‘the Romans, whom they (i.e. westerners) call Greeks, are of the same church and Christ as the Italians’ (*Michael* 359.11–13). Moreover, he goes one step further on three occasions when he applies ‘Roman’ to the westerners. After the Union of Lyons in 1274, the mass was celebrated in the Church of the Holy Wisdom Γραικῶς τε ὁμοῦ καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῶς, ‘in the Greek and likewise the Roman style’; here, *Rhomaïkos* is used to signify the western Catholic rite and *Graikos* signifies the eastern Orthodox. Similarly, Pachymeres says that it was ‘the Romans and not the Greeks’ (*Andronikos* 29.1–2) who used the *filioque* in the Creed – potentially, a very confusing statement.

This usage of *Graikos* in Pachymeres is a fascinating adoption of the vocabulary of the enemy. As noted, Choniates had been fully aware of the negative associations of this term, using *Graikos* in a sarcastic fashion to provide a Latin viewpoint. The history of relations with the Holy Roman Empire reveals that the Byzantine Romans had in the past been extremely keen to keep the name of Roman to themselves, and Choniates typifies this Roman rejection of the western term *Graikos*. This use by Pachymeres surely illustrates an educated awareness of the roots of the terminology of

³⁵ *Michael* 359.11–13, 362.4, 367.7–8, 375.5–6, 399.13–14, 410.11, and *Andronikos* 22.11–13, 29.1–2 and 4–5.

Roman-ness and of the growing power of a renascent Rome – from where, after all, these clerics of the rival church came.

This idea, and this use of *Graikos*, were not unique to Pachymeres and may even have been in general circulation among the educated elite, as it also appears in a theological, rather than historical, work by Akropolites, where he compares the ‘Greeks’ and ‘Italians’, seeking to show how they were all in origin Romans.³⁶ *Graikos* was also employed with reference to ethnic Romans by Germanos II, patriarch of Constantinople under Theodore II Laskaris, when writing to churchmen in the west; Germanos was perhaps attempting to use vocabulary which his audience would understand.³⁷ The religious context is worth noting: it should be observed that this usage of *Graikos* similarly clusters in Pachymeres only around his treatment of church union. Limited thus to the religious sphere, it need not directly impinge on Roman political identity. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Pachymeres is clearly anti-unionist in sympathy and this usage may even have been intended to reflect badly on Michael Palaiologos and his policy, as pandering to the Latin way of looking at things. Notwithstanding, this use strikes the modern reader as an intelligent and ironic slant over and above the potential polemical agenda, and it is certainly conspicuous among the overwhelming positive and typically Byzantine use of Roman terminology.

Rhomaïos was the fundamental term of identity for Akropolites and Pachymeres as it had been for Choniates, *Graikos* was an occasional conceit; what then of the terminology of Hellenism? It is well established that the rule of the Laskarid emperors in Nikaia witnessed a revival of some kind of Hellenism in Byzantine Roman culture. At the very least, alongside the older and negative uses of Hellene, the Nikaian Romans began to make a far freer and more positive use of the terminology of Hellenism to the extent that the scholars and leaders of the empire of Nikaia adopted the vocabulary of *Hellen* for one form of self-identification.³⁸ Writing to Pope Gregory IX, Emperor John III Vatatzes (1222–54) called his imperial predecessors *Hellenes*, Emperor Theodore II Laskaris (1254–8) called his realm *Hellas*, and so on.³⁹ This has been characterised as a revival of an admiring interest in the ancient Greeks that extended, at least, to a wish to identify with them. Michael Angold has proposed that this was in part a response to the Latin conquest; to the educated Byzantine, the ethnonym *Rhomaïos*

³⁶ Heisenberg 1903 II: 64.12–15; Magdalino 1991: II. ³⁷ Angelov 2007: 95–6.

³⁸ Angold 1975b; Browning 1989: 124; Angelov 2007: 95–8.

³⁹ Grumel 1930; Festa 1898: 165, 176. Vacalopoulos 1970: 36–41 gives other examples.

had associations with westerners that were more than ever regrettable; on the other hand, a fresh awareness of intellectual currents in the west may have impelled the Nikaian Romans into reacquainting themselves with their ancient past.⁴⁰ This would seem to be correct, but it is important to appreciate that this was a limited phenomenon. The examples of self-identifying Hellenism are actually quite few and do not extend beyond the absolute elite of Nikaia, where the terminology of *Rhomaïos* also maintained its hold.

However, Akropolites and Pachymeres belonged to this Nikaian elite: so to what extent, then, do *Hellen* and its associated vocabulary feature as terms of self-identification in these historians of the thirteenth century?

For both Akropolites and Pachymeres, as for Choniates, the Hellenes were first and foremost the ancient inhabitants of Greece. Akropolites speaks of Hellenes as one among ancient peoples, also citing 'Romans', 'Persians' and 'the nations' (4.1–3). Pachymeres, who in his usage of this terminology is once again closer to Choniates than is Akropolites, makes one reference to the ancient lawmakers Solon and Lykourgos which explicitly contrasts them with Christ with clear negative connotations (*Michael* 217.16–218.3); on the other hand, another reference contrasts them favourably with the lawgivers of the barbarian Tatars (*Michael* 445.16–9). This mixture of allusions from the adulatory to the contemptuous is reminiscent of Choniates, as seen above, and is typical of the educated Byzantine Roman outlook.

Each writer, nevertheless, at least hints at some level of Hellenic self-identification. This is strongest of all in Choniates who, as already noted, directly and repeatedly identifies Romans and Hellenes in his account of the taking of Constantinople. This self-identification is strongest, however, in the linguistic context, and reference was made to Choniates' repeated references to the Hellenic language, which he presents as his own language. Pachymeres also seems to identify *Rhomaïos* with *Hellen*, but only in certain contexts and primarily that of language. Pachymeres customarily speaks of foreign words being translated into 'the language of the Hellenes', or 'as a Hellene might say' (*Michael* 162.17–18 and 163.4 or 360.2), and it is tempting to think of this as meaning 'into the language which we Romans speak'. Yet it may not be so simple. Bearing in mind the Byzantine diglossia outlined above, it is possible that Pachymeres and Choniates are actually saying something like, 'as I, an educated Roman, might put it in my educated

⁴⁰ Angold 1975a: 29–31.

Hellenic style of the language'. In support of this interpretation may be cited the references in Pachymeres to words 'as the Romans say'; one such reference contrasts the Roman name and the ancient Athenian name for a month: 'the month which the Romans call January the Athenians called Hekatombaion' (*Andronikos* 306.8–9). Here, 'Athenians' is employed where elsewhere Pachymeres might use 'Hellenes' (cf. also *Andronikos* 448.14). Comparable in Choniates is 'the ruler of the axe-bearing British whom people now call English' (417.67–8), which contrasts the correct classicising name for a people with the contemporary name. Like Choniates again, Pachymeres also refers to 'the common tongue' in contrast to grander, Hellenic, ways of saying things, for example, at *Michael* 310.7–8, or 288.18–19. Akropolites is nowhere as specific about a Hellenic style of language as are both Choniates and Pachymeres, but he too is aware of and makes repeated reference to a 'common' way of speaking.⁴¹ Linguistic uses of Hellenic terminology could therefore be understood as referring primarily to the educated language of the Roman elite, and by no means extend to any identification with the ancient past.

Other Hellenic self-identification in Pachymeres takes the form of describing someone as becoming a Hellene, or more Hellenic, in the context, seemingly, of becoming more like a Roman: the bishop of Kroton (*Michael* 360.10–11) and a renegade Catalan (*Andronikos* 530.1–2). It is hard to draw any conclusions from this, but it is tempting to say that the Hellenic connection was an established conceit that Pachymeres used as part of his educated style. There is insufficient evidence to suggest any identification of contemporary Romans with ancient Hellenes – and we should put this in the context of Pachymeres, like Choniates, being a highly educated man of letters and science who worked extensively with ancient texts and had the greatest respect for them. The mere fact that these historians worked in the same language as the ancient historians of the Hellenes can only have nurtured any identification they felt with their ancient counterparts, and Choniates presents the clearest example of this with his specific evocation of the classical roots of historical writing.

Revealingly, the equally erudite Akropolites makes minimal use of the terminology of Hellenism. He cites the Hellenes as an ancient people, and he gives a single contrast between barbarian and Hellenic language, which clearly refers to the contemporary language of the Romans (discussed below). His reference to eastern Greece as τῆς Ἑλληνίδος καὶ ἡμετέρας γῆς ('our Hellenic land', 166.7) has been cited as evidence for a growing identification with the ancient Hellenes at the Nikaian court.⁴² Yet this is

⁴¹ Macrides 2007: 51. ⁴² Angold 1975a: 31.

not necessarily Hellenic self-identification; *Hellenis* could be understood as a variant of *Hellas*, and thereby be simply a geographic reference – *Hellas* was the imperial province which included Attika and Thessaly.⁴³ Akropolites could thus be saying ‘the Pindos mountains separate the old and the new Epiros from Hellas and our territory’. Alternatively, if Akropolites is applying the name *Hellenis* to the dominions of Nikaia, over their whole extent, this would be consistent with the application of Hellenic terminology to the territory of the Nikaian empire by Theodore Laskaris and Nikephoros Blemmydes.

What seems surprising is that this should be the only use of Hellenic terminology in the *History*, if the Nikaian identification with the Hellenic past was so prevailing, and one explanation may be that Akropolites was writing for a Palaiologos. One personal subtext of Akropolites’ *History* is a determined effort to play down his individual associations with Theodore II Laskaris, in order to play up and promote his links with the usurper Michael VIII Palaiologos.⁴⁴ The Hellenic associations may have been seen as especially linked with the Laskarids and less appealing to Michael Palaiologos; certainly, in Michael’s autobiography the emperor himself uses ‘Hellenic’ only in a geographical sense. The careful and subtle wordsmith Akropolites thus could well have limited his use of this particular brand of rhetoric.

In conclusion, the terminology of Hellenism played a minor role in self-identification in the historians of the thirteenth century. Both had their closest personal link with the Hellenes in the language in which they were writing, and it seems likely that they called their spoken language ‘Hellenic’, at least when they were writing about it; they were also familiar with the diglossia of their society. Such a usage could only foster some kind of identification with their ancient Hellenic forebears. There is a possible trace in Akropolites, and rather more than a trace in Pachymeres, of the kind of Hellenic self-identification cultivated by the Laskarids of Nikaia; however, the influence of this trend is very slight, and *Rhomaïos* remains the only significant self-identifying ethnonym for each writer.

DEFINITELY NOT ROMANS . . .

Both historians of the thirteenth century contrast strongly with Choniates in their use of the terminology of barbarism, suggesting a distinct shift in the Byzantine Romans’ attitudes to other peoples and by extension perhaps to themselves.

⁴³ Koder and Hild 1976: 38–40; Macrides 2007: 358.

⁴⁴ Macrides 1996: 221–4.

As noted above, *barbaros* was for Choniates the term of choice for any non-Roman, and he used it extremely widely in his *History*, though we can detect something of a scale of barbarity, with northern peoples the most likely to be called barbarians. In his presentation of the various barbarian groups, Choniates allows for some insights into what it was to be barbarian and, conversely, what it therefore was to be Roman. In his portrayal of the uniquely civilised imperial Romans surrounded by essentially hostile barbarians, Choniates' conception of 'the barbarian' was the conventional one of the typical educated Byzantine Roman.

Akropolites presents the most striking contrast with this traditional viewpoint. Unlike Choniates, he very rarely uses the terminology of barbarism, with a mere eight occurrences over the course of his *History*. (Appendix 1, p. 292) Only Bulgarians and Cumans are specifically identified as barbarian, though there is a suggestion that there were further barbarian groups. This strong association of barbarism with northerners is reminiscent of Choniates, but Akropolites goes farther than his predecessor in defining what it was that made northerners so essentially barbarian. Barbarism for Akropolites seems mostly to be about a different way of living, a way which was not ordered and hallowed by centuries of precedent as was the Roman way. Thus, the Cumans were 'barbarous men, wanderers and incomers' (55.4). Alongside this, as noted above, Theodore Doukas' attempts at empire in Epiros and Thessaloniki are mocked: 'Being ignorant with regard to the institutions of the empire, he [Doukas] dealt with the undertaking in a more Bulgarian, or rather more barbarous way. He was not aware of proper order, nor of method nor of any of the time-honoured imperial institutions' (34.8–12). This denigration of Doukas highlights a contrast between Roman civilisation and order and their barbarian opposites.

This interpretation is reinforced by the account of Michael Palaiologos and the trial by hot iron (*History* 92–100). In the winter of 1253, towards the end of the reign of John III Vatatzes in Nikaia, the aristocratic and popular Palaiologos was suspected of treachery and one suggestion was to have him prove his innocence by holding a bar of hot iron. Palaiologos appealed to Phokas, metropolitan of Phokaia, asking if this was a legitimate form of trial, and Phokas replied that, 'this is not part of our Roman system, nor of the ecclesiastical tradition, nor of the laws, nor above all is it taken from the holy and godly canons. It is a barbarian way of doing things and unknown to us, to be enacted only by imperial order' (98.4–9). This is informative on the detail of Roman 'proper order' and 'method' and 'the time-honoured imperial institutions', as linked to tradition, law and written canons. Palaiologos then asserted, in a successful defence:

if indeed I myself was born of barbarians and had been nurtured in barbarian customs or educated in such laws, then I would pay my full penalty in the barbarian way. But as a Roman and born of Romans I will have the judgement of the court on me determined according to Roman laws and written doctrines. (98.9–13)

There is evidently a strong element of ethnic identity here – being born of a certain group – but it is also clear that the different identities are made manifest by different modes of social organisation. The emphasis on written paradigms in forming a contrast with the barbarian model is significant. It is worth noting that this episode is suggestive of a shift in legal method under the Nikaian empire that may well have alarmed traditionalists.⁴⁵ Akropolites was not alone in identifying and deprecating this method of trial as barbarian; Demetrios Chomatianos of Epiros for one had deprecated the procedure in much the same terms. The emphasis in Akropolites on the contrast between civilised, cultured Roman and uncivilised, disorganised barbarian may well have been a defensive reaction against a fear that Roman standards were slipping.⁴⁶

Again, Akropolites links barbarism closely with inhuman behaviour. Asen I of Bulgaria is called a barbarian in specific association with his reputed conversion of the head of the Latin emperor Baldwin into a drinking goblet. His son John Asen II, in contrast, was ‘a man plainly the best among barbarians, not only among his own people but also among others. For he dealt in a more humane way with foreigners who came to him and especially with the Romans, and he provided for them honourably’ (64.6–8). It is plain from this how barbarians were expected to behave, and equally clear that John Asen was remarkable in perhaps even coming up to Roman standards. It is noticeable that John Asen’s excellence was manifested in public procedures, in the civilised business of receiving embassies and trade, confirming that for Akropolites the contrast between the Roman and the barbarian was a matter of social norms.⁴⁷

The only other way in which Akropolites distinguishes Romans and barbarians is by language. The foreign contingents of the Nikaian army, Latin and Cuman, are said to acclaim Michael Palaiologos as emperor, and the Cumans do so ‘not in the barbarian speech, but in fine Greek as

⁴⁵ Angold 1975a: 173–4; Pitra 1891: no. 127, cols. 525–8.

⁴⁶ The passage is a key one in Akropolites’ construction of Michael Palaiologos: Macrides 2007: 61–2 illustrates how Akropolites uses the incident to denigrate John III Vatatzes and his administration as barbarian in contrast to Michael Palaiologos as the noble Roman.

⁴⁷ Macrides 2007: 91–2. Cf. also John Vatatzes’ settlement of the Cumans, formerly nomadic, as ‘changing them from their wild nature’ (*History* 65.15–20).

was fitting' (158.19–20). It should be noted that these foreigners could and did speak good Greek, and this was perhaps a mark of their inclusion in the Byzantine Roman state, in contrast to their more alien and less fluent compatriots living apart from and inimical to the Romans.

Thus, the conventional division between Romans and barbarians (with the latter being everyone else) is no longer so clear-cut in Akropolites, and any idea of barbarian encirclement of the Romans is entirely lacking. Westerners, and even more surprisingly the 'pagan' easterners, are never identified as barbarians. Akropolites' account of the ordeal of hot iron, described as barbarian and unfitting for a Roman, has attracted attention as possibly exemplifying western legal practices at the court of Nikaia, but this possibility is not enough to show that Akropolites saw westerners as barbarian, particularly given his total neglect of the term in this respect, in strong contrast to Choniates. Nevertheless, some of the adjectival uses of the barbarian terminology are suggestive of the fundamental Roman/barbarian dichotomy in a familiar exercise of Byzantine Roman rhetoric. The difference between the two is seen to rest essentially on the contrast between civilised, urban and imperial society, and the uncivilised, inhuman and nomadic; as such, the distinction is more specific than the vaguer and more generalised dichotomy employed by Choniates.

In some ways, Pachymeres marks a return to the more conventional approach of Choniates. He applies the terminology of barbarism far more widely than Akropolites, but at thirty-five occurrences is nowhere near as lavish with it as Choniates ([Appendix 1](#), pp. 294–5). Bulgarians, Tatars, Turks, Serbians and Alans are described by him as barbarian, but not the French, Franks in the Aegean region, or Latin clerics; Catalans, however, were barbarian, and so were the English. *Barbaros* is most commonly used by Pachymeres in a Bulgarian context; however, this is overwhelmingly in application to the individual Lachanas, who had risen from being a swineherd to marry the Byzantine princess who was queen mother for the child-heir in Bulgaria in the late 1270s (*Michael* 553, 563–7, 656). Similarly, out of three uses in a Catalan context, two are specifically applied to the Catalan leader Roger de Flor in the context of his leadership of the violent, acquisitive and disrespectful Catalan mercenaries (*Andronikos* 512, 525). Half of the Serbian references apply to the elderly and formidable Kral Stefan Milutin in the context of his regrettable marriage with the Byzantine child-princess Simonis in 1299 (*Andronikos* 271, 293). In each of these 'individual' applications, then, there is a strong and specific reference to unpleasant character and behaviour.

As a people rather than in reference to a specific individual, it is Turks who are most often called barbarians, but the numbers – just three out of four references – are not sufficient to draw firm conclusions. Considering how rarely they occur in the story, it is actually the Alans who are referred to as barbarians in the densest fashion and as a mass rather than individuals (*Andronikos* 309–10). Again then, in terms of relative density (above, p. 90) it is northerners that are most barbarian, followed by the Muslim easterners. This is again reminiscent of how Choniates' use of the terminology of barbarism showed up some peoples as more barbarian than others.⁴⁸

A few conclusions can be drawn, with regard to religion, territorial origin and behaviour. There remained for Pachymeres a strong connection between being barbarian and being non-Christian; thus the Turks could casually be called barbarian, typically without any behavioural connection. Turks also came from beyond the limits of Byzantine Roman power, though now generally living within the older boundaries, and there may thus also have remained a territorial association with barbarism. Bulgarians and Serbs in Pachymeres' day still carried strong associations with barbarism from their past, i.e., though now settled in kingdoms within the historical limits of the Byzantine Roman empire, they came originally from beyond the limits of the Roman *oikoumene* and had a history of raiding and nomadism before (and after) their Christianisation that had become entrenched in the Byzantine Roman world picture as archotypically barbarian. Their barbarian nature was thus behavioural as much as religious and, like Choniates, Pachymeres often reflects this in tying his usage of the terminology of barbarism in their case to regrettable behaviour, as with Lachanas (see *Michael* 444.17 and 446.2–4) and Stefan Milutin (*Andronikos* 271.15). The Alans, as nomadic and of distant origin, remained typically barbarian. As for the English, their distant origin was probably enough to ensure barbarian status; and they were further specifically associated with the Varangian guard who, as the barbarian guards of the emperor, were in a way the classic barbarians for the Romans.

Territorial origin may also lie behind Pachymeres' ascription of barbarian status to Emperor John Komnenos of Trebizond, which seems at first sight astonishing (*Michael* 520.10). The empire of Trebizond, based on the coast of the Black Sea, was the third of the Roman successor states that had emerged from the disaster of 1204. In the early years after the Latin conquest, the empire of Trebizond had clashed with the empire of

⁴⁸ Above, pp. 89–91.

Nikaia for hegemony in Asia Minor; Nikaia had won out and Trebizond had concentrated on its heartlands towards the east. Ruled by an imperial Roman family, and in its court procedures and titles viewing itself as a Byzantine Roman empire, it is noteworthy that Trebizond's very existence was as far as possible ignored by the historians of Constantinople and Nikaia, and when it is mentioned it is customary for its Roman-ness to be downplayed. After the recapture of Constantinople in 1261, it was necessary for the Trapezuntines to come to some kind of accord with Michael VIII Palaiologos, and in 1282 the Trapezuntine emperor John II Grand Komnenos settled a treaty with Michael by which John accepted the lesser title of despot; this is the context for Pachymeres' slighting reference. The location of the Trapezuntine empire on 'the barbarian sea' was enough to provide an erudite tool with which to put this upstart in his place. According to the ancient paradigm, the Black Sea was a classic frontier between the civilised and the barbarian, lying between the urbanised living of the Greeks and the nomadism of the steppe.⁴⁹ As such this reference may be compared to Akropolites' dismissal of Theodore Doukas' attempts at empire in Epiros as 'more barbarian' (34.8–12). These two references are examples of the use of the terminology of barbarism for political ends, by denying Roman status to a potentially awkward rival. In both cases, the perceived peripheral location gave added weight to the slight.

With regard to the Catalans, it is likely that their behaviour alone gave them barbarian status, as they pillaged their way across Byzantine Roman territory. In all other regards, the Catalans would have seemed just like other 'Franks' or 'Italians' to most Romans in Constantinople; and Andronikos II employed them as mercenaries in just the same way as the Laskarids and Michael Palaiologos had employed westerners before. The Franks of the Aegean region and Syria, the French in their own country and Latin clerics were not barbarians to Pachymeres. This is in contrast to Choniates: it is therefore clear that the old dichotomy of Roman/barbarian had entirely disappeared. It would seem that just as the Christian identity had widened to include significant groups of non-Romans, so the barbarian identity had shrunk, again to accommodate important groupings who were now neither Roman nor barbarian. Overall, then, the pattern of usage of the terminology of barbarism in Pachymeres, and in particular the specific usage of barbarian in relation to Roger de Flor, Lachanas and Milutin, supports the use of barbarian as moral judgement as much as ethnographic identifier.

⁴⁹ King 2004: 25–37; Laiou 1993: 101–3; Eastmond 2004: 25.

The terminology of ethnicity

It is interesting to correlate Pachymeres' usage of the terminology of barbarism with his use of the terms *genos* and *ethnos*. While the evidence is not conclusive, it seems that *ethnos* is the 'group term' for barbarians, while *genos* (in its ethnic, non-family sense) is applied to non-barbarians. Only *ethnos* is used with relation to the Turks and Alans, and it is heavily predominant in references to the scattered tribes beyond the Black Sea, who would surely be classified as barbarian (e.g. *Michael* 129.11, 311.6 for Turks, *Andronikos* 307.1, 315.19 for Alans and *Michael* 344.17–18 for northern tribes). On the other hand, *genos* is used for the peoples of the Italian trading cities, with only a single exception (*Andronikos* 324.14, where it is used to signify 'Christian peoples'). The evidence is not so conclusive with relation to the Bulgarians; with only three references *ethnos* is used twice to *genos* once. Pachymeres does not appear happy with either term in relation to Byzantine Romans; *genos* appears restricted to its sense of family/descent (where it is widely used), and *ethnos* is only used in what appears to be an insult along the lines of 'Where on earth did you spring from?', as Michael Palaiologos questions the actions of Patriarch Arsenios, who was so virulently opposed to him (*Michael* 331.20): as an implied insult, this would however fit with the barbarian connotations of *ethnos*.

This is broadly reminiscent of the use of the terminology of ethnicity in Choniates, where as we have seen the treatment of *genos* and *ethnos* is, while not so clear-cut, nevertheless suggestive of a similar, broad distinction between *ethnos* – foreign, inferior and barbaric, and *genos* – non-alien, familial and often noble. We have noted how both writers had occasion to use *genos* in an indication of Roman ethnic identity, and indeed both are happy to use *genos* or *ethnos* for the Romans, with a slight leaning towards the former. A similar correlation may be perceived in Akropolites. He uses *ethnos* in relation to westerners only for the western squadron in the Nikaian army (120.21–4); the term is otherwise used, and that sparingly, for northern and eastern peoples – Bulgarians, Tatars, Cumans, Turkomans and Albanians – or else very generally. Specific references are singular while the general references are plural and by implication probably include the Romans: the *ethne* are to be understood as 'everybody', 'the whole world'. In contrast, Akropolites employs *genos* far more widely for all groups, including western subgroups like the Venetians, Bulgarians, Tatars, Cumans and Romans. Akropolites' use of *ethnos*, then, is comparable to his use of *barbaros*; it is limited in its specific application to northerners, with the addition of the Turkomans – another nomadic people. Westerners and Romans do not appear as *barbaroi*, or as *ethne* except in the generalised

sense, and for Akropolites the Byzantine Romans were more comparable to other peoples, lacking the distinctive special status which they had been accorded by Choniates.

Otherness: conclusions

To sum up, while usage of 'Roman' terminology remained fairly constant over the thirteenth century, usage of the terminology of barbarism underwent considerable development. At the close of the twelfth century, *barbaros* could be used for anyone who was not a Roman. This applied equally to non-Romans in the political sense, i.e. people living outside the territory of the empire, and to non-Romans in the ethnic sense, i.e. residents of the empire who were not by birth and family history Roman. On the eve of the Fourth Crusade, westerners could thus happily be called barbarians, although it was true that on a scale of barbarism they were far nearer to the Romans than they were to the archetypal nomadic barbarians of the northern Balkans or the pagan barbarians to the east. The Byzantine Romans were surrounded by barbarians, and the world consisted of Romans and barbarians. For Akropolites, writing in the second half of the thirteenth century, barbarians played a far less important role, probably because the focus of his work was the rise to greatness of Nikaia, and this was as much, if not more, a matter of internal Roman rivalry as of conflict with external foes. However, the Nikaia clearly had to contend with the Latins based in Constantinople and there is no hint that these were classed as barbarians. On the evidence of Akropolites' *History*, westerners had ceased to be barbarians and the world was now made up of Romans, barbarians and certain others. The Roman–barbarian dichotomy had not entirely disappeared; there was a strong contrast between Roman and barbarian ways of behaviour that served to emphasise the perceived virtues of the Byzantine Roman system: founded on long-standing institutions, literate, disciplined and hallowed by the Orthodox Christian religion. Writing at the end of the thirteenth century, Pachymeres too saw the world as made up of Romans, barbarians and others, and as in Akropolites westerners broadly came into the final category, although Pachymeres contrasts the Roman character, moderate and civilised, with the cruelty and immoderation of the barbarian or Latin (see, for example, *Andronikos* 567). His lengthy excursus on the Tatars (*Michael* 445–7), very much along the lines of the 'noble savage' brand of ethnography, confirms a belief in character as typifying different *ethne*. The *Gasmouloi*, whose character is specified and fixed as a mixture of the best in both Romans and Latins, further confirm

this aspect. However, the contrast between Roman and barbarian ways of operating is not so clearly set out, and barbarism can sometimes seem more a matter of individual personality than ethnic characterisation.

The arrival of westerners as conquerors, occupiers and rulers within the territory historically ruled from Constantinople effected a change in how these westerners were perceived. Although in the shock of conquest Choniates' reaction against westerners hardened, as the years went by the Romans got to know the incoming westerners as more like themselves. These westerners, moreover, were ruling in the imperial fashion in Constantinople, and this was a Byzantine Roman and not a barbarian model. These 'others' were too similar to the Romans: Christian, urbanised, living in structured societies that the Romans had to recognise and deal with as comparable to their own. Close proximity thus served to highlight similarities as much as differences, making it more and more difficult for the Byzantine Romans to maintain their exalted self image and leading them to begin to view themselves as less singular and superior.

The nightmare of the fourteenth century

It is hard to express the debilitated misery of the Byzantine Roman empire in the fourteenth century – a period of repeated civil war, religious hatred and foreign invasions. It is now necessary to trace the course of that century, an age of decline for the empire of the Romans to such an extent that by the end of the century it had become a tributary state of the Ottomans. How did things get so bad?

At the end of the discussion on Akropolites and Pachymeres, we left the empire of the Byzantine Romans under the rule of Andronikos II Palaiologos: Constantinople had been regained by Andronikos' father Michael VIII, who had also neutralised the western threat of the Angevins; however, Michael had also stirred up a great deal of unhelpful religious fervour and, as the new century dawned, the Ottomans and the Catalans had presented fresh threats.¹

After the disasters against the Ottomans and the Catalans, the second decade of the fourteenth century onwards was a period of stabilisation under Andronikos II. The treasury was brought back to health, although at the expense of substantial military cutbacks. Epiros and Thessaly were inching back into the imperial fold while, in the Peloponnese, Byzantine Roman power was growing at the expense of the Frankish principality, which was torn between rival claimants. However, in 1320 the untimely death of the heir presumptive Michael IX Palaiologos, son of Andronikos II, precipitated a crisis. It was believed that Michael's death had been hastened by the misadventures of his son Andronikos, and in 1321 the young Andronikos was consequently deprived of his title of co-emperor and debarred from the succession. This was a provocation to the younger generation who were tired of the four-decade rule of Andronikos II, which

¹ Above, pp. 109–11.

seemed to them to have brought neither glory nor profit. In a first outbreak of civil war, Andronikos II was forcibly constrained to recognise his grandson's claims: the younger Andronikos was named co- (though junior) emperor and crowned accordingly in 1325. However, this was not enough for the younger man, and civil war broke out once more in 1327. Andronikos III seized Constantinople in the following year, and Andronikos II was then finally forced to abdicate.²

The manner of Andronikos III's accession to the throne was therefore far from auspicious, and the process of civil war had introduced unfortunate precedents. This was especially so in the increasing involvement of foreign powers in domestic squabbles: in the final stage of the conflict from 1327–8, Andronikos II had been backed by the Serbs and his grandson by the Bulgarians. However, the young emperor proved to be a vigorous and effective ruler.³ With the aid of his able friend John Kantakouzenos, he wrested back control of Epiros and forged working relationships with his powerful northern neighbours in the Balkans as well as with the Ottoman and Aydin Turks in Anatolia, who proved useful allies in his successful expansionary campaigns in western Greece. Nevertheless, predatory raiding remained a significant problem, and the threat from the Ottomans only grew – they took Nikaia in 1331 and made it their capital.⁴ Andronikos III died in 1341 while still in his forties, and the state was swiftly plunged into chaos once more. He had – probably – appointed his great friend John Kantakouzenos as guardian and regent for his nine-year-old son John V Palaiologos (Kantakouzenos, *Histories* III.14, 91), but his widow the Anne of Savoy preferred Patriarch John Kalekas for the role. The fates of John IV Laskaris in the 1250s and Alexios II Komnenos in the 1180s, both juvenile imperial heirs and both slain by usurpers, stood as a warning against such regencies; John V was, however, at least going to survive the experience.

When Kantakouzenos left Constantinople to campaign against the Serbs in the autumn of 1341, Anne, Kalekas and Alexios Apokaukos took over the regency, deposing Kantakouzenos. Civil war broke out with Kantakouzenos determined to protect his position, and it continued for six years, with Serbs, Bulgarians and Turks again drawn into the fight and able to take advantage of the turmoil in the Byzantine state to seize considerable

² Laiou 1972: 243, 284–98; Nicol 1996: 17–28; Nicol 1972a: 159–71.

³ Andronikos III is unfairly overshadowed by Kantakouzenos in the historical record; there are reasonably full accounts in Nicol 1972a: 172–90 and 1996: 29–44.

⁴ Inalcik 1973: 5–7; also Fine 1994: 231–3, 252; Nicol 1972a: 150–6.

amounts of territory. Stefan Dušan of Serbia declared for Kantakouzenos, and by 1345 he had managed, as a result, to acquire vast swathes of Macedonia and Albania, from Kavalla on the Aegean over to the Adriatic coast. Kantakouzenos also concluded an alliance, bound by marriage, with Orchan of the Ottomans.

Kantakouzenos proclaimed himself emperor John VI Kantakouzenos at Adrianople in 1346, and took Constantinople in the following year. He then ruled in a coalition with the young John V Palaiologos, though very much as senior emperor, for some seven years; his reign was marked by conflicts with Genoa and continued Turkish raiding and also saw the onslaught of the Black Death. In 1354, in a fresh outbreak of civil war that saw the Ottoman allies of Kantakouzenos occupy their first foothold in Europe on the Gallipoli peninsula, John VI Kantakouzenos was forced into abdication. John V Palaiologos then became sole ruler; however, Kantakouzenos as the honoured 'emperor and monk' remained an influential figure in the state until his death in 1383.⁵

The second half of the fourteenth century was increasingly dominated by the Turkish threat. In 1341 at the start of the reign of John V Palaiologos, the Ottomans were comparative newcomers in Europe. As early as the 1320s they had been raiding Thrace from north-western Anatolia, but they did not settle in the region until the 1350s, when they were given their opening by the turmoil of the Byzantine civil wars. Despite any number of formal alliances with the Byzantine Romans, they continued their raiding and settlement to the extent that by the death of John V Palaiologos in 1391 every ruler in the Balkans, including the emperor of the Romans, was a vassal of the Ottomans. The Romans did succeed in making territorial gains in the Balkans during John's lengthy reign, thanks to the political and social instability in the region arising from the pressure of the Ottomans' advance. Also on the positive side, the despotate of Mistra in the Peloponnese had continued to prosper at the expense of the Latins and enjoyed a fruitful relationship with Nerio Acciajuoli, the new Florentine ruler of Athens from 1388; Florentine Athens and Byzantine Roman Mistra cooperated against the Navarrese rulers of the principality of Achaia and also against Venetian interests in the Peloponnese.⁶ However, Ottoman raids were a continual problem and Despot Theodore Palaiologos of Mistra had probably acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty by 1387, when the Ottomans helped him to put down a revolt. He was joined as an Ottoman vassal

⁵ Nicol 1996. ⁶ Runciman 1980: 58–61.

by the emperor's other sons, Manuel Palaiologos, who had held lands in Thrace, and John Palaiologos, who held an appanage on the Black Sea coast. The emperor John V Palaiologos had himself become an Ottoman vassal as early as 1379.⁷

NIKEPHOROS GREGORAS AND JOHN KANTAKOUZENOS

The early and middle years of the fourteenth century were chronicled by two very different historians: Nikephoros Gregoras and the emperor John VI Kantakouzenos. Exact contemporaries and for many years close friends, they moved in the same exalted circles of the Byzantine Roman elite, and their accounts of the chaotic fourteenth century can thus be set directly alongside each other for contrast and comparison. They also come out of exactly the same cultural stable as Choniates, Akropolites and Pachymeres before them.

Nikephoros Gregoras was born in Herakleia Pontika in Paphlagonia on the Black Sea coast in around 1295. Much of the early biographical detail of his life is found in his *Life of John of Herakleia*; this John was the archbishop of Herakleia and Nikephoros' uncle, and he took over his nephew's education after the death of Nikephoros' parents when he was still a young boy. His uncle took him through an advanced education, and Nikephoros did not come to the capital until the end of his teens when, with the benefit of a recommendation from the archbishop, he was swiftly able to obtain the distinguished patronage of both John Glykys, patriarch of Constantinople (1315–19) and Theodore Metochites, the emperor Andronikos II's chief minister (*Roman History* vii.271). Through the 1320s, Gregoras ran his own private school and was tutor to two of Metochites' own children; Gregoras says Metochites treated him as if he were his own son (*Roman History* viii.309). He was soon introduced to the emperor (*Roman History* viii.327) and gained recognition as a scholar. He also established himself as a statesman, undertaking several diplomatic missions including, in 1326, an embassy to the Serbian ruler Stefan Uroš III Dečanski (*Roman History* viii.375–83).⁸

In contrast, John Kantakouzenos came from a far more distinguished family background and was always closer to the seat of power. He too was born around 1295, possibly in Mistra in the Peloponnese where his father

⁷ Barker J. W. 1968: 34–5; Fine 1994: 423, 427.

⁸ The *Life* is found in Codex Par. Gr. 3040 3r–17r; the details are given in Guiland 1926, which also gives the fullest biographical account. See also Fryde 2000: 357–73; ODB ii: 875–6. *Roman History*: Schopen 1829–30, 1855. References to the *Roman History* are given here by book number of the original, followed by page number of the Schopen edition.

was governor and, through his mother Theodora, he was connected to the imperial families of the Palaiologoi and the Angeloi.⁹ His father died before or very soon after his birth, so John was brought up by his mother in Constantinople. Here he moved in the highest circles of the court of Andronikos II Palaiologos and became an intimate of the emperor's grandson, the future Andronikos III Palaiologos, who was in fact his cousin. He was a leading supporter of Andronikos III in the civil wars of the 1320s, and was rewarded with the position of Grand Domestic, or military commander-in-chief, for some fifteen years from 1325. At the same time, although Gregoras' career had prospered under Andronikos II, the fall of the elder emperor in 1328 proved no obstacle either, since he and Kantakouzenos had become close friends.

Now clearly Andronikos III's right-hand man and generally accepted as the power behind the throne, Kantakouzenos' greatest triumphs came in his successful campaigns against Epiros in 1340–1, which brought the westernmost provinces of the pre-1204 empire once again under Constantinopolitan rule after nearly 140 years (Kantakouzenos, *Histories* 1.509–17). He is also remembered as a friend of the Turkish Emir Umur of Aydin; he seems to have been the negotiator in a new and successful treaty concluded with Aydin in 1336 (*Histories* 1.482–95), and Umur was to prove a loyal friend. Meanwhile, Gregoras forged a career as a leading teacher, intellectual and writer in the capital. As the protégé and eventual literary executor of Theodore Metochites, he had gained unrivalled access to the great library created by Metochites at the Monastery of the Chora, and his interests were exceptionally wide covering mathematics and astronomy as well as history, philosophy and theology¹⁰. As an indication of his expertise, in 1324 he presented the emperor with a proposal to correct the Julian calendar which almost exactly foreshadowed the Gregorian reforms implemented in the west from the seventeenth century. Andronikos II accepted the proposal but decided against implementation of the reform, citing the conservatism of the church (*Roman History* VIII.372).

When Kantakouzenos became emperor in 1347, Gregoras could reasonably have expected to continue to thrive. Indeed, in 1350 Kantakouzenos offered him the position of patriarch of Constantinople, which would have represented the zenith of any career in the church (*Roman History* XVIII.870–1). However, Gregoras refused the appointment, as he and Kantakouzenos had by this stage come to disagree profoundly on the validity of

⁹ The details of Kantakouzenos' family and early life are given in Nicol 1996: 17, n. 1.

¹⁰ Fryde 2000: 359–68.

hesychasm, the controversial method for the religious life that asserted the possibility of accessing divine grace through meditative prayer.¹¹ Controversy over the legitimacy of hesychasm had divided Orthodox churchmen throughout the 1340s, and Kantakouzenos had come to be identified with the pro-hesychast position of the Athonite monk Gregory Palamas, while Gregoras was a leading anti-hesychast. Upholding this position with fanatical courage despite the enshrining of hesychasm as orthodox doctrine, Gregoras was forced to retire from public life. His very survival was due only to the emperor's continuing affection, and Gregoras' vigorous defence of his religious beliefs must bear witness to the centrality of the Orthodox religion in his outlook and mentality. He was imprisoned from 1351 to 1354 (*Roman History* xxv.8–10) and remained in disgrace, and widely hated, on his release. He died around 1360.¹²

In his lifetime, Gregoras was rightly respected as an erudite polymath and often called upon as an official rhetorician, even though he is remembered today mostly for his *Roman History*. Gregoras has been characterised as learned but not particularly original, and this is exemplified in his historical writing.¹³ The *Roman History* covers the period from the Fourth Crusade to 1358 and, for the first century or so of this period, Gregoras clearly consulted the earlier works of Akropolites and Pachymeres (*Roman History* i.12–13). His account becomes richer and far more detailed for the years following 1315 and his own arrival in Constantinople, and his account of the 1340s is particularly thorough.

The bulk of the *Roman History* was composed towards the end of Gregoras' life. At the earliest, he began writing before 1337 (*Roman History* i.14), and Books I to XI – covering the years up to the reign of Andronikos III – were clearly completed by 1341. Books XII to xvii (which take the story to 1350) were certainly written before his imprisonment in 1351. In his account of the years from around 1350, that is from the middle of his Book xviii, Gregoras departs from any objective historical account and turns to religious polemic in an attempt to justify and explain his stance against the pro-hesychasm of Kantakouzenos: Books xviii to xxix were actually written while imprisoned and in disgrace, and xxx to xxxvii after his release.¹⁴ Writing of this nature, composed in the last years of Gregoras' life and very close to the events described, comprises over half of the whole work of

¹¹ Meyendorff 1959, 1974, 1975 and 1988; also Runciman 1988: 128–58; for Gregoras, Guiland 1926: 23–40.

¹² Guiland 1926: 45–53. ¹³ Fryde 2000: 357; Guiland 1926: 257.

¹⁴ Guiland 1926: 238–9; Ostrogorsky 1969: 466–7; Nicol 1996: 2, III, n. 41.

thirty-seven books, and this part of the *Roman History* is not considered in this study, beyond the latter half of Book XVIII, which covers the transition from a historically focused narrative to religious exposition.

Leaving the latter half of the work on one side, then, in his historical writing Gregoras is less analytical than Pachymeres, and his treatment of identity appears altogether less subtle and considered than that of his immediate predecessor. He offers little in the way of explanation for the decline in Byzantine Roman affairs, of which decline he was nevertheless very much aware; in the details he provides of administration, of taxation, of corruption, he adds considerably to our understanding of that decline. He did not approve of Andronikos III, and his account of the younger emperor is a useful corrective to Kantakouzenos' positive portrayal of his friend and patron. Indeed, for his treatment of the middle years of the fourteenth century, Gregoras' account may as a whole be set directly against the autobiographical narrative of John Kantakouzenos.¹⁵

Kantakouzenos' *Histories* probably postdate Gregoras' *Roman History* by a few years. Having fought his way to the throne, Kantakouzenos reigned for some seven years but, as time went on, his ambitious son Matthew came to resent the fact that the throne would go to the younger emperor John V Palaiologos; at the same time, as John V grew up, he was keen to take up his imperial inheritance. Kantakouzenos' reign ended as it had begun in civil war before he retired in favour of John V in 1354 to become a monk.¹⁶ Though officially retired, he still played an intermittently active part in government: thus, he worked to ease relations between John V and his own son Matthew Kantakouzenos and between John V and his rebellious son Andronikos IV. He led debates with western churchmen in 1367 and was often addressed by foreign statesmen eager to enlist his support and influence. At some point he retired from Constantinople to Mistra in the Peloponnese, where his sons Manuel and Matthew were based, and he died there in June 1383.¹⁷ It was at Mistra that Kantakouzenos wrote his *Histories*, along with various theological writings, during his long retirement as a monk. His theological work largely focused on the defence of hesychasm, championing the Palamite position against its many detractors, but it is his *Histories*, probably composed in the decade before 1369, that remain best known.¹⁸

¹⁵ Guiland 1926: 248–57. ¹⁶ Nicol 1996: 115–33.

¹⁷ Nicol 1996; for a summary, *ODB*, II: 1050–1.

¹⁸ Fryde 2000: 369; Nicol 1968: 100; *Historiarum libri*: Schopen and Niebuhr 1828–32. References to the *Histories* are given here by book number of the original, followed by page number of the Schopen and Niebuhr edition.

Kantakouzenos' *Histories* cover the period from 1320 to 1356 and are divided into four books. Book I focuses on the first civil war of Kantakouzenos' lifetime, that between Andronikos II Palaiologos and his grandson Andronikos III. Book II covers the reign of Andronikos III, while Book III deals with the civil war which brought Kantakouzenos himself to the throne in 1347, and Book IV covers his own reign and abdication.

Kantakouzenos' opening claim to write objectively (*Histories* 1.10) is a conscious nod towards the style of his ancient model Thucydides.¹⁹ However, his historical account is closer in approach to Akropolites than to Choniates, Pachymeres or Gregoras in that it is, in some sense at least, an attempt at the vindication of an emperor. Choniates and the others had in contrast used their history-writing as a forum for franker criticism of imperial policy and character than was generally possible. An autobiographical account of this length was something of an innovation, but in some ways was a continuation of a trend in historical writing. While not autobiographies, the historical accounts of both Akropolites and Choniates contain a considerable amount of personal detail; likewise, Gregoras' account can be highly personal. With the exception of Pachymeres, we can see here a trend in historical writing towards the more personal and autobiographical; this development was part of a wider cultural shift, which can trace its origins in Byzantine Roman culture back to the eleventh century.²⁰

Overall, Kantakouzenos' *Histories* have attracted widely varying opinions. Nicol saw Kantakouzenos as fundamentally honest, and his history as a justification which tried to tell the whole truth from the perspective of 'the reluctant emperor'; in contrast, Ljubarskij has described the work as fiction rather than history, a conscious rewriting of events to the greater glory of the author.²¹ Certainly, even a cursory look at the career of John Kantakouzenos – closely implicated in the origins of two bouts of civil war and instrumental in bringing Serbs and Ottomans into the territory of the empire – suggests that he was irresponsible, if not amoral, in the pursuit of his own advantage. It is also clear that he does not always tell the whole story: significant details of the Ottoman conquests in Asia Minor are omitted. Where all agree on Kantakouzenos, however, is that his *Histories* constitute a consummate exercise in the Greek language, a skilful and lucid homage to Thucydides; again, it is remarkable as a rare explicitly autobiographical exercise in Byzantine Roman literature. We should

¹⁹ Hunger 1976.

²⁰ Angold 1998: 227–8, 254–5; Hinterberger 1999: 316–31; Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 220–30; Macrides 2007: 44–7; Magdalino 1993b: 20, 401–42.

²¹ Kazhdan 1980: 279–335; Ljubarskij 1993: 137; Nicol 1972a: 163; Nicol 1996: 167–70.

therefore be careful in using Kantakouzenos' history as a guide to events; however, it provides an invaluable glimpse into the world view and social attitudes of the Byzantine aristocracy, and is thus very useful for our present purposes.

The historical works of Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, then, permit us to compare and contrast the approach of two exact contemporaries who were close friends from the same elite milieu yet nevertheless had differing loyalties and outlooks. Given the huge scale of their works (Gregoras in particular), I have chosen two periods for close examination: the reign of Andronikos III from 1328 to 1341 (*Roman History* ix–xi and *Histories* ii) and the first half of the reign of John VI Kantakouzenos, from 1347 to 1350 (*Roman History* xv–xviii and *Histories* iv, to chapter 24 only). Both sections cover periods of controversy in terms of Byzantine Roman imperial rule: Andronikos III came to the throne in a military *coup d'état*, thrusting his grandfather into early retirement, while John VI Kantakouzenos won his throne through civil war. In avoiding sections dealing overtly with these civil conflicts, it is possible to maintain the focus on the relationships between Romans and others, particularly westerners.

Picking up on the themes highlighted by the analysis of the writers of the thirteenth century, this discussion of Gregoras and Kantakouzenos will focus in turn on the political Roman identity, the ethnic Roman identity and the treatment of other peoples.

THE POLITICAL ROMAN IDENTITY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Back in the days of the Komnenoi, as shown by Choniates, the political Roman identity and the ethnic Roman identity were largely congruent. Romans were those who lived within the empire – in an actual or ideal sense – and who accepted and expected the rule of the emperor in Constantinople. Moreover, birth was an important part of this identity as it was transgenerational: Romans belonged to families who were Romans in the territorial and political senses before them, and they should expect that their posterity would also be Romans in a like sense after them. The political identity was thus also an ethnic identity, and certain ethnic markers were relied upon to indicate this transgenerational ethnic identity. These markers emerged more strongly than before in Choniates' account of the immediate aftermath of the fall of Constantinople in 1204, raising at least the possibility of an ethnic Roman identity independent of political loyalties.

In the thirteenth century, there are signs that the political Roman identity was becoming more and more distinct. Akropolites wanted to limit any Roman identity to those politically loyal to the empire (or his Nikaian version of it at least). However, the content of his narration compelled him very occasionally to acknowledge the existence of Romans outside any kind of Roman empire. The political identity is not entirely absent here: the Romans living under Latin rule in the Peloponnese could be called Romans because of their historical allegiances – the transgenerational aspect of the political identity. However, the political identity is undoubtedly minimal here, reduced to one aspect of the ethnic identity.

Pachymeres was more ready than Akropolites to accept Romans outside the empire, and thus an ethnic Roman identity with minimum political content, although his use of special group names reveals the continuing fundamentality of imperial allegiance. For Pachymeres, political Roman-ness is extremely important, as he clearly believes that the Roman ethnic identity (revealed by various markers) should coincide with political loyalty to the Roman state. For Pachymeres, birth identity is pre-eminent, so that if you are born a Roman that is what you will remain, no matter what else might happen. Political loyalty as a Byzantine Roman imperial subject could be one aspect of this birth identity. In some instances, as with Akropolites' Peloponnesians and the pro-Catalan Romans in Pachymeres, people are identified as Romans when their only connection with political Roman-ness can be historical – an aspect of their birth identity.

For both Akropolites and Pachymeres, then, the political identity remains extremely strong even if, under pressure of circumstances, they have been forced to acknowledge the existence of Romans individually devoid of political loyalty. The collective political Roman identity is still very important to them, and it feeds into their presentation of these ethnic Romans. In many cases it is explicitly expected that ethnic identity should condition political loyalty – imperial allegiance is thus seen as a natural part of being Roman. However, this is not always the case, and the actuality which the historians present cannot always be reconciled with their preferred model of Roman-ness.

In the historians of the fourteenth century the political and ethnic Roman identities divide further. In Gregoras and Kantakouzenos it is possible to see that the Roman political identity is now largely separate from the ethnic identity in that it is a collective expression of the state and much less one of the many ethnic markers that make up an individual's Roman-ness.

It should come as no surprise that the political Roman identity, the dominant ideology of the empire and the fundamental expression of Roman-ness in the historians of the thirteenth century, should continue to dominate in the fourteenth century – despite the very obvious and painful vicissitudes of the imperial state. This was the framework that all educated Byzantine Romans were unable to elude in any consideration of themselves and their empire. Thus, in both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, the conception of Roman identity is overwhelmingly political and collective.

Like their predecessors, both authors repeatedly use the genitive formula, and overwhelmingly this formula is employed with clear political associations (see [Appendix 1](#), pp. 295–6, 297–8). In both authors, the use of the genitive formula underlines the fundamental conception of the *Rhomaioi* as the collective mass that constitutes the state and goes beyond the literal to represent the idea of the empire. As we have seen, this is familiar from the historians of the thirteenth century who have already been analysed, and on further back into the first millennium.

For Gregoras, *pragmata* is by far the most frequently occurring item in the genitive formula, and in Gregoras this can generally be understood as ‘the empire’, with the sense of its political health or lack of the same. *Hegemonia* denoting Byzantine Roman imperial authority, *chora* and *basileus* are also repeated in this formula, along with *tyche* (political fortunes), which is particularly important in Gregoras. The emphasis on the political is clear, and all these uses require an understanding of the collective sense. Military associations are also frequent in Gregoras’ use of the genitive formula, and the vast majority of these military uses of the genitive formula again have a clear collective, political, sense: for example στρατιά (*stratia*: army, *Roman History* XVI.837.13–14), *dynamis* (IX.433.12), στόλος (*stolos*: fleet, XVII.843.1) and so on.

Kantakouzenos likewise makes repeated use of the genitive formula. In Book II, *stratia* occurs most frequently and wholly in the collective sense. Next most frequent are *hegemonia* and *basileus*, with *basileia*, *pragmata*, *arche*, and κοινός (*koinos*: community) each also employed more than once. On the evidence of Book II, then, Kantakouzenos’ conception of Roman-ness is, like that of Gregoras, dominantly political. This is made even more emphatically clear on consideration of the selection from Book IV, where the vast majority of occurrences of the genitive formula are clearly political. *Hegemonia* is the overwhelmingly dominant item in Book IV, with *basileia*, *basileus* and *arche* also noticeably frequent, while *stratia* drops to a mere five occurrences. There is far less military action in Book IV, so this change in frequency is no surprise.

It is noticeable that *hegemonia* has emerged as a newly significant term in the fourteenth century. It largely replaces *arche* as the characteristic term for the fact of political control, be it Byzantine Roman or of some other state, and it is the dominant term in this context in both Gregoras and the later Kantakouzenos. This may reflect a fresh familiarity with the ancient historical writings of Thucydides, for whom *hegemonia* was a centrally important political term. Kantakouzenos' debt to Thucydides is especially clear, and the writings of Gregoras' mentor Theodore Metochites and Kantakouzenos' chief minister Demetrios Kydones show great familiarity with the classical historian.²²

In their use of the genitive formula, then, both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos reveal a political emphasis to their conceptions of Roman identity, with Kantakouzenos if anything the more extreme in this respect. This is further brought out in the use of the plain formula (see [Appendix 1](#), pp. 295, 297). In Gregoras, more than half of the occurrences of the plain formula over the whole selection are clearly political, with purely political contexts once more including the empire having enemies and allies, being the subject of loyalty or having control, or having good or bad fortune. Kantakouzenos employs the plain formula far more frequently, with well over half of the occurrences having political associations. That is to say, in Kantakouzenos, *Rhomaioi* is often used in a collective sense as the body which makes war, peace or alliances, which owns the allegiance of various territories or cities, which fares ill or well, and which owes loyalty to the emperor.

So it is clear that the genitive formula and the plain formula are of importance to both writers in denoting and emphasising the political identity that is central to their conceptions of Roman-ness. To focus on Kantakouzenos, he repeatedly uses the genitive formula to denote the Byzantine Roman state through such concrete concept terms as *hegemonia*, *arche* and *basileia*, the fundamental Roman ruler-term of *basileus* and the more fluid *pragmata*, with its connotations of political fluctuation. The plain formula is also most commonly used to denote the collective identity of the subjects of the emperor and the imperial state.

Moreover, Kantakouzenos' understanding of '(the) Romans' in a collective sense may also be exemplified in his use of the definite article in both the genitive and plain formulas, which is striking enough to suggest a pattern (which cannot, however, be detected in any other of the

²² Fryde 2000: 325, 382.

historians considered here). Kantakouzenos inclines markedly to non-use of the article, in both the genitive and plain formulas, in any context of the Byzantine Roman state as a collective totality of its subjects, and such a pattern of usage is suggestive of an absolutism in Kantakouzenos' Roman political identity, whereby he means to denote less a group of individuals and more a monolithic political entity with an identity of its own independent of its constituents. Kantakouzenos' usage of the definite article may be more worthy of note than the inconsistent and inconclusive patterns of usage in any of the other elite writers. All in all, the primary aspect in Roman identity for Kantakouzenos, as for Gregoras, is clearly the exercise of a special political power, and the Byzantine Roman state is the essence of being Roman.

As we have seen, the strong conception of Roman territory is considerably weaker in both Akropolites and Pachymeres than it had been in Choniates. Akropolites in particular very specifically needed to skirt the awkward issue of multiple Roman authorities in what had historically been Byzantine Roman territory, so his downplaying of this aspect is unsurprising. Pachymeres, in contrast, shows that he was well aware of the imperial rhetoric of Roman land (*Michael* 344), but equally that he himself had little patience with such an approach (above, p. 119). In contrast, both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos have a strong conception of Byzantine Roman territory, and in this they are reminiscent of Choniates, who had emphatically seen the empire as having a territorial expression as well as its expression as a collectivity of people ruled by the emperor. In fact, this sense of a territorial aspect to Roman-ness seems stronger in the fourteenth century than it had been in the thirteenth, and it is possible that this is a defensive reaction to the collapse of the empire. Alternatively, this may be because the political Roman identity was now far more of a theoretical construct and less a matter of a felt individual identity.

Both writers, then, display a strong conception of territory being Roman in essence, even if temporarily ruled by others. One example in both is the island of Chios: in 1329, Andronikos III was able to expel the Genoese from this profitable island, and Gregoras legitimises this expulsion, saying, 'For the island belongs to Romans' (*Roman History* ix.438.18). Somewhat more subtly, on the recovery of Epiros in 1341, he comments, 'thus the whole of the province (*eparchia*) of old called Epiros became subject to the rule of the Romans' (xi.553.19–21). The key word here is *eparchia*; in choosing to call the area a 'province', Gregoras was able to emphasise that this was a

return to the Byzantine Roman imperial fold for Epiros, not a matter of new acquisition, and the period of non-Roman rule was thus marked as transitory and without validity.

Kantakouzenos shares this sense of certain lands belonging to the Romans even when these lands are threatened or taken and, although on the subject of Chios he is far less direct than Gregoras, his treatment conveys much the same message, as he speaks of recovery by (*anaktasthai*) and restoration to (*apodidonai*) the Romans (*Histories* II.370.14–15, IV.370.19–20). However, this motif of rightful reacquisition is again and most strongly to be observed in Kantakouzenos' treatment of the recovery of Epiros in the 1340s – very much his own personal achievement.

As we have seen, Epiros had been effectively independent of imperial control, whether from Nikaia or from Constantinople, since 1204. In 1335, the empire was given the opportunity to intervene in the area on the death of the Epirot ruler John Orsini. Orsini's widow Anna Palaiologina, who was distantly related to Andronikos III, took over as regent on behalf of her young son Nikephoros. Anna agreed to submit to the emperor and so Epiros was formally reunited with the empire. However, there was some local opposition, and this was fomented by the Angevins who had titular claim to parts of Epiros and saw the opportunity to secure these and more; crucially, Nikephoros was smuggled over to Italy before the Byzantine Romans could remove him. Nevertheless, Andronikos III set up a Byzantine Roman provincial administration in Epiros under Theodore Synadenos (*Histories* I.495–504). In 1338, rebels aided by the Angevins seized Synadenos, and Nikephoros, by now engaged to an Angevin princess, came over to head up the revolt in 1339. Andronikos III and Kantakouzenos returned in force to Epiros in 1340 and by the end of that year the revolt was over – largely through negotiation, apparently orchestrated by Kantakouzenos (*Histories* I.509–34).²³

These negotiations are the context for Kantakouzenos' version of a speech delivered by himself to the rebels at Arta, in which he gives a fascinating account of the years of and following the Latin conquest of 1204. In this speech, which it is worth citing at length, the 'Angeloi' are the Doukas family who ruled the so-called despotate of Epiros in the thirteenth century and on whose supposed behalf the rebels were acting, the 'Tarantinoi' are the Angevin Princes of Taranto who were aiding the rebels, and by 'Akarnania' we may understand Epiros:

²³ Fine 1994: 252–5; Nicol 1996: 36–43.

‘The empire of Romans has been the fatherland of these people almost from the time of Caesar, and you do very great wrong in imposing on them instead the rule of the Tarantinoi, of barbarian men . . . For the Angeloi didn’t acquire Akarnania by freeing it from barbarians – rather, they were subjects of the Roman emperors and received their yearly rule over the lands from the emperors. The Angeloi took the rule to themselves as a result of the war then waged by the Latins on the Romans. While the Latins, with the fall of the mightier Byzantium, were in control of all of Thrace and most of the cities of Macedonia, the Roman empire withdrew to the east. The Angeloi secured the rule of Akarnania for themselves, and other men got hold of those others of the western provinces which they had hitherto been governing. They were able to do this because the Roman emperors had no way of getting to these men through Thrace and Macedonia, which were under the Latins. Many years later, the empire of Romans came under the guidance of the Palaiologoi. The Latins were once more, with the help of God, expelled from the hegemony of Romans, and both Asia and Europe, whatever the Latins had been ruling, were united into one. At this time the Palaiologoi demanded Akarnania of the Angeloi, but they were not able to take it. Rather, the Angeloi, acting unjustly and with violence, defrauded them and repeatedly sent armies against them and brought in the neighbouring barbarians as allies.’²⁴ (Histories II.520.1–521.12)

This speech demonstrates an insistence that the territory of the pre-1204 empire was essentially Roman – in other words, that it was the preserve and charge of the emperors of the Romans. Thus, before 1204 any local rulers were only officers of the emperors, and such local magnates were only able to subvert the rule of their localities because the emperors were temporarily incapable of exerting their rightful powers. Continued subversion of such rule on a local basis constituted fraud against imperial rule. As with Gregoras, then, there is recourse here to the concept of the imperial province to assert Byzantine Roman rights over far-flung areas. The Latins, who, it should be noted, are in no way presented as rightful imperial rulers (and are

²⁴ ἀδικεῖτε δὲ τὰ ἐσχάτα, ἀντὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων βασιλείας, ἥ σχεδὸν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν Καίσαρος χρόνων πατριὸς ἐστί, τὴν Ταραντίνων αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων βαρβάρων ἐπάγοντες ἀρχὴν . . . Ἀγγέλους γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων Ἀκαρνανίαν ἐλευθερώσαντας κτήσασθαι συνέβη τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλ’ ὑποχειρίους ὄντας Ῥωμαίων βασιλεῦσι καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνων ἐτήσιον ἀρχὴν τῆς χώρας ἐπιτετραμμένους, σφετερίσασθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸν ἐπενεχθέντα τότε παρὰ Λατίνων Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον. ὦν δὴ τοῦ κρείττονος συγχωρήσει Βυζαντίου κρατησάντων καὶ Θράκης ἀπάσης καὶ τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν πόλεων πολλῶν, βασιλεία μὲν ἡ Ῥωμαίων ὑπεχώρησε πρὸς ἑω. Ἀκαρνανίας δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν Ἀγγελοι προσεποιήσαντο ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλας τῶν ἐσπερίων ἐπαρχιῶν ὧν ἕκαστοι ἐτυχον ἐπιτροπεύοντες, διὰ τὸ βασιλεῦσι Ῥωμαίων δίοδον οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς διὰ Θράκης καὶ Μακεδονίας οὐσῶν ὑπὸ Λατίνους. ὕστερον δὲ ἔτεσι πολλοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Παλαιολόγων ἰθυνομένης τῆς Ῥωμαίων βασιλείας, Λατίνους μὲν αὖθις, τοῦ Θεοῦ συναρμομένου, τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐξήλασαν ἡγεμονίας καὶ Ἀσίαν καὶ Εὐρώπην, ὅσης ἦρχον, εἰς ἐν συνήψαν. Ἀκαρνανίαν δὲ Ἀγγέλους ἀπαιτοῦντες, οὐκ ἠδύναντο ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄδικα καὶ βίαια ποιοῦντες, ἀπεστέρουσαν καὶ στρατιᾶν πολλὰκις ἐπ’ ἐκείνους πέμψασιν ὅπλα ἀντήρουντο καὶ τοὺς περιόικους συμμάχους ἐπήγοντο βαρβάρους.

indeed given the ultimate Roman put-down of being called barbarians), were eventually expelled from the 'hegemony of Romans'.

Kantakouzenos here expresses an understanding of the empire which is familiar from Choniates, the empire as an idea of rule which had a natural physical, geographical expression that might not always be concrete but was nevertheless an essential component of the political Roman identity. His approach to the restoration of lost parts of the empire would have been recognised under the Komnenoi two centuries earlier.

Thus the political Roman identity remained dominant in the historians of the fourteenth century. It is in fact so emphatically maintained that one suspects that the strain on this idea arising from the pressure of events resulted in a defensive bulwarking of the traditional ideology. Despite its continuing dominance, however, it should come as no surprise that the political Roman identity also came to seem more and more problematic during this period. Given the appalling losses suffered by the empire in this period and the repeated, debilitating, episodes of civil war, it is hard to credit such total faith in the old, self-confident, ideologies.

The problematic aspects of the political Roman identity can be recognised in the treatment by both authors of territory and political control – both Roman and non-Roman. Firstly, both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos are able to accept foreign rule within the extent of the ideal Byzantine Roman empire – despite the example of Epiros just given. Secondly, both authors show themselves able to treat other states as broadly comparable to the Byzantine Romans in quite a new way and, as part of this, have a freer use of the terminology of *basileus*. Thirdly, they both illustrate aspects of an alternative and individual ethnic identity that had very little to do with the more theoretical collective Roman identity. In sum, it is clear that the political and ethnic identities had now become distinct identities.

The rule of others over erstwhile parts of the empire is, in fact, generally accepted by Gregoras and Kantakouzenos without any insistence on a continuing Byzantine Roman identity. This would have been unthinkable in the traditional outlook. In this regard we may note in Gregoras the unchallenged portrayal of Galata, the Genoese republic's mercantile community at Constantinople which was essentially self-governing: he speaks of 'the Galatikan fortress of the Genoese' (*Roman History* xviii.877.3–4) and 'the Galatikan triremes of the Genoese' (xviii.880.14–15). Again, the reference to 'the Latin prince of the Peloponnese and Achaia' (xi.546.6–7) and the passing reference to 'the Venetian islands' of the Aegean (xviii.878.17) show no hesitation about foreign ownership of formerly imperial territory.

These were all examples of long-standing political realities, although it may be significant that the foreign rulers in all these cases were westerners.

Like Gregoras, Kantakouzenos made few bones about long-established western states or communities – Galata, for example, or the Frankish Peloponnese. He sometimes calls the Genoese of Galata ‘the Latins in Galata’ (e.g. *Histories* IV.72.13), or even ‘Galatians’ (e.g. IV.72.9, 79.20). More charily in Book II the Genoese of Galata are ‘colonists from Genoa’ (II.476.17–18), implying they were at least not considered to be natives in Galata. Fundamentally, however, and despite the long history of hostility, Kantakouzenos did not make an issue of the Genoese presence in the heart of the empire. He was similarly unequivocal about the position of the Peloponnesian Franks: ‘the Latins who hold that land called Achaia by the Hellenes and who are subjects of the prince’ (IV.85.5–6). This description comes in the context of Kantakouzenos’ initiative in creating the despotate of the Morea under his son Manuel, an institution that was to go from strength to strength and eventually recapture all the Peloponnese from the Franks. As we shall see below (p. 167), with regard to the Peloponnese Kantakouzenos does not suggest any quarrel with the Frankish princes of Achaia, but rather with the local, ethnically Roman, population. Western rule in the Peloponnese is not challenged by Kantakouzenos, as it had also not been challenged by Akropolites or Pachymeres.

Thus, the territorial aspect of the political Roman identity, while influential, was not consistently applied by either historian. Another crack in the political identity emerges with a comparison of the writers’ treatments of the Byzantine Roman state with their treatments of the Serbian and Bulgarian states. The problem here is that both Kantakouzenos and Gregoras present their northern neighbours in such a way as seriously to diminish the traditional picture of the Byzantine Roman imperial state as unique and superior.

Gregoras never uses the terms *Rhomaïs* or *Rhomania* to denote the imperial territory, or indeed the fact of Byzantine Roman rule, and this perhaps again reflects the ever-growing instability of the territorial empire. In fact, within the pages of Gregoras the only great state to benefit from a state name in this style is Serbia – the truly pre-eminent imperial power of his day, especially under the rule of Stefan Uroš IV Dušan from 1331 to 1355.²⁵ Gregoras thus usually refers to the Serbians’ state as Σερβία (*Servia*) and this approach seems to suggest a respect for the Serbian state as, indeed, a very real power. Similarly, the Serbian leader-titles Κράλες (*Krales*) and

²⁵ Fine 1994: 336–7.

Κράλαινα (*Kralaina*) are the only leader-titles besides *basileus* and βασιλῖς (*basilis*: empress) which are used without being qualified by people or territory; this suggests that these titles presumably could be understood, without any qualification of name or place or people, and this may be another way in which Gregoras reveals his high estimation of Serbian status. *Krales* had also been used by Pachymeres with reference to Stefan Uroš II Milutin, and this may be a usage that Gregoras has picked up from his predecessor.

In Gregoras, the formulation (τῶν) Τριβαλλῶν ('of the Triballoi', i.e. the Serbs), which would follow the favoured model for all other peoples in Gregoras (including the Romans), occurs only six times in a political or geographical sense compared to twelve occurrences of *Servia*. Kantakouzenos does not use *Servia* in the same way as Gregoras, preferring 'the land of the Triballoi' or 'the land under the kral'; this is, though, comparable to his treatment of Romans and so may serve to put the Serbs on a par with Romans. Like Gregoras, Kantakouzenos frequently uses *Krales* without qualification; moreover, it can be used to represent the people and the state as well as just an individual ruler. This presents a striking parallel with Kantakouzenos' use of *basileus* in the Byzantine Roman context. As with Romans again, the Serbs also have land and cities. Like Gregoras, then, Kantakouzenos recognised the clout of the Serbs under Stefan Dušan, and both writers portrayed the Serbian state as comparable to their own Byzantine Roman state.

When it comes to their treatments of the other major Balkan power, the Bulgarians, the two writers are more dissimilar, and this difference revolves around their use of *basileus*. Generally since the time of Choniates, there had been a relaxation in the use of this terminology. As we have seen, Choniates had restricted it to the Byzantine Romans and, with reservations, to the Latin emperor in Constantinople after 1204, while Akropolites applied *basileus* to the Byzantine Romans, to the Latin emperors and to the Bulgarians, favouring the Byzantine Roman application more and more over the course of his history to emphasise the primacy of Nikaia (above, pp. 101–2). Both Choniates and Akropolites, then, are meticulous in their use of *basileus*, as terminology which denoted a special quality to Byzantine Roman rule. Pachymeres used *basileus* in relation to the Byzantine Romans, to the Bulgarians (often but not always with reservations), to the Latin emperors and, once, to the Tatars. On balance, in Pachymeres *basileus* is no longer a term reserved for Byzantine Roman power, but is nevertheless a term still most associated with the empire of the Romans.

In contrast, Gregoras returns to a more restricted use of *basileus* and its cognates. He is very careful with the terminology, using it only for the Byzantine Roman emperors (by far the dominant use), the heavenly kingdom, rulers in the ancient world and for the Komnenian empire of Trebizond. There is additionally a single application of *basileus* to the Serbs, but this is in the context of his somewhat biting account of Stefan Dušan's 1346 self-proclamation as emperor of the Serbs and of the Romans. This reference, which recalls Choniates on the claimants of 1204 and is discussed below, is surely to be understood as satirical if not downright sarcastic. As for the Bulgarian ruler, in Gregoras he is usually simply an *archon*, a ruler. In his use of the terminology of rulership, then, Gregoras does not present the Bulgarians as in the least comparable to the Byzantine Romans.

Although he uses the term many more times than Gregoras, Kantakouzenos is also careful in his use of *basileus*: out of nearly 1400 occurrences in the selection under consideration around 98 per cent refer to Byzantine Roman rulers. However, Kantakouzenos' usage of the terminology does reveal a different attitude to the Bulgarians. With twenty-eight occurrences which refer to Bulgarian rulers it is fair to say that *basileus* is, in Kantakouzenos, the characteristic and dominant term for the Bulgarian ruler.²⁶ Unlike Gregoras, Kantakouzenos in this way presents the Bulgarians as in some way analogous to the imperial Byzantine Romans, and this difference in usage between Kantakouzenos and Gregoras is hard to explain. However, despite Gregoras' avoidance of *basileus* in the Bulgarian context, it is nevertheless true that both writers present the Bulgarians in a way broadly similar to their presentation of the Byzantine Romans: the Bulgarians have cities and territories, diplomats, armies, customs and laws. Thus, the presentation of both Serbia and Bulgaria in these two writers effectively diminishes the supposedly unique status of the Byzantine Roman state which was at the heart of the Roman political identity.

Gregoras' treatment of the Komnenian empire of Trebizond is also worth considering. In striking contrast to Pachymeres (above, pp. 133–4), Gregoras handled this eastern offshoot with considerable respect. Eirene Palaiologos, daughter of Andronikos III and widow of the Trapezuntine ruler Basil, is consistently called *basilis* (empress) and her rule in Trebizond is characterised as empire (*basileia*) (XI.549–50); this is a generous attitude from Gregoras, who as we have seen protects the terminology of

²⁶ Kantakouzenos, *Histories*, II.323.6–7; 326.6; 327.2, 8; 340.19; 394.3; 428.4–5; 429.1, 11–12; 430.2, 6, 16; 459.2–3, 3–4; 460.20–1; 462.9, 18–19; 463.9; 468.2, 20, 22; 469.15; 503.18; 508.19–20, 20–1; 509.3, 4; IV.162.14.

imperial rule as much as or even more than any of his predecessors. The inhabitants of Trebizond are, however, never called Romans, nor is that Komnenian state ever expressed as being subject to Roman imperial rule. While allowing for a plurality of empires, Gregoras was not prepared to countenance the existence of more than one Roman state, and this recalls Akropolites' attitude to Epiros. Thus, Gregoras' attitude to the physical or ethnic periphery of the empire appears mixed, to say the least.

THE ETHNIC ROMAN IDENTITY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

We can see in Gregoras that the link between political power and territory was in fact becoming more and more nebulous, and that Roman-ness went beyond the matter of political control. Though the political sense of Roman is dominant in both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, they are like their predecessors nevertheless operating within some other conceptions of Roman identity. Over the course of the fourteenth century, the ethnic Roman identity continued to be clarified and to become more explicit as an alternative to the political Roman identity. This continuing process was a logical extension of developments observed in the historians of the thirteenth century and can most easily be detected when Gregoras or Kantakouzenos have to deal with people living outside the Byzantine Roman empire whom they nevertheless have to identify as Roman.

While Choniates had preferred to deny Roman identity to those who were explicitly loyal to another political power than the true emperor, we have already seen how this traditional attitude had had to be modified in the light of the conquests of 1204 and later. Akropolites and Pachymeres both acknowledged Romans outside the empire, relying on the ethnic Roman identity, and the same is true for both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos. Although the material in Kantakouzenos is more scanty, there is in both writers a clear sense of an inheritable and transgenerational ethnic Roman identity based on descent. This is shown in their treatment of Romans living outside the Byzantine Roman state, or generally alongside other ethnicities, in the treatment of those who might seem to have changed ethnicity, and in the apparent denial of Roman identity to those who sought to secede from the Byzantine Roman state.

Gregoras and Kantakouzenos bring the ethnic Roman identity to the fore, firstly, when they seek to differentiate between Romans and others living alongside each other within the empire in its widest sense. Gregoras writes of Romans living alongside Bulgarians in Mesembreaia on the Black Sea (x.487.22) or alongside Genoese in Phokaia on the coast of Asia Minor

(XI.553.13–14). Examples of this in Kantakouzenos similarly include for the most part Romans contrasted with Genoese on Chios or in nearby Phokaia (II.481.8, IV.82.16ff.) or with Serbs in the Balkans (IV.152.17), or again with Turks in Asia Minor (II.340.14–15).

Gregoras and Kantakouzenos each tend to use *Rhomaioi* in general contrasts with Latins or Turks, especially in military episodes, but not all of these occurrences are necessarily ethnic, although some are strongly suggestive. Many occurrences are perhaps better understood as simply denoting ‘subjects of the state’ or ‘subjects of the emperor’, and Kantakouzenos refers to courtiers and imperial servants in this way (for example, II.387.12, 392.5 and 24, IV.156.7). It is essentially moot how much this kind of usage was understood in an ethnic sense; certainly, in such cases an ethnic identity is almost certainly present as a component of the dominant political identity. More indisputably ethnic in association are the usages, as above, that distinguish the Romans as one group living alongside other groups and not necessarily under secure Byzantine Roman rule, or otherwise being in close contact with another group. One interesting case in Gregoras is that of the ‘Roman and Persian doctors’ (XI.554.14) treating Andronikos III Palaiologos; presumably all the doctors were resident at court and in some sense subjects of the empire, but this could be a way of distinguishing them by descent (and perhaps type of training).

Gregoras: what makes a Roman?

We can also get an idea about what it was to be Roman by looking at cases of those who were not. A highly significant episode in this respect is Gregoras’ account of the ‘Skythian’ (in other words, Cuman) woman who ‘wanted to come over to the Romans and to receive holy baptism’ and who fell in love with a Christian captive (XI.542.23–544.18).

This story comes in Gregoras’ account of the late 1330s, and presumably recounts something of a cause célèbre in Constantinople at the time. The woman in question was living on the north side of the Danube river, an area heavily settled by the Cumans from the mid thirteenth century after their defeat by the Mongols in 1238 forced them to move west. The object of her affection was a prisoner taken on one of the numerous raids into Byzantine Roman territory, specifically into Thrace. The Cuman woman bought the prisoner as a slave; it is assumed that they fell in love and, indeed, he promised not to abandon her even if they were to go away somewhere else. She had one child by the Christian, and was pregnant with another when the Christian’s wife was also captured and brought north of the Danube.

The Cuman (who is presented as a model of consideration throughout the story) then bought the man's wife as well as a domestic servant. In time, the Cuman was able to be baptised, and in due course the whole household made its way to Constantinople. At this point, the former wife made a complaint to the patriarch against the Cuman, saying that she had stolen her husband; however, a patriarchal examination of the whole story redounded only to the credit of the Cuman woman. It was agreed in the end that the Cuman should be paid the price of the husband whom she had fairly bought, so that she could have the money to bring up her children in a foreign land; she would then give up her husband to his former wife. In the end, justice was done when this former wife was again taken captive by the Cumans (!) and the Cuman woman and her chosen man were then again able to live together.

This is a fascinating story because its theme is very much that of changing identity. The Cuman woman wanted 'to come over to the Romans', and in many ways she did that – she married a Roman, she became an Orthodox Christian, and she even came to live in Constantinople. However, despite all this and bearing in mind that she is moreover throughout portrayed as an admirable individual, the foreign woman nevertheless remains a 'Skythian'. There is a very strong association in this story between being Roman and being Christian, and while it is also notable that her husband is identified only as a Christian captive from Thrace, and is not specifically called a Roman, the implication is nevertheless very clear that he was one, and, for that matter, that his former wife was Roman also. Gregoras uses 'Roman' just once in the account to five occurrences of 'Skythian', and repeatedly calling this woman 'Skythian' helps to distinguish her from her Roman rival in the story but also rams home her alien identity. It should be noted that, as a Cuman, the woman came from one of the northern peoples traditionally seen as the archetypal barbarians, although this admirable woman is perhaps significantly at no point identified as a barbarian.

Gregoras' single use of *Rhomaioi* in the story deserves extra attention. When he says that the Cuman woman 'wanted to come over to the Romans and to receive holy baptism', the connection with Christianity is clear but, less obviously, Gregoras is also making reference to a political identity. This woman wanted to become (and in the end did become?) a Roman not in any sense of ceasing to be an ethnic Skyth but in the sense of becoming a subject of the empire. Moving to the empire is as important as becoming Christian in this story, which shows that in this collective political sense only it is possible to become Roman while not changing one's basic identity.

The story of the Skyth might suggest that it was impossible to lose an ethnic identity but, in apparent contrast to the Skythian, there is also the figure of Theodore Palaiologos, marquis of Montferrat.²⁷ Theodore was the second son of Andronikos II Palaiologos by his second wife Yolanda (renamed Eirene by the Byzantines), daughter of the marquis of Montferrat. Andronikos had had two sons by his first wife, Anne of Hungary, so Theodore was the emperor's fourth son and fourth in line for the imperial throne. However, Theodore turned his back on the empire when he inherited and moved to the Italian marquisate on the death of his mother's brother John in 1305. Despite having a mother of western origin, the fact of being born into, and growing to adulthood in, the imperial family (Theodore was 23 when he succeeded to the marquisate) would surely seem to have been enough to make someone by birth a Roman. However, Gregoras is quite clear about Theodore: 'in outlook and in faith and in appearance and shaved beard and in all his ways of behaving he was utterly a Latin' (IX.396.15–16).

In the case of the Skythian woman, it should be remembered that she had gained baptism and residence within the empire, but nevertheless remained ethnically Skythian in Gregoras' account: thus descent, birth identity, was the most crucial criterion of identity. The case of Theodore seems to suggest in contrast that descent was not as important, although Theodore was admittedly of mixed parentage. But is it that simple – is Gregoras really saying that Theodore had become a Latin? No: the very fact that Gregoras emphasises Theodore's Latinity so explicitly in itself reveals that the marquis was *not* considered wholly Latin. His alien qualities stood out by virtue of being expressed in a Roman. Thus, descent again remained pre-eminently important, as with the Skythian woman.

Appearance and ways of behaving are clearly important here, the cultural baggage expressive of ethnic identity, even if descent was always the *sine qua non*. It was assumed that one's ethnicity (one's birth identity) should be expressed or made apparent by these external aspects. Gregoras gives few clues as to the detail of these ethnic signs, and most of the evidence is negative. From the example of Theodore we can see that Romans had an outlook, a faith, an appearance which included unshaved beards and, generally, a set of ways of behaving which were all different from the characteristics of Latins. It will be noted that the only specific detail is that of the 'shaved beards', and this certainly seems to have been an

²⁷ Laiou 1968: 386–410; Angelov 2007: 198–9.

important marker, being also specifically mentioned by Pachymeres in the case of the Romans in Asia Minor who went over to the side of the Catalans (*Andronikos* 626.3–5). Gregoras does not give a lot of behavioural information, and in this he differs from Pachymeres or Choniates; however, he does echo the familiar type of criticism of westerners as robbers and profane men (the context is the establishment of the Latin empire) and, repeatedly, as arrogant: Latin arrogance means they are never content within their bounds (x.469.22–3) and Italians rush at theology with very great arrogance (x.517.9–11). However, such comments can tell us only that the Romans thought they themselves were well-behaved.

In the story of the Skythian woman, we are told that she had long wanted ‘to . . . receive holy baptism’ (xi.543.2–3); it is plain that the receiving of holy baptism was one element of ‘going over to the Romans’, and the Orthodox faith surely was essential in the Roman identity. However, it is worth emphasising again that there is no talk of this woman changing her basic identity – in other words, orthodoxy, unlike descent, was a necessary but not sufficient condition of being Roman.

Gregoras returns to the theme of changing identities with his account of Kral Stefan Uroš IV Dušan’s conquests in the early 1340s and, especially, the ruler’s formal assumption in 1346 of the title ‘emperor of the Serbs and Romans’. Gregoras’ account is heavily satirical in tone:

he proclaimed himself emperor of Romans, he changed the barbarian way of life for Roman behaviour and the diadem and all the distinctive garb, whatever was fitting to this mighty rule . . . (xv.747.1–4)

Taken literally, the great kral stopped living like a barbarian and started living like a Byzantine Roman emperor.

Gregoras is here making accurate reference to Dušan’s frank mimesis of Byzantine Roman court ceremonial and trappings: Dušan did indeed have himself represented as a Byzantine Roman ruler, and even referred to himself as the new Constantine.²⁸ The details given here all relate to his imperial status rather than to any more basic Roman characteristics, and this passage relates to political developments under Dušan rather than being any kind of statement on the kral’s ethnic identity. This use of Roman vocabulary to describe and satirise the efforts of the kral in itself reinforces the fundamentally political nature of Roman identity for Gregoras.

In his continuing account, however, there is more that is relevant to the ethnic identity. Gregoras deals with the areas under Serbian rule, and

²⁸ Soulis 1984: 60–85.

suggests that the land ruled by the kral could be divided into land essentially Serbian in character on the one hand and land essentially Roman on the other, both determined by the 'accustomed ways' of those areas:

and he [Dušan] provided him [his son] with the rule, according to the accustomed ways among the Triballoi [i.e. the Serbs], of the land from the Ionian Gulf and from the River Istros [the Danube] as far as the city of Skopje . . . while to himself went the rule, according to the accustomed ways among the Romans, of the Roman lands (Ῥωμαϊκῶν χωρῶν) and cities there, as far as the entrances to the passes around Christoupoli. (xv.747.6–12)

Again, Gregoras is accurate about Dušan's actual practice here, reflecting the kral's attested policy of ensuring continuity in the lands he had acquired from the Byzantine Romans. In the interests of stability in these lands, Dušan maintained the bulk of the Byzantine Roman administrative system, reaffirming existing Roman charters for formerly Roman towns and retaining many Roman officials in post. Landowners were reconfirmed in their estates and Greek remained the official language, with a separate chancellery for the formerly Byzantine Roman and still Greek-speaking areas of the Serbian empire.²⁹ However, Gregoras also reveals here a belief in the importance of cultural baggage in establishing identity, irrespective of political control, and this reveals the influence of the ethnic sense of identity as well. In this account of Dušan's rule, Gregoras again illustrates that Roman identity could exist outside the bounds of actual Roman political control. Important in determining such politically anomalous identity was the cultural baggage that almost certainly reflected ethnic descent, and this thus included the detail of law and administration ('the accustomed ways') in the Roman areas under Serbian rule. These lands and cities were almost certainly called Roman, firstly, because of these legal and administrative systems but also, and secondly, because the people in them were Romans by culture, religion and so on.

This may well also be the ethnic context for other identifications of land as Roman in Gregoras, making his use of *chora* in the genitive formula worth a closer look. From the nature of the historical material, Gregoras most often has to refer to Byzantine Roman territory when it is under threat and it is thus perhaps not surprising that many references to Roman land using this formula refer to it being invaded or borders being crossed. In most cases, the territory can clearly or arguably still be seen as politically Byzantine Roman, and this is true for several occurrences of *chora* in the

²⁹ Fine 1994: 309–19; Obolensky 1971: 329–32; Soulis 1984.

genitive formula, further reinforcing Gregoras' politically focused Roman identity (cf. ix.454–8). However, some occurrences in point of fact refer to territory no longer held by the Byzantine Romans. Thus lands and cities actually seized by Serbs are described as 'of Romans' (x.490.8–9, xv.746.5–6); and a τόπος (*topos*: district) held by Latins is identified as 'of the Romans' (xvii.866.11–12). Such expressions could be interpreted as further appearances of the imagined empire (as with Choniates) but, alternatively, Gregoras may be relying only on the ethnic Roman identity to describe certain areas as Roman simply because they are occupied by ethnic Romans and operate in Roman ways.

The example of Theodore Palaiologos strongly suggests that it was possible to lose one's cultural identity as a Roman, while perceived descent – the ethnic sense of identity – was yet extremely significant in the case of the Skythian woman and remains an issue in any consideration of Theodore. Similarly, however seriously we take Gregoras' description of Dušan's assumption of 'Roman behaviour', the kral emphatically remained Serbian. Descent conferred an ethnic identity that ought to be confirmed and validated by external signs, and if descent and signs coincided this was sufficient to confer a Roman identity even where the hugely important political aspect was lacking. However, in individual cases, it was not necessary for descent to be accompanied by signs: descent was the basic and solely sufficient guarantor of identity. Again, political identity on its own – as, arguably, acquired by the Cuman woman – was not enough to change one's basic identity which depended on birth and descent.

Kantakouzenos: what makes a Roman?

Just like Gregoras, Kantakouzenos was able to accept Romans existing outside the Byzantine Roman state, even though for him the political aspect of Roman identity was so much to the fore. He can therefore be seen to acknowledge the ethnic Roman identity, especially in multi-ethnic contexts. There are references to the Roman quarter in Mamluk Cairo (iv.96.8), to Romans as opposed to Genoese 'Latins' in Chios, Phokaia or Lesbos (e.g. ii.376.8, 388.23–4, 487.17) and to Romans, not Turks, in Asia Minor (e.g. ii.340.14–15). In all of these locations, there was at best only a sketchy connection with Byzantine Roman political power. In the case of Cairo, the emperor was appealing to the sultan on behalf of the Romans in the city, and this was primarily out of a sense of religious

responsibility. The context makes it very clear who had political control of these Romans – and anyway, this occurrence comes in the words of the sultan himself, making it a foreigner's perception of Romans. Regarding Asia Minor, these areas were steadily being lost to the Turks and were at best only debatably Roman. As for Chios, Phokaia and Lesbos, the central issue here is that these communities were between Byzantine Roman and Latin rule, switching from one to the other as circumstances changed.

In the case of Chios, Kantakouzenos goes into the judicial arrangements specially devised in order to accommodate the different traditions of the two communities in considerable detail (iv.82.16–19), in a model familiar from other ethnic borders in the middle ages. Back in the tenth century, the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitos had commented that each nation had different customs, laws and institutions (above, p. 42), and it was similarly well established in the west that different peoples had their own legal systems.³⁰ Further, it was held that the individuals of specific groups had the right to legal autonomy even if they were not living within their home territory, and where there were different ethnic communities living side by side, then plural judiciaries were a favoured solution.³¹ This was the situation in Chios: Kantakouzenos agreed with the Genoese that cases involving only Romans would be judged by a Roman judge, but that in cases involving both Romans and Genoese the Roman and Genoese judges would sit together to judge the case.

It should come as no surprise that ethnic identities thus became more defined and more explicit in situations of multi-ethnic interaction. Here it can be seen most clearly that Kantakouzenos' conceptions of Roman identity included individuals and communities not subject to Byzantine Roman political rule – or at least subject only very theoretically. In their way of life, these people were still Roman; so, again, descent coupled with external indications was a sign of identity. In the case of Chios, this 'way of life' included legal tradition; in the case of Cairo, it is clear that religious custom is also important.

A further hint on the content of ethnic Roman-ness may be gained from the unflattering contrast drawn by Kantakouzenos between the ways

³⁰ Cf. Bartlett 1993: 207–8 for Spain; Lydon 1995: 106–7 for Ireland; Richter 1998: 73–4 for Wales. Michael Palaiologos made appeal to this principle in his arguments against trial by ordeal – see above, pp. 130–1.

³¹ Bartlett 1993: 208–11, 219–20; Geary 2002: 153–5.

of life at the Bulgarian and the Byzantine Roman courts, as he speaks in regard to the latter of 'Hellenic and imperial laws and customs' (II.505.1–2). The emphasis on law and custom is reminiscent of Gregoras on Dušan and the Serbs, and although Kantakouzenos gives no more clues on the external phenomena of the Roman-ness which is beyond the political (we may speculate about language, dress, etc.) the given aspects of religion and legal tradition are strongly suggestive of a sense of ethnic identity based on presumed shared descent.

However, the situation is in fact a little more complex than this. Kantakouzenos also deals with several groups who were surely as Roman as the Romans of Cairo, Lesbos, Chios or Phokaia in terms of the externals of their ways of life, but who were apparently not Roman, namely, the Peloponnesians, the Verrhiotes of Macedonia and the Epirots. These three groups are never called Roman – but why this difference? The fact is that Kantakouzenos is happy to assign the ethnic Roman identity to certain groups, and ignore their lack of any political Byzantine Roman identity, while he denies other groups any ethnic identity *because* they explicitly lack any political identity. The question might be why he can overlook the political aspect in some cases but not in others.

Starting with the Epirots, we have seen how Kantakouzenos insisted on the status of Epiros (Akarnania) as immemorially part of the Byzantine Roman empire and, given this insistence, it is therefore surprising that he never calls the residents of the area 'Romans'. Rather, he always sticks to localised names – the Artans, the Rogioi, or the Akarnanians. The situation is the same in the case of Verrhoia in Macedonia, where Kantakouzenos speaks of the leaders of the Verrhiotes (IV.31.12), who had been corrupted by the Serbs into surrendering to them. An alternative here would have been to speak of 'the Romans in Verrhoia', in a formula akin to that employed in the cases of the Romans of Cairo, Lesbos, Chios and Phokaia touched on above. Comparably, the ethnic Romans of the Peloponnese are called 'Peloponnesians'.

However, there were important differences between Verrhoia, Epiros and the Peloponnese on the one hand and Cairo, Lesbos, Chios or Phokaia on the other. Firstly, the situation in Verrhoia was not polyethnic such as would typically promote a hardening of ethnic positions with an emphasis on border-markers: there were not two or more groups existing alongside each other in Verrhoia, so there was no need to speak of 'the Romans' of Verrhoia as opposed to any Latins of Verrhoia. In

Epiros, though, there were contrasting groups, and Kantakouzenos nevertheless succeeds in distinguishing between locals and the incoming Italians of Taranto without recourse to the terminology of 'Romans': the locals' fatherland is the 'empire of Romans', but they are not named as Romans any more directly than this. So, polyethnicity cannot be the whole answer.

More important perhaps is that, in the case of Verrhoia and Epiros, Kantakouzenos was dealing with an explicit leaving of the Byzantine Roman fold, whereas in Cairo the situation was long established, and in Lesbos, Chios and Phokaia the situation was and had been for some time in flux. In the case of Epiros, although the Angevins had been exerting influence, there was no real ethnic rivalry for control of the region. Kantakouzenos and his master Andronikos III Palaiologos were recovering an area for the empire which had long been in outright opposition dating back to the days of the empire of Nikaia. This agenda is clear in Kantakouzenos' speech (II.520.15–521.10, see above, p. 152), which is addressed to the native people of the region; Kantakouzenos accuses them of wrongdoing in involving the Angevins, and he characterises the native rulers of Epiros as fraudulent rebels against the empire. In other words, in avoiding the terminology of Roman-ness for the people of Epiros, Kantakouzenos is following Akropolites (and also Pachymeres to a lesser extent) in denying Roman identity to the empire's Roman rivals, and the political Roman identity is dominant over the ethnic in his approach to Epiros. His refusal to acknowledge the Epirots as fellow Romans is a statement about their political identity, and only incidentally about their ethnic identity. Kantakouzenos is not ostensibly interested here in their ethnic identity, apart from the fact that historically these people had been politically Roman, and this fact ought to condition their contemporary political status. Thus, the historical trans-generational political identity of the Epirots was one aspect of their ethnic identity, and this ethnic identity should have dictated their political identity (but it did not).

As for the position in Verrhoia, in contrast to Lesbos, Chios and Phokaia, this was not a long-established position of political fluctuations or foreign occupation, but was new and a situation against which any emperor would feel the need to put up some defence. Officially, Stefan Dušan of Serbia was Kantakouzenos' ally in the civil war between Kantakouzenos and the regency for John V Palaiologos, but he had in effect taken advantage of the civil conflict to make massive gains in Macedonia. Verrhoia was one of the last areas to fall. It was a significant and prosperous town lying inland to the west of Thessaloniki, and its importance is shown

by the fact that Kantakouzenos appointed his own son Manuel as its governor from 1343.³² The fact that the leaders of Verrhoia had not only seceded to the Serbs but had in so doing rejected the rule of his own son may well have fed Kantakouzenos' hostile presentation. Kantakouzenos' choice of the localised term *Verrhoiotes* in place of any mention of their Roman status may be coincidence, a simple varying of vocabulary; it is highly likely, alternatively, that he could be denying the Verrhiotes any Roman identity because of their explicit disloyalty – just as was the case in Epiros. Kantakouzenos knew these people were ethnically Roman, but their rejection of the political Roman identity has meant that they cannot be called Romans in this account. Again, he is only concerned with the political Roman identity here.

The case for this interpretation is strengthened by Kantakouzenos' approach to the Peloponnese where, unlike Verrhoia and Epiros, the situation was far more comparable to the situation in Chios or Phokaia in that this region was in flux between Roman and Latin control. The context once again involves his own son, Manuel Kantakouzenos. In 1349, John Kantakouzenos, now emperor, sent Manuel to the Peloponnese as the new governor based at Mistra. Manuel had already been given the title despot, and this meant that he would be ruling the Byzantine Roman territory in the Peloponnese as the emperor's deputy:

Then too, the Peloponnese seemed ready to fall apart on all sides. This was not only because of the attacks of the Turks in their great fleets or because of the Latins who hold that land called Achaia by the Hellenes and who are subjects of the prince, but also and even more so because of the people themselves (σφῶν αὐτῶν) continually hostile to each other, laying waste each other's possessions, and slaughtering... (iv.85.3–8)

Despite the polyethnicity and the unstable condition of the region, then, Kantakouzenos again avoids calling the local people Romans. Instead, he calls these ill-behaved residents of the Peloponnese the Πελοποννήσιοι (*Peloponnesioi*: e.g. iv.85.13, 20, 86.4, 10) or the 'residents' (85.17–18). There are two alternatives here. Firstly, Kantakouzenos could mean to denote 'the people who live in the Peloponnese', regardless of ethnic origin, and as we shall see below this could cover ethnic Romans, Franks, Turks, Slavs and more. Kantakouzenos seems to contrast the Peloponnesians with the Latins and Turks, saying that the new despot

³² Fine 1994: 300–6.

made treaties with the Latins, in order to preserve the residents from harm from them, and he opposed the barbarians [i.e. the Turks], winning many victories, so that they would not attack the Peloponnesians . . . and he was well-disposed to the leaders of the Peloponnesians . . . (iv.85.16–20, 86.3–4)

This does not rule out a multi-ethnic understanding of *Peloponnesioi*. The uses of ‘Latins’ and ‘barbarians’ here may be understood as signifying external enemies – the Latin principality of Achaia, the pirate fleets – and need not be read as implying that Manuel himself had no ethnically Latin or Turkish subjects. Under this explanation, Kantakouzenos’ avoidance of *Rhomaioi* is easy to understand on an ethnic basis.

However, the context works against an understanding of *Peloponnesioi* as having primarily ethnic content. Rather, Kantakouzenos’ use of the term is politically driven – he uses it specifically because these residents of the Peloponnese, who should have been loyal to the empire as represented by his son Manuel, were not so loyal. It is further likely that Kantakouzenos in fact thinks of the *Peloponnesioi* as ethnically Roman rather than multi-ethnic, and in never calling them Roman, despite the fact that there were Latins (not to mention Turks) against whom he could contrast ‘the Romans of the Peloponnese’, he departs from the approach of Akropolites to the Peloponnesian ‘Romans who served the prince’ (above, p. 105).

The fact that Kantakouzenos’ approach is overwhelmingly politically based is shown by the very clear implication that these *Peloponnesioi* ought to be loyal to the empire; in other words, even though he avoids calling them ‘Roman’, he nevertheless clearly identifies them as subjects of the Byzantine Roman state. After all, this whole exposition comes in the context of him sending his own son to rule over them as a despot: these Peloponnesians thus owed allegiance to the state in a way that their Latin neighbours did not. Still, and notwithstanding, they are not identified as Roman. In name, then, Kantakouzenos denies Roman identity to the Peloponnesians, but in the actions and attitude he expected of them he shows his belief in their Roman status since he characterises them as rebels who were expected to be loyal. His attitude is confused, but we can say from this that, although you could be a Roman while not being a subject of the Byzantine Roman empire (like the ethnic Romans on Chios or Lesbos), you could not, it seems, be explicitly disloyal to Byzantine Roman rule and remain a *full* Roman. Here indeed the primacy of the political identity for Kantakouzenos is manifest. In the case of the Epirots, Verrhiotes and Peloponnesians, Kantakouzenos deals only with their political identity; given their explicit disloyalty to the empire, they cannot be called Romans. Any question of their ethnic

identity is ignored – save for the fact that they were viewed as people who should have been loyal to the empire, and this expectation rested to some extent on their transgenerational ethnic identity. Political considerations dictate Kantakouzenos' treatment of these people, but he is nevertheless working with an implicit ethnic understanding of Roman-ness.

This underlying ethnic understanding is shown by the fact that, contrariwise, explicit loyalty to the Byzantine Roman state was not sufficient to make you Roman if your transgenerational birth identity was other. A striking example of this is the Catalan soldier-architect Juan de Peralta – a devoted adherent of Kantakouzenos – who is described as 'one of the Latin subjects of the emperor' (IV.30.14); there is also the Latin Frances, sent as an ambassador from Kantakouzenos to Pope Clement VI in 1347. Frances is described as 'of the Latin race; he had served the emperor for a very long time' (IV.53.15–16). Overall, Kantakouzenos shows in these cases that the ethnic aspect of identity is important to him: presumed descent is a *sine qua non* for being a Roman, and no amount of political Roman- or non-Roman-ness could, ultimately, override this. Nevertheless, political loyalty also remained a necessary though not sufficient condition.

As we have seen, Gregoras and Kantakouzenos saw the Roman identity primarily in terms of the political institution of the empire, which had an inherited authority over a certain territory and by which that territory was organised. It was a community under threat; its territory was shrinking and on the periphery debatable; there was a strong association with ill fortune, defeat and decline. This political Roman identity existed alongside, but did not always coincide with, an ethnic Roman identity. For those who were ethnically Roman, ideally, the transgenerational participation in the political identity was one, perhaps the most significant, of the markers of their ethnic identity. Over the course of time, as we have seen, the political and ethnic identities were slipping more and more out of joint. More and more there were people identifiable and identified as Romans who were not part of the political dimension of Roman-ness. With the emergence of such people, the other markers of Roman ethnic identity (besides the political dimension) became more prominent. Arguably, by the fourteenth century, the political Roman identity and the ethnic Roman identity had in fact become divorced. This is shown in various instances covered above. Thus some people identified as *Rhomaioi* have no association with the Byzantine Roman state – Romans in Chios or Phokaia or Cairo, for example. Here, the writer is appealing to the ethnic identity marked by religion, customs, dress, language and so on. On the other hand, some people who were

clearly ethnically Roman have their Roman identity ostensibly denied to them because of their disloyalty to the Roman state. However, it is their ethnic identity that is instrumental in their ascription as disloyal – if they were not ethnically Roman, they would not be expected to be loyal. Thus the ethnic and political identities could come into conflict with each other.

NOT ONLY ROMAN BUT ALSO . . . ?

Certain markers, then, came to be associated with the ethnic Roman identity and, for both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, there was at least one other marker and associated identity within and beyond the Roman – the Christian.

As has been seen, Gregoras sometimes associates *Rhomaïos* with religion: the Skythian woman wanted to ‘go over to the Romans and receive holy baptism’ (xi.543.2–3). At other times, Gregoras speaks of religious decrees being sent to ‘all Romans’ (xvi.832.6); and he comments that the Calabrian monk Barlaam, the outspoken opponent of hesychasm, treated orthodoxy (‘the common wisdom of the Romans’) with disdain (xviii.901.6). However, for a man like Gregoras – to whom religion was exceptionally important – this relative paucity of direct association between religion and the terminology of being Roman is striking. It is, though, in line with his predecessors Choniates, Akropolites and Pachymeres.

Gregoras occasionally speaks of *Christianoi*, rather than Romans, as a group with which he identifies. Christians were being attacked by barbarians (ix.399.8–9), John Alexander the Tsar of Bulgaria sought peace with the Romans saying that fellow Christians should not fight each other (x.484.8–9), it was a Christian captive, clearly of Roman descent, with whom the Skythian fell in love (xi.543.4) and John Kantakouzenos had been excommunicated from the community of Christians (xv.792.1). These instances show that ‘Christian’ was far from synonymous with ‘Roman’. Most of the time, Romans could be called Christian, although the case of excommunication obviously made this very occasionally problematic. From the other side, definitely, some Christians were not Roman and a noticeable example of this was the Bulgarians.

All in all, the terminologies of ‘Roman’ and of ‘Christian’ are rarely combined by Gregoras. Although, as shown by the case of the Skythian woman, the Orthodox religion was clearly an important aspect of what it was to be Roman, religion does not present as a principal ingredient of Roman identity for Gregoras in the way that he uses key vocabulary. Kantakouzenos similarly does not develop any close associations between

the Roman and the Christian identities. *Christianos* and *Rhomaïos* are directly linked on only one occasion, and it is worth noting that this is in the words of a non-Roman, the Catholic envoy Bartholomew (iv.18.22–4) sent by Kantakouzenos to Pope Clement VI in 1347 as part of an appeal to pan-Christian unity against the Turks. Here again, the Romans were a group within a larger context, but this time they were a subgroup within the wider Christian world.

The Catholicism of the west had had a major impact on the Byzantine Roman world, of which both Gregoras and especially Kantakouzenos would have been aware, as both men had a keen personal interest in theology. As emperor, Kantakouzenos worked hard to achieve a better relationship with the west, and the appeal to the common religious faith was still a useful tool in any attempt to forge alliances between east and west. This was a theme emphasised by the emperor himself in his attempts to nurture an anti-Turkish league: in a further letter to the Pope in 1350 Kantakouzenos speaks of ‘the whole mass of Christians’ (iv.59.19).³³ As we have seen, Kantakouzenos had western churchmen in his personal entourage, men like Bartholomew or the Frances ‘who had served him a long time’ (iv.53.16–17). Most importantly, the Byzantine Roman response to the western church was now – in some instances – more generous and open-minded. The best example of this is Demetrios Kydones, chief minister to John VI Kantakouzenos and, in time, to John V Palaiologos as well. Kydones was actively involved in negotiations with the west in the late 1340s and this led him to decide to learn Latin for himself, so that he could communicate without interpreters. His instruction by a Dominican friar introduced him to the work of Thomas Aquinas, and he was bowled over by the adventurous scholarship of the west. He translated Aquinas into Greek and promoted philosophical studies before, by 1363, joining the western church himself.³⁴ Later, he achieved the conversion of the emperor John V Palaiologos.

It would not be surprising if this more tolerant awareness of the western church made any identification of Christian and Roman problematic although, as we have seen, Christianity is in fact throughout this period very rarely associated with the political Roman identity. Christianity presents in fact as a whole other identity besides the Roman. In line with this, when Kantakouzenos makes his appeals to the west his focus is entirely on common Christianity – any language of Roman

³³ Nicol 1996: 102–4. ³⁴ Fryde 2000: 381–6; Kianka 1980.

identity is lacking, as political Roman-ness was of no use here. As with Gregoras, religion is very important to Kantakouzenos, but it does not impinge on his conceptualisation of Roman-ness, which is an overridingly political identity. Only in the correspondence with the Mamluk sultan of Cairo (iv.96.8) does *Rhomaïos* have any religious content, and this is a purely ethnic identity in which Orthodox Christianity was a significant marker.

DEFINITELY NOT ROMAN – BUT WHY?

Some elements of Gregoras' perceptions of others have already been covered, with the cases of Stefan Dušan and of the Skythian woman employed to elucidate Gregoras' models of ethnic identity and particularly the possibility for ethnic change. Turning now to the terminology of barbarism, although Gregoras and Kantakouzenos present quite a contrast, the historians of the fourteenth century would in general seem to follow on from the modifications to the barbarian model already noted in the thirteenth century.

In striking contrast to Choniates, Akropolites had hardly used the terminology of barbarism and, while Pachymeres was more conventional in his application of this terminology, the model of barbarian encirclement is far less pervasive in the thirteenth century. Both Akropolites and Pachymeres presented the Bulgarians most strongly as barbarians. Akropolites used the terminology to make a strong and generalised contrast between ordered Roman civilisation and regrettable alien barbarism, and Pachymeres also laid strong emphasis on the behavioural content of barbarism. Pachymeres also made a strong link between the non-Christian and the barbarian.

The picture in the fourteenth century remains pretty conventional: both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos show familiarity with the traditional, pre-1204, model of the barbarian as an all-enveloping model of the non-Roman. However, this model is used more for rhetorical effect than as an accurate presentation of their contemporary world, and there is a strong sense that not all non-Romans are barbarians and that the true opposite of the barbarian is the Christian. Thus, while the older models have not been forgotten, both writers portray the non-Christian, eastern, Turks as the typical barbarians, as opposed to the non-civilised, northern, Balkan peoples.

For both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, and in contrast to Pachymeres, barbarians are masses of people rather than individuals. Starting with Gregoras, his use of the terminology of barbarism is strikingly restricted

(see [Appendix 1](#), pp. 296–7). Of the thirty-five occurrences of *barbaros/barbarikos* no less than twenty-seven relate strictly and only to Turks, while as noted above there is also one clear association with a Serb, Kral Stefan Dušan, who ‘changed the barbarian way of life for Roman behaviour’. To this may be added the mention of ‘the barbarians settled on the Istros’, which probably refers to the Cuman settlement across the Danube. Two references, while not much, are sufficient to show that the time-honoured identification of the northern peoples as barbarians had not been forgotten. On the other hand, Gregoras’ more customary avoidance of the terminology of barbarism for these northerners witnesses to the considerable assimilation of the Serbs at least into Byzantine Roman norms.³⁵ The close correlation between barbarian and Turk suggests that geography, religion or both lay at the heart of barbarian identity for Gregoras, but he makes no explicit definition or comments to help here. The use of *barbaros* and its cognates is simply another way of referring to Turks, especially in military contexts (cf. IX.434–9, XI.540–1, XVI.836–7). Certainly, apart from the comment on Dušan, *barbaros* is never applied to any Christian.

In contrast, Kantakouzenos makes far more extensive use of *barbaros* and associated terminology, and the sheer quantity of occurrences makes for a remarkable disparity with Gregoras, Pachymeres and Akropolites (see [Appendix 1](#), p. 299). Indeed, in terms of quantity, Kantakouzenos’ liberality comes closest to Choniates and, as in the case of his predecessor, such lavish use reflects Kantakouzenos’ reliance on classical models.

As with Gregoras, for Kantakouzenos the *barbaroi* are primarily the Muslims, with over 85 per cent of occurrences applied to Turks and a further handful applied to the Mamluks of Egypt; there is also a cluster of occurrences applied to the Tatars. Moreover, there is a strong explicit equivalency between barbarian and non-Christian, with barbarians at one point defined as ‘the barbarians, who have not been enlisted by faith in the dispensation over us of Christ saviour’ (II.497.14–15). Again, with reference to a proposed Bulgarian and Roman alliance it is urged that ‘the army of each [i.e. the Bulgarians and the Romans] is of the same faith, so it is fitting that they go to war, not against each other, but alongside each other against the barbarians, who do not revere God’ (II.325.6–8), with the barbarians here again being the Turks. Kantakouzenos makes a similar appeal to shared faith in his calls upon the west for aid against the Turks, ‘the barbarians, enemies to Christians’ (IV.57.14). There is a clear political agenda here, but the pattern of use makes the religious content of *barbaros* clear.

³⁵ Bartusis 1998: 151–9.

Nevertheless, Kantakouzenos also occasionally characterises Christian peoples as barbarians. On just three occasions, he calls the Christian Bulgarians barbarians, albeit that they play a role in Book II comparable in size to that of the Turks. The Bulgarians' Christianity is important here and is surely the main reason why Bulgarians are comparatively so rarely called barbarian; after all, as seen above, where Kantakouzenos has to deal with both Bulgarians and Turks it is the latter that earn the barbarian epithet. Two of the Bulgarian applications, one of which deprecates the Bulgarians' lack of stamina as typically barbarian, occur in the context of military conflict with the Romans; the other is used to make a general contrast between the Bulgarian, barbarian, way of doing things and the Hellenic way (II.504.24). In addition, in one episode the 'Tarantinoi', the Angevins who were interested in Epiros, are repeatedly called 'barbarous' (II.520). Here again, there is a strong contrast with the Roman, as Kantakouzenos is unfavourably comparing the *arche* of the Angevins with the *basileia* of the Romans: this is a contrast of the barbarian with the political Roman identity and there does not appear to be anything ethnic in it. All these anomalous applications of barbarian terminology to Christians appear to have been carefully chosen; such that we can say that parallel to the Christian/barbarian opposition there was a political Roman/barbarian opposition.

Remarkably too, the more generally hostile Ottoman Turks are, in terms of relative density, much more likely to be called barbarian than Kantakouzenos' Turkish allies from the Emirate of Aydin – thus their relationship with the empire and the imperial author influenced the perception even of the Turks. So barbarians are those who are in opposition to the Romans – physically, or more intangibly. The Bulgarians are more likely to be called barbarians if they are at war with the Romans, but also if a cultural contrast is being drawn; tangible opposition and cultural contrast are similarly both involved in the Angevin application, as this one is closely associated with the question of imperial rule. Christian and Roman were therefore not synonymous in Kantakouzenos: there were barbarians who were Christian but not Roman, such as the Bulgarians and Latins. This may reflect the influence of the old idea of barbarian encirclement; however, this political barbarian identity is in Kantakouzenos far less dominant or pervasive than the religious barbarian identity (it is noticeable that Serbs are never called barbarian despite their hostility to the Romans), and the non-Christian content of *barbaros* is paramount.

Gregoras too has recourse to the time-honoured model of Roman/barbarian opposition. He provides two purely generalised applications of *barbaros*; with one contrast between barbarian and Hellene

(xv.748.19) and one between barbarian and Roman (xvi.811.10); further, Dušan's change of way of life, from barbarian to Roman (discussed above) can also be read as another barbarian versus Roman contrast.

This kind of dichotomy is familiar from Gregoras' predecessors, and he shows that he is aware of its classical roots in the phrase 'and for barbarians and for Hellenes and for the whole earth and sea and for all ruling powers' (xv.748.19), in which we may see the contrast used as one way of saying 'the whole world'. This phrase has specific reference to the ancient world, as Gregoras is employing this dichotomy explicitly to refer to a bygone world, contrasting the 'barbarians and Hellenes' with 'we who are Christians' (748.22). This should therefore be read as an educated application of the classical world view, now somewhat out of date, and in no sense as an identification between the Hellenic and the Roman in opposition to the barbarian.

Gregoras rewrites the classic Hellene–barbarian pairing as Roman–barbarian to provide a similar shorthand for universality: 'most of the Romans and the barbarians know . . .' (xvi.811.10), but this is as much of an anachronism. It is clear, not least from Gregoras' limited application of the terminology of barbarism, that by the fourteenth century educated Byzantine Romans such as he had ceased to think of the world as innately divided into civilised Christian Romans and uncivilised, unchristian, barbarian hordes. For Gregoras, the opposition between the Roman and the barbarian is more rhetorical than meaningful. It represents the 'official version' of Byzantine Roman identity, complete with all the baggage of Romans-versus-the-rest, of the one unique Byzantine Roman empire qualitatively different from and superior to all other groupings. In other words, this contrast is predicated on the political Roman identity, which had minimal affect and relevance by this stage. The contrast between Christians and non-Christian barbarians now had more weight.

Kantakouzenos also has occasional recourse to a model of barbarian encirclement of Romans which is again more typical of the Komnenian period; such usage would include comments like 'there being no war with either the western or the eastern barbarians', 'the barbarians living around the Roman hegemony', or 'the barbarians attacking from all sides', of which the first specifies barbarians in the west and the others logically imply the same. However, such comments should again be understood as rhetorical in composition and effect; Kantakouzenos evokes a classical model to suggest the extremity of the crisis for the empire threatened on many sides, and this use of barbarians in contrast to Romans relies on the political Roman identity; however, western and eastern foreigners remained qualitatively different for him because of the difference in religious faith.

There is no explicit association in Gregoras between being barbarian and behaving badly save perhaps the contrast between barbarian way of life and Roman behaviour in the case of Dušan. This lack of behavioural reference contrasts with Gregoras' occasional more hackneyed comments on westerners, which have already been touched upon. In addition to the visible differences implied by his comments on Theodore Palaiologos, Gregoras characterises westerners as wild, aggressive and arrogant, and this is a familiar portrait that Anna Komnene would have recognised. Yet it is noticeable that Gregoras does not indulge very much in the stock range of abuse of others and is here closer to Akropolites than Pachymeres or Choniates. Kantakouzenos is also restrained in this regard. He hints at some behavioural content to the nature of *barbaros*; the lack of stamina viewed as typically barbarian was as we have seen an established *topos*, and the uses of *barbaros* for the Mamluks in Jerusalem (iv.100–3) are also associated with brutal behaviour.

In conclusion, the primary reference of *barbaros* in the fourteenth century is now religious. There are only slight traces of the archetypal nomad model of the barbarian which had been pervasive in the preceding century. The terminology of barbarism is only rarely associated with westerners by Kantakouzenos and never by Gregoras, and this represents a logical progression from Akropolites and Pachymeres. There are now only rhetorical traces of the traditional dichotomy between Roman and barbarian based on political and cultural status.

CHAPTER 6

Meanwhile, a long way from Constantinople . . .

THE PELOPONNESE AND THE *CHRONICLE OF THE MOREA*

In the last three chapters, a close analysis of the histories of Choniates, Akropolites, Pachymeres, Gregoras and Kantakouzenos made it possible to access something of the perspectives and attitudes of the exceptionally well educated men who dominated the small Byzantine Roman elite. Of them all, though, only Akropolites ever lived under Latin rule, and that only as a child in Constantinople in the years to 1233. In contrast, the records and history of the Frankish principality of Achaia in the Peloponnese provide a view into developments in provincial Roman identities under the direct pressure of the western presence. The discussion in [Chapter 2](#) outlined how, in various ways and for various reasons, the nature of Roman identity among the provincials who became subject to Frankish rule after 1204 differed markedly from that felt or professed by the privileged elite of Constantinople. In the farther-flung provinces like the Peloponnese, which had already become considerably alienated from the capital before the Frankish conquest, it is possible to see the growing significance of an ethnic understanding of what it meant to be Roman. This ethnic identity included the non-ecumenical understanding of Roman Christianity and stood in contrast to the political Roman identity. Moreover, the political Roman identity, contrasting with the barbarian, clearly possessed minimal resonance in the distant provinces. As we have seen, the ideology of the elite – as revealed in historians from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries but part of a belief system with its roots in the ancient world – included a fundamental contrast between Romans and non-Romans, or barbarians. Significantly, examination of the literary and other sources relating to the Peloponnese after 1204 reveals that this sense of necessary ethnic division was far less influential in this region. Further, it is clear that, contrary to the prevailing trend in the historiography of Frankish Greece, there was in fact a remarkable degree of inter-ethnic assimilation in the Peloponnese,

twinned with a strongly regional identity that did not ascribe to any sense of pan-Roman imperial identity.

The key text here, and the basis for this investigation, is the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*, the single Greek work of the period most clearly divorced from the elite Constantinopolitan milieu, yet nevertheless part of the Byzantine Roman world. This work will be the basis in this chapter for a close look at ethnic identities in the Peloponnese in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The *Chronicle of the Morea* survives in eight manuscripts in four different languages, and this linguistic variety is itself a witness to the ethnic mix in the late medieval Aegean where the *Chronicle* originated and which it describes. The *Chronicle* tells the story of the Frankish principality of the Morea, from its foundation after the Fourth Crusade through to, variously, 1292 in the Greek and Italian versions, 1305 in the French version or 1377 in the Aragonese version. Thus, the French prose chronicle was produced in the first half of the fourteenth century, perhaps for Catherine de Valois, titular Latin empress and prince of the Morea, and tells the story through to 1305 with some notes of later events. The Aragonese prose chronicle was written between 1377 and 1391 for Juan Fernandez de Heredia, the Grand Master of the Order of St John, who had an active interest in the region, and this version finishes with the assumption of command in the principality by the Hospitallers in 1377. The Italian *Chronicle*, a prose translation of the Greek, was produced as late as the sixteenth century, perhaps for the Venetians still holding out against the Ottomans in the Peloponnese.¹ However, as a source plainly originating among and written for Greek-speakers, it is primarily the Greek *Chronicle* that is considered here, and its origins are far more problematic.

Five manuscripts of the Greek *Chronicle* have survived, with the earliest, that now in Copenhagen, dating from the 1360s. All subsequent versions date from at least a century later. Internal evidence indicates that the version in the Copenhagen manuscript was written during the lifetime of Erard le Maure of Arkadia, who died in 1388, and thus the Copenhagen version is accepted as the earliest and most authoritative version of the Greek *Chronicle*.² It is indisputable that the French version of the *Chronicle* was composed some years before the Copenhagen version but, complicating

¹ The 'French *Chronicle*': Longnon 1911; the 'Aragonese *Chronicle*': Morel-Fatio 1885; Italian version in Hopf 1873: 414–68.

² Codex Havniensis 57; cf. Agapitos and Smith 1992: 46. The 'Greek *Chronicle*': Schmitt 1904 gives parallel translations of the Copenhagen and Paris mss, and references here are to the Copenhagen version unless otherwise stated; Lurier 1964 for a passable English translation.

the issue still further, the French *Chronicle* is avowedly an abridgement of an existing text and is clearly less detailed than the Greek *Chronicle*, although it continues to a later date. Thus, there was at least one version of the *Chronicle* in existence in the early fourteenth century that has not survived, and there has been considerable debate on the authorship of this original and the language in which it was composed.

The Greek *Chronicle* as we have it has itself been the focus of similar attention: who might have produced such a work? Written in a vernacular that is probably the best example we can now obtain of contemporary spoken Greek, the Greek *Chronicle* looks very like the work of a native speaker of Greek. Thus, it has attracted considerable interest from linguistic specialists, who have argued for Greek authorship. On the other hand, the *Chronicle* is notorious for its alleged 'anti-Greek' outlook, causing many commentators to argue for French authorship – at least of the original of which Copenhagen is a translated copy.

However, the supposed 'anti-Greekness' of the Greek *Chronicle* rests almost entirely on a few explicitly polemical passages, which appear to their fullest extent only in the Copenhagen manuscript, Codex Havniensis 57 (here called 'H'). These passages have no equivalent in the French and other language versions, and are almost entirely eliminated in the later Greek versions now in Paris ('P') and Turin ('T'). The passages in question are H724–30 (largely repeated in P, reduced to omit direct reference to 'Romans' in T); H756–826 (dramatically curtailed in both P and T); H1245–64 and H3931–9 (both reduced in P, omitted in T). The overriding theme of these exclamatory diatribes is the untrustworthiness of the Romans – as we have seen, a classic western theme about the Byzantine Romans.³ The conclusion has been that H cannot have been composed by a Roman, or, if it was, then the author must have been wholly antipathetic to his Byzantine Roman heritage, identifying instead wholeheartedly with the Franks. However, the anti-Roman passages in H may be a distraction in considering thirteenth-century Moreot society. They may not have appeared in any earlier Greek version or, indeed, the original 'Book of the Conquest' – we could then safely view the *Chronicle* as, in its origins, certainly pro-Frankish but not violently anti-Roman.

It is in fact probable that there was an earlier version of the *Chronicle* in Greek which did not contain those polemical passages that have conditioned views of the work as fundamentally anti-Roman (see below,

³ Above, p. 38. The polemical passages are discussed below, pp. 215–17.

pp. 215–17 and [Appendix 2](#)). These diatribes should be seen as interpolations of non-Roman origin inserted into an existing text. Similarly, the genealogical details which date the Copenhagen version show clearly the action of scribes adding to an existing text. Thus, the Greek *Chronicle* as we now have it should be viewed as a mid fourteenth-century source which strongly reflects its origins in an early fourteenth-century account of the principality of Achaia.⁴

The *Chronicle of the Morea* as we have it in the Greek version is in its origins a creation of the Morea of the early fourteenth century and, as shall be demonstrated, this was a polyglot society in which Franks were pre-eminent but equally many Greeks played an important and willing part. But an analysis of the language of the Greek *Chronicle* clearly reveals this also to be a work of the Byzantine Roman milieu – in the widest sense. In this regard, most basically, the Greek *Chronicle's* use of *Rhomaïos* rather than *Graïkos* marks the work as an ‘insider’ from within the Byzantine Roman world, in contrast to the French and Aragonese versions, which employ forms of the western-orientated *Grecus*. Moreover, while it is crucial to appreciate that the Greek *Chronicle* uses *Rhomaïoi* far more freely than any other source of the period to denote ethnic Romans – that is, Romans living outside the Byzantine Roman state whose identity is not at all politically based – yet the political Roman sense familiar from the elite works is nevertheless repeatedly manifest here in such phrases as *basileus ton Rhomaion* (emperor of the Romans). The plain formula is similarly widely employed in its collective sense of the *Rhomaïoi* as the Byzantine Roman state. Such usages mark the *Chronicle* as a work from within the Byzantine Roman world. As for the ethnic origins of the *Chronicle's* author, these are impossible to determine and, anyway, not really the issue – the important point is that this work was written by someone fluent in Greek to the standard of a native speaker, but prepared to eulogise the conquests of the Franks, and speaking to or writing for a similar audience. If he was Greek, he identified in many ways with the Franks; if he was a Frank then he was one of many fluent in the language – and attitudes – of the conquered: thus, the *Chronicle* is in itself an argument for significant cultural integration in the Frankish Peloponnese.

Obviously, the author of the *Chronicle* has had some education and his style is as a result not wholly demotic. There is a tendency to employ correct spelling even where, in the spoken style required, such spelling spoils the

⁴ Jacoby 1968: 133–89; Jeffreys 1975: 304–50; more recently see Shawcross 2006: 19–28.

metre – although this could well be scribal interference, and this is typical across vernacular Greek poetry of the period. There are also touches of archaic style in both grammar and vocabulary, and the language of the *Chronicle* has thus been described as macaronic, a mixture of the spoken and the learned. This patchwork style, which is typical also of the vernacular romances of this period, is potentially evidence of an oral background such that the author had available a set of formulas which might have included material of ancient date. In other words, the educated archaic touches may be evidence more of traditional oral style than of advanced education. Thus, the interference of educated learned style is at the minimum in the *Chronicle of the Morea* and, as we shall see, this impacts on its content and perspective as much as on its linguistic style.⁵

Presenting a marked contrast to the elite historians in its social and geographical origins, language and outlook, the Greek *Chronicle* in its several versions allows for a view into the development of the mixed ethnic society of the Peloponnese from the thirteenth into the fifteenth century and will provide the framework for the investigation of that society in this chapter. Thus, firstly, the Greek *Chronicle's* narrative account of the principality of the Morea in the thirteenth century will be set against a range of other source material to demonstrate the considerable level of inter-ethnic cooperation in this period. This will be followed by an analysis of the language of the fourteenth-century Greek *Chronicle*, similarly set against other evidence (including the other language versions of the *Chronicle*) to illustrate the importance of the ethnic Roman identity as against the political, alongside a continuing pattern of inter-ethnic exchange and even assimilation. These patterns of development will be further explored in the next chapter, where the later fifteenth-century versions of the Greek *Chronicle* will be set against high- and middle-ranking Byzantine Roman writing of the period immediately preceding the Ottoman conquest.

Fundamentally, it will become clear that the regional Peloponnesian identity was of greater influence than any ethnic identities posited on the contrast between Roman and barbarian. Thus, the constructed *other* of the formal histories was more powerful in promoting an ethnic sense of Roman identity in the elite circles of Constantinople than was the actual presence of the other, in the Peloponnese at least. On the borders of the Byzantine Roman world, boundaries were more nebulous and negotiable than in the more ideologically driven centre.

⁵ Schmitt 1904: xxxiv; Jeffreys 1975: 307–17; Jeffreys 1973: 164–95; Browning 1983: 74–7; Horrocks 1997: 276–81.

THE VILLEHARDOUIN PRINCIPALITY

Conquest and consolidation

In the confusion of the end of the twelfth century, the Peloponnese had become increasingly cut off from Constantinople, with powerful local magnates pursuing a progressively more separatist course. This was to prove helpful to the incoming Franks, and the principality of Achaia, or the Morea, in the Peloponnese was one of the more successful of the Latin states in the Aegean. Founded in 1205 by Geoffrey de Villehardouin and Guillaume de Champlitte, both knights of Champagne engaged in the Fourth Crusade, it endured in some form until 1430.⁶

Before the arrival of their Frankish conquerors, the Peloponnesian experience of western foreigners would have been patchy and mixed. Venetians and other Italian merchants must have been a familiar presence in ports such as Patras, Modon and Coron, Monemvasia and Nafplion, while Corinth was a major centre of production and trade. The 1082 treaty between the empire and Venice by which Alexios I Komnenos gave the Republic such valuable privileges in return for naval assistance, detailed Modon, Coron, Nafplion and Corinth as Peloponnesian centres of trade for the Venetians. Sources like the *Geography* of Edrisi, composed at the Norman court in Sicily in the 1150s, and the *Itinerary* of Benjamin Tudela, written again in the middle of the twelfth century, show the Peloponnese to have been a thriving commercial environment. Peloponnesian ports were conveniently situated for the sea-borne trade routes from Italy to Constantinople and Syria, and the resulting activity of Italian merchants was more welcome here than it was in Constantinople; this also put the Peloponnese close to the maritime pilgrim route. Local producers made the most of the consequent opportunity to explore new and larger markets.⁷

The Peloponnesians had also had occasional and unfortunate familiarity with western soldiers: the Normans of Sicily had raided all around the coast in 1147, meeting determined resistance at Monemvasia but sacking Corinth. The Venetians likewise conducted raids in the Aegean in 1172 in reprisal for the mass arrest of Venetians in the previous year. Piracy was also endemic, and became more of a problem from the 1180s with the decline of the Byzantine navy under the Angeloi.⁸ Thus, in coastal regions

⁶ Lock 1995: 266–309; Ilieva 1991; Jacoby 1973: 873–906; Bon 1969.

⁷ Adler 1907 (Benjamin); Jaubert 1836 (Edrisi); Borsari 1969–70 (Venetian treaty). Cf. Magdalino 1993b: 144–6.

⁸ Magdalino 1993b: 137–9, 170–1.

westerners would have been familiar, and welcomed or feared depending on their activities. The mountainous hinterland of the Peloponnese would in contrast have seen far less of westerners. The Peloponnese of the empire was itself hardly ethnically homogenous, with substantial Slavic communities in the mountainous interior, but these ethnic groups had a long history in the area and were a familiar presence, while not fully integrated into the imperial system.⁹

The *Chronicle of the Morea* gives a confused account of the arrival of the Franks in the Peloponnese, but we know from the account of Geoffrey de Villehardouin the elder that when his nephew of the same name was marooned near Modon in the southern Peloponnese in the summer of 1204, he was soon able to come to friendly terms with 'a Greek who was a great lord of the land' (Faral 1961: 113). This lord has been tentatively identified as Leon Chamaretos, the most powerful Roman magnate in the Lakonian region and another of the independently minded *archontes* on the model of Leon Sgouros. When this Roman was succeeded by his less friendly son, Villehardouin joined the forces of Boniface of Montferrat and Thessaloniki, who had reached as far as Corinth on his largely uncontested takeover of the European territories of the empire.¹⁰ Subsequently, Villehardouin and Guillaume de Champlitte, a knight in Boniface's following, proceeded to the relatively unproblematic subjugation of the north, west and centre of the Peloponnese. Geoffrey de Villehardouin succeeded Guillaume de Champlitte as prince in around 1209, and under Geoffrey and the two sons that succeeded him, Geoffrey II and William II, the principality of the Morea prospered and grew in both territory and importance. The south and east held out for longest against the Franks, with Monemvasia finally falling to William II in around 1250.¹¹

The Villehardouin princes are the heroes of the Greek *Chronicle*, with Geoffrey I dominating the story of the conquest (*Chronicle* 1514–2460) and the reign of Prince William taking up well over half of the whole account (*Chronicle* 2756–7806). These thirteenth-century princes were proud, independent and ambitious, aiming at a wider hegemony over Frankish Greece if they did not indeed harbour imperial aspirations. Their principality was clearly prosperous, as it was able to offer military and financial assistance to the Latin empire. Geoffrey II provided an annual subvention to Latin

⁹ *DAI* 50.15–70. ¹⁰ Magdalino 1977: 316–23; Kalligas 1990: 73–7, 81–5.

¹¹ Greek *Chronicle* 2930–59. The surrender has usually been dated to 1248, but Kalligas 1990: 86–94 convincingly argues for 1252 or 1253, comparing the account in the *Chronicle of the Morea* with that in the fifteenth-century *Petition by the Metropolitan of Monemvasia* and using the latter to flesh out the earlier *Chronicle* and where necessary to correct its confused account.

Constantinople which was said to have totalled over 20,000 *hyperpera*, and he also sent a fleet to raise the Nikaian blockade of the city in 1235 and 1236, with further action against the Nikaiaans in 1238, 1243 and 1248. Over its first fifty years, then, the principality saw a period of sustained internal peace in which a second generation of Franks grew up in their new, native, land. The Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello painted a glowing picture of the principality under the Villehardouins in the first half of the thirteenth century: wealthy, chivalrous, flamboyant.¹²

However, in 1259, Prince William II joined his Greek father-in-law Michael Doukas of Epiros in the campaign against Nikaia which culminated in the battle of Pelagonia, where the Franks were deserted by their Epirot allies and utterly defeated. William himself ended up in Byzantine Roman captivity for three years, and the halcyon days were over for the principality. As we have seen, after the Romans regained Constantinople in 1261, Prince William was eventually released by Michael VIII Palaiologos in return for territorial concessions within the Peloponnese. This deal between William and Michael is very well documented in the contrasting sources of the *Chronicle of the Morea* (Greek *Chronicle* 4324–42); and Pachymeres' *Michael Palaiologos* (Michael 123.22–125.5). Both sources agree that William finally agreed to surrender the castles of Maina, Mistra and Monemvasia to the Byzantine Romans, although Pachymeres adds Geraki and the area around Ginsterna to the territorial concessions: Ginsterna and Geraki were within the triangle demarcated by Mistra, Monemvasia and Maina and were consequently very swiftly brought under Byzantine Roman domination, which perhaps explains Pachymeres' assertion. The historian also says that the prince became a vassal of the Greek emperor with the title of Grand Domestic, and this is confirmed by the fifteenth-century *Petition by the Metropolitan of Monemvasia*; the *Chronicle* merely speaks of agreements and a treaty of mutual defence.¹³ As we shall see, though, the *Chronicle of the Morea* is more explicit than Pachymeres about Byzantine Roman claims to the Peloponnese, where the renewed Roman presence soon led to tensions and open war.

Although the Byzantine Romans had formally received just three castles, this effectively permitted them to control the south-east quadrant of the Peloponnese. Monemvasia was the most important gain. This city, built on a rocky peninsula joined to the mainland only by a narrow causeway, had been in Frankish hands for a mere decade or so. It had a long record

¹² *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, Hopf 1873: 101.

¹³ Bon 1969: 122–4; Wagstaff 1991: 145.

of independence; examination of the privileges granted to the city by Constantinople reveals that Monemvasia was accustomed to autonomy and had enjoyed numerous exemptions from taxation under Byzantine rule before 1204.¹⁴ These privileges were confirmed by William II when he took the city (Greek *Chronicle* 2936–40), such tendency against innovation in their dealings with the local population being, as we shall see, typical of the Franks in the Peloponnese. With its near-impregnable position and thriving port, Monemvasia was the door into the Peloponnese, providing a route into the rich Lakonian plain around the river Evrotas. Commanding this plain from the west, nestled in the foothills of the Taygetos and close to the Langadha pass over the mountains to the west, there was Mistra, which was to emerge as the Byzantine Roman capital in the Peloponnese. To the south-west, somewhere in the Mani peninsula, was Grand Maine.¹⁵ The Byzantine Romans swiftly took advantage of these three key points to dominate the land they demarcated to the east, north-west and south, and from that point on there was intermittent war between the Byzantine Romans of Mistra and the principality.

Prince William turned for help in this struggle against Constantinople and Mistra to Charles I of Anjou, who had acceded to the throne of Naples and Sicily in 1265, and was an ambitious and determined opponent of Michael VIII Palaiologos. At a series of agreements at Viterbo in 1267, Charles established himself as the leading advocate of Latin rights in the Aegean region. The ousted Latin emperor Baldwin II ceded to Charles his sovereignty over mainland Greece and the Aegean (a few islands excepted) and thus the Angevin became feudal overlord of William and of the principality.¹⁶ More directly, William effectively willed the principality to the Angevins. He had at that time no sons, and so it was agreed that his daughter Isabeau would marry Charles' eldest son Philip, and that on William's death Philip would succeed him as prince. Even if William's princess Anna, pregnant at the time of the treaty, were to bear him a son, under the terms of the agreement this son would inherit only a fifth of the principality as an Angevin vassal. Such massive concessions must serve as evidence of the pressure now exerted on the principality by the nascent Byzantine Romans.¹⁷

¹⁴ Kalligas 1990: 97–8, 102–5; Magdalino 1993b: 148–9.

¹⁵ Grand Maine has been most convincingly, but not conclusively, situated on the site of the surviving Turkish castle of Kelepha; see Wagstaff 1991; also Burridge 1996: 19–28.

¹⁶ Dunbabin 1998: 91. ¹⁷ Perrat and Longnon 1967: 207–11; Setton 1976: 48–9.

On William's death in 1278, then, the principality passed under direct Angevin rule under the terms of the treaty of Viterbo. For the next century, it was administered at second hand via *bailis*, or governors, save for the period 1289–1306 when William's daughter Isabeau reigned in the Peloponnese along with her successive husbands Florent of Hainault and Philip of Savoy. For this decade and a half the principality enjoyed the presence of a ruling prince. Soon after his arrival in 1289, Prince Florent signed a seven-year truce with Andronikos II Palaiologos, and the two came to an agreement on their respective rights in the Peloponnese, whereby the Franks of the principality and the Romans of the emperor (based at Mistra) would share the revenues from certain lands, the *casaux de parçon*.¹⁸ Although the truce ended in 1296, the system of *casaux de parçon* persisted well into the fourteenth century.

*The Greek Chronicle of the Morea and the Villehardouin policy
of compromise*

The *Chronicle of the Morea* had its origins in the Angevin principality of the fourteenth century, but tells the story of, and looks back with considerable nostalgia to, the days of greater prosperity under the Villehardouin princes. Speaking of the first period of absentee Angevin rule in the late 1270s and 1280s, before the return of Isabeau de Villehardouin with Florent de Hainault, the Greek *Chronicle* bemoans the state of the Peloponnese:

the lieutenants whom he [Charles II of Anjou] sends there are hired men and they are always out for themselves. The land is being drained away, it is being lost, it is in danger; the king has the expense and others profit (Greek *Chronicle* 8535–8)

and again

you send lieutenants and hired men to the Morea and they tyrannise the poor, they wrong the rich, they fight for their profit and the land is being wasted. (Greek *Chronicle* 8556–8)

These comments should be understood as fourteenth-century Moreot reflections on the reality of their own times, a reality which contrasted unfavourably with the earlier happier times under the Villehardouins. This, it has convincingly been argued, is the context for the creation of the *Chronicle* itself, as at least in part a mirror and critique of Angevin rule.¹⁹

¹⁸ Jacoby 1963: 111–25. ¹⁹ Furon 2004: 142–53.

It was, however, more than a matter of lost prosperity or anti-Angevin spin. The picture presented by the Greek *Chronicle* is one of considerable inter-ethnic cooperation in the thirteenth century, and this is a depiction which can be supported by a range of other evidence. The Villehardouin princes can be shown to have pursued a policy of accommodation and compromise with their Roman subjects, and the Peloponnese clearly prospered under their rule.

On the initial arrival of Geoffrey de Villehardouin in the summer of 1204, the response to the incoming westerners had been mixed: the elder Chamaretos had thought he could work with Villehardouin, while his son had mistrusted the Frank. The elder Villehardouin tells us that under the heir's prompting 'most of the castles in which Geoffrey had placed a garrison turned against him' (Villehardouin 113): the local soldiery thus chose not to serve under the westerner, though for what reasons we cannot tell. Although the Greek *Chronicle* does not deal with this early history (it is indeed hopelessly confused about the various Geoffreys de Villehardouin in its account), it does tell of 'a certain one of the Voutsarades, Doxapatres they called him' (1762–3), who held out against Villehardouin and Champlitte for a limited time in central Arkadia, and the south-east of the Peloponnese maintained effective resistance for some forty years. The most prominent resister, and the one of whom most is known, was Leon Sgouros, who held out on the Akrocorinth for several years; given Sgouros' record of opposition to Byzantine Roman rule, it is doubtful in this case whether any great patriotism was behind his defiance to the Latins, although it is possible that he and other resisters were honoured as despots by the ex-emperor Alexios III Angelos to reward or encourage their resistance to the incomers.²⁰ However, just as Boniface of Montferrat had found in his march south through Greece, in most areas Villehardouin and Champlitte met with very minimal resistance. The brief account provided by the elder Villehardouin suggests that the military prowess of the Franks scared many Greeks into submission (Villehardouin 114), and the Greek *Chronicle* also suggests that a show of force was helpful in encouraging friendly relations (*Chronicle* 1622–4).

More interestingly, however, the Greek *Chronicle* implies that Villehardouin sought to cultivate local Romans by including them in the Frankish system of control he was busy putting in place. Geoffrey is

²⁰ Magdalino 1977: 320–2.

shown persuading local Romans to be realistic about the Frankish conquest (*Chronicle* 1611ff.); such local Romans advised on military strategy (2023), and it was thanks to Romans working with the Frankish army that their fellow Romans of Amykli surrendered (2041–8). The Greek *Chronicle* also suggests that Geoffrey and Guillaume had Roman councillors: εἶπαὺν οἱ Ῥωμοῖοι, οἱ πρῶτοι τῆς βουλῆς του ('the Romans said, the leaders of his council, that . . .') (1751). Though not unambiguous, this is indicative of organised Roman involvement in policy at a high level, implying institutional involvement of local Romans in the government of the Frankish principality. The evidence of the Greek *Chronicle* thus suggests that Geoffrey de Villehardouin pursued a policy of conciliation with the Romans of the Peloponnese, taking their advice and utilising their contacts and language skills.

The Franks were further ready to make concessions to win a positive attitude from their new subjects. In a passage reminiscent of the plea for religious freedom from the Romans of Constantinople to the Latin emperor Henry, as given in Akropolites (*History* 30.5, see above, pp. 106–7), we are told that the 'archontes, the leaders of the Morea', struck a bargain with Villehardouin, whereby the Romans' way of life, including the Orthodox faith, is assured continuity in return for loyalty to their new masters:

if our lord wishes . . . that we, the race of the Romans, will die your slaves, this we ask, we say, and that you will swear on it and put it in writing, so that we and our children may have it – from now and henceforth, a Frank may not force us to change our faith for the faith of the Franks, nor our customs, the law of the Romans. (Greek *Chronicle* 2089–95)

As we shall see below, there is a substantial body of evidence confirming the Frankish policy of conciliation and concession implied here.

The Greek *Chronicle*, then, is strongly suggestive of a deliberate policy on the part of the incomers to involve the locals and coopt them into collaboration with the new regime. Some Peloponnesian Romans did, however, flee the region on the Frankish conquest: there is the suggestion of substantial migration into Epiros in the early years. Most if not all of these exiles seem to have been wealthy local aristocrats – Theodore Doukas of Epiros, as recorded by Demetrios Chomatianos, says that 'there's a huge number of people from the Peloponnese at my court, and all the wealthy and high ranking', and one can only hypothesise as to the reasons for this flight.²¹ The wealthy families suggested by this were precisely those

²¹ Pitra 1891 vi: cols. 93–4. Nicol 1976: 3–33.

who would have been targeted by the land-hungry Franks, while poorer Romans could have suffered less in the way of direct attack. Perhaps these were also people who had family relationships with the new rulers in Epiros and even estates in that region. Michael Doukas of Epiros had been imperial governor of the Peloponnese in 1204 and had no doubt cultivated a working relationship with the local nobility; he may also have involved himself in the early resistance to the Franks in the Peloponnese, such as it was, since Geoffrey de Villehardouin speaks of a 'Michael' who organised resistance to the Franks in the Peloponnese, and it has been supposed that this was Michael Doukas of Epiros. However, it seems unlikely that Michael would have left Epiros at this early stage, and Michael Chamaretos, the brother of Leon who may have been the lord who befriended Geoffrey de Villehardouin, has also been proposed.²² Returning to the reasons for any exodus to Epiros in the aftermath of the conquest, it is possible that the more pragmatic attitude of compromise on the part of the Franks may not have been immediate: indeed, the wording of the agreement in the Greek *Chronicle* suggests that a harsher approach may at first have been pursued. Such an eventual relaxation of policy would be in line with secular practice in other Frankish states in the region, and compares with the Latin emperor Henry's relaxation of religious policy towards his Orthodox subjects, discussed in relation to Akropolites.²³

One of the refugees to Epiros was a certain John Chamaretos, who may potentially be identified with the anti-Frankish son of the pro-Roman Leon. The records of Demetrios Chomatianos, bishop in Epiros, tell how Chamaretos, who had held out against the Frankish conquest, had then been forced to flee from the Peloponnese after an unhappy marriage to the daughter of a pro-Frankish *archon* named Daimonoianis had resulted in his attempted murder and kidnap; reaching Epiros he consequently sued for divorce.²⁴ This story reveals that, however many Romans may have fled to Epiros, nevertheless some Romans like Chamaretos' enemy Daimonoianis came to terms with the incomers and consequently kept their lands together with a measure of influence.

According to the Greek *Chronicle* there was equal Frank and Roman representation on the land commission set up to register landownership and distribute lands within the principality (1649, 1832–3), although the French *Chronicle* suggests that there was a majority of Franks (French

²² Bon 1969: 59–62; Magdalino 1977: 319.

²³ Cf. also the contrast between religious and secular policy on Frankish Cyprus: Coureas 1997: 302–5.

²⁴ Magdalino 1977; Kalligas 1990.

Chronicle 120). Such an arrangement with Greeks at least playing a significant part obviously made good practical sense: only the Romans would have had the language skills for thorough investigations and, as we shall see, throughout the history of the principality Romans continued to be employed in significant administrative positions. While allowing many local Roman *archontes* (landowning provincial nobility) to remain in possession of their property, the Franks were still able to distribute plenty of lands among themselves from imperially owned land, church property and the property of those magnates who had fled. The *Chronicle of the Morea* details the various fiefs allotted to the various ranks as well as to the church and to the military orders, reflecting a register that must itself date from the second generation of the conquest but reflects the earlier apportionment.

The approach of the Franks in the Peloponnese is in contrast to that of the Venetians in Crete during the same period. Here, the incoming Venetians had confiscated all land for redistribution to their followers, prompting sustained resistance from the local *archon* class, who needed and attracted peasant support in this struggle to recover their land over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The effort bore first fruit in the 1250s, when some ethnic Romans were given land and the privileges of Venetians in return for the usual feudal obligations; such Romans typically went on to become loyal subjects of the Republic.²⁵ In contrast, the Franks in the Peloponnese interfered little with existing land tenure and consequently had comparatively few problems with the local landowning class.

'Our customs'

What practical alteration did this process of conquest and appropriation make in the lives of the Romans of the Peloponnese? As we have seen, for some it meant a complete break as they left the region to make their lives elsewhere. For men like Leon Sgouros too, who resented any superior authority, the arrival of the Franks meant the end of a way of life. For the others who stayed, we may distinguish between the *archon* class and their social inferiors, between the powerful and the poor.

Since the time of the Macedonian emperors, the model of tension between the δυνατοί (*dynatoi*) and the πτωχοί (*ptochoi*), the powerful and the poor, had been an influential one in Byzantine views of rural life. Successive acts of legislation under the Macedonians had sought ostensibly

²⁵ McKee 1999: 69–71.

to protect the rights of the poor peasants against the land-hungry rich; it has been cogently argued that the real motivation behind this legislation was a desire to check the growing wealth and consequent independent leanings of the provincial aristocracy. However, the legislation had had a more charitable legacy with, for example, Alexios I Komnenos making direct appeal to the 996 novel of Basil II as a model for his fair-minded legislation on behalf of slaves.²⁶

Under the Byzantine Romans, *archon* could signify simply a rich land-lord, or an office-holder in the civilian or military service: naturally, landowning status and imperial service often went hand in hand. Such men, the *dynatoi*, made up the leading provincial families who, under Constantinopolitan rule, were used to considerable local power as well as to implementing imperial rule in their area. In the context of the deterioration in central control under the Angeloi, such men had been able to act more and more independently. Leon Sgouros and the 'Greek who was a great lord of the land' who collaborated with Geoffrey de Villehardouin on his first venture into the Peloponnese were both men of this class, as was Daimonoianis of Monemvasia, and it was men of this type whom Champlitte and Villehardouin were able to persuade to collaborate with the incoming Franks. Crucially, they were not to lose economically: 'they should have their inheritance and more besides he would give to them' (Greek *Chronicle* 1637, French *Chronicle* 106). Thus in the Frankish Peloponnese economic and social status did not exactly parallel ethnic status: although Frankish *ptochoi* were no doubt rare, there were certainly Roman *dynatoi*.

The terms under which these Roman *archontes* held their land from the Franks are not clear, but the evidence suggests that the arrangements in place before 1204 were in general permitted to continue. This note of continuity is suggested by the *Chronicle's* treatment of the subject, and further confirmed by the evidence of the *Assizes of Romania*, the lawcode of the Frankish principality which, despite surviving only in the form of a Venetian Italian version written in the mid fifteenth century, was originally composed in the mid fourteenth century and in its procedural details looks back to the thirteenth century.²⁷

The Greek *Chronicle* describes the Roman *archontes* as having προνοίης (*pronoies*) and this is given as *fies* (fief) in the French *Chronicle* (e.g. 106),

²⁶ Kaplan 1992: 281–444; McGeer 2000, especially 25–31; Neville 2004: 79; Morris 1976; Novel xxxv of the Emperor Alexios Komnenos, in Zepos and Zepos 1931 1: 341–6.

²⁷ Recoura 1930; Jacoby 1971; Topping 1977a.

but it is unclear to what extent the Byzantine Roman πρόνοια (*pronoia*) can be identified with the western feudal fief. It is generally agreed that the *pronoia* was a form of grant of land or the revenues from land that was conditional on military or other service to the emperor, and that over time a *pronoia* came to be inheritable rather than a grant to one individual. This makes the *pronoia* at least analogous to the western fief, and this in turn would mean that Frankish rule need not have effected any extraordinary change in the lives and finances of the Roman *archontes* of the Morea, even if the western model was imposed on the local Roman lords. However, it is at least possible that the *pronoia* only acquired its peculiarly military and heritable characteristics from the later thirteenth century under the influence of incoming Frankish institutions; thus too, and problematically, there is no direct evidence for the existence of *pronoies* in the Peloponnese before 1204 and it has been argued that the Greek *Chronicle's* references to the institution as existing in 1204 are anachronistic misinterpretations conditioned by the western-influenced fourteenth-century practice with which the author of the *Chronicle* would have been familiar.²⁸ Under this model, where the Romans of the Peloponnese were unused to conditional landholding, the coming of the Franks could have been much more irksome if fief-holding was simply imposed.

Nevertheless, the case for the continuance of pre-existing *pronoies* in the Morea in 1204 in fact remains strong. Significantly, the Greek *Chronicle* employs alternative sets of terminology for Roman and Frankish landholders in the principality. For the former, as well as *pronoies*, it speaks of ἀνθρωπέα (*anthropea*), προσκυνῶ (*proskyno*), δοῦλος (*doulos*) and δουλεία (*douleia*), and these Greek terms have been understood as 'homage', 'to do homage', 'vassal' and 'service'. However, the parallel terms which are clearly derived from French, such as φίε (*fie*), ὁμάντζιο (*homantzio*), μπαρουνία (*barounia*) and so on, are never used in relation to Roman *archontes*, but only for subjects of Frankish origin. Contrast, for example, *anthropea* used in relation to the Greek subjects (1646) and *homantzio* (1554, 1558) in relation to the lords of Athens and Evia, although it is worth noting that in the register of fiefs and rules of service (Greek *Chronicle* 1903–2016), which arguably apply to both Franks and Romans in the principality, the terminology of *pronoia* is used less exclusively. This dual nomenclature is strongly suggestive of different institutions for Franks and Romans, indicating that the Franks continued or adapted an existing

²⁸ Kazhdan 1995 for a review of the problem and the literature; Jacoby 1967.

system for their Roman subjects, but one that was recognisably analogous to their own.

That the Franks certainly recognised some distinctions between their mode of landholding and that familiar to the Romans is confirmed by the *Assizes of Romania*. The Roman subjects of the prince are not often mentioned in the *Assizes*, and this could in itself suggest that on many matters there was no difference in the treatment of Frankish and Roman subjects. However, there is explicit confirmation in the *Assizes* that some Byzantine Roman norms of tenure and inheritance were permitted to continue under the principality. Thus, with regard to inheritance law, Article 138 states explicitly that 'in the fiefs of Greek vassals which have been held since an early date [*tegnudi antegamente*], their sons and daughters will succeed equally'; in other words, the Byzantine Roman tradition of partible inheritance was permitted to the *archontes*, in contrast to the western rules of primogeniture. There is further reference to the system of shared inheritance in Article 178. We cannot know what is meant by *tegnudi antegamente*; this could imply tenure from early in the history of the principality, or potentially tenure from pre-Frankish days. If the latter, this implies that the Franks did not meddle with the existing Byzantine Roman systems of land tenure: land held in a certain way before the Franks arrived on the scene continued to be held in the same way; this is possibly supported by the somewhat ambiguous Article 95, which states that land may be bequeathed 'to all heirs' if it dates 'from the acquisition of the principality'. At any rate, at some point it was agreed that the Romans of the principality could inherit in the ways they had been used to.

Article 138 clearly states that Romans could be vassals in possession of fiefs. This is supported by Articles 70 and 71, which together set out the military service required of vassals, and end with the problem of 'an *archon* ... [who] has little land or few serfs', and so presumably might have found the terms of service unduly onerous. Lesser *archontes*, then, were permitted to continue in their estates. This is supported by Article 178, which is primarily concerned with grants of land to serfs but takes care to point out that different, and more favourable, rules apply to a grant to an *arcondo* (*archon*). Additionally, by Article 71, Roman landholders were clearly expected to provide service like their Latin counterparts: the potential issue here is not one of ethnicity but of economic status.

The article lacks a definitive solution to the implied problem of the impecunious low-ranking *archon*, stating that 'the service is not given', i.e. there is no record of the service for such *archontes*. This is in itself interesting. Article 95 (provisionally) exempts those 'who hold fiefs according to the

manner of the Greeks' (*segondo lo muodo de li griegi*) from the usual rules on time-limits for investiture, which are strictly applied to Frankish vassals. We may conclude that, while the *Assizes* are extremely detailed on the rules applicable to western subjects in the principality, the work is basically not concerned with the rules for Romans, who were administered at least in some respects along different lines: the details of this *muodo de li griegi* have not been preserved alongside the *Assizes*. In conclusion, there are enough references within the *Assizes* for us to know that there were at least some different rules for Roman subjects, as suggested by the *Chronicle*. Such concessions as we see in the *Assizes* could well be viewed as preservation, in the *Chronicle's* words, of 'our custom, the law of the Romans'. Thus, the Franks were content to allow for continuity in Roman practices in the Peloponnese, where these did not conflict with their own interests. If, as seems probable, there was a system of conditional landholding, then this too was allowed to continue.

As for those outside the ranks of the *dynatoi*, both the *Assizes* and the *Chronicle* agree in an indication that the coming of the Franks meant little change for the less well-off Romans of the Peloponnese. The Greek *Chronicle* briefly informs us that it was agreed between Villehardouin and the *archontes* that 'the villagers of the villages would stay as they found them' (1648). The Franks would have recognised the basic division in Roman society between the *dynatoi* and the *ptochoi* as corresponding to their division between freeman and serf, and the *Assizes* cover the status of serfs in some detail (Articles 23–5, 42–3, 174–88, 214–15, 219). Unsurprisingly, their provisions on peasant land tenure with the associated taxes and services suggest an identification of *villanus* ('villein' in the Italian of the *Assizes*) with the Byzantine Roman *παροικος* (*paroikos*).²⁹ Article 198 hints at a difference in legal status between Roman *villani* and others, but we should assume that the vast majority of *villani* were of Roman origin, as suggested in relation to the fourteenth century by the villeins who are recorded in the registers of land owned by the Acciajuoli family, to be considered below.

On those lands held by Roman *archontes*, conditions can hardly have changed for the peasants; on lands held by Franks there may have been more upheaval as the incomers viewed their dependant peasants through a western lens and treated them accordingly; not least with regard to religion. However, it is impossible to quantify the changes in peasant life that were brought about by the Franks.

²⁹ Jacoby 1973: 891; Jacoby 1989: 20–3; Lock 1995: 287–90.

Elsewhere in the Byzantine Roman world, this period was one of change for the peasantry. In the empire of Nikaia, many free peasants were bought out as part of the formation of new and large estates; peasants on these estates were now dependent *paroikoi*. Although change was slow, and many landowners at first worked within existing institutions, there is evidence that the status of the dependent peasants declined over the thirteenth century and the burden on them became more onerous. Likewise in the Pontos (on the Black Sea coast), small estates owned by rural families who had come into debt were bought up and absorbed into large estates.³⁰ There is no particular evidence for a similar process in the Peloponnese in the thirteenth century. The *Assizes* show that serf (*villanus*) status was hereditary, but we cannot know whether this was an innovation arising from the incoming Franks' identification of the Byzantine *paroikos* with the western villein, or whether this reflected Byzantine Roman practice before 1204. As with the *pronoia* the evidence is simply too scanty to draw any firm conclusions about the measure of change, but the general trend against innovation seems clear.

Continuity is also clear in at least some elements of the fiscal system. Documentation of land tenure in the principality is scanty, but anything we have confirms the continuing use of Greek terms. The *Assizes* mention the *zemuro* (Greek γημόρον, the tithe on produce due to the lord, Articles 37 and 214); *acrostico* (Greek ἀκρόστιχον, the hearth tax, Articles 183 and 190) and *dispoticaria* (Greek δεσποτικόν, 'for the master', the services due to the lord of the land, Article 190). Similarly, Venetian land surveys of the early fourteenth century refer to the *anagraffi* and the *catastica* (Greek ἀναγραφή and κατάστιχα, registers of property) and to *stico* (Greek στίχος, line, i.e. an individual entry in a register) etc., while a survey compiled for Niccolo Acciajuoli in the 1330s refers to the *practico* (Greek πρακτικόν, an inventory of an estate) prepared in Greek by the local agent.³¹ All these words are clearly of Greek origin and must have been taken over directly from the pre-1204 system, as is also the case with the use of *arconde*, *arcondo* (Greek *archon*) in the French *Chronicle of the Morea* and the *Assizes*. Continuity of terminology is not a guarantee of continuity of practice. In Norman Sicily, the incoming Normans inherited and adapted a developed Arabic administration; however, while on the surface little seemed to change, with the same terminology for processes and

³⁰ Angold 1975a: 123–43; Bryer 1979: 415–18.

³¹ Thiriet 1966: 297 (no. 254); Longnon and Topping 1969: 52, line 14. For more examples, Jacoby 1989: 11–15, and the discussions in Longnon and Topping 1969: Appendix III.

institutions, it is nevertheless clear that there were in fact considerable divergences in practice. Notwithstanding, in the Morea, the prevalence of Greek in everyday interactions between conquerors and conquered suggests a continuity in fiscal practices – perhaps as a result of the use from the earliest days of the principality of Romans in those administrative roles that required fluency in Greek. The likelihood of such continuity is increased by the weight of evidence for continuity of Byzantine Roman landholding and inheritance law.

‘Our faith’

So much for the ‘customs of the Romans’. The *Chronicle’s* suggestion that the Peloponnesian Romans were allowed to continue in their Orthodox faith is similarly confirmed, firstly by the provisions of the Act of Pope Honorius in 1223. Fundamentally, this aimed at resolving the serious dispute that had arisen between some of the Frankish lords of Greece and the papacy over issues of Catholic church lands and taxation, but it also dealt with questions that had arisen with regard to the native Orthodox clergy.³² Like their Latin counterparts, Orthodox priests were eventually made exempt from most taxes, with the exception of the *akrostichon*, or hearth tax. However, perhaps in an attempt to check abuses, limits were set upon the numbers of Orthodox priests: villages of less than twenty-five hearths (family units) had to share a priest with another village; villages of twenty-five to seventy hearths were allowed two priests; villages of 71 to 125 hearths were allowed four priests; and any larger villages were allowed six priests.

Thus, it is clear that the Orthodox faith was allowed to continue on a personal level, as suggested by the Greek *Chronicle*, and there does not seem to have been any kind of campaign to convert the rank-and-file Romans of the Peloponnese to Catholicism, nor any mass exodus of priests at the lower levels. Similar restrictions on the recruitment of Orthodox priests in Cyprus show that here too Orthodoxy was regulated but not seriously interfered with ‘on the ground’.³³ The 1223 agreement also allowed for the protection and maintenance of Orthodox monasteries on generous pre-conquest terms, and the Greek *Chronicle* (7778) likewise confirms that there were both eastern and western monastic establishments within the principality – as in all parts of the Latin east.³⁴

³² Bon 1969: 94–7; *PL* CCXVI: cols. 968–72. ³³ Coureas 1997: 261–3.

³⁴ Coureas 1997: 279; Richard 1989: 51–5.

In the Peloponnese, as in other crusader states, the arrival of the Latins had brought the eastern and western churches into direct contact with each other. As we have seen, there was a history of religious disagreement between the churches, with one important element being the role of the pope: the eastern church rejected any notion of papal supremacy. The fact of conquest seemed to give the western church the opportunity to encourage or enforce its primacy over the eastern, which might extend merely to an acknowledgment of papal jurisdiction or go on to insist on conformity in all points of doctrine and practice. This effort on the part of the Latin church can be seen in all conquered areas, although actual results differed from region to region. In each region for which evidence can be found, though, there is basically the same pattern of effective tolerance of everyday Orthodoxy among the 'native' population, alongside a formal relegation of the Orthodox hierarchy to a junior position behind the Latin.³⁵

As in all the Latin crusader states, then, a Catholic hierarchy was soon in place in the Peloponnese, and after 1204 most senior Orthodox churchmen are thought to have refused to take the required oath of submission to the pope and consequently to have left the areas of Frankish rule at an early stage; only four specific exceptions are known from papal correspondence and none of these compromisers were from the Peloponnese.³⁶ It is in fact impossible to say whether any Orthodox hierarchy remained in place in the principality. In a letter of 1210, Pope Innocent III declared that on the imminent submission of Corinth he would be willing to accept a vow of submission from the Orthodox bishop of that city, but the conclusion of this matter is not known.³⁷ That dual Latin and Orthodox hierarchies in fact emerged in some places (not necessarily the Peloponnese) is strongly suggested by the provision of the fourth Lateran Council (1215), outlawing the existence of multiple bishops in a single diocese. In Cyprus, for example, this had been a very contentious issue in the first decades of the thirteenth century; eventually, however, a pragmatic settlement had been reached whereby an Orthodox bishop could remain as a junior to the Latin, tending only to the Orthodox in the diocese. This was very like the situation that had pertained in the kingdom of Jerusalem, and there were

³⁵ Cf. for Jerusalem Hamilton 1980: 159–87; for Crete, McKee 2000: 102–15; for Cyprus, Coureas 1997: 251–317. Angold 1989 is a useful survey.

³⁶ Lock 1995: 207; Richard 1989: 47. See also Kolbaba 2001: 129–30; Kolbaba emphasises the degree of Roman cooperation with the Latin church.

³⁷ *PL* CCXVI: col. 201.

clear advantages to this solution in terms of language and the minimising of unproductive doctrinal disagreement.³⁸

The Orthodox bishops on Cyprus lived in obscure villages in each of the four Latin dioceses, and this is reminiscent of the position in the far south of the Peloponnese in Venetian-ruled Modon and Coron, where the Orthodox bishops were permitted to remain alongside their Latin counterparts as long as they lived outside the actual cities, the seats of the dioceses.³⁹ It is possible that a similar solution prevailed in the neighbouring Frankish Morea, but there is regrettably no conclusive evidence either way. There is one tantalising mention of 'the bishop of Maina, who was a Roman' in the account given by Demetrios Chomatianos of the trials of John Chamaretos, the distinguished refugee from the Peloponnese.⁴⁰ This bishop is likely to have been based in the far south of the Peloponnese, in or near the peninsula of the Mani, and may thus have been at this date, probably around 1220, outside or at least on the margins of Frankish influence in the region.

The imposition of the western church on the Peloponnese must nevertheless have had some negative impact. One should distinguish between the impact on the countryside, dominated by the Orthodox and largely left alone, and the towns such as Glarentsa, Andravida, Kalamata, Patras or Corinth where there were marked changes, with churches, cathedrals and monastic houses. The Frankish population in such towns was significantly greater and the religious aspect to this manifested itself more strongly, with some western churches actually replacing or reusing Orthodox establishments.⁴¹ In the Orthodox-dominated countryside, the impact was less concrete but perhaps more provocative. Successive agreements laid down the obligation on peasants of paying the tithe to the Latin church, a custom that was wholly new to the Orthodox, although there is now a general consensus that this rule was probably largely ignored.⁴² Apart from this, there were at least two western monastic establishments in the Peloponnesian countryside, both Cistercian: Isova in the valley of the Alpheios in Arkadia and Zaraka on Lake Stymphalia west of Corinth. All other known monastic houses were situated in towns with substantial western populations.⁴³ One may speculate that these rural establishments may have seemed basically familiar in principle to the local Romans, although their Gothic form

³⁸ Coureas 1997: 275. ³⁹ Cf. Richard 1989: 45–8; Coureas 1997: 261, 271, 280.

⁴⁰ Pitra 1891 vi: col. 95. ⁴¹ Cooper 1996; Coulson 1996.

⁴² Cf. Wolff 1954: 267–74, and more recently Coureas 1997: 277–8; Lock 1995: 215–16; Richard 1989: 56–7.

⁴³ Lock 1995: 222–39.

and the appearance of the monks may have been more disconcerting. The Franciscans and Dominicans made most impact in Orthodox territories, having a more proactive approach to the conversion of the Orthodox; their zeal led to at least one incident of Orthodox martyrdom in Cyprus.⁴⁴ However, there is no information on their specific impact in the Peloponnese. Alongside the Latin houses, Orthodox monastic life continued in the Peloponnesian countryside, as it did also in Crete and Cyprus.⁴⁵

As a final comment on religion for the present, we should be wary of assuming that all Romans were necessarily Orthodox. In Venetian Crete, the choice of rite went a long way to determine a person's ethnicity, and this could have major social implications. Thus it is likely that in Crete some at least of the local gentry who prospered under Venetian rule may well have gone over to the Latin rite to reflect or promote their perceived social status; this had also happened in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem where, initially at least, fief-holding was restricted to those of the Latin church.⁴⁶ In the Peloponnese in 1239, four Romans (two Katomerites, a Cyriaque and a Genople) were involved with a majority of Franks in the donation of lands to a Catholic monastery in Andravida, while in 1245 Manuel Mourmouras built a Catholic church in the Argolid.⁴⁷ Thus, not all Peloponnesian Romans were equally determined to stick to their faith and their customs; even in the matter of religion some seem very early to have adopted Frankish ways.

As for the other side of the Villehardouin's *quid pro quo* with their Roman subjects, the latter were expected to be actively loyal. There was thus a Roman presence in the army of the principality. The *Chronicle* says that the Roman *archontes* agreed to provide military service in return for their *pronoies*, and in its account of the conquest of the Peloponnese, the Greek *Chronicle* has Romans campaigning with the Frankish army at the siege of Amykli (2041–8). As Prince William subjugated the Slavic mountain tribes of the Taygetos, they were bound to provide service to him as they had previously done to the imperial power of Constantinople: 'they would never give the *despotikon*, just as their parents had never done so, but they would give allegiance, armed service, as they had likewise fought for the emperor' (Greek *Chronicle* 3026–9): this note of continuity is typical. As noted, Article 71 of the *Assizes of Romania* clearly implies that Roman *archontes* were expected to provide military services in just the same way

⁴⁴ Coureas 1997: 279–86. ⁴⁵ Coureas 1997: 255–9, 280.

⁴⁶ McKee 2000: 104; Riley-Smith 1973: 10–11. ⁴⁷ Bon 1969: 115.

as any other landholder. Akropolites, as noted above, explicitly states that the prince's army on the Pelagonia campaign included Romans of the Peloponnese, indeed many 'Lakonians' from the recently conquered south-eastern quadrant (*History* 168.12–6), and the recruitment of Lakonians is also suggested by the French *Chronicle* (273). The Greek *Chronicle* agrees that the army at Pelagonia included both ethnic groups: Prince William addresses '... all the knights, both Franks and Romans' (3959–60).

Moreover, in its account of the battle, the Greek *Chronicle* also twice makes use of the term Μοραῖτες (*Moraïtes*: 'Moreots'), on both occasions to make a contrast with the army 'of the despotate', that is, the Epirot army which was ostensibly in alliance with the Moreot army. *Moraïtes* is typically used in the Greek *Chronicle* to make a contrast between the people of the principality and various outsiders, and this term, which appears only in the Greek *Chronicle* (3900, 3915, 7166, 8266, 8435 and 8630), is most probably to be understood as inclusive of both Franks and Romans. The first two uses refer to Moreot troops at Pelagonia; the French *Chronicle* has no comparable phrase and thus it may be significant that only the Greek version explicitly has both Romans and Franks in this army. At Greek *Chronicle* 7166, 8266 and 8435 the French *Chronicle* has as its closest equivalent 'the people from all parts' or 'of this land' (of the Morea), while for H8630 the French *Chronicle* has no directly equivalent phrase but, unusually, specifies 'everyone, as much Latins as Greeks'. This suggests that the French author might have understood *Moraïtes* as including Romans ('Greeks' to him), even if he did not always make it explicit.

Franks and Romans were thus mixing together, in the army at the very least. They were therefore able to communicate with each other, and in this respect the *Chronicle* also provides strong suggestions of bilingualism in the thirteenth century. Prince William himself, the first prince of the Morea to be born in the Peloponnese, was bilingual in French and Greek: negotiating with the Nikaïans after Pelagonia, 'the prince, as a wise man, answered him in Roman' (Greek *Chronicle* 4130). The French *Chronicle* makes more of the prince's linguistic ability, saying he spoke Greek well – *auques bien* (308). One wonders how many other Peloponnesian Franks spoke Greek, and indeed how many Peloponnesian Romans spoke French, and the *Chronicle's* story of Geoffrey de Briel, who laid an unsuccessful claim to the fief of Karytaina in the late 1270s, gives some hints (Greek *Chronicle* 8110–8475, French 557–85). Geoffrey had just arrived from France and cannot have known any Greek, nevertheless he was able to befriend the castellan of Araklova, a Roman called Philokalos. He and Geoffrey must have spoken French together: we thus have here a native Roman working

for the Franks in a position of military responsibility and speaking French. Philokalos was also fluent in Greek, as he apparently spent most evenings in the village taverna. Having taken the castle, Geoffrey releases the prisoners, who are 'villagers and Romans', and sends two of these to negotiate with the Romans of Mistra. Presumably at least one of these prisoners spoke French, or Geoffrey used an interpreter. The story suggests a high degree of bilingualism among the Moreots.⁴⁸

Prince William II at least spoke Greek, but he was also plainly at home in French culture, working himself in the *trouvère* style; love of French and fluency in Greek were not, therefore, incompatible.⁴⁹ The minority Franks would have had to speak Greek to their subjects, and as successive generations were born they were likely to acquire Greek at an early age from their carers. Furthermore, the stories of disputes between Franks and Romans, to be discussed below with reference to the fourteenth century, show that by the end of the thirteenth century Franks and Romans had become used to consorting together at markets and fairs. Greek may thus have functioned as a useful everyday means of communication, while French was reserved for official affairs, and perhaps for interactions between Franks – thus the *trouvère* songs of Prince William in the *Manuscrit de Roi*.

There is, however, the matter of castle names. Many castles seem to have borne both a French and a Greek name: Akova Castle was also 'Matagriffon', i.e. 'Kill-Greek'; there were also Pontikos/Beauvoir, Chlemoutsi/Clermont, Leftron/Beaufort and Araklova/Bucelet. The Greek and French versions of the *Chronicle* stick to the names in their respective languages, with the notable exception of the French *Chronicle*, 207: the prince built a castle 'which is called Beaufort in French and Lefftro in Greek'. This phenomenon of double-naming seems indicative of a long-lasting favouring of French by the conquerors; indeed, the Aragonese *Chronicle* often gives both names (see, for example, the register of fiefs, 117–18), suggesting that both versions were current in the later fourteenth century. It is possible that the dual naming arose very early in the history of the principality but that its use became progressively less ethnically determined over time, with both versions becoming current over time with different ethnic groups.

As suggested by the detail of the tavern in the story of Geoffrey and Philokalos, most Frankish castles were centres of settlement where Romans and Franks mixed freely. Until recently, apart from the larger sites like Mistra or Monemvasia, the evidence for settlement patterns has been mostly

⁴⁸ Bi- or multilingualism is not a guarantee of ethnic harmony, cf. Dagron 1994: 222–3.

⁴⁹ Longnon 1939; Mayer 1988: 209.

documentary. The Acciajuoli documents edited by Longnon and Topping give details of settlements at the towers of Krestena and Voulkano and at the castle of Archangelos; there is also the *bourg* at Santameri, a substantial town which was itself walled and situated to the north of the main fortification; in a survey of 1391 this was said to house 500 hearths, making it the largest settlement in the principality at that time.⁵⁰ This question of settlement is an area where archaeological investigation would be useful, but until recently the archaeology of Frankish Greece has remained of subsidiary interest to the ancient.⁵¹ This is now changing, with the investigation of Frankish Corinth begun in 1989, and much significant ground and architectural survey work undertaken in Boiotia and Evia, and now Elis and Messenia.⁵² The Morea Vernacular Architecture Survey has more recently looked at vernacular settlements in the north-west of the Peloponnese from the Frankish to early modern period. For the Frankish period the survey focused on sites including Frankish fortifications revealing, in most cases, a pattern of settlement around the fortified building situated at the highest point. Settlements varied in size from 15 to 300 buildings.

One of the sites examined was Santameri, and the survey confirmed the documentary evidence that this was indeed a substantial settlement, with 193 buildings recorded on a site of some 700 × 250 metres. At Minthe Palaiokastro in Elis, tentatively identified as Frankish Crevecour, the tower is again at the highest point with over one hundred houses scattered down the hill and surrounded by a fortified defensive circuit. At the ruins of the castle of Akova, twenty-five buildings can be detected, among them a chapel and houses. Similar patterns of occupation have been surveyed at Kalidona, Smernakastro, Portes, Salmeniko, Agia Triada Gatsiko, Kastro tes Ochias, Misovouni and Kastelli, and this suggests a fairly dense occupation by the ruling Franks, who lived closely alongside the Romans of the villages. As has been illustrated by Ronnie Ellenblum, in relation to the Frankish settlement in the Holy Land, the Franks who moved east were likely to, and in fact did, maintain the fundamentally rural way of life with which they had been familiar in the west.⁵³ Again, clauses of the *Assizes of Romania* clearly point to rural activity on the part of the ruling Franks. Moreover, the evidence points towards an expansion of the rural economy in the Peloponnese in the Frankish period, and this

⁵⁰ Longnon and Topping 1969: 65, 88, 99; Bon 1969: 691–2. ⁵¹ Vroom 2003: 21–47.

⁵² Cooper 2002; McDonald and Rapp 1972; Lock 1986; Bintliff 1996.

⁵³ Ellenblum 1998: 14; Hirschbickler 2005: 47–50.

would not have been surprising given the stronger links with the west and particularly Italy.

Outside this north-western corner of the Peloponnese, the many castles of the Peloponnese await systematic archaeological examination, but what has been done supports a pattern of settlements clinging to fortresses, whether for the economic benefits, protection or both. In Geraki in Lakonia, where the medieval site has been preserved thanks to the movement of the village in the early modern period, there is again the castle on the height with churches and houses scattered down the slope. Peter BurrIDGE has similarly drawn attention to the buildings clustered within and to the north of the castle of Vardounia in the hills above Gytheio, a castle which is credibly seen as a guard on the Panayia Pass over the Taygetos, linked to the Frankish castle of Leftron at Stoupa south of Kalamata. Timothy Gregory has described the site on Mount Tsalika, south-east of Corinth, where the remains of as many as 200 separate structures can be detected, situated outside the fortifications; this site can be dated by ceramic evidence to the Frankish period, but cannot be securely identified as any named location within the documentary record. At Mount Tsalika, there does not seem to have been any significant settlement before the Frankish period, but we unfortunately cannot be sure to what extent either the Franks fortified existing settlements or, alternatively, settlement followed upon fortification. Certainly, the Morea survey has confirmed that many Frankish castles were occupations or rebuildings of existing Byzantine Roman structures. In conclusion, then, we may say that these fortified structures were not isolated outposts of Franks divorced from the rural Romans living around them.⁵⁴

The existence of the Roman castellan Philokalos also indicates a Roman presence in the military beyond the rank-and-file. There is, however, little evidence yet of the existence of other specific Romans in positions of authority within the principality. At the end of the century, Isabeau de Villehardouin employed a 'Quir Vasylopoule' as *Prothoficier* (a partial rendering into French of the Byzantine title *protovestiarius*, that is, the officer in charge of administering the Prince's revenues and estates in the principality (French *Chronicle* 829, cf. *Assizes* 171). This was a task where fluent Greek would have been essential, and we may speculate that Romans had been involved in this aspect of administration since the earliest land commission established by Villehardouin and Champlitte, although Franks are

⁵⁴ Molin 2001: 208–11, 247–9; BurrIDGE 1996; Gregory 1996; Cooper 2002; Sigalos 2004.

also known in the post – which fact may again support the case for Greek language acquisition by the incomers.

As we have seen, then, the Villehardouin princes pursued a successful policy of non-interference and cooperation with their Roman subjects, coopting the local *archontes* into their society in return for loyalty and service. However, the arrival of the Byzantine Romans in strength in the Peloponnese in 1262, after Michael VIII Palaiologos had wrested Mistra, Monemvasia and Maine from Prince William, was to fundamentally upset this balance. The growing power at Mistra offered a focus for any discontents felt by residents of the principality, and it also drove some who were caught between the Franks and Romans to make a choice of loyalty. Thus, the Romans living in Frankish La Cremonie (Lakedaimonia, i.e. Sparta) took shelter on the slopes of Byzantine Roman Mistra rather than be repeatedly overrun by the warring parties. The presence of two powers, neither of whom seemed strong enough conclusively to defeat the other, also presented opportunities for the unscrupulous. Although the Byzantine Romans of Mistra soon learnt not to engage the Franks in formal battlefield engagements after massive defeats at Prinitsa in 1263 and Makry Plagi in the following year, they were more successful in the subversion of the unruly mountain tribes of Skorta and the Taygetos against the Franks. From now on, these peoples, who had had a history of independence under Byzantine Roman rule, were to pursue an opportunistic policy, supporting first one side and then the other in the conflict between the Franks and the Romans.

However, we should be wary of viewing any developments as conditioned by ethnicity. As noted above, some Romans are known to have converted to, or at least actively supported, the Catholic church. Similarly, in the 1260s not all of the Romans of the Peloponnese automatically switched their allegiance to the new Byzantine Roman power base. The Aragonese *Chronicle* relates how Geoffrey de Briel, fighting in Skorta on the frontline against the Mistran Romans in the mid 1260s, was helped by 'his Greeks, who were very fierce and fine and loyal, because he had cared for them and raised them' (Aragonese *Chronicle* 313). The Aragonese *Chronicle* gives a detailed account of how the Roman captain at Mistra attempted to suborn these 'Greeks', but was instead at their instigation trapped in an ambush and slain by the combined efforts of de Briel's Frankish and Roman soldiers. As a reward, the noblest of these loyal Romans were knighted by de Briel: 'the lord of Quarantana . . . gave his Greeks very fine gifts of land and of other things, and the most noble he made knights, and then he had great faith in them and they were very happy with their lord' (Aragonese *Chronicle* 331).

This is witness to a successful relationship between ruling Franks and subject Romans within the principality under the Villehardouins. This particular account may originate in a eulogistic tradition surrounding the figure of Geoffrey de Briel, the model Frankish knight; we may similarly cite the account of and lament on de Briel's death in around 1276: 'Who would not grieve? The orphans had had a father, the widows had had a husband, all the poor folk had had a lord and a defender. He used to guard everyone from injustice, he never let a poor man suffer misfortune . . . ' (Greek *Chronicle* 7224–8, and see also French *Chronicle*: 'all the land were grieved, great and small' in a phrase which typically corresponds to an inclusive 'Franks and Romans' in the parallel Greek *Chronicle*). The contrast with the rapacious governors sent by the Angevins is striking and, in sum, the tradition of Geoffrey de Briel reflects a memory of common prosperity across the ethnic divide in the Peloponnese of the Villehardouins.

THE PRINCIPALITY AFTER THE VILLEHARDOUINS

As narrated above, in 1278 the principality of Achaia passed to the Angevins who ruled as relatively neglectful absentee landlords, although there was a brief return to Villehardouin rule under Isabeau de Villehardouin and her husbands from 1289 to 1306. After Isabeau was ousted from her principality for daring to marry against the wishes of her Angevin overlords, the principality came near to collapse in the first decades of the fourteenth century under the pressure of the competing dynastic claims arising from the surviving female lines of the Villehardouin family. There was civil war in the principality in 1316 between Louis of Burgundy (married to Mahaut, daughter of Isabeau de Villehardouin) and Ferrando of Majorca (married to Isabeau's niece), during which Louis was supported by Byzantine Roman forces from Mistra. These years also saw the arrival of the Catalans in southern Greece. In 1309, the Catalan Company was employed by Gauthier of Brienne, duke of Athens, in an attempt to assert Athenian suzerainty over Thessaly. Inevitably, the Catalans ended up at war with their employer and in 1311 they defeated the duke and his forces at the battle of Kephissos. They went on to take over the duchy of Athens for themselves and this success against Athens had a destabilising effect throughout the Frankish areas of southern Greece; it seemed for a while that they might also attempt to take the principality in the Peloponnese. In 1312 they sacked Corinth, and over the next decade Catalan raids on the southern coast of the Gulf of Corinth continued.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Aragonese *Chronicle* 609–13; Laiou 1972: 255; Setton 1948.

After years of border squabbles, the balance between the principality and Byzantine Roman Mistra was radically altered in 1320, when Andronikos Palaiologos Asen, the Byzantine Roman governor of Mistra and father-in-law of the future emperor John VI Kantakouzenos, attacked Frankish Skorta in strength. Asen captured the castles of Akova, Karytaina, Polyphengos and St George in central Arkadia and may also have penetrated into Messenia given the recorded grant by Asen to a monastery near Androussa in 1322. As a result only three of the original twelve baronies of the principality finally remained in Frankish hands, with the Franks pushed back into Elis and Messenia in the north- and south-west. The Aragonese *Chronicle* tells how 'Sir Andronico Assani' besieged first Matagriffon (Akova) and then Karytaina, taking them in the end through bribery. St George followed by the same means (Aragonese *Chronicle* 641–54). Frankish attempts to recover lost ground, like John of Gravina's attempt on Karytaina (Aragonese *Chronicle* 655–62), were in vain.⁵⁶

For the Angevins, the Peloponnese was not high on the list of priorities and was consequently neglected. According to the Aragonese *Chronicle* (662–725), between 1326 and 1377 no fewer than thirty-eight *bailis* were appointed by the predominantly absentee Angevin princes. Clearly, continuity and a sense of security were going to be hard to maintain, especially when a new threat emerged with major Turkish raids on the Peloponnese, first noted in 1327 and thenceforward becoming more and more frequent. In trying times, the continually changing Angevin leadership contrasted unfavourably with the memory of the Villehardouin principality which, as we have seen, may well have taken on something of the aura of a golden age. Angevin rule also suffered by comparison with the more stable Byzantine Roman administration in Mistra. Therefore, in 1341, according to the memoirs of John VI Kantakouzenos (*Histories* II. 74–7), a group of Frankish nobles from the principality approached him with an offer to secede to the Byzantine Romans, and this account is given greater credence by a letter written in late 1340 from King Robert of Naples to the clergy and barons of the principality, in which he urged them to maintain their loyalty to his family; he had heard rumours of their intrigues with the 'Greeks' (i.e. the Romans of Mistra). What is particularly noteworthy is that the Frankish barons' offer followed directly upon a visit by the reigning prince Catherine de Valois, who was resident in the principality from late 1338 to the summer of 1341. The barons perhaps resented Catherine's policy in

⁵⁶ Bartusis 1992: 70–2; Nicol 1996: 16 with notes; Runciman 1980: 51. Millet 1899: 115–18.

Epiros, misliking her provocation of Byzantine Roman power of which Kantakouzenos himself gave such a penetrating critique; they would have served for Catherine against the Byzantine Romans in Epiros and might have come away impressed by Andronikos III Palaiologos and his Grand Domestic, John Kantakouzenos. It is also possible that the established families of the principality resented the sway of Catherine's Italian advisors: in particular, Niccolo Acciajuoli had gained substantial estates and influence. The offer to Kantakouzenos, coming at this time and in this context, must surely reflect a complete disenchantment with Neapolitan rule and shows again that the ethnic divide in the Peloponnese was by no means an unbridgeable gulf.⁵⁷

The appeal of Mistra can only have increased with the coming of Manuel Kantakouzenos, second son of Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos, as despot in 1349. The title afforded rank secondary only to an emperor and had traditionally been given to the imperial heir apparent: Manuel was therefore coming to the Peloponnese as his father's deputy and was to steer an autonomous course in which policy was rarely determined by ethnic status. Manuel was himself already linked with a Latin family by his marriage to Isabelle de Lusignan in 1349, and from the start he pursued a conciliatory policy with his Latin neighbours. He did not initiate any significant actions against the Frankish principality (the battle at Gardiki in 1375 was a response to an attack by the Franks), and when Emperor John V Palaiologos tried to oust him in 1355 Manuel was able to call on his Venetian and Frankish neighbours to help him; four years later he again cooperated against the Turkish threat with the principality and Venice, as well as the Hospitallers, and this alliance secured a significant naval victory.⁵⁸

As we have already seen, Manuel had greater problems with his own Roman lords, who resented his financial demands and perhaps the arrival of a forceful outsider. In his *Histories*, Kantakouzenos excoriates the 'Peloponnesians' – as noted, he never calls them Romans – for their inability to live in peace:

Not failure, not success, not time the destroyer of all is able to wipe away the hatred among them for each other. Lifelong they are mutual enemies and after death, as if it were a patrimonial legacy, they leave their quarrel to their children . . . (*Histories* IV. 86.19–23)

It has been well noted also that Byzantine Roman authority was often only accepted under conditions that emphasised the desire for local autonomy.

⁵⁷ Nicol 1996: 50–1, 175–6; Bon 1969: 212–13. ⁵⁸ Aragonese *Chronicle* 714–22. Runciman 1980: 53–7.

Privileges to Monemvasia are comparatively well documented, and reveal a progressive increase in immunity from local taxation as well as considerable independence in law and administration.⁵⁹ Thus, again, ethnicity often came second to pragmatism.

By the third quarter of the fourteenth century the once prosperous Peloponnese had become a bad investment for the Angevins. The Black Death of the 1340s must have devastated the village communities and affected their economic potential, and Turkish raids had had a ruinous effect. Most settlements on the Acciajuoli estates are listed as having deserted hearths in the 1350s, and the grant of Corinth to Nicholas Acciajuoli (1358) mentions the depopulation of the district as the peasants had fled. Things were no better three years later when Marie of Bourbon's agent Nicholas of Boyano found the coast of the Gulf of Corinth deserted (Longnon and Topping 1969: 151). This is the context for the *Chronicle's* nostalgia for the good old days of the thirteenth century. Economic decline, natural disasters and political instability had worked together to make the Peloponnese a far less happy place.

In 1377 the then prince, Joanna of Naples, gave the principality of Achaia to the Hospitaller knights of St John on a five-year lease, in an attempt to maintain an effective defence of her principality, in particular against Turkish raids. The Hospitallers employed the Navarrese companies of mercenaries, which had had their origin in the campaigns waged by Charles II of Navarre against Charles V of France and had then come east in the service of Louis d'Evreux to press his claims in Albania. On Louis' death, the mercenaries took service with the Hospitallers in Epiros and then, soon after, they or some part of them are found serving the Hospital in the Morea. In 1381 the Hospital's lease of the principality came to an end and by the autumn of that year the Navarrese had entered the employ of Jacques des Baux, latest pretender to the principality. In his name they began to conquer large areas of the Peloponnese. When Jacques des Baux died in the summer of 1383 the Navarrese Company were the single most organised western grouping in the Peloponnese, and moreover the most effective administration that most people there could remember. Like the Catalans and the conquerors of 1204, these hard-bitten troops turned out to be far from disastrous administrators. In 1384, the Gascon Peter Bordo de St Superan took over leadership of the Company, and in the following

⁵⁹ Laiou 1972: 256–7; Kalligas 1990: 101–15, 149–53.

year he concluded a significant treaty with the Venetians in which he had the backing of all the important western lords, secular and spiritual, of the Peloponnese.⁶⁰ A further document of 1391 shows him in direct personal possession of all the traditionally princely lands in the principality; in 1396 St Superan finally bought the title of prince from the Angevins for himself. He died six years later, after which the principality was ruled for some three decades by the Zaccaria family before at last becoming part of the Byzantine Roman despotate of Mistra, which enjoyed its greatest successes in these years.

Little is yet known about the quality of Navarrese rule during the twenty years in which they dominated the Peloponnese. No contemporary chronicle deals with them in any depth, although their history has been pieced together from archival material, including Venetian, Catalan and Hospitaller, in the work of R.-J. Loenertz, Rubio y Lluch and Anthony Luttrell.⁶¹ The fundamental point to appreciate here is how much local support the Navarrese received: their impressive military capability made them a convincing source of authority in chaotic times, with a proven 'capacity for effective violence' (see above, p. 50). We have noted the wide backing which St Superan swiftly gained for his dealings with Venice. Moreover, in his attacks on the territory of the despotate, the Navarrese had, as Peter Topping puts it, 'a permanent invitation from the landowning caste (*archontes*) of the Byzantine province to support their rebellions against the despot'.⁶²

THE CHRONICLE OF THE MOREA: AN ANALYSIS

The Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* is a work of the fourteenth century and must remain the primary resource for inter-ethnic relations in that period.⁶³ The educated Byzantine Roman writers can hardly bring themselves to call the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians of the Peloponnese 'Romans' at all but, as we have already seen, there is no doubt about the ethnic status of the Peloponnesians represented in the *Chronicle*. Submitted to the same kind of analysis as that applied above to the elite Byzantine Roman writers, the Greek *Chronicle* gives a unique insight into the contrasting perspective of those provincial Romans who made up a significant part of the audience

⁶⁰ Topping, 'The Morea 1364–1460', in Setton, 1969–89 III: 151.

⁶¹ Loenertz 1956; Rubio y Lluch 1880; Luttrell 1978 and 1982.

⁶² Cf. Manuel Palaiologos' *Funeral Oration* 123.20–125.21.

⁶³ It should again be emphasised that 'the Greek *Chronicle*' here refers to the earliest, Copenhagen, version of the Greek *Chronicle*. The later fifteenth- and sixteenth-century versions are discussed in the following chapter.

of the *Chronicle*. While sharing much with the elite historians in terms of vocabulary and the familiar formulas of Roman identity, the *Chronicle* presents the strongest portrait of the ethnic Roman identity, where political allegiance was irrelevant, and regional identity was far more important.

The Romans of the Chronicle

The *Rhomaioi* appear in the Greek *Chronicle* in a variety of forms (Appendix 1, pp. 299–300). In the initial section dealing with the crusades (1–1338) the *Rhomaioi* are primarily the crusaders' allies and opponents in Constantinople, and here we first meet familiar formulas such as 'basileus of (the) Romans'. Later in this section, *Rhomaioi* is employed to designate the Nikaian successor state which opposed the Latin empire and went on to retake Constantinople. Additionally, this section contains three extensive polemical passages in which the *Rhomaioi* are presented with primarily religious overtones as untrustworthy schismatics from the Catholic church of Rome; these polemical passages are considered below. Moving beyond the prologue concerned with the crusades, the story of the Franks in the Morea begins at 1339, and the situation now becomes more complex, with *Rhomaioi* used to refer to a variety of groups.

In the *Chronicle*, in a way that does not apply to the formal Byzantine Roman histories, the *Rhomaioi* stand in contrast to a single named other group, the Φράγγοι (*Frangkoï*: Franks). This is in a real sense the story of a clash of the Franks and the Romans, and the clash is not merely political. In all manifestations, the *Rhomaioi* are presented as the group which contrasts with the Franks – overwhelmingly in active opposition to the Franks, but not always. *Rhomaioi* is thus used to denote the Byzantine Romans before 1204 and the Nikaian and Byzantine Romans after 1204 (including those of Mistra), but also the Roman subjects of the Frankish principality, who are shown as pro-Frankish. In its use of *Rhomaioi* for the Byzantine Roman state the *Chronicle* shows itself to be firmly in the Byzantine Roman tradition, but in its extension of the term to other Romans outside the empire it is significantly more liberal than the conventional Constantinopolitan approach.

Beginning with the genitive formula, this is commonest with *basileus*, which always has a Byzantine Roman context, whether pre-1204, Nikaian or with reference to the Palaiologoi. The political aspect to Roman identity familiar from the more formal histories is thus unsurprisingly strong. This use further makes clear that the Byzantine Roman authority at Mistra was seen by the chronicler as part of the rule of the Palaiologoi (see, for

example, 5746, 5822, 6582, 8357). There are nine occurrences of 'genos of the Romans', which is a high number compared to the formal histories. Suggesting a strong sense of ethnic Roman identity in its connotations of shared descent, this usage is twice explicitly contrasted with *Fragkoi* (1297, 2090) with strong ethnic connotations; however, it is also used to denote the Byzantine Roman state, of Constantinople or Nikaia, or its military arm. Nevertheless, even when making a political contrast, the ethnic identity is strong: Prince William asserts that the Byzantine Roman emperor is a legitimate enemy because he and the prince are not related: 'and further, he [Michael Palaiologos] is from the tribe of the race (*genos*) of the Romans and I do not share with him any relationship at all' (4155–6); thus, political entities are seen to have their foundation in race. Unsurprisingly, given this tale of conflict, military associations are also common, with μάχη (*mache*: warfare), φουσσᾶτα (*phoussata*: armies) and ἀλλάγι (*allagi*: squadron) also each appearing more than once.

Turning to the plain formula, there is much again that is familiar from the formal histories. Over a third of the occurrences relate to the Byzantine Romans in a military context and these are dominated by references to the forces of Mistra battling the Franks of the principality. Around a quarter of the total have political associations, denoting the subjects (or rulers) of the Byzantine Roman state either individually or collectively. The collective application is rare compared to the histories, but there are eighteen occurrences in the contexts of making war, being ruled by the emperors and the Byzantine Roman control of territory, which confirm this conception, in this non-Constantinopolitan milieu, of the imperial state as a collectivity of people. A few uses of the plain formula have strong religious associations (see 769–815), but these occurrences are concentrated in one of those passages of polemic against the Romans that are written from a strongly western and Catholic viewpoint, and which should be considered scribal interpolation. Occurrences in these polemical passages, which also contain the single use of *Rhomaioi* to signify the people of ancient Rome, will be treated with caution as deriving from an explicitly non-Roman perspective.

So much for the instances of usage in the dominant Byzantine Roman context. Out of the thirty-seven occurrences of the genitive formula, a mere three – *genos*, *pragmata* and νόμος (*nomos*: law) – relate to the Roman subjects of the prince (hereafter, the 'Principality Romans'). These occurrences cluster around the incident, discussed above, when representatives of these Romans strike a bargain with Geoffrey de Villehardouin: loyalty from 'we, the *genos* of the Romans' in return for the continuity of the Roman way

of life: 'our faith, our customs, the *nomos* of the Romans' (2094–5). This choice of the ethnic markers of religion and legal tradition by the Principality Romans are strongly suggestive of their desire to maintain their ethnic identity alongside the new political identity. The use of *pragmata* comes in the same context: Villehardouin agrees the pact, and is described as having satisfactorily settled 'all the affairs (*pragmata*) of the Franks and of the Romans' (2098). Thus these uses, unsurprisingly, confirm a strong ethnic Roman identity in contrast to the Franks, and call attention to some of the ethnic criteria which marked out the two ethnic groups in the Frankish Peloponnese and were thus brought to prominence by the closer interaction of these groups. As noted in relation to Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, religion and legal practice appear as prominent markers of ethnic borders in the elite writers of the fourteenth century, and appear again in the *Chronicle*.

Of around 150 total occurrences of the plain formula, only eighteen indisputably do not refer in the least to Byzantine Romans (i.e., those under the rule of a Nikaian or Constantinopolitan emperor). Of these eighteen, fourteen refer to the Principality Romans who are as noted shown as soldiers in the prince's army (2029, 2041, 3960, 4018) and advisers to the Franks (1424, 1577, 1726, 1744, 1751, 2023, 8985); they also appear as otherwise unspecified loyal subjects (2823), as monks (7778) and as the audience of the *Chronicle* (724). *Rhomaioi* is also used in application to Roman subjects of the Latin empire (1138, 1162, 1293) and to the people of Epiros (3923), who were similarly not subjects of the Byzantine Roman state ruled from Nikaia or Constantinople.

Although this is a small proportion of the total uses of the plain formula, this pattern of use constitutes the most relaxed application of the terminology of Roman-ness in all the texts considered, and reflects an ethnic Roman identity in the Peloponnese in which the political aspect of loyalty to the Byzantine Roman state plays an absolutely minimal role.⁶⁴

This ethnic Roman identity can also be traced in the scattering of occurrences of the plain formula which are more generalised, referring clearly to no single grouping. Four occurrences make reference to the Greek language, with χαμοτσουκιν (*chamotsoukin*: picnic) and ἱερεῖς (*hiereis*: priests) described as words which the Romans use, and people who know 'the γλῶσσαν [*glossan*: language] of the Romans' being deputed to speak to the prince's Turkish mercenaries (2408, 7796, 5207, 5234). Greek is thus

⁶⁴ Comparably liberal 'frontier' applications of *Romani* to both outsiders and insiders can be found in the early medieval west: Claude 1998: 123–4; Pohl-Reisl 1998: 206–7.

associated with the Romans although it was clearly a common tongue in the region, with Romans, Turks and many Franks explicitly fluent in it. Similarly regional in application are the references to the warfare of the Romans, by which is meant the tactic of ambushing with cavalry archers and fighting with light troops, rather than the heavy-armed battlefield techniques favoured by the Franks; there is in turn an equally strong ethnic association of Franks with lances (cf. 4019–25, 4916, 5128). At 1062 and 1114 ‘the warfare of the Romans’ is associated with the Byzantine Romans and their mercenary Cuman troops, while at 6907–7007 it is repeatedly characterised as the artifice, knavery and tricks which ‘the Romans and Turks have’. In this latter instance, the *Rhomaioi* and *Tourkoi* are explicitly contrasted with the *Fragkoi*; again, the style of warfare is similarly strongly associated with *Rhomania* (6908, 6943) and is contrasted with the warfare of *Fragkia* – though it should be noted that Prince William de Villehardouin was explicitly practised in this war as one from *Rhomania*, and thus this identification was not purely ethnically driven. Generally, though, it is hard not to see this as a contrast between, one might say, eastern and western warfare. Just as, in the *Chronicle*, ‘Franks’ is a relatively unspecific term for westerners, so there are elements in the terminology of Roman-ness that allow for a broad regional identity in contrast to the western origin of the Franks; here again we see the influence of the mixed culture behind the Greek *Chronicle*. Moreover, in the context of this broad contrast between the Franks and the Romans, the Principality Romans and Romans of Epiros were as much *Rhomaioi* as the Byzantine Romans of Constantinople, Nikaia or Mistra. Nevertheless, all such *Rhomaioi* could still be distinguished from the Cumans and Turks, with whom they yet shared a certain regional identity.

The Greek *Chronicle* makes frequent use of *Rhomania* in various ways. Firstly, it could signify all the territory historically ruled by the emperor in Constantinople before 1204, a geographical territory which at its largest encompasses the Balkans and Asia Minor. Thus the Frankish Peloponnese was a part of *Rhomania*: Geoffrey de Briel of Karytaina is, repeatedly, ‘the finest soldier in *Rhomania*’ (1924, 3255, 5763); note too that Guy de la Roche is said to have travelled from *Rhomania* to France (*Fragkia*); the Frankish lordship of Athens was thus also a part of geographical *Rhomania*.

But *Rhomania* also has a more localised signification. Thus, the Peloponnese can be distinguished from *Rhomania*: on the Pelagonia campaign Prince William and the despot of Epiros travel from Boiotia into Vlachia and on to *Rhomania*; again, returning from Constantinople Geoffrey de Briel travelled from *Rhomania* through Vlachia to Thebes (3504, 3630–51,

4363–4). Here, *Rhomania* is the area ruled by the Byzantine (or Nikaian) Roman emperor, and this is a common narrower reading of *Rhomania* within the *Chronicle* (cf. also especially 3648–9, 3761, 3778, 4641). A strong association can thus be seen between *Rhomania* and the rule of the Byzantine Romans.

Rhomania can, however, also denote the Latin empire of Constantinople, for it is that area which was won and ruled by the crusaders (1368). The Latin emperor Robert and Geoffrey de Villehardouin are ‘the two lords of *Rhomania*’ (2583); later Robert gives Geoffrey the title ‘Grand Domestic of all *Rhomania*’ (2606); similarly Ancelin de Toucy’s brother Philip was ‘Caesar of *Rhomania*’ under Baldwin II (5417). After 1204 it was general in the west to call the new Latin empire ‘Romania’ and this is reflected in the *Chronicle*.⁶⁵ However, the emphasis in the use of *Rhomania* for the Latin empire is highly territorial as opposed to political. It is an area in which the Franks operate rather than a political entity: they have lands or authority *in* this area – the emperor Robert is lord ‘in *Rhomania*’ (2474) – and this contrasts with the formulation for Byzantine Roman rule ‘of *Rhomania*’ (e.g. 61, 591, 3056). Despite this Latin application, then, *Rhomania* is strongly associated with Byzantine Romans and the rule of Romans over it is implicitly more appropriate.

In this narrower reading, it is not clear whether *Rhomania* is understood to include the Byzantine Roman-ruled parts of Asia Minor, although in the Nikaian context this would seem unavoidable (cf. Greek *Chronicle* 3769–70). When the Byzantine Romans recruit for Pelagonia they have ‘all the Romans from *Rhomania*, those from Tourkia and Anatolia are innumerable’, and in the later Paris manuscript this latter is changed to ‘uncounted Turks from Anatolia’. The Copenhagen version could be read to mean that *Rhomania* included part at least of Anatolia, but a more natural reading would be that the regions are contrasted. We are up against the fact that by the time the *Chronicle* was written the Byzantine Romans had little hold on Asia Minor, and the chronicler could suppose that any troops from that region would be mercenary Turks – although at the time of Pelagonia this was not necessarily the case.

This expectation that the extent of *Rhomania* should more fittingly be ruled by Romans may have extended even to the lands ruled by Franks, since Byzantine Roman protagonists in the *Chronicle* repeatedly maintain that the Roman emperor had a natural, hereditary right to the Peloponnese.

⁶⁵ Wolff 1948: 12–14.

The Byzantine Roman ruler of Thessaly tells Prince William that Michael VIII Palaiologos 'is going to throw you out of the Morea, where you have no right – he is the hereditary lord of Romania' (4125–6), and the Grand Domestic similarly tells the prince; 'you have not justly inherited the land of the Morea; you hold it with unjust force, for it is the hereditary rule of the emperor of Romania' (5529–31). Similar claims are made by Michael Palaiologos himself (4230, 4247). Such assertions, which are of course not accepted by Prince William, tally with Pachymeres' presentation of Michael Palaiologos's dreams of reconquest over the lost empire, discussed above. Interestingly, though, the *Chronicle* is far more explicit than the Byzantine Roman historians in setting forth the imperial claim to the Peloponnese.

The *Chronicle*'s usage of *Rhomania* is at first sight more typically western than Roman, but in fact it goes farther than any Byzantine Roman source in asserting the Roman claim to southern Greece. Even in his own autobiography, Michael Palaiologos refrained from making any direct claim to the Peloponnese as Roman land, and one may contrast his description of the Epirot Romans – 'those Romans for many years in rebellion against the rule of the Romans' – with his phrase for his enemies in the Peloponnese – 'those . . . who had as their leader the prince of Achaia'. When Michael described his recapture of the Peloponnese he spoke of overrunning and subordination, and not of recovery.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, this claim was physically asserted by Palaiologos, even if it was not emphasised in the elite written record (perhaps because it was seen as not yet completed). This claim to rights in lost lands gained part of its strength from an ethnic understanding of Roman identity: where Romans lived was somehow Roman land. The broad regional sense of *Rhomania* and the narrower sense restricting it to land ruled by the Byzantine Romans are linked by this idea of predominant Roman residence and prevailing Roman customs, language and culture in a way reminiscent of Gregoras' treatment of 'Roman' lands within the Serbian empire.

Fourteenth-century polemic

We have seen how the dominance of the ethnic Roman identity allows for a freer application of the terminology of Roman-ness. Sometimes, the contrasting uses of *Rhomaioi* clash to confusing effect: 'Listen all of you,

⁶⁶ Grégoire 1960: 455.

both Franks and Romans, all you who believe in Christ and bear the baptism, come here and listen to a great matter, the evil actions of the Romans, the faithlessness which they have' (724–7).

This is the opening of the account of the coup by Mourtzouphlos in early 1204, which overthrew Alexios IV and prompted the crusaders to take the City for themselves. There are two types of Romans here, the hostile and wicked Romans of thirteenth-century Constantinople, and the presumably friendly Romans who are listening to the tale. Such a conjunction reflects the fourteenth-century origins of the *Chronicle*, whose audience included both Franks and Romans who were sympathetic to the tale it told and the pro-Villehardouin perspective it adopted, and who were also familiar with the Byzantine Romans of Mistra as potential enemies or allies. As outlined above, the decline of the principality under Angevin absentee rule coincided with growing assurance on the part of Mistra, leading Peloponnesians of all backgrounds to reconsider their loyalties for the sake of increased personal security. Personal choices led to personal bitterness: 'These Romans, who say they believe in Christ – however much one swears to you and affirms his oath, just so much is he plotting to destroy you, to take the shirt from your back or to kill you' (1252–5).

This idea of the faithless Roman is a recurring theme in such polemical passages of the *Chronicle*, namely 756–826, 1245–64 and 3931–9. As discussed above, these vituperative outbursts against the Romans appear in full only in the Copenhagen manuscript of the Greek *Chronicle*. Such passages should be viewed as interpolations into the original *Chronicle*, which was not nearly so anti-Roman. The French *Chronicle*, which is the earliest of all extant versions, contains none of the lengthy anti-Roman diatribes, suggesting that its source, which it calls *the Book of the Conquest*, did not contain them. It is likely therefore that the original Book of the Conquest was devoid of explicit hatred of the Romans and not, therefore, inherently anti-Roman (see [Appendix 2](#)). Examination of the content of the anti-Roman diatribes further suggests that they are interpolations. It is worth noting that only one (3931–9) is prompted by an action genuinely detrimental to the Franks and each is directed against a powerful Byzantine Roman figure from outside the Morea. The diatribes are slotted in as comment on the actions of Byzantine Romans from outside the Morea in the thirteenth century but gain their intensity from their tone of contemporaneous and local discontent, implicitly tying together the malevolent 'outside' Romans of the thirteenth century with the treacherous 'inside' Romans of the fourteenth-century scribe's knowledge. Most credibly, the diatribes are interpolations added into the Book of the Conquest at a later

date and so are more illustrative of fourteenth-century discontents than of the actuality of thirteenth-century relations. It was noted above that the Villehardouin leadership in the Peloponnese permitted the continuance of the Orthodox faith in the principality and this is presented as a good thing. Virulent attacks against the Orthodox church are anomalous in this broader picture of inter-ethnic cooperation in the Villehardouin principality presented by the Greek *Chronicle*.

The Greek *Chronicle*'s more typically complex approach to the Romans is illustrated well by its account of the 1259 battle of Pelagonia. In its extended account of the battle, the *Chronicle* tells how the Frankish command agreed to join the Epirots in their flight from the battlefield, leaving their troops from the principality to fend for themselves as best they might. These rank-and-file troops in the Frankish army at Pelagonia would have been predominantly Roman, though this is not explicitly stated in the *Chronicle* where they are called 'the minor people' (3850, 3869), 'his [Geoffrey de Briel's] people' (3859) and 'our people' (3888). However, the admirable Geoffrey de Briel of Karytaina refused to abandon the ordinary troops and shamed the Franks into staying – 'anyone who says that we should flee and leave our people is a wretched fool who shouldn't be a lord of men, or bear arms, or call himself a soldier' (3888–90). It has been speculated that one of the sources for the *Chronicle* may have been a verse chronicle or oral tradition of the deeds of Geoffrey de Briel, and this may well be the source of this account of his actions at Pelagonia.⁶⁷ Whatever the source, the story of de Briel's chivalry reflects a more generous attitude to the Roman subjects of the principality, and we therefore have in this account of Pelagonia a contrast between the Romans subject and loyal to the principality, who are deserving of loyalty, and the Byzantine Romans from outside the principality who are faithless and contemptible.

It should also be noted that the later versions of the Greek *Chronicle* tone down the anti-Roman polemic considerably. The Paris manuscript gr. 2898, of which Codex Parisinus gr. 2753 and Codex Bernensis gr. 509 are copies, was written around 1500, as was the Turin manuscript B, II.I. All these later versions abridge or entirely omit these polemical passages and in general present a more positive view of the Romans. The alterations introduced in these later versions allow us a window into ethnic relations in the Peloponnese into the fifteenth century which will be further discussed in the following chapter.

⁶⁷ Jeffreys 1975: 336.

Other identities?

There is no evidence in the *Chronicle* of any Hellenising identification of contemporary Romans with the ancient past. A tower at the castle of Arkadia (Kyparissia) is described as being ‘from the Hellenes’ (1774), and this certainly seems to be a reference to the ancient masonry still evident at the site. Significantly, the French *Chronicle* speaks here of ‘giants’ rather than ‘Hellenes’, and it seems clear that this – an awed acknowledgement of the sheer scale of the ancient construction – is the primary content in this reference to the Hellenes. This understanding of the Hellenes as a race of semi-mythical, supernormal beings survived into the modern era.⁶⁸ The Hellenes also appear, rather mysteriously, as the originators of the title Μέγας Κύρ (*Megas Kyr*: ‘Great Lord’), which was used by the Frankish lords of Athens (1557, 7242, 8050). At most, this usage suggests that Athens was recognised as a place especially associated with the Hellenes – perhaps Michael Choniates’ sermons had not been entirely in vain or, more likely, the sheer bulk of ancient remains in the decaying city prompted the association – but this can only be hypothetical.⁶⁹

Others in the Chronicle

The *Chronicle of the Morea* stands apart from the other historical works under consideration here in that the *Rhomaioi* are not the centre of attention. It is the Franks who take centre stage here and, as we have seen, for most of the account the *Rhomaioi* in the form of the Byzantine Romans are the ‘other’. The *Chronicle* tells its tale from a predominantly Frankish viewpoint, and thus the two unambiguous instances of an authorial ‘we’ both refer to Franks: it is ‘our people’ who were betrayed by the Byzantine Romans in 1204 (636) and ‘our Franks’ who settled to the siege of Constantinople (846).⁷⁰ In contrast, the French *Chronicle* is far more explicitly partisan and frequently speaks of the Franks as ‘our people’:

⁶⁸ Molin 2001: 210; Vacalopoulos 1970: 6, 18.

⁶⁹ Schmitt 1904: 626 associates this usage with the legend that rulers of Athens had in the past been called ‘(Great) Dukes’, pointing out that Gregoras gives the supposed practice a Constantinian origin; this does not explain the connection with the Hellenes.

⁷⁰ Two other uses of ‘we’ may be noted. At 4384 there is the threat that the emperor’s armies might ‘throw us out of the Morea’, and at 6964 Roman and Turkish warfare is contrasted with the style of ‘we Franks’. Both of these instances, however, should be read as direct speech by a Frank (respectively the duke of Athens and Prince William) and it should be noted that this Copenhagen version survives intact in both the Paris and Turin mss, which typically take out the more extreme pro-Frankish elements and indeed omit the ‘we’ references at 636 and 845; this supports a contemporary reading of speech rather than authorial identification.

compare, for example, French *Chronicle* 101, 341, 468, 485, 632 with the Greek 1533, 5062, 6703, 7050, 9042. The lack of such references in the Greek *Chronicle* again supports an audience of mixed ethnicity for this work.

Nevertheless, the Greek *Chronicle* is clearly on the side of the Franks, who are favourably compared with Romans – one Frank on horseback was worth twenty Romans (4944) and Franks are praised as honest (56), brave (4913), fine soldiers (5128) and highly skilled in battle (8932). This emphasis on the martial virtues shares much with the typical Byzantine Roman view, as do the two less complimentary comments on their arrogance at 4305–6 and 7290. At 4305–6, Michael Palaiologos is negotiating with Prince William after Pelagonia: ‘Prince, I can tell you’re a Frank, because you have the Franks’ arrogance – which always leads them astray and stops them achieving what they want’; this comment is mirrored in the French *Chronicle* and so may be seen as the words of a Roman. However, at 7290, Gauthier de Brienne is castigated as being typically Frankish in his arrogance when he attacked the Catalans in 1311. This comment is noticeable in being both authorial in tone and sounding like the comment of a non-Frank; in the French *Chronicle* Gautier is still described as proud, but this is not given as *typically* Frankish. The Greek *Chronicle* is thus pro-Frankish in recounting to good effect the deeds of the Franks in their conquests, but it does not appear necessarily to have been written by a Frank. Again, this is consistent with its origins as a product of the ethnically mixed Peloponnese of the fourteenth century.

The Franks appear in the *Chronicle* more than any other group, including the *Rhomaioi*, with more than 200 occurrences. Approximately half of these refer simply to the Franks established in the Peloponnese, but other groups customarily termed Franks include the crusaders of 1204 (e.g. 731), the westerners of the Latin empire (e.g. 1270), and Angevin troops (e.g. 6591); *Fragkoi* is also used for western Christians (e.g. 508, 2094, 2678, 7778), always in contrast to the *Rhomaioi*. The term is sometimes used as a general term for westerners: the despot of Epiros hires Franks from the Morea, from Athens and from Evia (3082), the Franks’ style of war is contrasted with that of the Romans and Turks (e.g. 6940), reference is made to the inheritance law of the Franks (8133) and to the ‘training of the Franks, the western military skill’ (9224). Such instances employ *Fragkoi* in a non-specific way, often in contrast to *Rhomaioi*. Alternatively, sometimes *Fragkoi* can be read more specifically as ‘the French’, as when Charles of Anjou and William de Villehardouin are said both to be Franks (6265–70), or when Geoffrey de Briel the younger is said to be of the race of the Franks

(8418); however, such instances could be read more generally as denoting western non-Romans.

Many more specific western groups are mentioned by the chronicler – including the French. When relating the dispute over who should be emperor, the Φραγκίσκοι (*Fragkiskoi*: French) are picked out as a special interest group, along with the Lombards, backing Boniface of Montferrat over Baldwin of Flanders (989); this is a usage shared by Choniates (*History* 597.64). Other specified groups within the overall Frankish crusade include Flemings (1108) and the men of Provence (397, 850). It should also be noted that the Venetians, heavily involved in the Fourth Crusade, are at all times distinguished from the Franks, as is also the case in Geoffrey de Villehardouin's account of the Fourth Crusade. Again, when the Franks at the heart of the story are involved in conflict with other westerners, the latter are given more specific group names, for example, the Ἀλαμάννοι (*Alamannoi*: Germans, 3576) fighting with the Byzantine Romans at the battle of Pelagonia, the Ντουσκᾶνοι (*Ntouskanoi*: Tuscans, 7073) opposed to Charles of Anjou, or the Κατελᾶνοι (*Katelanoi*: Catalans 7272) who defeated Gauthier de Brienne. Thus, when the context specifies distinctions between different western groups, more specific group names are used in preference to the more generic *Fragkoi*, or alongside *Fragkoi*, which is used for the groups at the heart of the story, the Franks in Romania and their allies. 'Franks', then, is used in the Greek *Chronicle* as a generic term for westerners, in a comparable fashion to the use in the Byzantine Roman histories of 'Latins' or, in Pachymeres, 'Italians'.

In his use of the terminology of otherness, the chronicler is far less ethnically prejudiced than the elite writers. He has less of an assumption of automatic ethnic division, and this surely reflects the down-to-earth approach of the Peloponnesians of all ethnic groups in the fourteenth century. As would be expected, the Franks are never called barbarians in the Greek *Chronicle*, where the terminology of the *barbaros* – a mere four occurrences – is reserved for Muslims (Appendix 1, p. 301). Religious associations are thus central, and there is an explicit correlation with being unbaptised. It should moreover be noted that the conceptualisation of the *barbaros* in the *Chronicle* is necessarily plural and associated with large groups in the Holy Land – crucially, outside the chronicler's sphere. When Muslims are encountered within Romania no opprobrium attaches to them; such Muslims are always called *Tourkoi*, and are encountered fighting alongside one side or another in the Morea. In the account of the troops under Melik who took service under Mistra but then, being cheated of pay, entered the service of Prince William, the Turks are portrayed sympathetically; indeed,

they are described as the finest soldiers in the army of Mistra (5151–2), and Prince William addresses them as ‘my brothers’ (5318). The single reference to the religion of these Turks comes at the end of this account, when it is mentioned that some of Melik’s men chose to settle in the principality and were baptised. Even in its account of the First Crusade the *Chronicle* distinguishes between the Turks who hold Anatolia and the ‘race of barbarians’ who hold Syria (contrast Greek *Chronicle* 47, 52 and 88–90).

This treatment of Turks contrasts markedly with that seen in the elite historians, who consistently name Turks as wicked barbarians, a status conditioned above all by their religion.⁷¹ This is true even of Kantakouzenos, who was on friendly terms with some Turks – notably Umur of Aydin. The chronicler likewise sees the undifferentiated Muslims far away in the Holy Land as barbarians because of their religion, but this is not an issue when Muslims appear on, so to speak, home ground. This is a reflection of the more pragmatic attitude towards others which was required on the periphery of the empire. Again, in contrast to the customary elite model, Turks are never called *Perses* (Persians): the chronicler eschews – or more likely knows nothing of – the classicising paradigm favoured in Constantinople.⁷² This is, unsurprisingly, in direct contrast to the elite historians already considered, who all use both *Perses* and *Tourkoi*; for example, Choniates favours the latter, while Gregoras slightly favours the former and Akropolites uses *Tourkoi* less than any other, preferring *Perses* or *Mousoulmanoi* – ‘Muslims’.

In his use of *genos* and *ethnos*, however, the chronicler is closer to the Byzantine Roman norms we have explored above, most clearly exemplified by Pachymeres. He uses *genos* in its ethnic sense for groups of all kinds – Romans, Franks, Christians, barbarians and, repeatedly, for humanity as a whole, while *ethnos* is applied only to non-Christians of the type that can also be called barbarians. There is thus no moral aspect to *genos*, while *ethnos* has strongly negative overtones.

THE CHRONICLE IN CONTEXT: FRANKS AND ROMANS UNDER THE ANGEVINS

Above, we examined the evidence to support the narrative which the Greek *Chronicle* gives for the thirteenth-century Villehardouin principality.

⁷¹ Akropolites uses *Tourkos* rather than *Perses* when referring to individuals rather than races, which is comparable to the *Chronicle*’s approach; however, Akropolites’ portrayal of Turks is still overwhelmingly negative: Macrides 2007: 92, n. 587.

⁷² See above, p. 24.

It is similarly possible to employ the analysis of the fourteenth-century language of the Greek *Chronicle* (in its earliest Copenhagen version) to garner supporting evidence for a view of ethnic identities and interactions in the fourteenth century. This picture can be supported and expanded through reference to other sources.

The fourteenth century saw steady encroachment by Byzantine Roman Mistra into the territory of the Frankish principality. By the beginning of the fifteenth century the principality had shrunk to Messenia and the western coast, and the title of prince had become a bargaining chip with little real power. The French *Chronicle* gives an insight into how Byzantine Roman influence spread, and further reveals the haziness of borders and the complexity of allegiances in the Peloponnese.

In 1296 Isabeau de Villehardouin, reigning as prince, erected a castle called Castelneuf in northern Messenia. We are told that this area had been used to pay tribute to the Romans of Mistra and of Gardiki, but that once Castelneuf was built it was agreed that 'all the tribute that the Greeks [i.e. the Byzantine Romans of Mistra] had been taking should be given and paid to Castelneuf' (French *Chronicle* 830). It seems that the Franks in the area had allowed the Byzantine Romans of Mistra to dominate from their strong bases, thinking it better to pay tribute than to suffer continual costly raiding. However, once the Franks had a military presence in the area they were able to put up effective resistance, and the local lords then paid their tribute to the prince.

When the local seigneurs had been paying tribute to Mistra, whose subjects had they been? The account of the construction of Castelneuf makes it clear that they were considered subjects of the principality, but this must at best have been only theoretical for some years. The agreement between Prince Florent and Andronikos II Palaiologos in 1290 recognised this phenomenon of shared authority, arranging for the sharing of revenues from the lands in question, the *casaux de parçon*. In some cases, this sharing of revenues may have formally reflected the type of dominance seen in the case of the Castelneuf area, which was assumed by Byzantine Romans in default of effective Frankish resistance. This system of shared authority was not unfamiliar to the Byzantine Romans, having a precursor in Asia Minor with agreements between the Romans and the Seljuk Turks in the twelfth century. In the Peloponnese, it can be detected into the 1340s, and *casaux* feature among the donations to Niccolo Acciajuoli.⁷³

⁷³ Jacoby 1963: 115–17; Longnon and Topping 1969: 46.24–5, 47.28–9. Asia Minor: Magdalino 1993b: 125–6.

However, the dominant impression of Peloponnesian society in the fourteenth century, from whatever source, is one of squabbling animosity. The *Chronicle of the Morea* details quarrels between Franks and Romans; a scribe adds his comments into the Greek *Chronicle* which are scathing about the Romans, who are said to have had no loyalty. Thus, Byzantine Roman writers such as the elite historians already considered are typically contemptuous about the residents of the Peloponnese, whom they dislike to call Romans and characterise as lovers of discord, faithless to an extreme. Nevertheless, closer examination reveals no firm sense of ethnic loyalty and no rigid ethnic divide: these were quarrels both *within* ethnic groups and *across* the ethnic divide. The Byzantine Roman despotate of Mistra struggled to preserve the loyalty of its ethnic Roman subjects, and various Roman rebels took up arms against the despotate with Latins or even Turks as allies. Similarly, some barons of the Frankish principality were ready to consider acknowledging Byzantine Roman rule in place of the rule of the Angevins, and some became loyal subjects of the Roman despotate. It is important to appreciate that by the closing decades of the fourteenth century it is no longer appropriate to speak of distinct ethnic groups in the Peloponnese, the Franks of the Morea and the Romans of the Morea. By the middle of the century, this had become a society of considerable ethnic assimilation.

The Greek *Chronicle* is firmly pro-Frankish in its sympathies, yet portrays cooperative local Romans in a favourable light; moreover, it addresses itself to Franks as well as Romans. This fourteenth-century audience of the *Chronicle* is indicative of the thirteenth-century patterns of language acquisition discussed above in that it includes Greek-speaking Franks; also listening, though, were Romans who identified with their Frankish rulers. Both Franks and Romans are explicitly addressed at 724: 'Listen all of you, both Franks and Romans'. The audience of the Greek *Chronicle* is linguistically familiar with both French and Greek. An Angevin *baili* is sent 'an order from Apulia, a κομείσιον [*komesioun*: commission] the Franks call it, thus they name it' (7993–4). Then again, at a celebration everyone 'had a χαμτσουκιν [*hamotsoukin*: picnic], as the Romans call it' (2408); we are also told of the Villehardouin chaplains that 'the Romans name them ἱερεῖς [*hiereis*: priests], they all call them that' (7796). Such references suggest an audience which is familiar with both Greek and French (though members of it might favour one or the other). Interestingly, the reference to *hamotsoukin* is omitted in both the later Turin and Paris manuscripts, and the *hiereis* reference does not appear in the Paris text; the absence of these 'as the Romans say' references may thus signal the diminution in the

non-Roman contingent of the audience over the course of the fifteenth century. This will be further explored in the following chapter. It is, anyway, clear that the earlier Greek version(s) were intended for an audience who knew both French and Greek, some of whom were bilingual, and who were native to the Morea. This would suggest a society where Franks and Romans often had languages in common and, equally, were used to socialising together.

Such a society would also have supplied the audience for some of the vernacular romances of this period, and Frankish Greece has been proposed as the place of origin for *The Tale of Achilles*, *Libistros and Rhodamne*, *Florios and Platzia-Flora* and *The War of Troy*.⁷⁴ It has been credibly argued that the example of western vernacular literature encountered in the courts of the Latin states in the region after 1204 encouraged the growth and acceptability of the literary use of spoken Greek forms, and in these vernacular romances we see a positive attitude to westerners, as well as a mingling of the Hellenistic romance tradition with western fairy tale and chivalric romance.⁷⁵

Increased knowledge of westerners has influenced these romances in various ways. *Florios and Platzia-Flora*, clearly derived from the early fourteenth-century Italian *Il cantare di Fiorio e Bianciflore*, is close to the rugged vernacular of the *Chronicle of the Morea*, and was probably written in the Peloponnese itself.⁷⁶ In the fourteenth-century Greek version of *The War of Troy*, Ajax is actually said to come from the Mani in the south of the Peloponnese and, in the earlier *Tale of Achilles*, the familiar presentation of Franks likewise makes a southern Greek origin at least plausible. In this tale a Frankish knight is defeated by the hero Achilles at the joust to celebrate his wedding. Emphatically, in the *Achilles* western things are not disapproved of; they are definitely different, but that difference is not negative or to be deprecated. Achilles' Frankish opponent is described in a thoroughly positive fashion as handsome, brave and manly – in fact the only worthy opponent for the hero. Achilles himself is said to wear his hair in the Frankish style, and his beloved loves to dress in Frankish fashion. It is at least possible that this reflects actual practice among some of the Romans living alongside westerners in Frankish Greece; turning to another context entirely, figures in western dress are depicted on some late Byzantine pottery of the period – but we cannot of course know for whom such

⁷⁴ Hesselning 1919; Lambert 1935; Kriaras 1955; Jeffreys and Papathomopolous 1996; Jeffreys 1993: 319.

⁷⁵ Beaton 1988: 136–40; Browning 1983: 77.

⁷⁶ Beaton 1996: 137–8; Spadaro 1996: 14; also Horrocks 1997: 281–3.

pieces were intended.⁷⁷ *Libistros and Rhodamne* is if anything even more positive about westerners than the *Achilles*. Here, the eponymous hero is actually from a Latin land and of noble Latin birth; he has a western-style haircut and he dresses in western dress. The presentation of the west in such romances is very different from the aloof caution of the elite historians, and the romances may reflect the closer interactions necessary in Frankish-ruled Greece.⁷⁸

There are further traces of evidence from the Peloponnese to support a picture of inter-ethnic cooperation. To add to the thirteenth-century instance of the Roman Philokalos working in a Frankish-owned castle, the castellan of Kalamata in 1313 was a Roman named Janni Misito and another Roman, Nikolakos of Patras, was captain at the castle of St George in Skorta in around 1320.⁷⁹ In the fourteenth century, Greek family names point to western origins of distinguished Roman families in the Byzantine Roman Peloponnese: Phrangopoulos ('son of a Frank'), (S)Phrantzes ('Francis') and the Syryannis Gilopoulos of Gardiki, clearly of Frankish origin but loyal to Mistra.⁸⁰ Contrariwise, there were now Romans among the senior baronial families of the principality; the Misito family held the barony of Molines in Messenia and the Sideros family claimed lands in Skorta.⁸¹

Although there is very little specific information in any source, it is also clear that there were numerous cross-ethnic liaisons in the Peloponnese. The *Gasmouloi* of mixed Roman and Latin descent who are mentioned by Pachymeres are said by him to have been resettled from the Peloponnese by Michael Palaiologos in the 1260s. It is of course worth noting that these *Gasmouloi* fight on the Roman side, but this need not have been true of all children of mixed parentage; indeed, writing in the 1330s, the Latin author of the *Directorium ad faciendum passagium transmarinum* saw these *Gasinuli* as simply perfidious, all things to all men, taking advantage of their dual heritage to seize advantage with either side as they might.⁸² Pachymeres states specifically that the *Gasmouloi* knew the language of the Latins, suggesting that they were not brought up in an exclusively Roman environment. Nor should we assume that all *Gasmouloi* were born outside marriage. It is true that the Catalan chronicler Ramon Muntaner, writing

⁷⁷ Dark 2001: 99. I follow Vroom's classification of 'late Byzantine' pottery here, for work from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century: Vroom 2003: 27–8.

⁷⁸ Beaton 1996: 155.

⁷⁹ In the French *Chronicle* (Longnon 1911: 404), Nikolakos of Patras is characterised as a traitor for the surrender of St George to Andronikos Asen; the Aragonese *Chronicle* is more generous, painting the here unnamed castellan as fooled by the Romans.

⁸⁰ Runciman 1980: 54 ⁸¹ Bon 1969: 212–13, 242. ⁸² Beazley 1906–7 (13): 100–1.

early in the fourteenth century, says that the Frankish barons married only into good French families; however, Prince William II himself married a Roman from Epiros and was moreover ready to 'give wives' to the two Turks whom he knighted and enfeoffed in the 1260s: if marriages to Turks could be contemplated, then why not also to Romans?⁸³

One answer to this question might be that such Turkish converts would then have been baptised into the Catholic faith, whereas Romans were more likely to have remained, from the western point of view, schismatics with their own Orthodox church. However, while this remained a concern for the leaders of the churches, it does not seem to have ruled out marriage. Several Articles of the *Assizes of Romania* (74, 125, 174 and 180) make careful stipulations about marriages between people of different social rank, and these have been interpreted as discouragement of inter-ethnic marriage. Article 138, moreover, specifically addresses issues arising from marriage between female 'Greeks' and male Latins; Article 194 likewise implies the possibility of marriage between female Latins and 'Greek' males. Papal concern at such cross-ethnic liaisons is expressed regularly throughout the fourteenth century (for example by John XXII, 1317–34, and Benedict XII, 1334–42) and it is worth emphasising that if, as seems certain, inter-ethnic marriages were taking place then, equally, the religious schism was not proving an unbridgeable gulf between the Latins and the Romans.⁸⁴ We shall return to the religious question below.

The persistence of the *casaux de parçons*, which can be detected into the 1340s, presupposes a predominantly 'peaceful co-existence between Franks and Greeks', despite the impression given by the narrative sources of almost perpetual conflict.⁸⁵ However, we naturally hear most about the relations between Franks and Romans in the Peloponnese in these years in relation to the moments of crisis, in the detail of the stories of disputes between Franks and Romans in the decade around the turn of the thirteenth century which are given in the French and Aragonese versions of the *Chronicle of the Morea*. These stories, which are not supported in any other source, are worth a closer look.

Foty Tzausios and Gui de Charpigny (French Chronicle 663–92)

This story takes place during the reign of Prince Florent (1289–97), and more precisely within the seven-year truce from 1289 to 1296, which had been agreed with the emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos. Foty (Photios)

⁸³ Raymond Muntaner, *Cronaca* CCLXI.

⁸⁴ Tautu 1952: n. 11, 48 (John XXII); Tautu 1958 n. 11 (Benedict XII).

⁸⁵ Jacoby 1963: 125, and cf. Coureas 1997: 310 on Cyprus: 'no news is good news'.

was a Roman of a notable family which was loyal to the emperor, who held lands in the region of Corinth on a shared basis with Frankish lords (i.e. a *casal de parçon*). His villeins were not happy with him, and complained to their Frankish lords, who in turn carried the complaint to Gautier de Lindequerc, the Frankish lord of Corinth and a friend of Prince Florent. Gautier had Foty hauled before him and, eventually, tortured, before releasing him in return for a substantial payment. Foty, understandably, made a complaint about this to his Byzantine Roman overlords at Mistra, who in turn complained to Prince Florent – who did nothing. Baulked of legal comeback, Foty looked to get his own revenge on Gautier. However, the hapless Roman managed to kill the wrong man – he ambushed and slew Gui de Charpigny who, being pale-skinned and blond-haired, is said to have resembled Gautier. As he attacked him, Foty taunted him: ‘Take your wages, Monsieur Gautier!’, then, when he was alerted to his mistake by Gui’s retainers (who also recognised him), he was utterly distraught as Gui had been ‘his lord and friend’. The Franks were understandably at first set on war and revenge for this murder but, in the end, Prince Florent decided that this incident did not justify bringing an end to the truce (especially as the Byzantine Romans might have held him culpable for not taking action against Gautier). Florent sued Mistra for justice against Foty, and the emperor’s captain at Mistra in turn sued the Franks for justice against Gautier, and so the matter was allowed to rest. The truce remained unbroken.

Sgouromailly and the castle of Kalamata (French Chronicle 693–753)

This story, which again takes place during the seven-year truce between Prince Florent and Andronikos II Palaiologos, begins with the capture of the Frankish castle and town of Kalamata by the Slavs who lived near the town, Slavs who had cried out the name of the emperor as they attacked. Prince Florent and the Franks naturally suspected that this was the work of the Byzantine Romans of Mistra, but Mistra said they had no control at all over the Slavs. So Florent sent two senior knights to Constantinople to ask for justice from the emperor; these were men who had been in prison in Constantinople with Prince William and therefore knew the ways of the court. Despite this, they at first had no luck getting an audience at all, but finally they gained the assistance of an Angevin envoy, and in audience Andronikos II agreed that Kalamata should be handed back to the Franks. However, they then received more unexpected help from one Sgouromailly, ‘a noble Greek man of the Morea’ (i.e. an important local Roman). Sgouromailly assured them that the emperor in

fact had no intention of giving them the castle, but would send orders countermanding the handover which would reach the Morea before the knights. With Sgouromailly's personal help, the knights managed to get back to the Morea in good time, and Sgouromailly personally saw to the transfer of the castle into Frankish hands. Then, just as he had suspected, orders arrived at Mistra countermanding the handover, and Sgouromailly had to flee for his life. He eventually died in poverty, one 'who greatly loved the Latins'.

Corcondille and the castle of St George (French Chronicle 802–27)

This was the incident that finally brought to an end the truce between the Franks and the Byzantine Romans in the Peloponnese. Corcondille was a Greek (as the French *Chronicle* has it) from Skorta in Arkadia in the central Peloponnese. In the June of 1296, he attended the *panejours* – the village festival – at Varvaine in Skorta, an event that was popular with both Franks and Romans. However, he had an argument that turned violent with a Frank called Girart de Remy, so that Corcondille came away from the festival determined on revenge. He looked out his son-in-law, a man called Anino who worked as cellarer at the nearby Frankish castle of St George, which stood on the border with the Byzantine Roman lands ruled from Mistra. Anino recruited a further crucial accomplice – his 'great friend' Boniface, the sergeant who guarded the keep of the castle. Then, Corcondille involved the Romans at Mistra: he contacted a relative of his called Leon Mavropapas who commanded a troop of Turks for the Byzantine Roman army, with the offer of securing St George for the Romans. The powers at Mistra had to think carefully before agreeing to this, as it would constitute a breaking of the truce between Prince Florent and the emperor. It was possible that the emperor would agree to give the castle back, just as the castle at Kalamata had eventually been handed back. However, they concluded that St George was in such a useful position on the border between them and the Franks that the emperor would accept the *fait accompli*. And thus it happened. The castle was taken with the help of Boniface and the Turks, Prince Florent was unable to win it back by force, and the capture of St George thus marked the renewed outbreak of hostilities in the Peloponnese.

The loss of Nikli (Aragonese Chronicle 472–85)

This incident happened in the days of Prince Florent, but cannot be placed any more precisely; it may well have been in the last year of his

reign and after the ending of the truce. Nikli was an important centre for the Franks, but its location cannot be securely identified. According to the Aragonese *Chronicle*, the 'Greeks' (as it calls them – in other words, the Byzantine Romans based at Mistra) were getting fed up with all the successes of the Franks, and therefore they were plotting revenge. The captain of the emperor (at Mistra) first tricked the Franks into selling them lots of quality horses, and then made sure that his men should attend festivals and gatherings and try to pick a fight with the Franks. On the first attempt, a fight was successfully picked, but the local Frank in command in Nikli did not choose to punish the Franks who had fought. On the second attempt, the 'Greeks' managed to manipulate the situation into a free-for-all, with the result that they ended up taking both the town of Nikli and some poorly fortified castles nearby. The Franks saw that the 'Greeks' were well armed and well horsed so that it would not be easy to retake Nikli. Both sides garrisoned the frontiers and settled to war.

The revolt in Skorta (French Chronicle 922–53)

In 1302, the principality was under the grasping rule of Philip of Savoy, Isabeau de Villehardouin's third husband, and he foolishly decided to tax the *archontes* of Skorta. These *archontes* plotted to revolt against the prince and go over to the Byzantine Romans of Mistra, but they waited until the respected marshal of the principality, Nicholas de St Omer, was absent on campaign in Thessaly. They then managed to take and reduce two castles in the valley of the Alpheios, but when the local captain Sir Nicholas de Maure and Prince Philip himself rallied their troops – including their own men of Skorta – the Byzantine Romans and rebels were in the end alarmed into flight. Prince Philip then punished the ringleaders and reasserted his rule in Skorta.

Under the obvious hostilities, these stories reveal a great deal about actual relations between Franks and Romans in the Peloponnese. In the stories of the loss of St George and Nikli, we may see that Franks and Romans mixed freely at markets and on social occasions, including religious (presumably Orthodox) festivals; as noted above, this is strongly suggestive of cross-ethnic language acquisition and fluency. There were friendships across ethnicities: the Roman Corcondille had a son-in-law Anino who worked at a Frankish castle and was sufficiently friendly with the castle guard, a Frank called Boniface, that the latter helped him betray the castle to the Byzantine Romans of Mistra. Here we see that on a personal level Franks

and Romans could get on very well. Similarly, Photios Tzausios ended up taking his misplaced and fatal revenge against Sir Gui de Charpigny whom, we are told, he 'held as lord and friend'.

Just as the castle guard Boniface ended up on the Roman side, the stories also reveal a readiness for cross-ethnic allegiance on the part of Peloponnesian Romans. It is worth noting that Foty's villeins, who were ethnic Romans, looked to Franks to protect them against another ethnic Roman. Similarly, it was noted above that some Frankish barons of the 1340s were ready to accept Roman authority; the implication is that such Moreots were clearly not driven by a model of necessary ethnic division. Even more striking in this regard is the story of the Roman *archon* Sgouromailly, who is portrayed as acting for the Franks and against the duplicitous Roman emperor. Asking the prince's agents to regard him as a *loyal chevalier* – which is at least suggestive of shared allegiances in the Peloponnese – he tells Florent's men in Constantinople that

the good Prince William was our natural lord; for his ransom he gave us to the emperor. And we are sure that we are only treated well and with honour by the emperor because of the war that we are making on you, noble Latins. If you were not there, he would not treat us half so nicely. And so I want you to know that I'd rather you had the castle of Kalamata than that the emperor should have it. (French *Chronicle* 721–2)

This incident is not recorded elsewhere and it would be dangerous to rely on the *Chronicle* for detail. What is interesting however, and lends verisimilitude to the account, is the emphasis on Constantinopolitan contempt for Peloponnesians. This is nowhere else reflected in the *Chronicle* but is as we have seen a strong element in the Constantinopolitan outlook. It is credible that resentment at such contempt could have promoted regionalist and even pro-Frankish sentiments among local *archontes* such as Sgouromailly. Such local Romans could also have observed the new attention being given to the region – in contrast to the historical neglect – and have reflected, as does Sgouromailly, that this new interest from Constantinople was not necessarily altruistic. Again, this story should warn us against assuming ethnic solidarity – although, as Sgouromailly's fate shows, the expectation that ethnic identity should have ensured political loyalty, familiar from the works of the elite historians, was also at work 'on the ground' in the Peloponnese.

The Slavs in the story of the castle of Kalamata are portrayed as more on the side of the Byzantine Romans than the Franks, but basically out for what they could get. This kind of pragmatic realism also emerges in the

story of the revolt in Skorta. Skorta, the mountainous heart of Arkadia, had initially put up resistance to the Franks under the *archon* Doxapatres, but by around 1215 seems to have been pacified under the rule of the de Briel lordship based at Karytaina. Although the Skortans' loyalty wavered when their lord was absent, under the popular Geoffrey de Briel they formed a stalwart front line against Mistra from the late 1260s. Three aspects of the account of this revolt are particularly worth noting. Firstly, some Skortans stayed loyal to the Franks against their fellows, and those who revolted are characterised as traitors. Secondly, the *Chronicle* comments that the Franks found it difficult to get reliable information in the area 'because all the villeins of the estates had fled through the mountains, because they were afraid – 'as much of the Greeks as of the Latins. They did not know whose side to take, and thus were waiting to see who would win' (943). Ethnic solidarity did not mean much against a quiet life attempting to till one's land or pasture one's flocks: pragmatism was all in the Peloponnese in the opening years of the fourteenth century as it had been a century earlier when Franks had first arrived. Thirdly, when Marshal Nicholas de St Omer returned to the principality the erstwhile rebels informed him that 'they had only revolted because he, from whom they had hoped to find help against the taxes imposed on them, was not in the land' (953). The *Chronicle* has already presented St Omer as a champion against the excesses of the prince, and so there is a suggestion here that the *archontes* felt their grievance against a particular ruler, rather than against Frankish rule in itself: differences in personality could be at least as important as ethnic rivalry (French *Chronicle* 922–53).

These stories, then, present little evidence of ethnically driven loyalty among the Romans. The registers of the Acciajuoli estates, dating from the middle of the fourteenth century, published by Jean Longnon and Peter Topping, similarly support a picture of cross-ethnic allegiances. Militarily, Romans made up the garrisons of archers at several Acciajuoli strongpoints, such as the tower of Krestena (Longnon and Topping 1969: 72.25–44), Archangelos Castle (88.8–33) and Voulkano Castle (99.1–47). There is now further evidence of Romans employed in more senior positions of trust: two other Romans are known to have held the office of protovestiary in the 1330s, Stephanos Koutroules and Ioannis Mourmoures; the latter drafted a *praktikon* in Greek for the Acciajuoli estates (Longnon and Topping 1969: 21.11–12, 33.8–9, 52.14–15). Romans were also among those employed by the Acciajuoli for the supervision of estates, just as they had been by the Villehardouin princes. The demesne land of the Acciajuoli in their castellany of Corinth was administered by one Todoro (i.e. Theodoros), and in

the same year another Theodore, surname Mabrudi, is recorded as the collector of the taxes due to the lord in Grebeni (Longnon and Topping 1969: 159.10, 160.4–5, 164.11, 127.20–3). In the 1350s, Roman feudatories named Manulli Magno, Migali de Stiva and Nicolucha are recorded at Krestena (Longnon and Topping 1969: 73.9–11); while at Voulkano there were Dominus Theoderus Papa Chyriacopulus, Manollus Vorcas and Theodore Papa Stamatopulus (Longnon and Topping 1969: 101.38–9).

Regarding the art and architecture of the Frankish Peloponnese, was there any cross-fertilisation of influences between the westerners and the Romans? Like the archaeology of the medieval Peloponnese, this is still an area for research. At this stage, it is possible to say that the presence of the western settlers did indeed have some effect on local styles in architecture and art, although in the Peloponnese this western influence had no lasting effect.

At Geraki, east of Sparta, the tomb monument of one of the thirteenth-century de Nivelet barons survives in the church of St George in the castle. Like the remains of the Cistercian monasteries of Isova in the Alpheios valley and Zaraka at Stympalia, most of all this exemplifies the gulf between the traditional soft curves of the Orthodox church and the dramatic angles of Frankish Gothic, which was, after all, reaching its zenith at the time of Frankish settlement.⁸⁶ An analysis of the medieval churches of Frankish Greece for any influence of the Gothic style reveals that, apart from the explicitly western structures like the Cistercian monasteries mentioned and the churches of the Princes at Andravida or Glarentsa (Fig. 1), the influence of the Gothic is relatively restricted to decorative elements – some pointed windows, slender columnettes and decorated column capitals.⁸⁷ There are ten known Byzantine churches in the Peloponnese which show overt western influence, several of which are in major Frankish sites. In Elis these are the Vлахerna Monastery near Kyllini (Fig. 2) and the Dormition of the Theotokos near Anilio; in Arkadia, the bell-tower of the church of the Zoodochos Pege in Karytaina; in Messenia, Aghios Georgios at Androusa and Agios Georgios at Aipeia; in the Argolid, the Dormition of the Theotokos at Merbaka; in Korinthia, the Palaiomonastero of the Phaneromene and the church of the Rachiotissa at Phlious; and in Lakonia the churches of Aghios Georgios and Aghia Paraskevi at Geraki. These are

⁸⁶ Wace 1904–5: 130–45.

⁸⁷ Bouras 2001; but contrast Grossman 2004, who argues for the development of a distinctive hybrid 'Moreot' architecture during the Frankish period.



Figure 1 Decorative pillars at the ruined Frankish cathedral, Glarentsa (Kyllini) in the Peloponnese

characterised as Byzantine because they date at least in origin to before the Frankish conquest, or otherwise are typically Byzantine in all barring the Gothic touches.

What these churches reveal is that Gothic elements were known and used in Byzantine church architecture. This was not only so in the Peloponnese, but generally around Frankish Greece and indeed in Epiros, which was never ruled by Franks but was clearly still open to the prevailing western trends through its links to Italy. However, it was only in Venetian-ruled Cyprus that the Gothic style was genuinely adopted by the Orthodox church. On the mainland, including the Peloponnese, the Gothic style made some impact but only in details, apart that is from the few wholly Frankish churches and monasteries. Furthermore, the wholly Frankish buildings display some characteristic features, beyond artistic detail, that indicate that techniques if not workmen were brought with the conquerors from the west, for example the use of a particular form of roof tile. On the other hand, it is clear that local craftsmen also worked on Frankish structures, and these presumably learnt some of the hitherto alien techniques and styles and proved to some extent capable of responding to the tastes of




Figure 2 Window on the south wall of the monastery at Vlacherna, near Kyllini in the Peloponnese

the westerners.⁸⁸ Outside the religious sphere, the Palace complex at Mistra shows clear western influence, particularly in the oldest wing, which may date back to the brief period of Frankish occupation (Fig. 3).

The Agnes stone from the Frankish church of St Sophia in Andravida has attracted attention. The grave-slab of Agnes/Anna, the Roman wife of Prince William II, this combines standard western epigraphy with Byzantine decorative motifs, leading some to argue for a considerable degree of hybridisation. However, others maintain that this slab is simply an existing piece of relief-work from an older Orthodox church, reused by the Franks,

⁸⁸ Cooper 2002: 23–5; Campbell 1997.



Figure 3 The earliest wing of the despot's palace, Mistra

and thus no indication of true assimilation.⁸⁹ Turning to painting, however, there is evidence of a more subtle western influence that is furthermore indicative of an assimilated society.

One study has focused on the portrayal of warrior saints in church frescoes of the south and east Peloponnese, to demonstrate that the detail of

⁸⁹ Contrast Ivison 1996: 94 and Cooper 1996: 34.



Figure 4 St George, from Agios Nikolaos at Polemitas in the Inner Mani

the characteristic iconography had changed by the end of the thirteenth century under the impact of the Franks. During the Frankish period, military saints appeared in greater quantity and were on average given greater prominence; moreover, the position of the saint changed to reflect western practice. It is argued that this reflects ‘appreciation of Frankish chivalric customs and . . . a certain degree of cultural emulation and symbiosis’.⁹⁰ The popularity of St George in such wall-paintings – a fine example is the thirteenth-century fresco of the saint at St Nicholas, Polemitas in the Mani (Fig. 4) – certainly fits well with the respect for the saint as military

⁹⁰ Gerstel 2001: 271.



Figure 5 St Theodore, from Trissakia near Tsopakas in the Inner Mani

protector shown in the *Chronicle of the Morea*. According to the *Chronicle*, the soldiers of the principality (who could be Roman, Frankish or both) believed that St George had helped the Franks to victory over the Byzantine Romans of Mistra at the battle of Prinitsa (Greek *Chronicle* 4791). Again, the vernacular Greek romances, several of which have strong connections with the Frankish Peloponnese, suggest that there was an appreciative audience for tales of chivalry and for the glamour of knightly combat. The cave church of the Old Monastery at Vrontamas near Geraki shows six military saints drawn up to face each other as if in a tournament, while the image of St Theodore at Trissakia in the Mani (Fig. 5) very unusually portrays the saint at full gallop, very like a western knight; both images date from the late thirteenth century. More generally, arms, equipment and pose imitate the western model.⁹¹ Familiarity with western forms is also shown by the appearance in thirteenth-century frescoes of soldiers in Frankish dress – for example at Trissakia (Fig. 6) or Agios Niketas at Karavas, both in the Inner Mani.

⁹¹ Gerstel 2001.



Figure 6 Frankish soldiers featured in the arrest at Gethsemane, from Trissakia near Tsopakas in the Inner Mani

Although much work remains to be done in this area, it is clear that western influences enter into the artistic decoration of churches in this period. Thus, the church of Aghios Nikolaos at Agoriani in Lakonia, with frescoes dating from the end of the thirteenth century, shows western influence in its portrayal of St Matthew.⁹² The artist here is named as Kyriakos Frangopoulos (Kyriakos, son of the Frank), raising the tantalising possibility that these frescoes were made by a *Gasmoulos*. The frescoes at Agoriani lie right in the border zone between western and Mistran control at the end of the thirteenth century, and most of the images of military saints in the study by Sharon Gerstel cited above lie within the areas where Byzantine power was re-established after 1262. In other words, western influence was not limited to areas under direct Frankish rule. Doula Mouriki has written about the use of the mask motif in the wall paintings at Mistra, showing how Latin styles crept into Byzantine Roman iconography, while Mary

⁹² Emmanouel 1989: 148.

Lee Coulson has more recently re-evaluated the church at Merbaka near Argos, arguing for Italian workmanship in the original thirteenth-century decorative programme.⁹³ Thus, though the evidence is still rather scattered and sparse, it can be seen that, as might be expected, there was a cross-fertilisation of artistic ideas arising from the western conquests and occupation.

It is important to remember that the Romans and the Franks were not the only ethnic identities in the Peloponnese at this date. The story in the *Chronicle* of the settlement and enfeoffment of Turkish mercenaries in the Morea during the reign of Prince William confirms a lack of ethnic exclusivity in the Frankish state (Greek *Chronicle* 5733–8; French *Chronicle* 397). By the end of the fourteenth century there had also been considerable settlement by Albanians, who were welcomed at least by Mistra as a useful source of manpower. This had begun in Greece especially as a response to the depopulation of the Black Death in the 1340s, and by the Ottoman census of 1460, Albanians exceeded ethnic Romans in some areas by 5 per cent.⁹⁴ Another group which always stood out were the Slavs, who lived a semi-nomadic life in the Taygetos range to the south of Mistra. In the growing political polarisation on ethnic grounds towards the end of the thirteenth century, the Slavs occupied a curious middle ground. When the 'Esclavons of Janisse' seized the castle of Kalamata during the reign of Prince Florent, neither side knew quite what to do (French *Chronicle* 693–753). The Franks believed that the Slavs were operating on the instigation of the Romans of Mistra, but the 'captain of the emperor' at Mistra denied all involvement, saying that the Slavs were 'wilful and hold lordship for themselves in rebellion against correct rule'. Later on, according to the *Chronicle*, the Slavs worked for Prince Florent against the Byzantine Romans of Mistra in his efforts to regain the castle of St George. Identifiably of a different ethnic group, then, the Slavs stood outside the central ethnic divide in the Peloponnese.

The examples of the Turks and Slavs suggest that there was little sense of ethnic exclusivity on the part of the Franks. Similarly, in the story of the taking of the castle of St George, Corcondille, Anino and Boniface are all equally and strongly characterised as traitors in the pro-Frankish *Chronicle*; and this suggests that Franks and Romans were equally accepted as subjects of the principality. In the incidents involving both Corcondille

⁹³ Mouriki 1981; Coulson 2002.

⁹⁴ Palaiologos, *Funeral Oration* 119; see Topping 1972: 69; Cooper 2002: 57.

and Photios, however, the offended Romans go on to involve the Byzantine Romans of Mistra; thus at a higher level ethnic identity was enshrined in political institutions and the possibility of availing oneself of such powerful assistance increased ethnic polarisation in the region. Thus, some local Romans asked for and received privileges from the emperor in return for professions of loyalty, and this was encouraged by some as a means of recovering imperial territory in the Peloponnese.⁹⁵ In this way the re-establishment of the Byzantine Romans at Mistra wrecked the balance of the Villehardouin compromise.

The polemical passages added to the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* at some point in the fourteenth century provide further evidence of a change in the climate of ethnic relations in the Morea during this period. As the remarks of a western churchman, the longest such passage (757–826) bears witness in particular to increased tension between the western and eastern churches in the fourteenth century. However, this tension was not evident at all levels – as noted in the context of intermarriage, which necessarily implied some weakening of the lines of demarcation. Indeed, it was perhaps just such weakening that promoted the wrath of churchmen. It should be noted that the traffic went both ways: Latins were attending Orthodox services and the Orthodox were attending Catholic services – thus, in 1322, Pope John XXII excoriated those Latins of the principality who, ‘living as they do with schismatics and other unfaithful, sometimes themselves (and their families too) ignorantly accept the said schismatics’ rite to the peril of their souls’; moreover, ‘the Latins do not fear to admit schismatics to their masses and other divine offices which are celebrated according to the rite of the sacrosanct Roman church’.⁹⁶ Similar papal comments followed in relation to other parts of Romania throughout the century, with the emphasis here mostly on Latins going over to Orthodoxy. There is also an epitaph in Greek which dates from 1354 and employs western dating conventions; this perhaps indicates a Roman in the Catholic church, but is as likely to indicate a Catholic Peloponnesian whose family was originally western but whose first language was now Greek. Again, the supposedly firm border markers – language, religion – were in fact fluid and permeable in the Peloponnese.⁹⁷

There was never complete ethnic polarisation in the Peloponnese, as we have noted in examples of both Franks and Romans exchanging or sharing loyalties, religious affiliation and language. However, two elements may

⁹⁵ Angelov 2007: 150–1. ⁹⁶ Raynaldus 1872: 187–8, translation from Setton 1976: 158.

⁹⁷ Setton 1976: 158; Vacalopoulos 1970: 98; Jacoby 1973: 898.

have led to an increase in polarisation in some circles at least. Firstly, the fact of transgression of assumed ethnic boundaries – like ethnic Franks starting to go to Orthodox churches, for example – is a precondition for increased ethnic awareness and consequent polarisation. So the very success of the Villehardouin compromise held out the possibility of stirring up ethnic hatred if people, for whatever reason, ceased to be on balance content with the situation. Secondly, the Byzantine Roman presence at Mistra and the failure of the Angevin administration of the principality created the conditions for growing dissatisfaction.

Returning to the fourteenth-century polemical diatribes, the tone of these is intensely personal: 'Never trust a Roman, however much he swears to you, for whenever he wants and desires to betray you, then he makes you a godparent, or his adopted brother, or else an in-law, just so that he can destroy you' (3934–9). The intensity of this feeling of betrayal, which can also be noted at 1252–5, could only have arisen after a period of preceding amity: the scribe has erstwhile friends and relatives in mind. Moreover, these diatribes are slotted in as comment on the actions of Byzantine Romans from *outside* the Morea in the thirteenth century – the Constantinopolitans of 1204, the Epirots of 1259 – but gain their intensity from their tone of current, local frustrations. In particular, the scribe may know of cases where the Byzantine Romans have retaken land and have reinstituted Orthodox worship and norms, including the disdainful attitude to Catholic worship that extended to cleansing churches which had been used by Latins (cf. *Chronicle* 767–8). As discussed already, these polemical outbursts should be understood as being interpolations added to the *Chronicle* sometime after its origination. Their value is that as the additions of a mid fourteenth-century scribe they are illustrative of the discontents of that century, the arguments and switching loyalties in communities that had once been more friendly but were becoming more polarised under the pressure of a flagging Frankish state and the more successful Byzantine Roman alternative at Mistra.

BEING ROMAN IN FRANKISH MOREA

It is clear that, in the liminal Peloponnese, one of many front lines in the encounter between the western rulers and the Romans ruled, a very different dynamic applied than that which is apparent in the writings of the educated Byzantine Roman elite.

Much in the way of detail is similar. The traditional ideology of the empire manifested in the political Roman sense is still apparent in the

Greek *Chronicle's* treatment of the Byzantine Roman administrations based at Constantinople, Nikaia or Mistra. Moreover, the new emphases on cultural criteria of Roman-ness detectable in the historians of the fourteenth century – specifically legal systems and the Orthodox religion – also have an important part to play in the Peloponnese. Language, historically of huge significance in the self-definition of the Byzantine Romans, is also present as an ethnic marker in the Peloponnese, and there are hints of the usual prejudices about others, with Franks characterised in the traditional Byzantine Roman model as warlike and arrogant.

However, the differences are far more significant, reflecting and revealing the kind of pragmatism that typified frontier zones in the pre-modern era.⁹⁸ Firstly, the ideology of Roman superiority is nowhere near as dominant: the Peloponnesian Romans looked on the Franks qua foreigners with far less automatic disparagement. Secondly, the ideology of imperial rule is dramatically weaker, in that political allegiance to the emperor of the Romans was, for the Peloponnesian Romans, entirely absent as a necessary component in their conception of what it was to be Roman. Thirdly, the ethnic criteria mentioned are dramatically more negotiable in the Peloponnese, with a pattern rather of transgression of boundaries than of defensive maintenance. Franks spoke Greek well, and Romans spoke French. Franks went to Orthodox churches and Romans attended Catholic services. Romans were happy to become feudatories of the Frankish principality, while Franks became loyal subjects of the Byzantine Roman despotate. Romans and Franks both enjoyed a story of Frankish triumphs. Franks and Romans married and had children who could choose to which group they would adhere. Orthodox churches portrayed the military saints in western style. Romans fought alongside Franks against Byzantine Romans, and Byzantine Romans joined in civil wars among the Franks. Such trends may well reflect the actuality as opposed to the rhetoric of inter-ethnic interaction throughout the Roman world and into Constantinople itself, one which is only barely manifested in the works of the elite, which are driven by the imperative to maintain the imperial world view. Above all, Franks and Romans in the Peloponnese felt a localised identity which expressed itself equally against Angevin governors and incoming Constantinopolitan rulers. This trend towards regional separatism, which predated the Frankish conquest, is at the root of the near-absence of the political Roman identity among the Peloponnesian Romans.

⁹⁸ Cf. Liebeschuetz 1998: 136–7; Mazano Moreno 1999: 32–54.

The long defeat

This chapter completes the survey of Roman identity during the period before the Ottoman conquests with a look into the fifteenth century. By the early years of this century, Frankish power and influence had shrunk to the Venetian and Genoese islands and mainland harbours (like Modon and Coron in the Peloponnese), Florentine Athens and the shrunken principality of Achaia clinging to the west of the Peloponnese. Byzantine Roman rule was similarly much reduced to Constantinople and its hinterland, Thessaloniki and the despotate of Mistra in the Peloponnese. Byzantine Roman life and hopes were now dominated by the Ottoman threat. Along with all other states in the Balkans, by the last decade of the fourteenth century, the empire of the Romans had become a vassal state of the ever-growing Ottoman empire. This subordinate status was underlined in 1393 when the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I summoned all his vassals, including the new emperor of the Romans, Manuel II Palaiologos, to a council at Serres in Macedonia.¹ From this point on it was abundantly clear that the Ottomans had set their hearts on Constantinople, and over the next eight years the Byzantine Romans struggled to survive and to find some support against this potent threat. The Ottomans established a blockade of Constantinople in 1397 and by 1399 their encirclement of the City was complete. The Byzantine Romans looked to their fellow Christians in the west, and in 1399 Manuel II set out on a tour of western Europe to enlist aid against the Turks. However, the empire was saved in the end by east not west, when the invading Mongols defeated and killed the Ottoman sultan Bayezid at the battle of Ankara in 1402.

Fifty-one years were yet to pass, but the political fate of the City and the empire had been fixed. Constantinople fell to Mehmet the Conqueror in 1453, while in the Peloponnese the Byzantine Roman despotate of Mistra hung on only for a further seven years. The last remnant of Byzantium

¹ Barker 1968: 114–22; *Funeral Oration* 133 for Manuel's own account.

was the empire of Trebizond on the coast of the Black Sea, and this fell to the Ottomans in 1461. Of the Latin lands of Frankish Greece, the last remnant of the principality of Achaia was finally absorbed by the despotate of Mistra in 1430. Only the territories of the Italian republics survived as long as Roman Constantinople and, unsurprisingly, they proved the most resilient. The last Venetian outposts on the Greek mainland were lost in 1540 and Genoese Chios fell to the Ottomans in 1566, while Venetian Crete endured until 1669.

The consideration of this period will focus once more on the Peloponnese, and there are several reasons for this choice. Firstly, with regard to formal historical works, very little emerges from the Constantinopolitan elite in the fifteenth century until the flurry of works dealing with the fall of Constantinople – notably, the histories by Doukas, Phrantzes, Kritoboulos and Chalkokondyles. The final fall of the City constituted a further and vast change in Byzantine Roman circumstances, a sea change that marks these later works out from their predecessors before the ultimate disaster and removes them from consideration here. Secondly, a focus on the Peloponnese offers a variety of sources to be set against each other. Two early fifteenth-century works which can be taken to reflect something of an elite viewpoint do in fact originate in and closely deal with the Peloponnese, so an emperor's perspective can be set against the point of view of a middle-ranking and independently minded civil servant, while use can also be made of the later Greek versions of the *Chronicle of the Morea*. Finally, keeping the spotlight on the Peloponnese allows for some continuity from the last chapter.

This brief look into the fifteenth century will show that, prior to the Ottoman conquest, the various Byzantine Roman identities continued to evolve and develop along the lines already suggested by the examination of the sources of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In particular, although the Roman political identity remained the same as ever when it was expressed, it was nevertheless more rarely made explicit. In the face of circumstances and the decline of the imperial state, the Roman political identity had inevitably lost much of its power, and there was therefore some searching for alternative identities.

Thus, at Mistra in the Peloponnese in the early fifteenth century, the philosopher Gemistos Plethon attempted to resurrect 'Hellene' as an ethnonym for the subjects of the empire.² Plethon looked to the classical

² Woodhouse 1986: 107–9.

past to provide a unifying identity for the subjects of the empire, picking up on the minority strand of Hellenic self-identification shown rhetorically by Choniates and more explicitly by John III Vatatzes and Theodore II Laskaris at Nikaia. For Plethon living at Mistra, Sparta was an obvious reference point in preference to Athens, which had not been part of the empire for over two centuries; moreover, for a Byzantine Roman, the monarchy of Sparta was a more suitable model than Athenian democracy. Plethon made the ancient past the foundation for a contemporary identity by claiming unbroken racial descent, asserting that the descendants of these Hellenes – and no one else – had inhabited the Peloponnese since classical times. It was a patently false claim but, in its justification of proposed change by an appeal to the ancient past, one that placed Plethon in the spirit of the European renaissance. Plethon's proposals had no practical influence on the rulers of Mistra, but are representative of a search for alternative identities as the empire struggled to survive.³

Thanks to the continuing influence of the political identity and its accompanying imperial ideology, fluctuating border loyalties continued to make *Rhomaïos* a problematic group name at times for the elite writers, and this may well also have aided the continuing affirmation of regional identities. It should be borne in mind, however, that *Rhomaïos* continued as an ethnonym expressive of ethnic identity right through the Ottoman period, and in these years immediately before the Ottoman conquest 'Roman' can be seen to have remained in use at all times by the ethnically Roman residents of the region as the major self-identifying term indicative of ethnic identity. On the periphery of the empire, however, this Roman identity was more and more divorced from political loyalty.

THE SOURCES

Manuel Palaiologos

The future emperor Manuel II Palaiologos was born in Constantinople in 1350, the second son of the emperor John V Palaiologos. He was governor of Thessaloniki in around 1370 and was named as his father's successor and crowned co-emperor in 1373, replacing his elder brother Andronikos IV Palaiologos, who had led an unsuccessful, revolt against their father John V. Andronikos did not take this demotion lying down. With Turkish help,

³ Vryonis 1991: 7–14.

he led a second, more successful, revolt in 1376: Manuel and his father John were captured and held for three years. They escaped in 1379 and recaptured the city, thanks to help in their turn from the Venetians and Turks (Manuel Palaiologos, *Funeral Oration* 101). John V and Andronikos IV were reconciled in the early 1380s and, as a result, Manuel was barred from the throne. In response, against his father's wishes, Manuel returned to Thessaloniki, where he led an active policy against the Ottomans. This was bold but rash – the Turks laid siege to Thessaloniki and took it in 1387. Manuel had to swear allegiance to Sultan Murad I.

Despite his disobedience and the disastrous loss of Thessaloniki, Manuel was reconciled to his father in 1389 and again recognised as heir to the imperial throne. Andronikos IV was now dead, having rebelled yet again in 1385. The agreement between Manuel and his father debarred Andronikos' son John VII from the throne; with grim inevitability, John now rebelled in his turn and took the city in 1390 with Turkish and Genoese help. Manuel defeated John with help from the Hospitaller knights and at last succeeded his father on John V's death in early 1391.

This unrelenting round of domestic disputes had allowed the Ottomans to exercise considerable influence, and Manuel repeatedly served as a vassal at the Ottoman court and on their campaigns in Anatolia. After his accession to the throne in 1391, Manuel seems to have been determined to fight against the Ottoman influence, and the first decade of his reign was dominated by the struggle against the inroads of the Ottomans and their obvious ambition to take Constantinople and the empire; thus he toured the kingdoms of western Europe in search of assistance (*Funeral Oration* 163.9–19) as Sultan Bayezid laid siege to Constantinople itself.

After their defeat at the battle of Ankara in 1402, though, the Ottomans were plunged into civil war and Manuel was able to take advantage of this. A favourable treaty with Sultan Mehmet I put an end to the humiliating tribute payments and regained Thessaloniki for the Byzantine Roman empire. However, on Mehmet's death in 1421, the inept policy of Manuel's son and co-emperor John VIII undid all this good work; Manuel was forced to sign a humiliating treaty and soon after retired to the monastic life. He died in 1425.

Manuel's brother Theodore I Palaiologos was despot of Mistra in the Peloponnese from 1382 to 1407. Byzantine Roman rule in the Peloponnese had been put on an impressively firm footing under Manuel Kantakouzenos, despot from 1349 to 1380, who was succeeded by his brother Matthew Kantakouzenos before Theodore took over in 1382 (*Funeral Oration* 111.4–16, 115.10–23). For the first five years of his reign, Theodore had to cope with a significant revolt under his cousin John Kantakouzenos,

which attracted considerable local support; Theodore finally managed to crush this insurrection with help from the Turks (*Funeral Oration* 115.27–119.8). However, this assistance was indicative of Ottoman interest in the region and, from the late 1380s, the Turks began to take a serious and acquisitive interest in the Peloponnese. By 1391 at the latest, Theodore was – like his brother the emperor – a vassal of the sultan (*Funeral Oration* 135.28–139.13). Subordinate status did not protect Ottoman vassals; rather it was all too clearly a prelude to outright conquest and, like Manuel, Theodore looked for western aid against the eastern threat. In the 1380s and early 1390s he maintained a profitable relationship with his father-in-law Nerio Acciajuoli of Athens (*Funeral Oration* 153.4–6), while alliances with Venice were usually more fragile. The despot also had to deal with endemic domestic unrest; the local subjects of the empire all too easily looked to their master's enemies if they thought that might bring them improved security (see, e.g., *Funeral Oration* 159.1–3). Then, after catastrophic Ottoman raids in 1395 and 1397, Theodore contracted to sell Corinth, and subsequently Mistra itself, to the Hospitallers, much to the dismay of his populace and the anger of the sultan (*Funeral Oration* 167.14–211.1). However, like his brother the emperor, Theodore was saved by the Mongols, and with his brother's diplomatic assistance he swiftly extricated himself from his commitments with the knights. He died in 1407.

The *Funeral Oration* composed by Manuel II Palaiologos for his brother, and delivered in 1409, reveals the affection between the two men, and also provides a wealth of historical detail as the emperor goes into considerable detail about the relationship with the Ottomans and Theodore's machinations with the various western groupings, by way of seeking to defend policies that had made Theodore unpopular with many of his subjects. The work is an apologia, but in the dearth of historical writing between Kantakouzenos in the 1360s and the various chroniclers of the fall of Constantinople writing after 1453 it constitutes a rare nugget of detail for developments in the Peloponnese in particular. It is written in Manuel Palaiologos' particularly complex classicising Greek.⁴

Mazaris

Almost contemporary with the *Funeral Oration* is the *Journey to Hades* by the satirist Mazaris, which was written in the second decade of the fifteenth century. This satire is the work of an educated man, being full of both Biblical and classical references, but it also approaches the contemporary

⁴ *Funeral Oration*: Chrysostomides 1985.

vernacular in its use of vocabulary and is written in a racy style that is far removed from the magisterial tones of the classicising historians. The *Journey* tells how the author visited Hades in a dream and met various people whom he had known when they were alive. On the advice of one of these dead men, Holobolos, Mazaris moved to the Peloponnese, and the second part of the work consists of the author's complaints to Holobolos for giving him bad advice, backed up by a description of the Peloponnese and its peoples to show just how bad that advice had been.

Little is known of the author beyond what can be gleaned from his work, but it is clear that he was an imperial civil servant, married and with several children. He had served the imperial family in some capacity before and during Manuel II Palaiologos' visit to the west (1399–1404), and on the emperor's return had been accused of embezzlement on the island of Lemnos and had consequently fallen into disgrace. Out of favour with the emperor (Manuel II Palaiologos) in Constantinople, he was advised to move to the Peloponnese in around 1414 to make his career at the court of Despot Theodore II Palaiologos at Mistra. He did not find things easy there at first, but eventually gained the patronage of the despot, who commissioned a copy of this satire. In the course of its scurrilous attacks the *Journey to Hades* includes much fascinating detail about the Peloponnese, particularly in its second half, which Mazaris implies was written some fourteenth months after his arrival in the despotate.⁵ The satire seems intended to be read and enjoyed by the imperial court at Mistra (although not the local residents of the province), and thus may well reflect the prejudices of the Byzantine Roman ruling class with regard to the local situation and people. Certainly, the *Journey to Hades* is well paired with the *Funeral Oration*, as they were written within ten years of each other and were intended for much the same audience of the well-educated elite.

The later versions of the Chronicle of the Morea

The Latin principality of Achaia came to an end in 1430; the Byzantine Roman despotate of Mistra lasted a further thirty years before falling to the Ottomans in 1460. It is again the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*, which apparently continued to be enjoyed throughout the fifteenth century, that allows us a distinctive glimpse into the Peloponnese in this period. Manuscripts of the *Chronicle* from the very end of the fifteenth century

⁵ *Journey to Hades*: Barry, Share, Smithies and Westerink 1975.

have survived, and in their handling of the Greek language they strongly suggest a close relationship with the spoken language as it developed into the early modern period. This implies that the *Chronicle* continued to be a genuinely popular work. These later versions of the *Chronicle* also vary from the earlier Copenhagen manuscript in their treatment of Franks and Romans, and thus the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* offers a chance to look into developments in the Peloponnese into the fifteenth century.

The family of manuscripts of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* can be divided up thus:

- the Copenhagen manuscript ('H'), demonstrably the earliest, dating from the 1360s and closely reflecting an earlier lost original;
- the two Paris manuscripts and the Berne manuscript, of which Paris 2898 is the earliest ('P'), dating to the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century; and
- the Turin manuscript, more closely related to the Copenhagen version but also of the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century ('T').⁶

It is practically a given in any examination of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* that P and T reflect a more 'Greek' perspective on the events recounted in the *Chronicle*, in contrast to the more Frankish prejudices of H.⁷ They thus show, it is implied, an eventual rejection of the Frankish presence in the Peloponnese over the course of the fifteenth century. This may well be overstating the case but, at the very least, the differences between these later versions and the earlier H are revelatory of developments during and after the last years of the Frankish principality.

ROMANS AND OTHERS AT THE COURT OF MISTRA

Compared to his predecessors Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, the emperor Manuel Palaiologos makes far scantier use of *Rhomaïos* and its associated vocabulary, with a mere six occurrences only in his *Funeral Oration* on his brother Theodore, despot of the Peloponnese (Appendix 1, p. 301). As we shall see below, Palaiologos preferred to evoke his central sense of identity through the use of 'we', and this was a natural genre-led choice in a speech ostensibly addressed to his subjects in Mistra, as opposed to the purportedly

⁶ Codex Havniensis 57: Schmitt 1904: xv–xvi, xxxvi–xxxviii and 624 under 'Erard III'; Jeffreys 1975: 305–6; Jacoby 1968: 155–9. Codices Parisinus gr. 2898 and Parisinus gr. 2753 and Codex Bernensis gr. 509: Schmitt 1904: xvi–xviii, xxix; Jacoby 1968: 158–9; Lurier 1964: 33–4. Codex Taurinensis B, II.1: Schmitt 1904: xviii, xxvii–xxx; Jacoby 1968: 159; Lurier 1964: 34.

⁷ Cf. Jeffreys 1975: 336–7: 'it has been assumed, probably rightly, that P was written by a Greek who identified himself with those under attack [supp. "in the polemic of H"]' also Lurier 1964: 42–9.

more detached historical form pursued by Gregoras and Kantakouzenos and their predecessors. Nevertheless, there may be more to this than genre as Mazaris too makes comparatively little use of *Rhomaïos* with again just a handful of occurrences (Appendix 1, p. 301). Potentially, this decrease in the use of the terminology of Roman-ness reflects its waning popularity, as denoting a Roman political identity which was increasingly out of step with reality.

Nevertheless, although *Rhomaïos* is so much rarer in both Mazaris and Palaiologos, both writers' use of the terminology of Roman-ness confirms the primarily political content observed in earlier writers. Palaiologos twice uses the genitive formula with *arche*, with the sense of the territorial extent of Byzantine Roman rule, and once with εὐδαιμονία (*eudaimonia*: 'prosperity'), with the sense that the state was flourishing. Similarly, he uses the plain formula once in its collective political sense by saying Bayezid was plotting evil for the Romans, and once in its individual sense – Theodore persuaded 'the Romans and the Rhodians who held towns in the Peloponnese' to make peace (*Funeral Oration* 205.11–12). The context here is the popular protest against the Hospitallers after Theodore sold them rights to his dominion in 1400, and Palaiologos' account is undoubtedly an attempt to vindicate his brother's unpopular policy (*Funeral Oration* 167–211). Here, the *Rhomaïoi* are clearly to be understood as Theodore's subjects, and there does not need to be any ethnic content to this use: Palaiologos has just expatiated at some length on how the involvement of the Hospitallers caused Theodore's subjects to renew their devotion to their beloved despot (cf. *Funeral Oration* 203.8, 203.27). He needs to minimise the very real unpopularity of Theodore at this time and to portray his brother as the true ruler in the Peloponnese, and the use of *Rhomaïoi* at this point is significant in emphasising Theodore's legitimacy and standing, and the subject status of the unruly Peloponnesians. There is less subtlety in Mazaris: all occurrences of *Rhomaïos* are in the genitive formula, and all come within the context of references to the fact of imperial rule and thus bear reference to the state as a collectivity of the Roman people.

Although the references are again scanty, Palaiologos is reminiscent of his predecessors, and of Kantakouzenos in particular, in his treatment of the concept of Roman land. Referring to Theodore's purchase of Corinth from Carlo Tocco in 1396, he credited his brother with the 'recovery' of the city 'which had been for so long torn from the rule of the Romans' – i.e., the city had been under Latin rule since around 1210 (*Funeral Oration* 169.15–16). Similarly, Theodore 'brings home' the cities held by the

Hospitallers in 1402 (*Funeral Oration* 209.12). However, Palaiologos is naturally here talking about successful recovery and, as we have seen in both Kantakouzenos and Gregoras in the cases of Galata and the Peloponnese, the pre-1204 territorial extension of the empire was not always seen as sacrosanct. We should perhaps say that, once it was the case that territory came to be seen as recoverable, then that area was newly celebrated as inherently and immemorially Roman; if however no chance of recovery was to be seen then a more pragmatic attitude prevailed. This attitude can be seen in the historians of the fourteenth century and is continued by Manuel Palaiologos. The evidence in Mazaris is scanty in the extreme, but his reference to the island of Thasos as 'the legendary island of the Romans' (*Journey* 48.25–6) would tend to confirm some territorial aspect to the political Roman identity.

In summary, it is fair to say that, as with all the earlier high status writers, the political Roman identity is also dominant in Manuel Palaiologos' *Funeral Oration* and in the less exalted work of Mazaris, but the sample of terminology is too small for any closer analysis. At the same time, the very smallness of the sample perhaps suggests some failure in the Roman political identity, which was still the primary significance of *Rhomaïos* for such educated writers.

It was shown above how the portrayal of Serbs and Bulgarians in both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos tended towards implying that these peoples were comparable to the Romans, and certainly illustrated far less of the automatic disparagement of others that had been customary in Byzantine Roman culture. The material for such a discussion is once more far scantier in Manuel Palaiologos' *Funeral Oration*. However, Palaiologos was in the rare position for a Byzantine Roman writer of having travelled extensively outside his empire, since he had toured western Europe in search of aid against the Turks from late 1399 to early 1404. In the *Funeral Oration*, he speaks of having visited Italy, France and Britain (163.10–11) – and this is a presentation of the states of western Europe as distinct and powerful political units (albeit somewhat inaccurately in the case of Italy), which perhaps betokens a new realism and respect. Moreover, at 185.28–30 he specifically and unfavourably contrasts the strength of the Romans with that of 'all the western nations (*ethne*)'. Mazaris (*Journey*, e.g. 12.20–1, 62.6–7) is similarly concrete about the western nations in his treatment of the emperor's journey, suggesting that this was a more general perspective on the west. Again, then, in the portrayal of other nations the standing of the Byzantine Romans is seen to have lost some of its lustre, and this

weakening of political status surely continued to be problematic for an identity which had the imperial state at its heart.

As we have seen, both Palaiologos and Mazaris use *Rhomaïos* extremely rarely; thus, alternative forms of self-identification were required. Partly, this is simply a question of genre. In the case of Manuel Palaiologos, the emperor was purportedly addressing an audience and thus he makes extensive use of the first and second persons in his appeal to this audience. Most uses of 'we' refer either specifically to the emperor and his audience qua speaker and listeners, or to their status as the living in contrast to the mourned, but Palaiologos also often refers to himself in the plural third person, not as orator but as actor in the story, as well as using 'we' to refer to the imperial family or members of it. Many occurrences refer to the Byzantine Roman state in much the way we have seen the terminology of Roman-ness employed elsewhere: thus 'we' possess land (e.g. *Funeral Oration* 123.9, 169.12), have enemies (159.3), prosper or decline (101.1, 177.18–19), make war or peace (131.26–7, 163.1) and so on. Interestingly, there is also a macro-'we' employed in application to the Christian world. This is used in Palaiologos' account of the conference at Serres in 1393–4 to refer to all the Christian leaders whom Bayezid had gathered to be at his mercy (139–141). Thus, unlike the more restricted, political, *Rhomaïos*, 'we' can be used across the Roman and Christian groupings. In Palaiologos, as in his predecessors, these groupings were not coterminous: 'we' could denote the *Rhomaioi*, or the *Christianoï*. Nevertheless not all Christians were equally 'we'; when specifically dealt with as a discrete group the Hospitallers could be praised as fellow Christians (*Funeral Oration* 171.25, 195.25–6), but they were also always a 'they' rather than a 'we'.

Moreover, like Choniates two centuries earlier, Palaiologos also had recourse to 'Christians' as an alternative to 'Romans' to provide him with a means effectively to deny Roman status to particular groups who might be considered ethnically but not politically Roman. This was useful when dealing with his recalcitrant subjects in the Peloponnese. Thus, he speaks of pro-Turkish rebels in the Peloponnese as 'the Christians who were in revolt' (129.8). Once again, all Romans were Christians, but not all Christians were Romans, and these rebels, similarly, were not 'we'. Palaiologos later says of such turncoats, 'I don't know what one should call them – Romans and Christians because of their race and their faith or the opposite because of their choice and their actions?' (*Funeral Oration* 161.22–4), and this neatly conveys the interlinking but not identical application of the political and religious identities.

Palaiologos' approach to these recalcitrant Romans of the Peloponnese also reminds one of Kantakouzenos, who, it will be remembered, avoided the use of *Rhomaioi* for those ethnic Romans who chose to be explicitly disloyal to the Byzantine Roman state. In another use of *Christianoï*, Palaiologos speaks of the rebels who sided with the Turks against Theodore Palaiologos in the early days of his despotate, saying that 'the Christians who desert to those ungodly men our enemies are clearly mad . . . it is the most shameful thing of all, to betray their religion and to insult both their honour and their whole race, against whom they have been persuaded to act' (*Funeral Oration* 129.8–9, 24–6). Such bitter comments on his ostensible subjects in the Peloponnese are very similar in tone to those of Kantakouzenos, writing half a century earlier with comparable complaints. Mazaris is also reminiscent of Kantakouzenos in this regard, commenting with heavy sarcasm on the Peloponnesian Romans about:

the loyalty they have to the emperor and the other lawless acts they commit, and the deals they do with one another and the perjuries and the murders . . . they are all demented and bloodthirsty, greedy and vain, always looking for a fight, always false in their loyalties and full of treachery and guile. (*Journey to Hades* 72.13–19)

The overriding impression in Mazaris' treatment of the people of the Peloponnese is of multiple ethnicities, all in their way objectionable and all perpetually quarrelling. At one point, he lists the different groups resident in the Peloponnese: Lakedaimonians, Italians, Peloponnesians, Slavs, Illyrians (i.e. Albanians), Egyptians (i.e. Romans), Jews and those who were of mixed ethnicity (*Journey* 76.18–23). The *Rhomaioi* are conspicuous by their absence, but the residents of the Peloponnese certainly included ethnic Romans – where are these to be found in Mazaris' list?

It is clear that the ethnic Romans would come under the headings of the *Λακεδαιμόνες* (*Lakedaimones*: Lakedaimonians) and the *Peloponnesioi*. Of these the first, the *Lakedaimones*, must be the residents living in and around ancient Sparta, those ethnic Romans from the rich agricultural land of the Lakonian plain in the valley of the Evrotas, which stretches east and south from Mistra. In other words, these were the local Romans with whom the courtiers of Mistra would have had most to do.

Earlier, Mazaris had called the people of this region *Λάκωνες* (*Lakones*: Lakonians) and had explicitly linked this group with Peloponnesians by the key fact that both spoke Greek poorly (see below, p. 257). He had introduced the Lakonians and the Peloponnesians in the context of his own supposed fear that, living in the Peloponnese, he would become 'barbarised'

in his speech, and he had given two examples of what he feared might happen. Firstly, he might start speaking Greek like a named *Peloponnesios*, Synadeos Kormeias, who we gather had come to Constantinople at some point and had been notorious for his awful provincial Greek (64.11–12). Alternatively, he might start speaking Greek like the Lakonians: Mazaris gives examples of the Greek of these Lakonians, and it is recognisably spoken demotic (64.13–16).

Returning to the list, then, it would seem that both the *Peloponnesioi* and the *Lakedaimones* were ethnic Romans, uneducated by Constantinopolitan or Mistran standards, in other words typical provincial Romans. It is true that Mazaris elsewhere speaks of *Peloponnesioi* in what seems a loose and general way: he says that he was advised to go ‘to the Peloponnesians’, i.e. to the Peloponnese (66.20); he says he will relate and describe the way of life ‘of the Peloponnesians’ (e.g. 68.7, 16, 26, 29) and (eventually) he goes on to speak of the mixture of ethnic groups. In such usages, *Peloponnesioi* could be understood very generally as ‘those who live in the Peloponnese’; however, the appearance of the *Peloponnesioi* in the ethnic list shows that they could also be understood as one group among many, and it is very likely that, being not westerners, people from the Balkans, gypsies or Jews, they were the ethnic Romans of the Peloponnese, people like the unfortunate Kormeias. It is unclear why the *Peloponnesioi* are distinguished from the *Lakedaimones* or *Lakones*; perhaps the latter simply had a strong regional identity within the Peloponnese.

Manuel Palaiologos also employs *Peloponnesioi* on one occasion for the ethnic Romans of the Peloponnese, or, at least, for the subjects of the despotate of Mistra (*Funeral Oration* 111.10). The reference is to the Peloponnesians looking forward to the coming of the despot, and this is thus an example of the avoidance of *Rhomaioi* for subjects of the empire, even when those subjects appear to have been loyal. Likewise, although Mazaris presents the Lakedaimonians and the Peloponnesians as disloyal and rebellious, it is manifestly clear that they should be considered as subjects of the Byzantine Roman emperor.

Arguably, the avoidance of *Rhomaioi* for such Peloponnesian subjects, which is apparent in both Palaiologos and Mazaris but goes back at least as far as Kantakouzenos, demonstrates a growing prejudice among the Byzantine Roman ruling class against these kinds of provincials. Perhaps the Roman elite customarily no longer thought of such ethnic Romans as *Rhomaioi* because of their supposed lack of education, lack of civilisation and culture, their general lack of what made Byzantine Romans special – in the eyes of this elite. This lack could be summed up and was in fact

made manifest by their poor (i.e. demotic) Greek. Although this can only be supposition, it is a credible theory in the general context of Constantinopolitan contempt for the provinces and the pattern of use in the elite writers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Turning to the terminology of *Hellen*, despite the strong trend of self-identifying Hellenism which is known to have existed at the Mistran court, there are in Palaiologos and Mazaris only minimal traces of this trend.⁸ Manuel Palaiologos, like Gregoras, twice contrasts Hellenes and barbarians, but in his case with absolutely no contemporary reference (*Funeral Oration* 215.5–6 and 219.15–16). He compares Theodore to great men of the past, and naturally turns to the Homeric heroes, to Hercules and to some historical figures. It is worth stressing that he does not at any point identify his brother as a *descendant* of the ancient Greek heroes, and equally no link is made between the ancient Persian enemy and the contemporary Ottoman, beyond the customary use of *Perses* for Turks.⁹ Moreover, Palaiologos does not unequivocally exalt the men of old: in fact, the comparison with the great men of the ancient world turns out to be to Theodore's advantage. For Palaiologos, the contrast between the barbarian and the Hellene is firmly placed in the ancient past, and has no contemporary reference beyond that of being an *exemplum* and a rhetorical device. This is closer to Gregoras than to Kantakouzenos.

The Byzantine Romans knew that Mistra was just a couple of miles from ancient Sparta and this clearly played a part in fostering Hellenising self-identification under such men as Gemistos Plethon. In this regard, the nearest Palaiologos comes to any identification between Theodore and the *exempla* from the past is to remark of Agesilaus that 'he had reigned here', i.e. in Sparta (*Funeral Oration* 221.1). Mazaris too repeatedly identifies Mistra with Sparta (e.g. *Journey* 64.11, 68.17, 76.6); however, like Palaiologos, he uses the terminology of Hellenism with minimal self-identification. One use is linguistic: some doctors are criticised for not knowing 'Hellenic letters' (*Journey* 10.35), making this a pure reflection of Byzantine Roman diglossia and familiar from Choniates and Pachymeres in particular. The other use is almost certainly simply geographical, 'Hellenic house' (26.29) denotes 'a house in Hellas', i.e. in southern Greece (cf. *Funeral Oration* 143.7). In both Palaiologos and Mazaris, such uses come across as erudite

⁸ Woodhouse 1986: 107–9, 223–8.

⁹ At least one contemporary panegyrist chose rather to assert that the Palaiologoi were descended from the Roman Flavii: Angelov 2007: 108–9.

display rather than ethnic identification. Mazaris also makes a single use of *Graikos* (46.14), and it is in the mouth of a Latin; one reference is not much, but this would tend to confirm that *Graikos* continued to be viewed as a foreigners' word for the Romans and not self-identifying.

Manuel Palaiologos, like Gregoras, Kantakouzenos and the fourteenth-century author of the Greek *Chronicle*, presents barbarians as undifferentiated hordes rather than as individuals. As with Kantakouzenos and the *Chronicle*, there is in Palaiologos a strong correlation between being barbarian and being non-Christian: in the *Funeral Oration* no less than fifteen of the eighteen occurrences of *barbaros* and its cognates apply to Ottoman Turks. In fact, *barbaros* is Palaiologos' commonest term for the Ottomans, who are also called 'the ungodly', 'Persians', 'Turks', the 'enemies of the faith' or 'enemies of the cross' and 'Mohammed's people'; these alternatives confirm the religious aspect as the primary marker in Palaiologos' conception of the 'barbarian' Ottomans.

But, again like Kantakouzenos, Palaiologos can also characterise Christians as barbarians, since he speaks of 'the many barbarian peoples' (*Funeral Oration* 153.7) who were effectively liberated by Theodore's escape from the Ottomans in 1394. The signification is not clear, but the context strongly suggests that these peoples were located in southern Greece and that these *barbaroi* stand in contrast to the Peloponnesian Romans, to the duchy of Athens under Nerio Acciajuoli and to the Albanians settled in the Peloponnese. In default of other options, it is therefore likely that these barbarians should be identified with the Slavic tribes of the Peloponnese and, perhaps, also with the Latins of the principality of Achaia.¹⁰ In the final analysis, this reference to 'the many barbarian peoples' seems more comprehensive than specific – a reference to 'everyone' rather than to any specific groupings – but at any rate Manuel is certainly referring here to non-Muslim Christian peoples. Apart from this ambiguous reference, however, Palaiologos does not associate barbarism with westerners, and this is in a logical progression from the historians of the fourteenth century. Again, like Gregoras, Kantakouzenos and Akropolites, Palaiologos is relatively restrained in his use of the stock abuse of others, but he does associate the *barbaros* with lack of trustworthiness (207.5–6) – a familiar charge by the Byzantine Romans.

Mazaris also describes Slavs (78.17) and Turks (82.13) as barbarians and thus he too retains a generalised understanding of *barbaros* in its ethnic

¹⁰ Chrysostomides 1985: 152–3, n. 76.

sense of the non-Roman; the continuing influence of this established ideology is shown in the ethnic application of *barbaros* to the Slavic northerners (albeit these were long-settled in the Peloponnese) and to non-Christians. However, these two occurrences are in fact atypical of Mazaris' use of the terminology of barbarism where, in fact, he presents a striking contrast with Manuel Palaiologos and his predecessors.

Mazaris' use of *barbaros* is overwhelmingly cultural (and especially linguistic) in reference, and has only a minimal sense of denoting ethnic groups; this is shown by the fact that Mazaris uses the terminology of barbarism most of all in application to ethnic Romans. As noted above, Mazaris castigates the Peloponnesians for their poor Greek, and adds: 'I'm afraid . . . that I myself might become barbarised just like the Lakonians have become barbarised, those people who are now called Tzakonians. They say "grab 'em" and "hand 'em over" and "hold 'em" . . . and other such barbarisms'.¹¹ In the past, one sign of the barbarian non-Roman had been that he spoke Greek poorly if at all, and this traditional ideology is at the root of Mazaris' patronising comments here. Certainly, the application of *barbaros* to the ethnically Roman Peloponnesians reflects the typical long-standing Constantinopolitan contempt for the provincials as at best semi-Roman, and so there is some ethnic content here. Thus too, the description of the local, ethnically Roman, barons of the Peloponnese as 'barbarised' (82.18–19), which comes in the context of the account of their revolt against Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, reflects their behaviour and their cultural level – both seen as appalling. However, when Mazaris says that he himself might become barbarised, the ethnic content has been reduced to a minimum. In effect, the well-established associations of the terminology of barbarism with poor Greek have worked to produce a rhetorical model for any description of Greek style; thus, Mazaris elsewhere praises an orator (somewhat sarcastically) for his faultless, 'unbarbarised', Greek style (58.3).

Ironically, then, Mazaris' desire to denigrate the Peloponnese and its people has had the result that, of all people, ethnic Romans are most thoroughly presented as barbarians in the *Journey to Hades*. This is an extreme reflection of the Constantinopolitan disdain for provincials that has been observed in all the elite historians. This educated chauvinism can be traced back to before the Fourth Crusade, but the fact of the Frankish conquest and occupation of provinces like the Peloponnese seems to have

¹¹ Δέδοιχα . . . ἥ ἵνα μὴ βαρβαρωθῶ καὶ αὐτός ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες βεβαρβάρωνται, καὶ νῦν κέκληνται Τζάκωνες, καὶ 'πιάσων τὰ' καὶ 'δώσον τὰ' καὶ 'σφίξων τὰ' . . . καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα βάρβαρα λέγουσι. *Journey to Hades* 64.10–16.

intensified the prejudice. On the evidence of historians from Akropolites to Kantakouzenos, and through to Palaiologos and Mazaris in the fifteenth century, this intensification had arisen because the long-perceived cultural, educational and linguistic deficiencies were now married to actual or alleged disloyalty to the empire and the Byzantine Roman state. This combination denied the provincials any part in the political Roman identity which was dominant among the ruling class, and educated writers thus also avoided calling such provincials *Rhomaioi*.

PELOPONNESIAN IDENTITIES IN THE LATER GREEK *CHRONICLE*
OF THE MOREA

For any kind of view from the much denigrated provincial ethnic Romans of the Peloponnese in the fifteenth century, it is necessary to turn again to the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*. It is clear that this work continued to be enjoyed in the Peloponnese in the fifteenth century, with four extant versions dating from the late fifteenth and into the sixteenth century. These versions show substantial changes and updating which can only reflect changing circumstances in the Peloponnese such that, on analysis, they permit of a viewpoint on the fifteenth century in comparison with the fourteenth.

It is firstly clear from the changes made to the later versions of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* that, some century at least after the death of the last of the Villehardouin princes, there was less loyalty to the principality and less attachment towards Franks. Both P (Codex Parisinus gr. 2898 of c.1500) and T (Codex Taurinensis B, II.1) reflect a more positive attitude to Byzantine Romans, and this seems a natural reflection of the state of affairs in the fifteenth century; nevertheless, the overall picture of considerable ethnic assimilation remains strong in the later versions.

One obvious point is that the audience for the Greek *Chronicle* was now more Greek-speaking. Thus, of the two references in H to things 'the Romans say' (the *hamotsoukin*, or picnic, and the *hiereis*, or Roman priests), the former is omitted in both T and P, and the *hiereis* reference does not appear in P. Moreover, some items of vocabulary of French origin which appear in H are replaced with Greek terms in P and T: T replaces the παρλαμᾶ (*parlama*: French 'parlement') of H with συντηχία (*syntechia*) (443t), and P speaks of the Συντροφία of the Catalans, rather than H's Κουμπάνια (7273, 7283, 7295). These linguistic changes may thus signal a diminution in the non-Roman contingent of the audience over time. Again, of the two authorial references in the H to the Franks as 'our people' (636) and 'we Franks' (846), the first is altered in P to 'their people' and the

second is omitted; both are omitted in T. Hence, the audiences did not include any significant contingent who would have identified themselves as Franks.

Similarly, most anti-Roman comments are omitted or toned down in both P and T. Of the lengthy polemical passages, all but the first are omitted or abridged in both P and T (see above, pp. 215–17). Moreover, several incidents of anti-Roman sentiment which are more in the way of passing comments are also toned down or omitted. Thus, where in H's account of the battle of Prinitsa 'God gave victory to the Franks and was angry with the Romans', P omits the divine wrath (4802). H makes this battle a victory of 300 Franks over 15,000 Romans, in P the Romans numbered a much less shameful 1,000 (5011). Dealing with Prince William's return from Apulia in 1268 to deal with a Roman revolt in the Peloponnese, H speaks of 'the lawless Romans . . . who never hold to their truth or oath' and had 'become foresworn' (7132, 7157, 7180); these comments are omitted in P. However, when criticism of Romans is put directly into the mouth of the prince (7185–6), there is only minimal change in P whereby ἀπιστων (*apiston*: faithless) in H becomes ταπεινῶν (*tapeinon*: wretched) in P and the Romans are still presented as disloyal. This reveals a relatively subtle understanding of the text in this version: scribe and audience can appreciate that the prince may well have seen the Romans as untrustworthy.

The treatment of such comments in T is less careful, but betrays a stronger pro-Roman sentiment. In T, the Romans of the Peloponnese are the victors against the Franks at the battle of Koundouras (1735), and the whole account of the Frankish victories at Prinitsa and Makry Plagi in the late 1260s is omitted (4680–5740). In its account of Prince William's return to the Peloponnese, all the anti-Roman comments cited above are omitted and the passages have been rewritten to minimise any blame on the Romans. Thus, H tells how 'the Romans trampled on their oath and began the war', while T says that 'they quarrelled and began to fight, the people of the prince together with the Romans' (7132–3); again, in T, Prince William's criticism of Romans is replaced by a rueful 'quarrels are the way of the world!' (7185–6). But T, which presents as a far less impressive version by a far less careful scribe, is not as thoroughgoing as P. The latter typically tones down H's laudatory tone in dealing with Franks: Princes Geoffrey I, Geoffrey II and William are each described in turn in H as 'a wise man' but not in P (1576, 2753 and 5701), yet the first two of these epithets survive intact in T.

It is also noticeable that P rewrites the 'obituary notices' on all three Villehardouin princes, and not to their credit. In P, Geoffrey I is no longer said to have died 'as a Christian' (2460), and angels no longer take the soul

of Geoffrey II (2754); P omits the reference to William going to Paradise (7760) and to 'there where are all the just' (7805 – although his soul is at least taken by angels). This may reflect a more Orthodox perspective in P, which is also less deferential about the pope and furthermore has no truck with the idea of crusade as a religious observance, omitting all such references (cf. 2089–95). Moreover, in its account of the compromise between Geoffrey de Villehardouin and the Peloponnesian Romans, P focuses on religion, with the reference to custom and law (2095) entirely omitted. In H the Romans ask that the Franks 'not force us to change our faith for the faith of the Franks', which in P becomes 'not force us to change our faith and to become Franks' (2093–4). However, this Orthodox perspective is peculiar to P, and all reflections of Catholic practice in the earlier H have survived in T, which is also closer to the original with regard to the Villehardouin princes.

P has a more careful attitude to the apparatus of Byzantine Roman rule. Michael Palaiologos is addressed as 'lord, holy emperor' in P, instead of the simple 'lord' of H and T (4297) and is again 'holy' only in P at 4527. Revealingly, P is far more careful with the term *basileus* (emperor), not allowing it to be applied to Prince William, even in the mouth of a Turk (5320, 5720), and P similarly correctly avoids the use of 'despot' for the early Byzantine Roman commanders at Mistra (cf. 4903, 5118). Generally speaking, T follows H in this respect; however, both later versions display a friendlier attitude to specific Byzantine Roman figures. Both P and T omit elements of the unflattering portrayal of the Nikaian sebastokrator ordering the slaughter of his own troops at Pelagonia (4047–50). In H, the sebastokrator is 'greatly shamed and made angry' by Prince William's attitude after the battle, while in P he is 'vexed, much grieved and made very angry'; the shame is similarly omitted in T (4183–4). Again, H gives a highly hostile account of the (supposed) slaughter of John IV Laskaris by Michael Palaiologos, which is wholly omitted in T and heavily abridged in P (4043ff.). Correspondingly, as we have seen, there is a less positive approach in P at least to the leaders of the Franks. In addition to the Villehardouins, the portrayal of Geoffrey de Briel is toned down in P: his description as 'that wonderful acclaimed soldier' (3857) is omitted and the lament on his death (7224–32) is cut short. Maybe the folk memory of this figure had diminished, as it is worth noting that the later Erard de Maure is remembered in similarly glowing terms in P (8470–3).

Indeed, much of the material noted above as evidence for a good working relationship between Franks and Romans in the Peloponnese of the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is lacking in P and in T. In neither do the Peloponnesian Romans come over to the Franks in 1204 'with eagerness' (1499), and P tones down the joy felt by William's subjects when he returned from Apulia in 1268 (7173–6). P presents the death of Geoffrey de Briel as a misfortune for the Franks, where H makes the grief more general (7213–9); T attaches no blame to the men of Skorta who went over to the side of the Byzantine Romans of Mistra in 1264, where in H their action is 'a great sin' and in P 'a great mistake' (4676). P rewrites the battle of Makry Plagi to play up Roman successes against the Franks (5379, 5390), and so on. It is clear from all this, firstly, that the scribes of the later versions, and so perhaps also the members of the fifteenth-century audience, associated themselves more strongly with the name of Romans and rejected any negative characterisations of Romans in the *Chronicle*. Secondly, the *Chronicle* was no longer a work meant explicitly for an audience within the Frankish principality. P especially betrays signs of being produced in a Byzantine Roman context with, firstly, its greater knowledge of and respect for imperial institutions and Orthodoxy and, secondly, its lack of sureness on the minutiae of the Frankish state. P makes mistakes about feudal practice (e.g. at 3365–6 or 4329) and also tends to collapse H's collections of ranks (lieges, bannerets, burgesses, knights etc.) into simpler formulations, and this again may reflect a lack of understanding (e.g. 7418, 8139–40, 8631–2). All these changes seem unsurprising in the context of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Nevertheless, it is still important not to overstate the levels of ethnic identification in the later versions of the *Chronicle*. Firstly, plenty of French language had been retained among the audiences of the *Chronicle*. At 7994, where H uses the French κομεσίουν (*komesioun*) as a translation of the Greek πρόσταγμα (*prostagma*: order), both P and T omit this explicit translation; however, at 8629 P actually employs *komesioun* in place of H's *prostagma*. P's use of western μπαστάρδος (*mpastardos*: bastard) in place of H's Greek νόθος (*nothos*) is also striking (3088).¹² More subtly, western languages pervade the Greek *Chronicle* in all its versions.¹³ Feudal terms, names for titles and offices, and terms associated with warfare, travel or the Roman church by and large survive into P and T, thus in a sample but far from exhaustive list:

¹² Spadaro 1961: 32 and 38 for P's use of French terminology additional to that of H.

¹³ Discussed extensively, though primarily with reference to H, in Lurier 1964: 42–52; Spadaro 1960 and 1961; Jeffreys 1975: 307–14; Kahane and Kahane 1982: 136–40.

fief	Η φίε, Ρ φέη, Τ φόει at 1914 (and <i>passim</i> in this list of fiefs)
barony	Η μπαρουνία, Ρ μπαρουνία, Τ μπαρουνία at 1929
homage	Η όμάντζο, Ρ όμάντζε, Τ τὸ μαζω at 1554 and cf. 1558, 1867, 3185
register	Η ριτζένστρο, Ρ ριτζίστρο, Τ ρεγίστρο at 2077
lady	Η ντάμα, Ρ μαντάμα, Τ ντάεα at 7458
castellan	Η κιβιτᾶνος, Ρ κιβιτᾶνος, Τ κηβοτάνο, at 2229 and cf. 2254, 6509
conquest	Η κουγκέστα, Ρ κογκίστα, Τ γκονκούέστα at 1023 and cf. 1859, 2452
truce	Η τρέβα, Ρ τρέβα, Τ τρέβα at 6882 (and cf. 8401 not Τ, 8704 not Ρ)
trebuchet	Η τριπουτσέτο, Ρ τριμπουτσέτο, Τ τρεμπουζέτο at 1412 and cf. 1700
cardinal	Η γαρδενάριν, Ρ γαρδινάλεον, Τ γαρδενέλε at 485.

Most of these words are of French origin, but Italian influence is also clear and is more noticeable in Τ and Ρ than in Η. For example, Ρ and Τ make general use of μισέρ (*miser*) from the Italian *misere/missier* in place of Η's μισίρ (*misir*) from the French *messier*; see also in Ρ:

καντσιλιέρης	from the Italian <i>cancelliere</i> , in place of Η's κλέρης (2329)
γατία	from the Italian <i>gatto</i> , in place of Η's κατσία (2932).

This shift again reflects the changing ethnic patterns in the Peloponnese of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, where most western immigrants were now Italian rather than French or Flemish, but also indicates the continuing currency of western imports into the spoken Greek of the Peloponnese into the fifteenth century. This should be taken as confirming the patterns of mixed language acquisition and knowledge at the courts of the Peloponnese where such a work as the *Chronicle* might be heard or read.

Mazaris can give some sketchy confirmation of this. Although the satirist devotes considerable space to his portrait of a Peloponnese racked by ethnic division and continual quarrels, the *Journey to Hades* nevertheless provides evidence for cross-ethnic friendships and working associations in the fifteenth century, and also for the blurring of ethnic markers. The *Journey* suggests that court Romans had a working familiarity with western languages: the Italian 'Syrbartholomaios Ntealagkaskos' (almost certainly the Italian Bartholomew de Langosco) greets Mazaris in Italian, and the dead

Romans Padiates and Pepagomenos use western words, commenting 'as the Latins say' (28.25, 38.24). Moreover, Bartholomew's son was working alongside Mazaris at the Byzantine Roman court (*Journey* 46.9ff.); Bartholomew and his son clearly both spoke Greek, and the father at least had also converted to Orthodoxy – in fact, Bartholomew prides himself on speaking better Greek, and being more purely Orthodox than at least one Roman (48.2–3). It is worth considering, then, that many Franks could now (as the fifteenth century progressed) be speaking Greek as a first language, going to Orthodox churches and even be subjects of the Roman despotate. The Frankish heritage was one element in the Peloponnesian identity, which could be remembered with pride by some at least as a part of the past.¹⁴

Most basically, the *Chronicle of the Morea* must remain a story of the deeds of the Franks, and plenty of material remains which is positive about the westerners. P's lament on Erard le Maure, Frankish lord of the barony of Arkadia in Messenia, has already been mentioned: 'he enriched the orphans, the widows were made happy, the poor and unfortunate became wealthy in the time of which I speak, the time of the lord of Arkadia. Remember him, all of you, he was a good lord' (P8470–3). It is clear that the le Maure family held special associations for the author/scribe of both H and P, and it has been posited that the Greek *Chronicle* was a product of their baronial court. A French family who had settled in the principality after the fall of Constantinople, the le Maures held Arkadia on the western coast of Messenia and St Sauveur in the south-west near Modon. Such baronies were comparatively secure from Byzantine Roman incursions, and the le Maure family rose to greater prominence over the fourteenth century as the principality shrank. On the death of Erard III in 1388, the le Maure baronies went to Andronikos Asen Zaccaria, under whose son, Centurione II, the barony of Arkadia was the last fragment of the Frankish principality to fall into the hands of the Byzantine Romans. The le Maures certainly did not hold themselves aloof from the Romans: in the 1380s Erard III le Maure's daughter was married to John Laskaris Kalopheros, an Orthodox convert to Catholicism. The author/scribe of P presents as an Orthodox Roman who was nevertheless ready to acknowledge the le Maure barons as having been a legitimate power. Furthermore, although the author/scribe of P does not appeal to his audience as much as that of H, he is capable of a direct appeal to listening westerners: 'Listen, archons, Franks and Romans'

¹⁴ Cf. Claude 1998: 127–30 on the aristocratic 'Gothic consciousness' in largely Romanised Visigothic Spain.

(724), and, in the words on Erard, P's author/scribe invited his audience to think kindly of a Frankish lord, while also clearly expecting them to be pro-Roman in outlook. The Arkadian court, the longest-lasting remnant of the Frankish principality, which was on friendly terms with Romans and may well have continued in the same hands under the Byzantine Roman despotate and even into the Turkish era, is thus a credible point of origin for the Greek *Chronicle*.

BEING ROMAN IN THE FIFTEENTH-CENTURY PELOPONNESE

In conclusion, we have seen that the educated writers, including Mazaris, were concerned to minimise if not deny the Roman identity of the provincial ethnic Romans of the Peloponnese. However, the evidence of the Greek *Chronicle* shows that these provincials themselves had no difficulty thinking of themselves as Romans: this was, in fact, the dominant ethnonym for those who were not of western, Slavic, Turkish or Albanian origin in the Peloponnese, and this dominance of the centuries-old ethnonym should not be surprising. The Romans of the Peloponnese called themselves *Rhomaioi* based on a nexus of transgenerational ethnic criteria including law, language and religion; loyalty to the emperor in Constantinople had formed an important part of this identity, but this had already been considerably undermined at the time of the Frankish conquest. By the fifteenth century, the Romans of the Peloponnese were forgetting the Frankish elements of their past, and the success of Mistra may well have encouraged the kind of greater familiarity with Byzantine Roman norms that is detectable in P, while not guaranteeing any political loyalty to the Roman state. Overall, the Peloponnese of the later versions of the Greek *Chronicle* presents as a society content with its past but gradually forgetting the Frankish elements.

Is it possible to reconcile the Greek *Chronicle* with Manuel Palaiologos and Mazaris? Certainly, the later versions (which after all tell the story of the thirteenth century and reflect the fifteenth only in scribal detail) cannot be used to support the story of continual enmity and revolt that appears in the elite writers. However, as we have seen, the *Chronicle* generally reflects the kind of picture of cross-ethnic allegiances and lack of ethnic solidarity that might lie at the heart of Palaiologos' and Mazaris' complaints. Perhaps most of all, the *Chronicle* underlines an insularity and dislike of outsiders that had come to be characteristic of the Peloponnese.

At the opening of the thirteenth century, the Franks had found it fairly easy to establish themselves in the Peloponnese. Like many parts of the

empire, the Peloponnese had to some extent fallen out of love with the empire, and this had been helpful to Leon Sgouros in establishing his own local power base just as others were doing in Asia Minor and the Pontos. Yet this was not simply insularity at work: the peripheral subjects of the empire had become disenchanted with an imperial rule from Constantinople that was both distant and ineffective. Thus, alien westerners could be and were welcomed if they offered the opportunity for effective and orderly administration which allowed the local *archontes* to prosper. Leon Sgouros resisted the Franks, but this was a continuation of his long-standing campaign against any authority. Similarly, although many Peloponnesian *archontes* fled to Epiros, many also stayed and actively cooperated with the new Frankish regime. Thus, in the thirteenth century, the Moreots could be characterised as inward-looking but ready to accept outside influence if it served their interests. There was a strong preference for an administration that was both closer at hand and more effective than had been the case with the imperial rule from Constantinople under the Angeloi. As the region continued to prosper under the rule of the Villehardouins, both Franks and Romans of the principality had good cause to be content.

The absentee rule of the Angevins was inevitably resented. Just as in the bad old days under the Angeloi, the principality suffered from a distant and ineffective rule. It is clear that for some time the Byzantine Roman rule established at Mistra benefited by comparison, across the ethnic divide, just as established noble families also attracted loyalty. Over the course of his lengthy tenure as despot in Mistra (1349–80), Manuel Kantakouzenos had been able to develop considerable local loyalty, which did not help Theodore Palaiologos when he came to take over in 1382. As the fourteenth century wore on, there was plainly much less positivity towards Mistra, as witness the frequent revolts against Theodore.

Manuel Palaiologos and Mazaris both show that the local Romans of the Peloponnese did not universally appreciate rule from Mistra. In the 1380s, the revolt against Theodore Palaiologos was supported by ‘many of the local people’ (*Funeral Oration* 117.21); in the 1390s, he was opposed by ‘men related to us by blood’ who ‘did not wish to be ruled by him’ (*Funeral Oration* 125.24–5, 127.29). Manuel Palaiologos says of these men that they were motivated by the desire for wealth and renown (*Funeral Oration* 129.15–16). Local rebels sided on occasion with both the Navarrese and the Turks (*Funeral Oration* 123.19–20, 159.1). Mazaris similarly confirms the Peloponnesian revolt against Manuel II Palaiologos in 1415 (*Journey to Hades* 82.14–86.6).

All this strongly implies that, by the end of the fourteenth century, many in the Peloponnese did not welcome imperial rule. There are several reasons for this development. Economically, there had been a decline in prosperity, not aided by the disruption and depopulation caused by the Black Death. The Navarrese Company had upset the balance of power in the Peloponnese, and the Ottoman Turks were making steady inroads against which Mistra did not seem able to mount effective resistance. The despotate of Mistra was great in itself, culturally remarkable and with an imperially high opinion of itself, but it was not so popular with many of its subjects.

Mazaris gives a hint of a reason for this – a contempt, perhaps a resentment, for the outsiders who made up the imperial court and administration. Bemoaning his miserable situation in the Peloponnese, he asks what will the rebellious locals ‘do to me and those like me, who are called “easterners” by the Peloponnesians?’ Here there is a suggestion that the court of Mistra was seen by some locals at least as an alien imposition. It is abundantly clear from Mazaris that many courtiers saw the locals, in an elite attitude with a very long history, as ill-educated, poor-spoken bumpkins; that the local subjects had an equally strong and negative perception of their rulers should come as no surprise. This was, nevertheless, perhaps representative of a failure on the part of the despotate to take advantage of strong local loyalties as the Franks had earlier been able to do.

At 8266, P nicely reinforces that insularity and resentment of outsiders that may be seen as characteristic of the Peloponnese at the end of the Byzantine period, an insularity which nevertheless managed to absorb and to varying extent assimilate so many different groupings. A newly arrived Frank is speaking, it is the young nephew of the deceased Geoffrey de Briel, come to inherit the fief unaware that his inheritance has become null and void through his uncle’s treachery. In H, the baulked and resentful Geoffrey speaks of ‘those wretched [δῆμιους: *demious*] Moreots’ whom he sees as disinheriting him. In what must be a reaction of injured pride on the part of this or some previous scribe – who thereby perhaps unwittingly identifies himself with the baronial court of the Frankish principality – this has in P been incongruously amended to ‘those worthy [τίμιους: *timious*] Moreots’. It is the kind of insularity and localised pride that we have seen reflected, whether wryly or with despair, in both Mazaris and Manuel Palaiologos – who were each themselves, be it remembered, outsiders.

Roman identity and the response to the Franks

QUESTIONS . . .

This investigation began with a set of linked hypotheses. Centrally, it was proposed that the Frankish conquest and occupation constituted an event of extreme significance for the Byzantine Roman identity which brought about developments in the way the Romans viewed themselves. In detail, it was proposed that, in the period following 1204:

- There was no single uniform sense of ethnic identity among the Romans (that is, the inhabitants of the territory under the rule of the emperor in Constantinople in the period preceding the conquest of 1204).
- Ethnic identities among the Romans were not static during this period but developed in response to major political changes.
- The phenomenon of Frankish conquest and rule was the single most critical impetus for developments in the ethnic identities of the Romans during this period.

The investigation began with a setting of the scene on the eve of the Frankish conquest of 1204. Firstly, the evidence revealed that it was permissible to speak of Roman ethnic identity at this time. The imperial Byzantine Roman identity was shown to be a group identity professed or implied by the individuals of the empire; this identity consisted of three major strands: the political, the religious and the cultural, all of which were seen to have a long history and to gain their validation from their age-old quality. There was a particularly strong contrast between the Roman and the non-Roman other, the barbarian. The political aspect to Roman identity was rooted in the fact of imperial rule from Constantinople, and this was thus a facet of identity which potentially all subjects of the Byzantine Roman state could share. Being ruled from Constantinople was a very significant criterion of what it was to be Roman; it constituted the roots of the state in the trans-ethnic classical Roman empire, and was most vividly and readily seen in operation in the continuing primacy of *Rhomaioi* as

the self-identifying term for the group and the individual members of the group. However, over time, this group name could lose the resonance of its imperial heritage, which could signal a crisis for the political aspect of Roman identity. The political identity also had strong territorial associations, with all territory that had historically been a part of the empire being potentially Roman. Given the dominance of Constantinople, there was a risk that the balance between the wealthy and prestigious capital and the less privileged provinces could be lost. With the loss of rival centres of influence in the east from the eleventh century – such as Antioch, lost to the Seljuks in 1084 – this risk would only increase.¹

Turning to the religious aspect of Roman identity, the Byzantine Roman empire – the *oikoumene* – was traditionally seen as the earthly realm of Christians such that to be Christian was to be a subject of the empire and vice versa. The emperor was thus an earthly ruler with a sacral role. Although there had always been minority religious sects within the Byzantine Roman *oikoumene*, the sole validity of the Orthodox rite had become more and more strongly established and had formed a close association with the imperial rule; this tight link was especially forged during the iconoclast struggles of the eighth and ninth centuries when legitimacy of rule went hand in hand with religious Orthodoxy. This political aspect of the religious identity ran into problems as multiple Christian states developed that did not necessarily acknowledge Byzantine Roman supremacy, either in the combined political–religious sense, or more subtly in the recognition of Orthodox correctness. It might be that the outward manifestations of the Orthodox religion would become increasingly associated with being Roman in such a way as to limit the profession of Orthodoxy to one group of Christians, so that eventually it might seem that only Romans could be Orthodox, in conflict with the ideal of religious ecumenism. Again, Orthodoxy might spread beyond the borders of the Byzantine Roman state so that the political entity would lose its especial and unique sacral role, and thereby a great deal of ideological buttressing.

Thirdly, the Roman identity carried and implied a great deal of cultural baggage, which constituted further ethnic criteria, although this was the aspect of identity that was liable to most variety over the millennial history of the empire. Markers of ethnic identity included the Greek language and styles of dress and appearance – these latter, of course, underwent change over the centuries. The Greek language was never the only language used

¹ Magdalino 1993b: 109.

in the eastern Roman empire but, from its earliest centuries, Greek was dominant in administration and the arts, and was spoken by the majority of subjects. With the contraction of the empire this dominance grew, although the fact of diglossia between the educated and demotic forms of Greek was a potentially divisive force. Also of crucial significance as cultural markers of identity were the acceptance of the political and religious identities. Romans could be identified by their modes of administration, law and religious worship; Romans would furthermore have their origins at least within the territorial sphere of Byzantine Roman political control and would acknowledge a history of imperial rule.

It was noted that the *Rhomaioi* stood in contrast to the non-Roman *barbaros* and this constituted a very strong boundary in the ethnic sense. Here as in so much else the Byzantine Romans owed a debt to and asserted a link with the ancient Romans and Hellenes. The barbarians were fundamentally all those who lived outside the Roman *oikoumene*, in all senses. They were rural and wandering as opposed to settled and urban, they had no written traditions of law and government and were uncontrolled in their behaviour, and they did not acknowledge the primacy of the emperor although they were in a sense his wayward subjects. They were essentially pagan as opposed to Christian, and immoral as opposed to moral; they could not speak Greek (at least not intelligibly or well) and were uneducated. They were inimical to the Romans, although they could be tamed enough to serve the empire, particularly in the military arena which was their natural forte. The Roman/barbarian dichotomy thus served to emphasise Roman superiority, and this would prove problematic when the Romans were clearly no longer able to claim effective superiority, although the first reaction would be a hardening of attitudes. Moreover, as the modes of living of various, supposedly barbaric, peoples changed, it would become harder to class them as barbarians. Either the barbarian model would have to change but continue in application to all non-Romans, or this universality of the model of the non-Roman barbarian would have to be abandoned and the Romans would need to acknowledge that some people were neither Roman nor barbarian. Either way, the conviction of uniqueness and superiority which lay at the heart of the Roman identity would be under threat.

AND ANSWERS . . .

In all discussions of Byzantine Roman identity, it is vital to bear in mind that our evidence base is skewed in favour of the elite of Roman society.

For example, when assessing the significance of Constantinople in the minds of the Romans, or the significance of the Hellenic heritage, or the fundamentality of urban living in the Roman model of identity, we must acknowledge that all of these were naturally more likely to assume importance for the urban and urbane Constantinopolitans who necessarily have to remain our main resource for assessing Byzantine Roman society. Thus, in examining the period of the Frankish conquests and occupation from the Roman point of view, we have most of all adopted the perspective of the elite politicians and historians of Constantinople. However, it has been possible to set these beside the evidence of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* to gain something of a non-Constantinopolitan angle and, taking the lead from the *Chronicle*, the history of the Peloponnese has been considered in greater depth and through a greater variety of sources in order to gain further insights into the actual response to westerners 'on the ground'.

Analysis of the Byzantine Roman response to the Franks serves, firstly, to illustrate the continuing strength of the political and imperial aspect of Roman identity. Initially, as passionately recounted by Niketas Choniates, the shock of the fall of Constantinople in 1204 was huge. Writing only a decade or so at most after the fall, more than the other Byzantine Roman historians Choniates seems to have been unsure of the continuity of the imperial state. As we have seen, he does not (in the *History* at least) credit Theodore Laskaris with any especial imperial status, and the Latin rulers Baldwin and Henry are more definitely presented as emperors. Yet this in itself is significant. Choniates illustrates the common and general recognition of the Latin empire and its emperors; it is as though there needs must be an emperor in Constantinople, and the ethnicity of this emperor is of less importance than the fact of his rule. Thus Romans who rebelled against Baldwin were characterised by Choniates as rebels rather than patriots. We have seen too how most areas of the erstwhile empire readily accepted Latin rule, and the Latins of the empire encouraged continuity in the established imperial symbology in order to encourage loyalty among their Roman subjects. The Latin empire permitted the maintenance of the ideal of imperial rule from Constantinople and thus of the political aspect of Roman identity. This ideal was of such central importance as to override, in the short term at least, the other aspects of Roman identity.

In 1204, the Latins also supplanted the then patriarch, John Kamaretos, replacing him with the Latin Thomas Morosini. Kamaretos nevertheless refused to sanction the Laskarid claim to the imperial position, and it was only after his death that Theodore Laskaris was crowned emperor in 1208,

when he was able to secure a new and more compliant patriarch who would crown him; it is clear that Laskaris needed the religious angle to endorse his imperial authority, especially when he laboured under the disadvantage of not being in the imperial city Constantinople and hence was unable to follow much of the established ritual of the assumption of imperial power. Laskaris' need for the sanction of the church gave explicit status to the patriarch as a co-leader of the Romans.

Crucially, when Theodore Laskaris had himself crowned he initiated a dual empire, just as the Latins had initiated the dual patriarchate in 1204, and this rejection of the established Latin empire in favour of an empire headed by a Roman must have had its roots in issues of identity. Laskaris' association with Orthodoxy certainly played a large role, but was part of a wider feeling of ethnic identity in contrast to the threatening Latin other. This awareness can be seen, firstly, in Choniates' collective use of *Rhomaioi* in the post-1204 context, whereby the genitive qualifier *Rhomaion* is never applied to the Latin empire, and all collective uses of *Rhomaioi* in the post-1204 context have an ethnic application. That is, they are not based on political allegiance or religious affiliation but, judging by Choniates' overall approach, on assumptions about ethnic descent made manifest in a nexus of behaviour and visible attributes. Again, Choniates explicitly describes certain subjects of the Latin empire as Roman, and this can only be to distinguish them from the Latin subjects on ethnic grounds. The net effect of Choniates' pattern of usage is to reinforce the non-political aspects of being Roman as certainly being of greater affective force, but the power of the political model is shown in the acceptance of the Latin empire which he recounts and exemplifies, as it were against his will. Here we see a disjunction between the political and cultural aspects of identity, brought to the fore by the fact of political power passing out of the hands of ethnic Romans, and a consequent emphasis on the ethnic element of identity.

Although Laskaris was able to combine both political and religious authority in his reborn empire, the Frankish conquests also initiated a split between the Roman religious identity and the Roman political identity that was of major significance. Thus we saw from Akropolites how some Romans under the Latin empire appealed to the Emperor Henry for protection of their Orthodox tradition while nonetheless affirming their political allegiance to him. Thus one's Roman loyalties might be split, with political, imperial, allegiance going to the emperor in Constantinople but religious allegiance going to the patriarchate, or at any rate not to the same church as that of one's ruler. A similar compromise was reached in the Morea

and it is safe to say that, where Latin rulers were both happy to allow religious freedom and strong enough to provide effective government, their Roman subjects were for the most part content to be ruled by them. There were always exceptions among the class most likely to be dispossessed by incoming westerners; nevertheless, the habit of subjection was strong and in this case the Byzantine Roman political tradition worked in the Latins' favour.

Thus the Frankish conquest was an event of major significance for the Byzantine Roman identity which brought the religious, cultural and perceived racial aspects to the fore at the expense of the political, forging new ethnic identities. The strength of the political imperial tradition is graphically shown by the initial acceptance and success of the Latin empire (and its adjuncts in southern Greece). However, while it is undeniable that many ethnic Romans were content to serve their new Latin masters, it is similarly clear that the fact that they *were* Latin and not Roman highlighted the religious and cultural differences between Latins and Romans, and gave these added force as expressing Roman-ness in contrast to Latinity and giving the subject Romans a sense of group identity. In turn, the ethnic sense of being Roman, which was made manifest by cultural attributes, came strongly to the fore. You could now be Roman without being a subject of the emperor of the Romans: this was, indeed, a weakening of the imperial position.

In the long run and with the ascendancy of the Nikaian empire, however, the political aspect of Roman identity appears to have been little affected by the Frankish conquest. Certainly, for the elite historians of Byzantium writing in the period, the political aspect remains for the most part pre-eminent in their presentations of the *Rhomaioi*.

In retaking Constantinople, Michael Palaiologos reunited imperial rule with its traditional trappings, and his triumph was understandably widely viewed as a vindication of the Byzantine Roman imperial tradition. Akropolites' *History* is a panegyric of Michael Palaiologos, who promoted himself as the new Constantine, and Michael's active policy of reconquest is borne out by both Pachymeres and the *Chronicle of the Morea*. Such an expansionist policy may attest to the new strength of the ethnic aspect of Roman identity, as Michael was trying to reincorporate into the empire all those areas with Roman residents that had been lost to the Latins; Akropolites' ascription of Roman status to the Peloponnesians who served in the army of the prince of Achaia witnesses to the strength of this ethnic aspect, as does the attention given by Pachymeres to the *thelematarioi* and those

he labels *Rhomaizontes* who were similarly explicitly called Romans while nevertheless living outside the Roman state (of Nikaia) and thus having no political Roman identity beyond a historical, transgenerational, allegiance.

All these examples, however, reaffirm that the political aspect was still extremely potent, at least among the elite commentators. As a means of demoting the status of the Epirot rivals to Nikaia, Akropolites strongly wished to avoid naming any non-Nikaians as Romans. The political agenda is clear – Nikaia was the true state ‘of the Romans’ – and the example just cited of the Peloponnesians should be viewed as an aberration. Thus too Pachymeres limited his use of *Rhomaioi* for those outside the Nikaian or Byzantine state, typically employing more specific or more neutral terminology. Yet, unlike Akropolites, Pachymeres wanted to emphasise that there were Romans outside the state, as his concern was to suggest that ethnic identity should coincide with political allegiance although it regrettably often did not. Pachymeres thus simultaneously demonstrates the desired strength of the political aspect of Roman identity, and even more the actual strength of the ethnic aspect. In the world outside Constantinople, this latter aspect was becoming dominant. On the evidence of the *Chronicle of the Morea* for the Latin states of southern Greece, *Rhomaioi* had, both in application to individuals and occasionally also collectively, an entirely ethnic and non-political sense, although it could also still be understood in its collective political sense as referring to the state of Nikaia or Constantinople.

In Choniates, we see ‘Christian’ used as an alternative term to deny Roman identity to certain people, and there was typically little direct association between being Christian and being Roman in the writers of the thirteenth century. Pachymeres notably avoided the use of *Rhomaioi* for the Orthodox Christians in recounting the debates and process of church union. The multi-stranded Byzantine Roman identity was again weakened as a result of Michael Palaiologos’ religious policy of pursuing union with the church of Rome; indirectly, this too was a result of the Frankish conquests since, in an attempt to neutralise the threat of renewed attacks from the west, Michael sought to appease the Latins with religious concessions. Through his ill-judged attempts at church union, the emperor presented his subjects with a choice of political loyalty to the emperor or religious loyalty to the perceived purity of the Orthodox tradition: once again, a disjunction between the political and religious aspects of the Roman identity had been made explicit. Although this dilemma was removed by Andronikos II in an explicit renewal of anti-unionist Orthodoxy, the imperial position had

thereby again been weakened. The dispute over church union had led to the emperor deposing Patriarch Arsenios, but many held out for Arsenios as legitimate patriarch against his imperially sponsored successors; Michael Palaiologos' high-handed religious policy struck at the heart of the ideology of the emperor as defender of Orthodoxy and again allowed for divided loyalties. This example of opposition to an emperor on religious grounds may have intensified the struggle against hesychasm, championed by John VI Kantakouzenos in the middle of the subsequent century.

How much did such conflicts impinge on the sense of Roman identity outside the hothouses of Constantinople and Mount Athos? On the evidence of the *Chronicle of the Morea*, the Union of Lyons impinged not at all on the Peloponnese, where traditional Orthodoxy was maintained under Latin rule. In a rare nod at the distant provinces, Gregoras says that anti-unionist monks were stirring up feeling in the Peloponnese in the 1270s (Gregoras *Roman History* 1.127–8), but this comment again primarily serves to illustrate the independent leanings of the Peloponnesians, since Gregoras presents the feeling as being as much against the emperor and his policy as it was against the local Latins. In the provincial Peloponnese, the religious controversy thus perhaps served only to weaken further whatever remnants remained of the imperial identity.

Yet the political aspect of Roman identity remained strong in all the writings of the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth. It is worth noting that such familiar formulations as *basileus* or *basileia* 'of the Romans' are used in the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* just as they are used in the elite historians to denote a collective sense of the Byzantine Romans as the stuff of the imperial state. This collective sense is dominant in Gregoras and Kantakouzenos and, given the limited use they made of *Rhomaioi*, also in the *Funeral Oration* of Manuel Palaiologos and in Mazaris' *Journey to Hades*. In fact, it is possible that this political aspect was emphasised ever more strongly in direct proportion to the decline of the state, as if to reassert what no longer seemed so obvious about the empire of the Romans. Thus, in the 1390s Patriarch Anthony insisted to Tsar Vasili I of Moscow that the emperor remained superior in rank to all other rulers and authorities, due and receiving, even from the Latins, 'the same honour and the same subordination which they gave him in the early days when they were united with us'. The patriarch acknowledged all the problems confronting the emperor, surrounded by enemies, his lands dramatically reduced, his supposedly unique title stolen by rival rulers, but insisted on the continuing sacred role of the '*basileus* and *autokrator* of the Romans,

that is, of all Christians' (βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, πάντων δηλαδὴ τῶν χριστιανῶν).²

However, alongside such apparent failures to acknowledge the realities of their own times, historians like Gregoras and Kantakouzenos were elsewhere more pragmatic. Thus there is in both an idea of naturally Roman territory, but this is only applied to territory that has been successfully reacquired by the Byzantine Romans. . . . Perhaps, with the imperial throne itself in dispute and the empire under such pressure, a defensive conservative return to the old imperial dogmas was inevitable; thus so much in Kantakouzenos in particular seems to recall the ideology reflected in Choniates a century and a half before. Yet this political identity now seemed to apply more theoretically than practically, and problems arose when individuals or more specific actual groups entered the equation. Firstly, like Akropolites and Pachymeres, Gregoras and Kantakouzenos both acknowledged the existence of *Rhomaioi* outside the political sphere of influence of Constantinople. As with Pachymeres, the importance of the political aspect of identity led Kantakouzenos, and later also Manuel Palaiologos, to deny the name of Roman to certain other groups: the Verrhiotes and Epirots (by Kantakouzenos) and the Peloponnesians (by both Kantakouzenos and Palaiologos) were all denied the name of Romans because they were not loyal to Byzantine Roman power. But why were they expected to be so loyal, unless they were Romans? Undoubtedly, such groups were expected to be loyal because they were identifiable as Romans in other ways and, though Kantakouzenos does not make this clear, Palaiologos at least refers to *genos* and faith as reasonably leading to the expectation of certain loyalties among the Peloponnesians, an expectation that was disappointed. Such people were Roman in a way that had come to be entirely divorceable from the question of loyalty to the Constantinopolitan state, other than by an appeal to family history, to a past transgenerational identity as subjects of the Byzantine Roman state. Similarly, Romans in Mamluk and some Latin-controlled areas could still be acknowledged as Roman because of these kinds of aspects – they were, we might say, ethnic Romans. The battle for political supremacy seemed sufficiently lost in Cairo or the areas controlled by the Italian republics. In contrast, the trouble with the Peloponnesians, Verrhiotes or Epirots was that their ethnic Roman identity

² Miklosich and Müller 1860–90 II: 188–92; the relevant passages are translated in Barker 1957: 107–8. This patriarchal letter has been rightly cited as evidence for the decline in imperial prestige throughout the 'Byzantine commonwealth', and for the corresponding rise in standing of the patriarch: Barker 1957: 105–10, 194–6; Obolensky 1971: 264–6.

should have coincided with a political identity as Romans, one which was seen by the Byzantine Roman leadership as viable – but as individuals or communities that was not what they wanted. Individual ethnic identity had thus come to be potentially in conflict with the ideologically desired Roman political identity. The *Chronicle of the Morea* reveals that the natives of the Peloponnese called themselves Romans, and that this self-identification was bound up primarily in the Orthodox faith and an accustomed, inherited, way of life, but not in any automatic loyalty to the Byzantine Roman state.

None of the elite fourteenth- and fifteenth-century sources strongly associate being Roman with possessing a distinct Christian identity, though the Christian and Roman identities were applied to interlinking groups. Indeed, the lack of equivalency between the group ‘Romans’ and the group ‘Christians’ is on occasion made explicit by Gregoras, who himself felt a strong personal sense of identification with his vision of correct Orthodoxy, but nevertheless very rarely associated Orthodoxy with being Roman. He associated the quality of ‘Roman’ most strongly with its political focus, and he also came into violent personal conflict over religion with the political power; the two identities thus sat uneasily together in his life as in his work. Nevertheless, we have seen that the profession of Orthodox Christianity was, along with language and appearance, an important element in the package of cultural phenomena that were expressive of the ethnic Roman identity. Explicit in the *Chronicle of the Morea*, this cultural and ethnic aspect is almost wholly negatively formulated in the elite sources, but we can nevertheless glimpse a familiar conception of Orthodox Romans, dressed as Romans, acting like Romans, identifiable to one of their own as distinct from any other group. Moreover, though one could change the externals that outwardly identified one ethnically, it was harder to lose one’s essential identity, which was a matter of birth, of ethnic descent. Thus it was possible to have Romans outside the Byzantine Roman state and, further, to define areas outside the Roman state as nevertheless Roman. Gregoras implies that it was both the external phenomena like laws and religious practice, and the residency of ethnically defined Romans that allowed such areas to be identified as Roman despite their political affiliation, and thus his formulation accords with that of the *Chronicle of the Morea*.

It is furthermore clear from the later sources that the relationship with the non-Roman other had fundamentally altered, with Gregoras, Kantakouzenos and Manuel Palaiologos all presenting the Byzantine Roman state far more as one among equals. The dichotomy between Romans and barbarians had largely broken down, though it survived in the elite works as

an exercise in rhetoric. Again, in the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea* and in some of the vernacular romances we see a positive attitude to westerners in particular that reflects the reality of mixed ethnicities in the region. The westerner remained an alien other, but he was better known; the situation was far less black and white.

Moreover, it is clear that, in the Peloponnese at least, the sense of ethnic identity occasioned or, at least in some ways, heightened by the closer contact with westerners was not the most significant category of group identification in his period. Rather, the coming of the Franks gave impetus to an already strong sense of regional loyalty. In the mixed ethnic society of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries this regional identity exerted influence across ethnic borders.

Returning to the hypotheses posed at the start of our enquiry, we can finally present some answers.

- **There was no single uniform sense of ethnic identity among the Romans.**

The conquest of Constantinople and the empire, in that it attempted to separate imperial rule from the Roman ethnic base, encouraged an aggressive sense of ethnic identity among the educated Byzantine Romans. There was a renewed sense of imperial destiny under the Palaiologoi, and also a search for validation of the Roman ethnicity that included a revisiting and re-evaluation of the Hellenic past, although this renascent Hellenism does not come across as particularly significant in the historians. Outside Nikaian and Constantinopolitan circles, the Romans living under Latin rule also became more aware of certain ethnic attributes through the sustained contact with another group, and they attached more value to these attributes; the profession of Orthodoxy was particularly significant in this regard.

However, the political aspect of Roman identity decreased in importance more quickly outside elite circles, and the Frankish conquest gave an added push to the regional separatism that was already of considerable significance at the end of the twelfth century. Thus, there was geographical variation in the ethnic identities of the Romans. Although the Byzantine Romans were able to re-establish their power at Mistra in the fourteenth century, for many in the Peloponnese Roman identity was far more about ethnic descent, Orthodoxy and cultural style than about imperial loyalties. Over and above this, in the Peloponnese a regional loyalty that could operate across ethnic boundaries was of far greater significance than an ethnic identity spurred on by any oppositional contrast with the incoming Franks. Even more

than before, the Constantinopolitan Roman was a different beast from the Roman of the western Peloponnese, the Roman of Trebizond, the Roman living in Cairo, or the Roman living in Epiros. The Frankish conquest fractured the Roman world, and presented workable alternatives to rule from Constantinople, either by westerners or by local lords able to take advantage of the upheaval. Again, the response to westerners varied across the Roman world, from the rabid sectarian hostility of some elements in Constantinople to some blurring of ethnic boundaries in the Peloponnese. It is worth remembering that there are strong hints in some vernacular romances of the period that western styles became fashionable (or covertly admired), and certainly that westerners were not automatic figures of hate.

• **Ethnic identities among the Romans were not static during this period but developed in response to major political changes.**

The political imperial identity was affected by the encounter with other societies whom the Byzantine Romans were forced to recognise as qualitatively like themselves in their Christianity and social organisation. The sense of uniqueness prized by the Byzantine Romans inevitably suffered, and this change in the perspective of themselves and others can be seen to evolve over the period. The sacral aspect of the imperial role diminished in significance and the patriarch gained in importance as a religious leader of the Orthodox Christians, who as a group were no longer coterminous with the *Rhomaioi*. This development was spurred on by religious disputes within the state as well as more frequent encounters with alternative models of Christianity which existed outside the Byzantine Roman state. Furthermore, in the Peloponnese, the almost complete separation from the Byzantine Roman state from 1204 to 1262 hastened a disenchantment with imperial Constantinopolitan rule that was already influential before the Frankish conquest. Thus, the sense of ethnicity to be gained from the texts of the period also varies according to the social origin of these texts.

In a way, social origin equates to geographical origin, since high social status largely came with Constantinopolitan origins. The histories and speeches of the elite historians and politicians are conditioned by the rhetoric of the established ideology of Byzantine Roman imperial rule. They do not fully acknowledge the problems in the Byzantine Roman state that had radically altered the effectiveness and relevance of this ideology – problems such as shrinking frontiers, greater effective equivalence between the empire and its neighbours, and the centrifugal effects of increasing regionalism. However, the problems were nevertheless there and, as a result, occasional fracturings in the application of the imperialist ideology of Roman identity can be detected; such fractures are usefully illustrative of

the developments in the Byzantine Roman sense of identity. The *Chronicle of the Morea* originated far from Constantinopolitan influence and in its presentation of the Romans of the Frankish principality offers a sense of Roman identity all but untouched by the imperial, political, aspect, as well as confirming the greater importance of a regional identity in which ethnic distinctions played minimal part. Again, it is in the works of the elite that we find any traces at all of the kind of identification with the Hellenic past that was undoubtedly given an extra impetus by the establishment and success of Mistra in the Peloponnese; even in the educated historians, however, such identification was minimal, while outside such advantaged circles Hellenism played no part in self- or group identity. The founding and development of the Byzantine Roman despotate at Mistra may also have fostered some return to imperial loyalties on the part of local Romans; this is suggested by analysis of the different versions of the Greek *Chronicle of the Morea*.

During the fourteenth century, the continuing round of internal disasters and external threats inevitably took its toll on the confident superiority that was part of the Roman political identity. Towards the end of the period, the political, imperial, Byzantine Roman identity was still functioning and can be found expressed in a variety of sources; nevertheless, it had diminished in affect and was now more of a formal ideology than a functioning identity. This decline in the political identity was to encourage a search for alternative identities which included the Hellenic in the years immediately before the Ottoman conquest, but the Hellenic did not emerge as a viable identity to replace the imperial Roman.

- **The phenomenon of Frankish conquest and rule was the single most critical impetus for developments in the ethnic identities of the Romans during this period.**

It has been generally accepted that the Frankish conquests were not the most significant factor in the development of Byzantine Roman attitudes in the period. Arguably, the loss of Asia Minor was of greater significance, depriving the empire of its richest areas and forcing a reorientation towards the west. Again, from the middle of the fourteenth century, the encroachments of the Ottomans nullified the Byzantine Roman superiority complex far more effectively than any military or other challenge from the west had done, with the emperor of the Romans reduced to a vassal of the sultan; this again prompted a turn towards the west. The resulting search for accommodation with the west presented the Christian aspect of the Roman identity with its greatest challenge and, as noted, in the debates on church union the emperor was often ranged against substantial and

influential sections of the Orthodox church. The sacral dimension of the imperial role was weakened, and the Christian identity separated from the Roman.

However, it is in reality fair to say that the fact of Frankish conquest had a far-reaching influence. Firstly, all of the above really applies only to the circles of power, while in the Peloponnese the Frankish conquests were undeniably of enormous significance. Already feeling let down by Constantinopolitan rule, many Peloponnesians were content to be ruled by the Franks and, returning after more than half a century, Byzantine Roman rule was not universally hailed. Despite the growing belief that ethnic identity *should* condition political loyalty, this was emphatically never the case in the Peloponnese. Sally McKee has shown that the situation was similar in Venetian Crete, despite an oft-cited pattern of repeated insurrection against the rule of the Republic: cross-ethnic language acquisition and religious worship, and also intermarriage, attest to mixed interest groups and loyalties.³ The Frankish conquests were of key importance in breaking the tradition of imperial rule, encouraging regional separatism and confirming the disappearance of the imperial tradition in the group identity of many provincial Romans.

Again, it was the close encounter with the western church which was consequent upon the Frankish conquests that buttressed the position of the Orthodox church. Thereby, the conquests indirectly encouraged the growth of an Orthodox Christian identity that could become detached from and eventually replace the imperial Roman identity that was becoming progressively tarnished under the weight of military and economic defeats, and by association with religious compromise. This growth in importance of the Orthodox identity applied throughout Roman society and the Roman world. Finally, when Michael Palaiologos set himself to regain Constantinople and remake the Byzantine Roman empire, it was the west that he saw as his main enemy – understandably, since his capital was held by westerners. One result was to exacerbate the disagreements on religious practice through his plans for church union, which gave enormous impetus to the breakaway Christian identity at the expense of the imperial ideal. Additionally, as Pachymeres ruefully saw, Palaiologos ended up physically neglecting the eastern half of the empire. As a result, the Ottoman conquests in Anatolia were easier than they might otherwise have been.

³ McKee 2000.

The Frankish conquest of 1204 is often seen as the end of the Byzantine empire, with some general histories of Byzantium choosing to end at this date or to give only a cursory account of the period from 1204, as if of some unfortunate and embarrassing epilogue. Certainly, the period can be viewed as a process of physical contraction and defeat culminating in the seizure of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453. Such times of crisis and decline, though, are often worthy of attention in that under strain the essentials of a society can be revealed. It is so with the Frankish period. The Byzantine Roman world was in fact terminally affected by the Frankish conquests: the fact of conquest and occupation by the crusaders from the west occasioned a crisis in the Byzantine Roman self-image that could not be undone. For the provincials of the Peloponnese, the Frankish conquest ended the tradition of imperial loyalty, nurtured a sense of Roman identity based on cultural difference from the incomer, and yet also promoted a cross-ethnic regionalism. At Nikaia, Constantinople, and even the court of Mistra in the fifteenth century, the imperial ideology and identity remained incredibly durable in the face of the facts, and this is a tribute to the longevity of the Byzantine Roman state – and the lasting sway of the established rhetorical norms in Byzantine Roman education. However, even the elite writers betray the inescapable waning of the imperial ideal and the splintering of the Byzantine Roman identity. The Byzantine Romans had now tasted defeat not only on distant battlegrounds, but in their sacred Queen of Cities. Constantinople might be regained, and the years from 1204 to 1261 theologically rationalised as the temporary exile of the Chosen People of God, yet in the end it would be impossible not to acknowledge that the empire was now an earthly power among its fellows. The political imperial identity foundered, giving place to a religious identity that was essentially distinct from the imperial tradition, and to an ethnic identity that emerged into and gained weight within the public consciousness of the Romans as a result of the enforced encounter with the Latins of the west.

Glossary

This glossary lists all the single Greek words which are used in the text more than once. They are listed in alphabetical order of their transliteration, along with the Greek original and a translation. Some words are also given in alternative grammatical forms, where these are frequently used in the text.

<i>akrostichon</i>	ἀκρόστιχον	Byzantine Roman hearth tax
<i>anax</i>	ἄναξ	lord
<i>arche</i>	ἀρχή	rule
<i>archon</i>	ἄρχων	ruler, lord; in provincial areas like the Peloponnese, a member of the local landowning nobility
<i>archontes</i>	ἄρχοντες	rulers, lords
<i>autokrator</i>	αὐτοκράτωρ	emperor
<i>barbaros</i>	βάρβαρος	barbarian
<i>barbaroi</i>	βάρβαροι	barbarians
<i>basileia</i>	βασιλεία	empire, majesty
<i>basileuon</i>	βασιλεύων	imperial ruler
<i>basileus</i>	βασιλεύς	emperor
<i>basilis</i>	βασίλισ	empress
<i>chora</i>	χώρα	land
<i>despotikon</i>	δεσποτικόν	services due to the lord of the land
<i>dynatoi</i>	δυνατοί	the powerful and rich class
<i>dytikos</i>	δυτικός	western
<i>eparchia</i>	ἐπαρχία	province
<i>epikrateia</i>	ἐπικράτεια	province
<i>ethnikos</i>	ἐθνικός	foreign
<i>ethnos</i>	ἔθνος	group, ethnic group
<i>ethne</i>	ἔθνη	groups, ethnic groups
<i>Fragkos</i>	Φράγκος	westerner, Frenchman
<i>Fragkoi</i>	Φράγκοι	westerners, Frenchmen
<i>Gasmoulos</i>	Γασμούλος	person of mixed race

<i>ge</i>	γῆ	land
<i>genos</i>	γένος	ethnic group, family
<i>Graikos</i>	Γραικός	Greek, Byzantine Roman
<i>Graikoi</i>	Γραικοί	Greeks, Byzantine Romans
<i>hegemonia</i>	ἡγεμονία	hegemony
<i>Hellen</i>	Ἕλληγν	ancient Greek, Greek-speaker, pagan
<i>Hellenes</i>	Ἕλληνες	ancient Greeks, speakers of Greek, pagans
<i>horia</i>	ὅρια	borders
<i>horos</i>	ὄρος	border
<i>Latinos</i>	Λατῖνος	Latin, westerner
<i>paroikos</i>	πάροικος	dependent peasant
<i>paroikoi</i>	πάροικοι	dependent peasants
<i>Peloponnesios</i>	Πελοποννήσιος	resident of the Peloponnese
<i>polis</i>	πόλις	city
<i>pragmata</i>	πράγματα	affairs
<i>praktikon</i>	πρακτικόν	inventory of an estate
<i>pronoia</i>	πρόνοια	conditional land grant
<i>ptochoi</i>	πτωχοί	the poor and powerless in society
<i>Rhomaïkos</i>	Ῥωμαϊκός	Roman (adjective)
<i>Rhomaïos</i>	Ῥωμαῖος	Roman (noun)
<i>Rhomaioi</i>	Ῥωμαῖοι	Romans (noun, plural)
<i>Rhomaion</i>	Ῥωμαίων	'of the Romans'
<i>Rhomaïs</i>	Ῥωμαῖς	the Roman empire
<i>Rhomaizontes</i>	Ῥωμαῖζοντες	'those who are Romans'
<i>Rhomania</i>	Ῥωμανία	the Roman empire, the Aegean region
<i>schoinisma</i>	σχοίνισμα	allotment of land
<i>Servia</i>	Σερβία	Serbia, the Serbian empire
<i>strateuma</i>	στράτευμα	army
<i>thelematarioi</i>	Θεληματάριοι	wilful people, volunteers
<i>Tourkoi</i>	Τοῦρκοι	Turks
<i>tyche</i>	τύχη	fate



Map 1 The Aegean region



Map 2 The Peloponnese

APPENDIX I

Key content items

CHONIATES

Roman: plain formula

political collective

13.35, 13.38, 15.76, 18.63, 20.86, 21.55, 22.80, 24.26, 30.71, 31.24, 34.2, 37.92, 38.5, 47.83, 50.57, 50.67, 52.24, 72.82, 73.1, 84.35, 90.81, 90.82, 91.2, 92.31, 94.94, 95.15, 98.86, 100.42, 101.68, 101.68–9, 101.74, 118.24, 121.11, 123.59, 124.10–11, 127.81, 137.78, 137.79, 137.79, 140.79, 141.10, 150.47, 151.69, 165.91–2, 166.7, 170.23, 170.32, 171.47, 171.54, 187.87, 199.60, 199.63, 200.84, 201.8, 201.13, 201.16, 201.20, 205.23–4, 205.34, 206.52, 208.16, 209.46, 226.68, 251.31, 262.8, 269.95, 281.62, 297.91, 308.10, 309.42, 319.69, 320.85, 326.5, 327.94, 336.40, 359.24, 363.25, 365.61, 368.40, 368.50, 371.26, 381.50, 382.64, 390.8, 390.9, 392.63, 400.84, 402.30–1, 402.32, 402.47, 410.59, 410.68, 412.10, 412.13, 419.5, 422.82, 428.64, 452.16, 453.12–13, 461.23, 463.71, 473.76, 464.6, 465.22, 465.33, 465.56, 472.25, 472.32, 472.38–9, 473.46, 473.49, 473.61, 476.49, 476.55, 477.77, 477.89, 479.46, 482.11–12, 483.14, 484.62, 484.72, 487.62, 487.64, 494.90, 495.41, 502.24, 503.36, 504.84–5, 506.19–20, 506.26, 506.33, 507.43, 510.34–5, 510.37, 511.63, 512.86, 512.93, 512.94, 512.1, 512.3, 513.25, 522.31, 523.40, 529.28, 538.64, 538.66, 538.74, 538.76, 538.81, 538.84, 538.88, 539.6, 539.12, 540.23, 540.28, 545.37, 549.9, 556.76, 569.13, 609.87, 617.63, 618.93, 618.95, 620.69, 625.20, 635.5, 638.55, 639.82, 642.66, 642.81, 643.8, 649.71–2, 654.61

political individual

42.20, 63.17, 64.48, 70.27, 109.84, 109.88, 121.6, 198.37, 203.58, 204.85, 205.18, 209.44, 251.44, 305.19, 306.48–9, 306.50, 306.53, 338.79, 361.58, 361.75, 364.47, 370.95, 387.32, 393.88, 393.92, 395.46, 410.71, 421.58, 475.37, 477.71, 477.79, 477.85, 484.86, 487.69, 493.85, 495.19, 405.30, 495.47, 504.80, 508.79, 512.79, 512.91, 513.21, 513.25, 513.31, 557.23, 560.8, 561.12, 563.76

political and military: Roman subjects in the army (includes organised military opposition to Latins post-1204); individual and collective reference	13.26, 13.27, 14.59, 14.67, 16.3, 20.21, 20.24, 21.47, 24.15, 24.21, 26.72–3, 27.17, 28.34, 29.65, 30.86, 31.11, 33.67, 33.72, 35.22, 35.28, 38.9, 53.24, 63.39, 64.58, 65.91, 66.1, 66.16–17, 67.40, 71.69, 72.87, 78.58, 78.65, 84.22, 85.40, 85.43, 85.58, 86.69, 86.90, 87.12, 87.19, 87.21, 92.43, 124.20, 125.38, 125.41, 133.52, 133.57–8, 133.69, 134.87, 134.2, 134.8, 135.22, 135.30, 135.34, 151.68, 153.29, 153.31, 154.59, 155.81, 156.24, 156.30, 156.30, 157.37, 159.95, 162.92, 162.1–2, 162.3, 163.6, 163.9–10, 163.20, 165.66, 167.52, 168.75, 173.89, 173.1, 173.8, 176.63, 176.72, 179.37, 179.37, 179.62, 179.64, 180.79, 181.2, 181.14–15, 181.16, 182.23, 184.59, 184.92, 184.94, 184.13, 184.2–5, 186.68, 186.71, 186.75, 187.89, 188.36, 189.49, 191.10, 191.14, 193.87, 194.93, 194.10, 194.18, 195.43, 196.62, 196.71, 196.76, 199.45, 199.48, 199.57, 199.63–4, 246.29, 247.34, 319.52, 319.55, 319.55, 358.94, 359.6, 363.28, 368.55, 269.61, 360.47, 369.71, 371.31, 372.54, 373.66, 387.17, 394.21, 397.91–2, 397.3, 397.5, 398.20–1, 400.82, 403.68, 403.84, 403.85, 409.27, 409.37, 430.20, 437.13, 465.27, 468.15, 468.27, 474.73, 475.38, 471.94, 476.40, 501.98–9, 502.22, 540.2, 540.64, 542.77, 543.93, 546.67, 546.70, 553.7, 567.47, 604.36, 604.37, 604.44, 604.45, 606.88, 619.24, 639.84–5
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	171.51, 173.16, 190.94, 572.69, 594.77, 597.67, 598.84, 599.19, 599.21–2, 599.27, 601.65, 604.50, 604.52, 606.87, 606.89, 612.46, 612.49, 613.52, 613.65, 613.78, 614.1, 614.4, 614.8, 614.90, 614.93, 615.22, 617.77, 618.9, 621.4, 621.90, 622.24, 622.27, 625.21, 625.24, 625.29, 628.10, 631.8, 632.21, 635.2, 636.56, 636.57, 636.62, 641.55, 643.2

Roman: genitive formula

political	emperor: <i>autokrator</i>	16.28, 31.6, 219.91, 270.22, 345.82, 347.43
collective	emperor: <i>basileus</i>	20.17, 31.8, 45.28, 46.46, 86.81, 99.20, 127.82, 169.90, 187.7, 206.54, 209.60, 270.22, 345.82, 347.43, 352.81, 382.72, 401.14, 409.44, 462.39, 471.84, 526.45, 541.44, 567.49, 598.82–3, 599.25, 626.55
	emperor: various others	76.12, 127.84, 137.71, 202.5, 252.69, 326.61, 336.31, 420.14, 461.21, 466.51, 479.33, 493.64, 498.13
	empress: <i>augusta</i>	540.27
	leader: <i>tyrannos</i>	460.93
	state: unspec. fem. sing. (<i>archel basileialge?</i>)	639.70
	state: <i>basileia</i>	32.34, 61.67, 77.22, 304.95–1, 481.1, 597.59
	state: <i>arche</i>	120.2, 127.72, 238.5–6, 327.88–9, 336.36, 433.91, 477.69, 557.15, 571.60

	state: <i>ethnos</i>	315.84, 437.1, 475.26, 498.29, 529.25, 541.54
	state, territory of: <i>polis</i>	635.18
	state, territory of: <i>chora</i>	34.2
	state, territory of: <i>horial horos</i>	55.20
	state, territory of: <i>schoinisma</i>	60.47, 61.77, 72.81, 116.72, 125.29, 132.26, 135.39, 159.15, 175.29, 227.18, 411.85, 412.27, 612.36
	state, territory of: <i>epikrateia</i>	117.8
	state, territory of: <i>ge</i>	132.30, 171.49, 612.53
	state, territory of: <i>ktema</i>	401.24, 412.24
	state, destruction of: <i>ektripsis</i>	38.2, 636.50–1
	imperial rule: <i>skeptron</i>	5.15, 14.45–6, 45.33, 49.29, 462.55–6, 538.80, 608.55
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	46.39, 72.84, 96.48, 194.16, 223.7, 436.93–4, 438.32, 463.72, 470.71, 483.59, 510.49, 522.31, 572.71, 586.68
	political affairs: unspec. neut. pl. (<i>pragmata</i>)	15.82, 30.78, 151.73–4, 257.80, 374.86, 421.50, 471.71, 472.27, 472.31, 507.49, 551.65, 569.93, 645.86, 646.1
	imperial subject: various	137.85, 372.47–8, 420.34
	other (various)	135.23, 467.81, 560.92, 601.64, 633.61
political and military	unit: various	15.87, 35.16, 43.51, 67.56, 182.49, 199.46, 233.66, 606.1
	soldier: various	19.8–9, 178.29, 179.36, 241.77
	other (various)	121.13, 166.94, 167.49, 248.61, 359.13, 376.22, 543.82
ethnic (as above)	race: <i>genos</i>	202.41–2
	revolt: <i>epanastasis</i>	614.83, 618.8

Roman: adjective

political collective	state: <i>arche</i>	246.27, 347.40
	state, territory of: <i>lexis</i>	16.7
	state, territory of: various	32.39, 62.92, 72.93, 192.60, 296.86, 356.30, 476.47, 552.79
	state, territory of: <i>schoinisma</i>	372.46, 482.29, 501.5, 533.58

	state, territory of: <i>horos/horia</i>	124.88, 595.14
	state, territory of: <i>ge</i>	171.62, 208.26–7, 209.50–1, 347.40
	state, territory of: unspec. fem. sing.	288.66, 339.12–13, 402.40
	state, territory of: <i>thema</i>	411.83
	state, territory of: <i>nesos</i>	461.25, 537.56, 639.88
political military	unit: various	23.94, 26.64, 27.12, 61.83, 90.86, 135.25, 153.28, 161.50, 167.45, 176.63, 185.3, 250.17, 318.22, 357.50–1, 359.14–15, 362.92, 374.82, 377.40, 430.5, 446.71, 465.25, 501.94, 510.40, 513.13, 602.92–3, 612.6
	action: <i>hormes</i>	77.37–8, 86.74, 93.73, 108.56, 157.43, 160.44, 173.92, 408.15–16,
	other (various materiel)	434.11, 482.16
political/ethnic	way of life: <i>ethos</i>	552.83, 594.85

Roman: compounds

political collective	pro-Roman: <i>philorhomaïos</i>	229.56
	anti-Roman: <i>misorhomaïos</i>	301.17, 551.44
	pan-Roman: <i>panrhomaïos</i>	338.79

Barbaros: all forms

noun/adjective/ adverb	Pechenegs	14.3, 18.63
	Armenians	26.69
	Syro-Phoenicians	27.14
	Turks	20.88, 31.11, 34.2, 36.56, 36.71–2, 39.36, 68.69, 68.86, 71.7, 71.51, 71.75, 72.83, 118.37, 120.94, 121.7, 121.23, 123.71, 124.3, 176.50, 177.77, 179.42, 180.77–8, 180.93, 181.14, 182.58, 183.72, 184.92, 186.69, 187.13–14, 187.86, 188.39–40, 189.51, 189.67, 193.66–7, 196.73–4, 198.33, 199.50, 206.51, 400.92, 413.53, 438.17, 474.81, 475.15, 493.69, 494.1, 494.89, 495.22, 495.49, 521.93, 640.9
	Venetians	86.67, 86.87

	Serbs	90.84–5, 92.34, 92.43, 136.63, 434.30, 531.87–8
	Cumans	94.86, 468.14, 630.92 (also 398.17, 474.70, 499.61, 500.65, 500.71, 635.6 (with Vlach/Bulgars))
	Rhos	130.71
	Hungarians	133.54, 135.26, 152.95, 153.32, 154.64, 156.16
	Saracens	163.13, 166.7–8, 166.10
	westerners (generic)	204.4, 205.25, 205.34, 588.19
	Germans	65.82–3
	Normans of Sicily	299.50, 300.72, 301.12, 358.72, 611.18
	Varangians	343.33, 533.45, 563.82
	Vlachs/Bulgarians	368.51, 372.53, 373.67, 374.79, 375.7, 376.22–3, 394.22, 394.28, 398.25, 429.89, 430.3, 430.17, 430.27, 447.80, 467.87, 470.60, 472.15, 474.70, 499.61, 500.65, 500.71, 504.57, 505.90, 506.30, 507.42, 510.37, 513.30, 518.13, 518.21, 533.34, 533.45, 627.82, 633.52, 635.6
	1204-crusaders	557.16, 560.6, 574.38, 579.69, 580.87, 580.88, 580.93, 580.95, 581.29, 585.50, 588.24–5, 590.66, 598.90, 610.1, 648.36, 649.81, 653.94
	general and unspecific	205.54, 208.16, 256.61, 263.26, 322.44, 346.30, 401.22, 431.48, 432.72–3, 438.17, 459.61–2, 585.52
compound	mixobarbarians on northern border	209.45

AKROPOLITES

Roman: plain formula

political collective	4.3, 17.16, 17.18, 18.16, 18.21, 18.25, 26.9, 32.8, 40.15, 46.7, 52.24, 52.25, 57.14, 57.22, 57.26, 58.3, 58.13, 79.10, 83.13, 83.14, 86.21, 88.13, 105.1, 108.17, 109.2, 109.4–5, 114.21, 114.23, 118.12, 125.24, 136.13, 144.15, 158.3, 158.23, 163.15, 171.22, 181.3, 181.17, 188.23
political individual	12.5, 24.17, 25.5, 40.5, 59.1–2, 64.10, 98.13, 98.13, 99.4
political/ethnic military:	16.9, 19.19, 19.22, 20.9, 20.13, 21.7, 21.16, 23.6, 24.4, 35.2, 87.6, 87.11, 88.10, 126.4, 126.7, 126.30, 147.12, 158.12, 182.19, 185.18, 185.19
Roman/Nikaian subjects in the army	
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	28.13, 41.24, 43.6, 43.12, 76.28, 168.14

Roman: genitive formula

political collective	emperor: <i>basileus</i>	24.16, 76.21, 76.29, 79.4, 183.19
	emperor: various other	25.2, 113.14
	imperial family: <i>despoina</i>	77.4
	state: <i>arche</i>	5.6, 32.7, 34.17–8, 35.8, 73.21, 74.7–8, 76.24–5, 89.8–9, 113.12–13, 154.17, 156.10–1 157.2–3, 158.5–6, 163.10–1, 187.9–10
	state: unspec. fem. sing.	15.1, 15.27–8, 19.1, 23.24, 110.1
	state: territory of (various)	18.12, 24.13, 27.5, 27.5, 27.7
	state: various	84.4–5, 157.5
	imperial rule: <i>skeptron</i>	5.2
	imperial subjects: <i>plethos</i>	161.16
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i> (and unspec.)	109.24, 172.20, 141.18
political military	unit: <i>strateuma</i>	19.2–3, 185.11–12
	materiel: <i>frouria</i>	35.24

Roman: adjective

political collective	state: <i>arche</i>	42.21
	state, territory of: various	28.17, 69.15–16, 112.20, 128.6, 138.24, 145.21
	imperial rule: <i>skeptron</i>	20.12, 32.13
	subjects: various	43.11, 156.19, 188.4
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	108.21, 110.17, 154.16
	other: way of life, laws	98.5, 98.13
political military	unit: <i>strateuma</i>	43.21–2, 107.19, 111.22, 113.4, 146.18, 146.24, 160.12, 160.18, 165.22, 170.5, 183.8, 184.5
	unit: <i>dynamis</i>	16.22, 65.15, 65.24, 164.12, 167.19
	unit: unspecified neut. sing.	120.23, 141.12
	other (various)	108.4, 112.13, 139.1, 144.12, 159.21
ethnic	race: <i>phylos</i>	169.4

Roman: compounds

political collective	pro-Roman: <i>philorhomaiois</i> , <i>rhomaioifron</i>	134.23–4, 146.14–5
political individual	<i>Rhomaioiktonos</i>	23.16

Rhomaiois

political and geographical	13.4–5, 33.16
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Barbaros (all forms)

Cumans ('Skyths')	55.4
Bulgarians	22.13, 64.7
General and unspecified	34.9, 98.7, 98.9, 98.12, 158.19

PACHYMERES

Roman: plain formula

political collective	<i>Michael</i>	11.3, 17.14, 39.1, 70.20, 82.18, 87.3, 87.10, 88.2, 88.7, 88.17, 88.20, 110.7, 110.11, 110.12, 110.16, 111.9, 130.14, 148.4, 149.15, 154.6, 159.20, 167.14, 167.18, 168.18, 205.1, 205.6, 310.1, 311.10, 317.9, 344.18, 345.1, 350.11, 359.11, 362.7, 367.12, 413.15, 420.1, 420.4, 441.6, 448.15, 468.16, 490.2, <i>Andronikos</i> 13.1, 68.14, 188.4, 190.5, 243.16, 243.18, 244.8, 251.16, 267.14–15, 276.14, 285.2, 286.6, 295.12, 296.2, 306.8, 308.1, 308.5, 322.2, 400.1, 460.10, 483.16, 490.15, 491.14, 498.13, 531.14, 547.2, 549.6, 559.4, 569.1, 571.9, 571.13, 573.4, 573.8, 574.12, 574.14, 575.5, 575.11, 580.15, 581.9, 588.6, 593.10, 601.15, 624.3, 624.12, 624.15, 624.17, 629.5, 634.3, 644.14, 648.5, 606.19, 610.14, 611.14, 612.15, 615.1, 620.13
political individual	<i>Michael</i>	180.18, <i>Andronikos</i> 239.5–6, 240.1, 240.13, 240.14, 241.8, 242.5, 309.6, 325.12, 327.3, 578.2, 581.4, 615.14
political/ethnic military: Roman subjects in the army	<i>Michael</i>	85.16, 186.7, 205.16, 232.16, 412.17–18, <i>Andronikos</i> 310.1, 314.5, 323.20, 334.11, 347.3, 347.5, 444.11, 451.17, 483.8, 516.1, 535.9, 557.10, 584.10, 584.13, 585.16, 601.7
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	<i>Michael</i>	16.1, 106.11, 106.12, 110.13, 145.19, 188.10, 188.12, 309.14, 309.15, 343.18, 343.19, <i>Andronikos</i> 89.4, 89.5, 117.15, 310.10, 327.12, 332.14, 345.10, 458.9, 490.16, 515.2, 559.11, 626.3
other associations	<i>Michael</i>	ancient Romans: 33.20, <i>Andronikos</i> : western priests 29.1, 29.5

Roman: genitive formula

political collective	emperor: <i>basileus</i>	<i>Michael</i> 82.18, 161.14, 319.11
	emperor: various	<i>Michael</i> 28.17, 69.4
	imperial family: various	<i>Michael</i> 82.22, 99.5, <i>Andronikos</i> 182.6
	state: unspec. fem. sing.	<i>Michael</i> 311.13, 509.3, 523.7, <i>Andronikos</i> 13.15, 71.8, 170.5, 216.12, 232.11, 314.7, 316.9, 322.5
	state: <i>basileia</i>	<i>Michael</i> 28.16, 82.4, 153.10, <i>Andronikos</i> 515.10
	state: <i>arche</i>	<i>Michael</i> 77.9, 135.3, 153.15, <i>Andronikos</i> 70.8, 70.14, 571.1
	state: <i>politeia</i>	<i>Michael</i> 78.3, 218.17
	state: <i>hegemonia</i>	<i>Michael</i> 52.9
	state, territory of: various	<i>Michael</i> 53.18, 306.4, <i>Andronikos</i> 525.7, 565.14
	state: various	<i>Michael</i> 39.3, 386.18, 515.13, <i>Andronikos</i> 567.13, 609.11
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	<i>Andronikos</i> 69.11, 287.16, 345.16, 347.9, 402.15, 552.5, 609.2, 610.6, 620.11, 626.2
	political affairs: unspec. neut. pl.	<i>Andronikos</i> 330.10, 582.2, 613.1
political military	unit: various	<i>Michael</i> 20.8, 35.14, 207.9, 309.2, 349.10, 350.3, 466.8, <i>Andronikos</i> 272.10
	materiel: various	<i>Michael</i> 332.20, 365.11, <i>Andronikos</i> 651.10
	soldiers: various	<i>Andronikos</i> 267.4, 267.8, 488.1
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	residents: <i>oikoi</i>	<i>Michael</i> 29.15
other: political religious	church: <i>ekklesia</i>	<i>Michael</i> 386.21

Roman: adjective/adverb

political collective	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i> state rank: <i>axia</i>	<i>Andronikos</i> 554.13–14, 610.11 <i>Andronikos</i> 546.14
political military	unit: various unit: unspec. neut. sing	<i>Michael</i> 144.18–19, 436.19, <i>Andronikos</i> 389.10, 512.10, 528.8, 546.11, 550.1–2 <i>Michael</i> 329.2, <i>Andronikos</i> 13.14, 312.4, 315.7, 332.19, 333.14, 395.15, 524.3, 531.2, 540.8, 544.2, 562.5
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	descent: various ethnic criteria: language, custom other: western Catholic practice	<i>Michael</i> 344.1, <i>Andronikos</i> 290.18 <i>Andronikos</i> 448.14, 612.16 <i>Michael</i> 399.14

Roman: compounds

political collective	<i>philorhomaïos</i>	<i>Michael</i> 71.6, 516.8–9
ethnic	<i>Rhomogenes</i> <i>Rhomaiozontes</i>	<i>Michael</i> 317.15 <i>Michael</i> 145.18

Rhomaïs/Rhomania

<i>Rhomaïs</i> : primarily political	<i>Michael</i> 41.9, 88.14, 96.5, 125.8, 440.6–7, 528.1, <i>Andronikos</i> 57.15, 57.17, 201.17, 208.5, 209.2, 222.16, 448.9
<i>Rhomaïs</i> : political with strong geographical content	<i>Michael</i> 16.4, 135.8, 179.17–18, 210.8, 219.13, 343.15, 344.5, 515.16, <i>Andronikos</i> 308.12, 447.10
Rhomania	<i>Michael</i> 88.17, 343.18, <i>Andronikos</i> 343.19

Barbaros (*all forms*)

Bulgarians	<i>Michael</i> 434.20, 442.15, 443.10, 444.17, 445.11, 446.2, 446.13–14, 447.3, <i>Andronikos</i> 189.5, 190.2, 190.18, 192.7, 406.14, 406.16
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Tatars	<i>Michael</i> 233.1
Turks	<i>Andronikos</i> 190.6, 333.2, 622.16, 622.18, 623.3
Serbs	<i>Andronikos</i> 271.15, 272.11–12, 273.9, 293.17
Catalans	<i>Andronikos</i> 500.18, 512.1, 525.19
Alans	<i>Andronikos</i> 309.14, 310.4, 310.15
English	<i>Andronikos</i> 74.2
Trapezuntine	<i>Michael</i> 520.10
general, unspecified	<i>Andronikos</i> 189.11, 399.13, 458.7

GREGORAS

Roman: plain formula

political collective	[A] 392.13, 399.2, 401.4, 426.11, 439.6, 440.1, 490.10, 494.16, 523.7, 524.5, 527.2, 534.12, 535.4, 543.3, 548.19, 553.10, [B] 746.19, 747.20, 756.11, 759.11, 759.16, 764.18, 810.21, 811.10, 823.16, 832.6, 832.19, 842.20, 842.21–2, 844.9, 871.3, 881.20, 883.17
political/ethnic military: Roman subjects in the army	[A] 434.21–2, 435.3, 435.14, 435.24, 454.21, 484.12, 484.12, 487.22, 527.8, 536.3, 538.6, 539.15, [B] 837.22, 838.14, 838.21–2, 839.1, 857.19
ethnic (i.e. political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	[A] 553.14, [B] 747.11
other: ancient Romans	[B] 752.14

Roman: genitive formula

Political collective	emperor: <i>basileus</i>	[A] 438.16–17, 551.1, [B] 747.1, 844.18
	emperor: <i>psyche</i>	[A] 466.11
	state: <i>arche</i>	[B] 811.6–7
	state: <i>olkas</i>	[A] 476.20
	state: <i>hegemonia</i>	[A] 391.25, 392.1, 400.21, 495.14, 552.20, 553.20, 555.8, [B] 814.13, 817.15
	state: various	[A] 548.8, [B] 810.21, 864.18, 887.2
	state, territory of: various	[A] 430.6, 438.18, 454.13, 457.13, 458.8, 487.18–19, 490.9, 545.2, [B] 746.6, 752.19, 760.14, 810.17, 866.12

	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	[A] 400.10, 401.2, 431.3, 526.15, 532.22, 534.14, [B] 752.24, 753.5, 754.13, 756.7, 761.15, 765.9, 767.17, 811.2, 811.7, 811.23, 816.21
	political affairs: <i>tyche</i>	[A] 399.17, [B] 753.3–4, 817.23
	political affairs: various	[A] 433.5, 532.13, 563.24, [B] 760.3, 761.17–18
	culture: various	[A] 477.11, [B] 901.6
political military	unit: various	[A] 409.22, 433.12, 435.21, [B] 752.15–16, 837.13–14, 838.2, 843.1, 860.12
	materiel: various	[A] 416.22–3, 417.13, 436.20, 438.8, 487.23, 527.5
	other (various)	[B] 764.2, 837.17, 837.22
ethnic	(possibly) descent: <i>iatros</i>	[A] 554.15
	way of life: <i>ethos</i>	[B] 747.3

Roman: adjective

political collective	emperor: <i>hegemonas</i>	[A] 556.12–13
	state: <i>hegemonia</i>	[A] 396.14
	state: <i>genos</i>	[B] 817.1
	state, wealth of: <i>ploutos</i>	[A] 527.7
	state, territory of: various	[A] 426.3–4, 489.19–20, 525.14, 535.12, [B] 747.10
	state: various	[A] 416.20–1, [B] 746.2, 844.21
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	[A] 466.19, [B] 789.7, 841.10–11
political military	unit: various	[A] 436.9, 485.3, 485.12
	materiel: various	[A] 416.21, [B] 859.20, 863.18
ethnic	ethnic criteria: dress	[A] 555.10–11

Barbaros

Turks	[A] 434.7, 434.9, 434.12, 434.15, 435.8, 435.13, 436.8–9, 438.12, 439.1, 458.17, 524.5, 540.4–5, 540.5, 540.15, 540.17, 540.19, 540.24, 541.2, 541.3, 541.10, 541.22, [B] 757.7, 763.6, 764.12–13, 795.7, 836.16, 836.21, 836.24, 837.11
Serbs	[B] 747.2
unspecified northern nomads	[A] 399.3–4

general, unspecific

[A] 399.9, 399.12, [B] 748.19, 811.10

KANTAKOUZENOS

Roman: plain formula

political collective

[II] 311.7, 325.21, 326.1–2, 326.20, 328.21, 335.22, 341.6, 364.23, 365.2, 365.15, 370.13, 370.14, 370.19, 372.12, 372.22, 374.7, 379.2, 380.13, 381.5–6, 381.20, 381.24, 382.7, 382.13, 382.18, 387.13–14, 387.14–15, 388.11, 388.16, 390.13–14, 394.6, 396.21, 397.17, 404.19, 405.17, 416.5, 416.10, 416.12, 428.11, 430.15, 447.18, 450.21, 450.26, 462.8, 462.15, 462.20, 463.7, 464.5, 464.7, 476.7, 476.20, 481.21–2, 482.3, 483.22, 484.11, 487.17, 492.18, 492.22, 495.3, 511.19, 513.10, 514.17, 520.20, 532.1, [IV] 12.3, 12.13, 20.9, 28.15, 34.11, 36.17, 37.8, 39.6, 44.13, 46.22, 57.7, 68.8, 68.14, 69.1, 69.3, 69.4, 70.2, 70.3, 70.21, 76.22, 80.18, 81.6, 83.13, 84.10, 85.1–2, 106.11, 110.15, 111.23, 113.4, 115.23, 117.22, 133.16, 134.8, 143.21, 144.4, 144.7, 144.12–13, 144.23, 145.1, 146.8, 147.15, 149.20, 150.8, 150.13, 152.17, 154.7, 154.8, 154.15, 155.10, 155.16, 155.19, 156.12, 157.20, 158.15, 164.23, 165.10, 168.18, 173.10

political individual

[II] 312.1, 371.20, 384.13, 385.8, 386.10, 387.12, 392.5, 392.24, 405.17, 411.10, 450.8, 487.1, 487.2, 558.1, 559.20, [IV] 53.23, 63.17, 70.9, 71.11–12, 115.14, 126.17, 128.3, 129.18, 156.17, 160.5

political military:
Roman subjects in the
army

[II] 327.11, 341.19, 343.24, 344.8–9, 344.12, 344.14, 344.16, 347.9, 347.12, 347.17, 347.23, 347.24, 348.1, 348.10, 348.13, 348.15, 348.18, 348.21, 349.2, 349.14, 349.15, 349.17, 349.19, 350.6–7, 351.6, 352.9, 354.15, 355.15, 356.21, 357.4, 357.9, 361.15, 362.8, 362.15, 362.18, 377.19, 456.14, 465.5, 466.11, 466.16, 467.19, 467.24, 467.25, 471.21, 471.25, 472.3, 473.1, 474.15, 497.13, 497.21, 506.20, 526.13, 537.19, [IV] 64.25, 65.7, 73.10, 75.4, 75.8, 75.10, 75.12–13, 75.16, 75.20, 114.17, 117.13, 123.13, 123.15, 134.9, 136.7

ethnic (i.e. political
association absent or
markedly subsidiary)

[II] 340.14–15, 340.18, 376.8, 388.23, 396.9, 481.8, 483.9, 488.16, 509.7, [IV] 82.17, 82.17, 82.17, 82.18, 82.19, 83.24–5, 156.5

Roman: genitive formula

political
collective

emperor: *basileus*

[II] 335.21, 336.8–9, 370.12, 468.21, 476.23, 477.18, 509.3, 520.17, 521.3–4, 529.14, 542.12, [IV] 79.10–11, 81.14, 95.18, 105.5, 149.22, 178.20

emperor: *basileuon*

[II] 521.18

empress: *basilis*

[IV] 11.19

	state: <i>hegemonia</i>	[II] 335.19, 386.21, 392.11, 415.13, 424.6–7, 425.9, 430.11, 502.7, 504.6, 504.16, 521.7, [IV] 8.4, 12.5–6, 12.7, 12.12, 20.16–17, 28.6, 29.19–20, 30.10, 32.12, 33.11, 34.11, 40.18, 41.4, 48.5, 63.10, 110.1, 115.6, 118.17, 138.21, 140.2, 143.14, 144.19, 148.2, 149.12, 150.6, 166.20, 179.15–16
	state: <i>basileia</i>	[II] 486.22, 486.25, 487.3, 520.1, 520.22, 521.6, 543.8–9, [IV] 16.5, 17.7, 60.14–15, 79.9, 108.24, 151.7, 173.14–15, 173.18, 176.6
	state: <i>arche</i>	[II] 311.1, 399.17, 407.11, 416.19, [IV] 12.9, 13.1, 13.8–9, 31.9, 108.16, 115.15, 133.22, 149.12
	state: unspec. fem. sing	[II] 323.7, 323.13, 324.13, 325.2, 328.5
	state, territory: <i>ge</i>	[II] 523.13–14, [IV] 138.13, 141.6
	state, territory: <i>polis</i>	[IV] 141.2, 151.24, 158.4–5
	political affairs: <i>pragmata</i>	[II] 391.21, 424.8, 425.17–18, 450.23, [IV] 11.15
	political affairs: unspec. neut. pl	[IV] 42.14
	political affairs: various	[II] 344.22, 393.7, 505.2, 538.20, [IV] 8.1, 21.6, 36.2–3, 77.21, 110.23, 159.24
political military	unit: <i>stratia</i>	[II] 326.17, 327.24, 328.15, 352.9, 352.18, 354.2, 361.10, 362.23, 431.15, 455.4, 496.13–14, 496.18, 502.20, 506.12–13, [IV] 32.11, 114.14, 116.6, 116.10, 137.6
	unit: unspec. neut. sing.	[II] 328.1, 422.17
	soldier/materiel: various	[II] 334.8, 349.9, 358.24, 469.16, 508.7, [IV] 77.18
	other: <i>tolma</i>	[II] 355.12, 469.22
Romans identified by others by reference to their religion		[IV] 95.23, 96.8
non-Byzantine Romans: the western church		[IV] 58.22

Roman: adjective

political military	unit: <i>dynamis</i>	[IV] 32.2
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*Rhomania*political and
geographical

[IV] 97.20

Barbaros (*all forms*)

Turks

[II] 323.24, 325.8, 341.8, 341.II, 341.I3, 341.I7, 341.I9, 341.2I,
342.2, 342.7, 342.II, 343.8, 343.9, 343.20, 344.I2, 345.3, 345.6,
345.I4, 345.2I, 346.6, 346.I8–I9, 346.23, 347.5, 347.7, 347.II,
347.20, 347.25, 348.4, 348.7, 348.8, 349.7, 349.I5, 349.22, 350.2,
350.II, 350.I3, 350.I9, 351.6, 351.8, 351.I0, 351.I2, 351.I7–I8, 352.I4,
352.I6, 352.20, 352.24, 353.I0, 353.I0, 353.I9, 353.I9–20, 353.20–I,
353.24–5, 354.I4, 354.I6, 358.22, 361.I9, 361.25, 362.7, 362.I5,
423.I8–I9, 447.23, 455.I7, 459.20, 459.24, 460.I, 460.3–4, 460.7,
471.7, 471.I4, 471.I6, 471.25, 472.3, 472.25, 482.9, 497.I, 497.I4,
505.I8, 505.22, 506.3, 506.6, 506.20, 507.2, 507.I5, 508.4, 508.I0,
508.I6, 537.I8, 537.2I, 538.2I, [IV] 32.3–4, 32.8–9, 32.I3, 32.22,
37.7–8, 53.2I, 54.2, 54.4, 54.I2, 56.I7, 56.22, 57.5, 57.I4, 57.I5,
64.I7, 64.I8, 64.20, 65.I, 66.24, 67.I, 85.I8, 90.4, III.9, III.I0,
III.I2–I3, III.I5, III.I7, III.22, III.I0, III.I2, III.I9, III.24,
III.25, III.I4, III.8, III.24, III.5, III.6, III.I8, III.I9, III.I8,
III.20, III.I9, III.9–I0, III.6, III.7, III.9, III.8, III.I9, III.7,
III.I3, III.9, III.I5, III.I7, III.22, III.3, III.6, III.II, III.I7,
III.23, III.I2–I3, III.23, III.I, III.23

Bulgars

[II] 328.I2, 461.I6–I7, 504.24

Tatars

[II] 465.I, 465.I9, 466.II, 467.I6

Serbs

[II] 520.3, 520.I5, 521.I2

Mamluks

[IV] III.I6

Angevins

[IV] 90.22–3, 93.23, I00.7, I01.7, I02.I0, I02.20, I03.I7

general, unspecified

[II] 364.24, 393.9, 473.7, [IV] 34.I3, 60.I9

CHRONICLE OF THE MOREA

*Roman: plain formula*political
collective

472, 620, 635, 757, 797, 828, I202, 2567, 2629, 2635, 2662, 2677,
2693, 2764, 2873, 3052, 5122, 5632, 6719, 7132, 7156, 7191, 7193,
7197, 7201, 7998, 8283, 8284, 8349, 8668, 8705, 8781, 8980

political
individual

634, 671, 833, I207, 4186, 5569, 5606, 6697, 6704

political military: the army of the Byzantine/ Nikaian state	717, 1074, 1300, 3709, 3769, 4081, 4319, 4527, 4530, 4768, 4772, 4774, 4777, 4779, 4780, 4795, 4802, 4809, 4843, 4846, 4858, 5057, 5059, 5071, 5084, 5086, 5129, 5278, 5290, 5375, 5382, 5385, 5388, 5399, 5401, 5404, 5406, 5479, 6490, 6605, 6610, 6664, 6669, 6673, 6675, 7212, 8361, 8386, 8383, 9025, 9027, 9029, 9036, 9042, 9055, 9063, 9166, 9127
ethnic (political content absent or negligible)	Roman subjects of Latin states 724, 1138, 1162, 1293, 1424, 1577, 1726, 1744, 1751, 2023, 2028–9, 2041, 2823, 3960, 4018, 7778, 8985 hostile Romans (not political Romans) 1715, 1729, 1732, 1737 untrustworthy Byzantine Romans 727, 758, 794, 1252, 1261, 3932, 3934, 7185 Romans of Epiros 3923 generalised contrast to westerners 1693, 2408, 4944, 5125, 5207, 5234, 6909, 6943, 6963, 7796, 8926, 8318, 8319
religious content primary	769, 789, 790

Roman: genitive formula

political collective	emperor: <i>basileus</i> 48, 448, 1467, 2768, 3046, 5527, 5746, 5822, 6582, 8278, 8357 state: <i>genos</i> 593, 670, 915, 2556, 4155, 4850, 6595 other (various) 3068, 6650, 8412
political military: the army of the Byzantine/ Nikaian state	unit: various 4837, 5379, 5409, 8368, 8374 other (various) 3836, 4823
ethnic (political content absent or negligible)	<i>genos</i> 1297, 2090 <i>nomos</i> 2095 <i>pragmata</i> 2099 <i>mache</i> 1062, 1114, 2539, 5694, 5743

Rhomania

primarily geographical content	529, 646, 841, 979, 1020, 1027, 1037, 1181, 1369, 1372, 1382, 1445, 1855, 1924, 2142, 2502, 2550, 2555, 2662, 2694, 3220, 3384, 3431, 3446, 3693, 4276, 5241, 5763, 6908, 6943, 6954, 7978, 8184, 8260, 8448, 8929, 9050
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the Latin state(s) in the region	2474, 2583, 2596, 2606, 2761, 3255, 5417
territory of Byzantine/Nikaian rule (actual or natural)	59, 61, 1207, 1228, 1282, 3056, 3059, 3107, 3504, 3505, 3518, 3551, 3562, 3572, 3648, 3697, 3761, 3769, 3778, 3973, 4126, 4363, 4641, 5531, 7286, 8794, 8889
other: papal states	5960

Barbaros

Muslims in possession of the Holy Land	42, 90, 6218, 6867
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MANUEL PALAIOLOGOS

Roman: plain formula

political collective	135.23
political individual	205.11
ethnic (political association absent or markedly subsidiary)	161.22

Roman: genitive formula

political collective	state: <i>arche</i>	169.16, 209.12
	emperor: <i>eudaimonia</i>	223.21

Barbaros: *all forms*

Turks	129.20, 131.4, 133.14, 153.18, 153.25, 161.20, 169.8, 171.9, 173.12, 173.13, 173.15, 195.4, 197.9, 199.25, 207.6
ancient Trojans	215.5
general, unspecified	219.16
unspecified, not Turk	153.7

MAZARIS

Roman: genitive formula


political collective	30.17, 42.21, 46.21, 48.26, 82.31, 86.8
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Barbaros: *all forms*

Peloponnesians	64.13, 64.16, 82.18–19
Slavs (probable)	78.17
Turks	82.13
general, linguistic	58.3, 64.12

The origins of the Chronicle of the Morea

Michael Jeffreys has argued that the original versions of the *Chronicle of the Morea* – the Book of the Conquest – was composed in Greek, and that the anti-Roman passages were a part of this original (Jeffreys 1975: 329, 336). His reasoning is, firstly, that the later P is certainly derived from a text which included these passages, since they are not omitted entirely, but rather cut short. Secondly, the scribe of P was not working from H or a derivative of H, for, Jeffreys argues, P agrees at certain points with the French chronicle rather than with H. Thus, P is derived from a text which was the source of the French *Chronicle*, and which had anti-Greek polemic. Jeffreys thus proposes a stemma something like this:




In this view, the French chronicler had anti-Greek polemic in his source, but chose to ignore it.

However, Jeffreys has overestimated the links between P and the French *Chronicle*. Close comparison of the Greek versions reveals that, where H and P differ and can be compared with the French *Chronicle*, it is generally H which is closest to the French version. Jeffreys gives the example of P6143–5, but this is arguably the only significant point of identity between the French account and that in P. In contrast, there are numerous points of

identity between the *Livre* and H. For example, H and the French *Chronicle* share material omitted by P at H1465–7/French 96, H3093–4/French 213 and H3151–72/French 219. Again, H and the French *Chronicle* agree, while P does not, at H1445/French 94, H2479/French 177, H5305/French 362, H6986/French 482, H7300/French 500 and H8383/French 578. As the French *Chronicle* contains none of the lengthy anti-Roman diatribes, this would suggest that its source did not contain them, while all the extant Greek versions go back to a source which did contain the polemic.

Thus there is an alternative stemma, requiring at least one lost Greek text, with polemic and derived from the original Book of the Conquest, which had no polemic and was the source of the *Livre*:



According to this, the scribe of the French *Chronicle* worked from an original Book of the Conquest which did not include the anti-Roman passages, and thus these do not appear in the *Livre*. The Book of the Conquest was also the source of another version (X), which introduced the polemic, and this is the source of both H and P.

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